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The beat generation has been examined as a social movement, literary period, and political 
statement from many different scholarly perspectives. Through the method of rhetorical criticism 
I tease out an implicit theory of rhetoric from the writings of the principal beat generation 
founders – namely Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac. Offering a rhetorical read of their major 
work along with analysis of their letters and journals I offer a theory of rhetoric from both 
thinkers. In the early chapters I discuss the history of poetic discourses and rhetoric to determine 
the connection between literary texts and rhetorical theory. I establish the rhetorical, cultural, and 
social environment of the post-war United States and its interpretation and assessment by both 
Kerouac and Ginsberg. I then establish linkages between Kerouac and the rhetorical sense of 
kairos, establishing his contribution to the beat theory by analyzing On the Road. Kerouac’s 
contribution to beat rhetoric is developed through examination of the timely and appropriate. 
Next I turn attention to Allen Ginsberg and his poem “Howl” to demonstrate his implicit theory 
that the limits of the human body are a rhetorical commonplace. Ginsberg’s contribution is 
established as finding great power of rhetorical invention in the limits of the human being’s 
embodied condition. In the final two sections, I show applications of this rhetorical theory 
through examining Diane Di Prima’s Memoirs of a Beatnik and Amiri Baraka’s “Somebody 
Blew Up America” for elements of applied beat rhetorical theory, concluding that elements of 
the beat rhetoric are present in both.  
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1.0   INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL BEATS, BEAT RHETORIC 
The singular force of the beat writers is manifest in the fact that they did not merely 
reflect the audience of American Bohemia; they substantially altered that audience, and 
in so doing they liberated and clarified motives until then only imperfectly realized.  The 
intensity of reaction to their work indicates that the motives embodied in Kerouac’s On 
the Road and The Subterraneans strike some sensitive hidden nerve that is more 
important than, before the appearance of those works, many had cared to admit.1
 
 
For Thomas Parkinson, a Berkeley literature professor writing in 1961, the value of the 
beat writers is rhetorical, though he does not explicitly say so.  That is, the single most important 
aspect of them is that they altered the audience rather than reflected what the audience already 
wanted.  Parkinson’s question opens the beat writers to investigation using a rhetorical lens. If 
the beats touched on “motives” that were present yet unrealized, it could be said that the beats 
achieved one of the ultimate aims of rhetoric – defined by Kenneth Burke as 
“consubstantiality.”2
 What is the rhetorical perspective? Parkinson does not directly invoke rhetoric as such.  
However, Parkinson’s approach – considering the “motives” that the beat writers “clarified” in 
their audience – puts Parkinson’s appreciation of the beats in line with Kenneth Burke’s 
appreciation of rhetoric. “Whether they represented an entire generation or a spasm of revulsion, 
the beat writers attained symbolic status, as did the until-then little-remarked Bohemian 
communities of New York’s Greenwich Village and San Francisco’s North Beach,” he writes, 
 
                                               
1Thomas Parkinson.“The Beat Writers: Phenomenon or Generation,” in Beat Down to Your Soul, 
ed. Ann Charters (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 458. 
2 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), 21. 
 2 
focusing on the beat writers as achieving a symbolic presence through their action of writing.3   
Professor Parkinson’s attribution of symbolic status to this group means they could stand in 
synecdochally for groups of people who felt there was little place for them in contemporary 
society.   As Kenneth Burke begins his investigation into the principles of rhetoric, he examines 
Milton’s poem “Sampson,” and concludes that the poem is best understood as “literature for 
use,” which “could give pretexts for admitting a motive which, if not so clothed or complicated, 
if confronted in its simplicity, would have been inadmissible.”4
The rhetorical perspective, besides including motive and symbolic attribution, also 
considers audience as a central element. Parkinson does so as well when he refers to the way the 
media handled the beats:  “When the San Francisco columnist Herb Caen dubbed the members 
of current Bohemia ‘beatniks,’ the derisive appellation stuck.  Beatnik life became a subject of 
general interest, and that special nexus of jazz, Buddhism, homosexuality, drugs and squalor was 
graphed and discussed in a wide range of media that reached a large audience.”
 The beat writers accomplish this 
by offering poetic works that clothe and complicate – or in Parkinson’s term, “clarify” the 
“imperfectly realized motives” of the bohemians. This symbolic appreciation is one way to think 
about the beat writers as beat rhetors. Burke’s “literature for use” idea quickly develops into an 
addendum to the classical, traditional conception of rhetoric as mere persuasion based on rational 
principles. 
5
                                               
3 Thomas Parkinson, “The Beat Writers,” 449. 
 Here Parkinson 
argues that the beat writers have been established as a collection of the undesirable elements of 
American society. At the same time, Parkinson attends to audience again, perhaps hammering 
4 Burke, Rhetoric, 5. 
5 Parkinson, “The Beat Writers,” 449. 
 3 
home for his audience a persuasive reason that they should be studied as writers. Audience, like 
symbolic exchange, is another way to think about the beat writers. 
 Parkinson identifies the importance of the beat writers in articulating not only a vision 
for their audience, but the audience itself. The two interpretations Parkinson raised above, as to 
whether the Beats are an “entire generation” – that is, the beat writers are the source of 
inspiration toward radical politics - or a “spasm of revulsion” – a group that for a moment turned 
totally against the center of its society’s values - is a question of evaluation.  Not an unusual 
question at all when considering the value of literature. But the way Parkinson approaches the 
question’s importance is through the audience. For Parkinson, the beat writers are worth careful 
study since they exerted influence over nearly an entire generation, and at the same time served 
as symbols for that generation’s attitude.  Parkinson’s writing resonates with Kenneth Burke, 
who considers poetry “symbolic action” because it is “the dancing of an attitude.”6
Writing a half century later, Jonah Raskin makes a similar claim about the work of Allen 
Ginsberg:  
  For Burke, 
poetics is a type of action, not description, and it is the symbolic action of poetics that allows 
humans to make, be and do.   
The 1955 Six Gallery reading was bohemianism at its best.  It was something ‘brave and 
honest’ – to borrow Tennessee Williams’s phrase – in the midst of a society that seemed 
cowardly and insincere, and it marked the start of the cultural revolution that would 
sweep across America in the 1960s . . The Six Gallery reading was living proof that the 
First Amendment hadn’t been destroyed by McCarthyism and the committees that 
investigated artists, playwrights, Hollywood directors, and TV screenwriters.  In America 
in the twentieth century there was no bigger bombshell than the Six Gallery reading.7
 
 
                                               
6 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, Third ed. 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 8-9. 
7 Jonah Raskin, American Scream:Allen Ginsberg’s Howl and the Making of the Beat 
Generation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), 6-7. 
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Although hyperbolic if considered from the historical perspective, the potential for a rhetorical 
reading is rather clear. Raskin’s hyperbole is possible only because he reads Ginsberg’s poem as 
a response.  Seen as part of a larger dialogue or argument with the values of society, Ginsberg’s 
poem becomes a marker, a similar articulation of a motive nobody seemed willing or able to 
express until this moment. 
Reading Parkinson and Raskin together we find ample exigence for a rhetorical reading 
of the beats. The idea that the beats were valuable for putting into words a feeling, attitude, or 
sensibility of the time indicates the presence of the rhetorical. As Burke states, “Rhetoric as the 
speaker’s attempt to identify himself favorably with his audience then becomes so transformed 
that the work may seem to have been written under an esthetic of pure ‘expression,’ without 
regard for communicative appeal.”8
 However, Parkinson makes even further revision in the scope of the value of the beat 
writers. Not all beat writing is valuable. Parkinson distinguishes the terms “Beat” and “Beatnik:”  
“The term ‘beat’ I take to be descriptive, and its primary reference is to a group of writers, 
especially, who participate in certain common attitudes and pursue common literary aims. . . The 
‘beatnik,’ on the other hand, is either not an artist or an incompetent and nonproductive one . . . 
 Well written rhetoric may appear to be expression of an idea 
or emotion that pre-exists the moment of its constitution. Rhetoric makes the communicative 
appeal appear to be expression, thereby increasing its persuasive appeal. This is apparent in the 
fact that two writers examining beat texts with fifty years between them arrive at the same sort of 
opinion regarding the importance and power of the works – they name or clarify something not 
quite articulated among people, but present. 
                                               
8 Burke, Rhetoric, 37. 
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He may write an occasional ‘poem,’ but he has no literary ambitions.”9
Parkinson’s assessment of the beat writers is designed to draw the attention of the literary 
critic. But it also calls for attention from the rhetorical critic. Concerns of audience, symbolic 
value, and persuasive efficacy are shared by both literary and rhetorical criticism. The rhetorical 
critic differs from the literary critic because he or she seeks to judge the effectiveness of the 
discourse in gaining audience assent at the specific time and place of its distribution.  Literary 
criticism, generally speaking, attends to a more internal looking manner in evaluating the work, 
although sometimes they do consider audience.  Parkinson tends to focus entirely on audience as 
a reason to attend more critically to these beat writers. 
  The beat writers have 
persuaded many to try to produce poetic texts. Not many literary movements in history can be 
evaluated on such a standard.  It might be important to examine the beat writers not as offering a 
product – poetry and literature for example – and perhaps also offering ways of making 
connections with words.  The beat writers’ influence might be in offering more than just good 
texts, but how to craft connection between human beings. This indicates there might be an 
implicit, or latent theory of rhetoric within the beat texts.  
It is a strange move for a literature professor to make. Although concerned with audience, 
in the height of New Criticism a literature professor should attend to the Beats’ texts instead of 
representations of who these people were.  Further, popular media portrayed them as without 
positive value. Since the launch of Sputnik happened to coincide with the rise of the term “beat,” 
Herb Caen felt that “Beatnik” was more appropriate to describe these strange people who seemed 
                                               
9 Parkinson, "The Beat Writers: Phenomenon or Generation," 452. 
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to be from space.10
Suggesting the rhetorical criticism of literature is nothing new. As Brian Vickers has 
pointed out, rhetorical devices in modernist writing such as Joyce gives a large amount of literary 
force.
  Parkinson’s starting point in offering an interpretation of the Beats could 
also be read as an ending point. 
11 Thomas Sloane has used rhetorical criticism to locate the moment in history where 
discourse shifted from highlighting controversy and argument to transmitting truths discovered 
in philosophy and science.12 Rhetorical criticism in general has turned its attention to many 
objects of criticism, from storefronts in Pasadena to hate crimes – a far remove from appraising 
speeches.13 Modern attempts to theorize rhetorical criticism see it as a fluid act that serves as an 
argument itself – or a text that one could critique and has obligation to do so once it is written.14
 In this study I will perform rhetorical criticism on texts written by beat authors. I hope to 
reveal new understandings about how the texts work and what they do in a Burkean sense, but 
what I strive to add is the development of a beat rhetorical theory by attending closely to their 
 
The utility of rhetorical criticism to reveal and elucidate perspectives on meaning forged from 
encounters with a variety of texts means that rhetorical criticism of key beat texts will reveal new 
understandings of the beat writers’ contributions. 
                                               
10 Herb Caen, “Pocketful of Notes” San Francisco Examiner, April 2, 1958. 
11 Brian Vickers “Rhetoric and the Modern Novel” in Craig Kallendorf, Ed. Landmark Essays in 
Rhetoric and Literature, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1999). 
12 Thomas O. Slone Donne, Milton and the End of Humanist Rhetoric. (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1985). 
13 See Greg Dickinson “Memories for Sale: Nostalgia and the Construction of Identity in Old 
Pasadena” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83, 1 (1997); Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki. "The Politics 
of Negotiating Public Tragedy: Media Framing of the Matthew Shepard Murder." Rhetoric & 
Public Affairs 5, 3 (Fall 2002): 483-505. 
14 See McKerrow, Raymie E. 1989. "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis." Communication 
Monographs 56, no. 2: 91., and also Ono, K.A., and J.M. Sloop. 1992. "Commitment to telos--a 
sustained critical rhetoric." Communication Monographs 59, no. 1: 48-60. 
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works. I think that Parkinson’s observations, specifically how audiences were driven to attempt 
to create their own poetic works, reveals the presence of at least an implicit theory of appropriate 
human communication – what I define as a rhetoric. The beat writers are not valuable for only 
creating poetry and novels, but an alternative way of communicating, one they felt was more 
appropriate to the position of human beings in the time and place they were writing. The beat 
writers – to re-address Parkinson’s question of whether they were “spasm” or “generation” 
becomes much more clearly “generation” if the beat writers are considered the founders of a 
rhetorical theory that offers what they saw as a much more appropriate way to interact with 
others. 
In this introduction I will explain what I mean by rhetoric and communication, as well as 
give more detail about the ideas of Kenneth Burke that I will draw upon for my study of the 
beats. The title of this dissertation – “Beating Rhetoric” – has a number of dimensions of 
meaning to it, and I chose it because of this depth. Jack Kerouac’s naming of the generation also 
contains this plurality of meanings in one term – and might be exactly why he chose to call the 
movement beat.  As Kerouac explains: “The word ‘beat’ originally meant poor, down and out, 
deadbeat, on the bum, sad, sleeping in subways. Now that the word is belonging officially it is 
being made to stretch to include people who do not sleep in subways but have a certain new 
gesture, or attitude, which I can only describe as a new more. ‘Beat Generation’ has simply 
become the slogan or label for a revolution in manners in America.”15
                                               
15 Jack Kerouac, “The Origins of the Beat Generation” Playboy 6, 6 (June 1959): 31, 42. 
 Kerouac traces the title’s 
meaning from its origins with a particular group of people to the more “current” understanding 
of the term as something more symbolic. Here Kerouac, like Parkinson, connects the beat 
movement to the realm of human action. Parkinson discussed motive, Kerouac discusses attitude.  
 8 
By defining beat as a “new attitude” or a “more,” Kerouac skirts Burke’s rhetorical theory, 
where symbolic action is the “dancing of an attitude,”16 and motives are “shorthand words for 
situations.”17
Kerouac continuously and repetitively defines “beat” in the terms of symbolic action, or 
something “done” not something in a “state.”  “Being bugged is not being beat. You may be 
withdrawn, but you don’t have to be mean about it. Beatness is not a form of tired old criticism. 
It is a form of spontaneous affirmation. What kinda culture you gonna have with everybody’s 
gray faces saying, ‘I don’t think that’s quite correct?’”
 
18 Placing beat as a form of affirmation 
opposed to the old criticism is directly tied to the holiness of the term. “Beat doesn’t mean tired, 
or bushed, so much as it means beato, the Italian for beatific: to be in a state of beatitude, like St. 
Francis, trying to love all life, trying to be utterly sincere with everyone, practicing endurance, 
kindness, cultivating joy of heart.”19
                                               
16 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1941), 9. 
 “Beat” as a practice that is continuously and spontaneously 
in process places it in the realm of action, and perhaps even Kerouac’s writing about beatness is 
an act of affirmation in the same vein, done through the symbolic attribution of motives to a 
particular person, group of people, or, going even further, carving out a space for people to 
identify with and inhabit in order to become consubstantial with his ideas. That ancient rhetorical 
concept of ethos can be translated as “dwelling” which carries with it the sense of a comfortable, 
familiar place. “The ethos of rhetoric makes use of our inventive and symbolic capacity to 
construct dwelling places that are stimulating and aesthetically, psychologically, socially, and 
17 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), 31. 
18 Jack Kerouac, “Lamb, No Lion” in Donald Allen, ed. Good Blonde and Others (San 
Francisco: Grey Fox Press, 1993), 51. 
19 Kerouac, “Lamb, No Lion,” 51. 
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perhaps theologically instructive.”20
The idea of rhetoric carving out a space is also discussed by Burke as falling under 
traditional rhetorical ideas: “And both Aristotle and Cicero consider audiences purely as 
something given. The extreme heterogeneity of modern life, however, combined with the nature 
of modern postal agencies, brings up another kind of possibility: the systematic attempt to carve 
out an audience, as the commercial rhetorician looks not merely for persuasive devices in 
general, but for the topics that will appeal to the particular ‘income group’ most likely to be 
interested in his product, or able to buy it.”
 Imperfectly realized motives can perhaps be fleshed out by 
articulating a comfortable place from where one can express these motives.  
21
Kerouac’s definitions of “beat” serve to further clarify and underscore his sense of what 
beat is. What we are left with is a sense that “beat” is more of a shorthand for a situation, as 
Burke put it, or a motive for a way of being that one can identify with. “Beat,” read this way 
 Of course Burke is pointing out the application of 
rhetoric to sales in particular, but his general point is that an audience in the modern era is not 
necessarily a given, observable assembly at a particular place in time. An audience can be 
present through identification with a particular attitude or motive, as this example of targeting 
product advertising to those of a certain economic class demonstrates. What is most important 
here is the replacement of the pre-existing audience with one that can be brought into existence 
by the rhetor’s “calling out” of the audience by perhaps, in Parkinson’s words, “substantially 
altering” an audience by “clarifying” their motives that were “imperfectly realized.” Calling 
attention to and clarifying the motives of an audience is what Kerouac may be doing with his 
many clarifications and definitions of beat. 
                                               
20 Michael J. Hyde, “Rhetorically, We Dwell” in Michael J. Hyde, Ed. The Ethos of Rhetoric 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xiii. 
21 Burke, Rhetoric, 64. 
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becomes rhetorical, and the question of how rhetorical theory and criticism can access and 
elucidate alternative understandings of beat appears.  In the next section, I introduce some of the 
concepts and theories that I argue are necessary for the articulation and understanding of beat 
rhetoric.  
Jack Kerouac addressed what he felt were misconceptions or misunderstandings of the 
phrase “beat generation” in his 1958 Playboy article, “Origins of the Beat Generation.” 
Kerouac’s argumentative strategy in this essay is one of association – lining up the idea of a 
“beat generation” with seemingly innocuous or even pleasant figures from 1940s popular culture: 
“It goes back to the inky ditties of old cartoons (Krazy Kat with the irrational brick) – to Laruel 
and Hardy in the Foreign Legion – to Count Dracula and his smile to Count Dracula shivering 
and hissing back before the Cross . . .”22
Yet it was as a Catholic, it was not at the insistence of any of these ‘niks’ and certainly 
not with their approval either, that I went one afternoon to the church of my childhood 
(one of them), Ste. Jenne d’Arc in Lowell, Mass., and suddenly with tears in my eyes and 
had a vision of what I must have really meant with ‘Beat’ anyhow when I heard the holy 
silence in the church (I was the only one in there, it was five P.M., dogs were barking 
outside, children yelling, the fall leaves, the candles were flickering alone just for me), 
the vision of the word beat as being to mean beatific.
 But even among these pop culture “roots” of beat 
thought lurk the holy dimensions of beat that Kerouac always returned to. In this essay Kerouac 
attempts to divide “beat” from the criminal and align it with the “acceptable,” as this passage 
demonstrates: 
23
 
 
Kerouac departs from the busy, party atmosphere associated with “beat” and reduces the 
meaning to solitude, alone in a church meditating and listening to the world go by. There’s the 
indication of solitude and reflection as central to beat – as well as the obvious holy sanctity of the 
                                               
22 Kerouac, “Origins,” 32. 
23 Kerouac, “Origins,” 42. 
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church. At the same time, the position that Kerouac occupies allows him to reflect and think 
about the world outside and perceive it differently, from a position outside of “normal” society. 
Placing beat’s meaning in the center of the church and in solitary reflection of a devout religious 
man could be read as an attempt to create a meaning for beat that is more central to society’s 
values. 
Later in the same piece, Kerouac explicitly denounces interpretations of beat that 
associate it with criminal behavior: “When a murder, a routine murder took place in North beach, 
they labeled it a Beat generation slaying although in my childhood I’d been famous as an 
eccentric in my block for stopping the younger kids from throwing rocks at the squirrels, for 
stopping them from frying snakes in cans or trying to blow up frogs with straws.”24
The study of rhetoric, according to Robert Hariman, is the study of how status is 
attributed to discourse.  “We determine what any of the arts of language is by stating how 
important it is.  We define dialectic, or poetics, or dialogue or investigative reporting by both 
saying what it is and where it is in some social order.”
 Kerouac 
embodies the definition of beat in these lines, connecting his own attitudes and actions as the 
living definition of beat in order to prove that violence could never be a part of it. He attempts to 
take beat back to its origins by re-defining beat as his own life, and his life events as the limits of 
what beat can mean. Kerouac tries to move the definition of beat to something of higher status in 
all of these examples – from the criminal margins of society to something central to spirituality 
and kindness. 
25
                                               
24 Kerouac, “Origins,” 42. 
  The term “beat” seems subjected to this 
sort of negotiation in Kerouac’s essay. Instead of defining beat is in terms of textual production, 
25 Robert Hariman, "Status, Marginality and Rhetorical Theory," Quarterly Journal of Speech 
72, no 1 (February 1986): 38-54. 40. 
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or grammatical considerations, beat is defined (or misunderstood) by association with societal 
elements – murder or kindness. The relegation of a type of discourse is a naming of its role and 
therefore its potential power in society: “[T]he attribution of status activates a pattern of thinking 
. . . it is the marking of symbols according to their centrality or marginality to the society of the 
thinker.  And this marking gives the symbols their power within the society.”26
The beat writers provide other moments where one can see the attribution of status to the 
marginal.  In 1960, poet Gary Snyder wrote “Notes on the Beat Generation” to introduce Beat 
poetry to a Japanese audience:  “What we had discovered, or rediscovered, was that the 
imagination has a free and spontaneous life of its own, that it can be trusted, that what flows 
from a spontaneous mind is poetry – and that this is more basic and more revolutionary than any 
political program . . “
  This pattern of 
thinking, according to Hariman, can be understood by investigating the markings one group or 
society attributes to various symbols. The location of discourses in society provides attribution of 
value.  
27
What is ‘new’ about the new American poetry?  First, what is new about the poets?  The 
most striking thing is their detachment form the official literary world. . . They earn their 
livings in a wide variety of ways, but feel their real work to be poetry –requiring no 
justification . . . They have kept out (or been kept out) of the comfortable middle-class 
life in America . . . they have rejected the academic and neoformalist poetry of the late 
thirties and forties.
 Snyder identifies the Beat poetic production as the result of a pure, 
unmediated thought.  He goes on to identify the characteristics of what he calls the “new 
American poetry”: 
28
 
 
                                               
26 Hariman, "Status, Marginality and Rhetorical Theory," 45. 
27 Gary Snyder, "Notes on the Beat Generation," in Beat Down to Your Soul, ed. Ann Charters 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 517. 
28 Snyder, "Notes on the Beat Generation," 522. 
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The historical accuracy of Snyder’s statement is of little interest – what is important here 
is the framing of the poet as someone who, through denial of the comforts of average life, has 
realized an alternative occupation. The attribution of marginality on the middle-class trappings of 
status has come with it the counter of attributing status to the marginal, whether it’s a marginal 
style or marginal existence.  Snyder’s construction of the “new poetry” is one beyond style or 
method, and refers instead to the attribution of status to poetry as a discourse by its practitioners. 
Poetry is, for Snyder, “a combination of the highest activity of trained intellect and the 
deepest insight of the intuitive, instinctive, or emotional mind, ‘all the faculties’ . . . It is sensitive 
awareness to things as they are . . . it is history, and most of all it is Magic, the power to 
transform by symbol and metaphor, to create a world with forms or to destroy a world with 
chaos.”29
Kenneth Burke, thinking about the importance of the teaching of rhetoric in its 
argumentative and persuasive sense also invoked the metaphor of magic when discussing the 
power of language: 
  Snyder assesses the power and importance of Beat poetic production by a metaphor to 
spellcraft, or magic.  Snyder works in contradictions through his entire definition – the new poet 
is a creator and a destroyer, yet bound by history.  He or she is a builder of forms or the usher of 
chaos, but still sees things as they are.  The poet as a powerful creator or destroyer of worlds is 
rooted to the poet’s one action – writing or speaking. By comparing the poet to the wizard, 
Snyder’s metaphor of Magic must refer to language.  And it is through language one attributes 
status and marginality to the world, ordering it. One can read Snyder’s capitalization of “Magic” 
as a reference to what he is doing rhetorically in his definition, attributing status to the marginal 
by metaphor to the sorcerer. 
                                               
29 ———, "Notes on the Beat Generation," 522. 
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The magical decree is implicit in all language; for the mere act of naming an object or 
situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something-
other.  Hence, I think that an attempt to eliminate magic, in this sense, would involve us 
in the elimination of vocabulary itself as a way of sizing up reality.  Rather, what we may 
need is correct magic, magic whose decrees about the naming of real situations is the 
closest possible approximation to the situation named.30
 
 
Burke distinguishes between correct magic and an implicit “bad” magic, one that eliminates 
rhetoric’s role in the apprehension of situation, motive and context.  Burke’s correct magic refers 
to his larger project of dramatism – a complete philosophy of the human person that would see 
human action as governed by motives in given situations.  Burke’s “good”magic would be the 
pedagogy that might fit with Snyder’s “new poetry” – teaching a sizing up or down of the world 
that approximates situations, but also attributes values, either constructive or destructive.  But 
through this very metaphor, Snyder casts attribution of status as well as marginality upon his 
own key term.  For if only a select few can recognize the importance of poetry in their lives as a 
center term, what happens to those who can recognize the status of this act of recognition? From 
this we might get the beat writers that Parkinson doesn’t care for, those who scribble some bad 
verse at a coffee shop and think they got it. 
For both Snyder and Parkinson, the Beat text is more than just a poem, it is a naming of 
what poetry is, and how that poetry fits into and functions for readers and writers.  This poetry 
and the poet constitute a system for naming, approximating, judging and creating situations.  The 
“magic” of the new poetry, the ability to constitute and transform audiences, create and eliminate 
belief and perspective, as well as symbolically fine-tune attitudes and motives are also the 
functions of rhetoric.  Kenneth Burke’s theories come close when in his criticism of Milton’s 
“Sampson” he claims the poem is, “almost a kind of witchcraft, a wonder-working spell by a 
                                               
30 Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form, 4. 
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cantankerous old fighter-priest who would slay the enemy in effigy,” and is no “sheer poetic 
exercise” – Milton’s poem serves as “literature for use,” it is doing something, but “wholly in the 
order of ritual and magic.”31
With this in mind, it seems evident that even from within their own ranks the Beat writers 
were assessing themselves from a rhetorical perspective. Seen this way, the Beat writers are 
offering to their readers not only a “magical decree,” naming reality, but a “spell book” – a way 
of becoming magic users via the symbolic incantations and actions of their writing. As Jane 
Blakenship points out, “‘magic’ and ‘mystery’ can be considered synoptic terms around (under) 
which we can place much of Kenneth Burke’s work, particularly his theory of ‘entitlement’ and 
his treatment of ‘social mystery.’”
 What Burke is trying to do is recover rhetoric for everyday use, and 
so are the beat writers – they approach the project from different directions. 
32
In this study I will give rhetorical criticism of key beat texts.  My rhetorical criticism will 
be primarily informed by the work of Kenneth Burke, since my argument will attempt to connect 
the trajectory of Burke with the trajectory of the beats in regard to rhetoric.  While the beat 
writers I criticize are not overtly proclaiming the construction of rhetorical theory, I argue that 
implicit in their claims is a rhetorical theory which can be articulated.  I will argue that the Beats 
developed a rhetoric in order to attend to eminent changes in communication styles and strategies 
that they felt were bad.  Some of these “bad” modes of human interaction, the beats felt, were 
 The idea of magic or incantation as a metaphor for poetic 
practice and a metaphor for Burke’s work as a whole is a connection that the beats share with 
Burke in the sense that both believe words have the power to create something from nothing. 
                                               
31 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), 5. 
32 Jane Blankenship, “‘Magic’ and ‘Mystery’ in the Works of Kenneth Burke” in Herbert W. 
Simons and Tervor Melia, Eds. The Legacy of Kenneth Burke (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1989), 128. 
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related to a rise in consumerism as well as limitations to personal expression brought about by 
the cold war. “This shared experience for the Beat writers was historical and political, based on 
the tumultuous changes of their times: the historic events that began with America’s dropping the 
atomic bomb on Japan to bring World War II to an end, and the political ramifications of the 
ensuing Cold War and wave of anti-Communist hysteria that followed in the United States in the 
late 1940s and the 1950s.”33 There were many economic changes in society, such as the shift 
toward a consumer culture precipitated by the need to replace a wartime economy.34 But even in 
the light of all of these political and social events, the beats were influenced by what they read, 
and also by a sense of community: “But the real key to tranquility would be found in a gentle 
tolerance toward all one’s neighbors, even the so-called criminals like Neal [Cassidy], who if 
treated with sufficient kindness would turn out to be merely backward saints. As Jack and 
Holmes envisioned him, the great American of the future would be ‘the hitchhiking Negro saint’ 
– an apotheosis of the Americans currently most despised.”35
The beat rhetoric – or “Beating Rhetoric” as I have titled this dissertation – is as much a 
return as it is a beginning. The beats can be seen as returning to a sense of rhetoric closely related 
  John Clellon Holmes and Jack 
Kerouac had conceived of a rhetorical subject that would “embody” their claims for a different 
mode of human interaction needed for the times. Attention to the neighborly seems strange as a 
central point for the beat generation, but it makes a lot more sense if the beat generation is read 
as offering a rhetorical theory rather than political rebellion. 
                                               
33 Anne Charters, “Variations on a Generation” in Anne Charters, Ed. The Portable Beat Reader 
(New York: Penguin, 1992), xvii. 
34 See Ewen, Stewart. Captains of Consciousness : Advertising and the Social Roots of the 
Consumer Culture. (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1977. 
35 Gerald Nicosia, Memory Babe: A Critical Biography of Jack Kerouac (New York: Grove 
Press, 1983), 253. 
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to poetics. I will proceed with a rhetorical criticism of four figures – Jack Kerouac, Allen 
Ginsberg, Diane Di Prima, and Amiri Baraka. The first half of the study is on two “founding” 
figures – Kerouac and Ginsberg. I selected them for this study because of their concern for 
human beings as communicative beings. Other figures of the beat movement, such as William 
Burroughs or Gregory Corso – do not express such a concern in the same way that Kerouac and 
Ginsberg do. William Burroughs, reflecting on Jack Kerouac after his passing, draws the same 
conclusion by distinguishing Kerouac’s project from his own: “What are writers, and I will 
confine the use of this term to writers of novels, trying to do? They are trying to create a universe 
in which they have lived or where they would live to live. To write it, they must go there and 
submit to condition that they may not have bargained for. Sometimes, as in the case of Fitzgerald 
and Kerouac, the effect produced by a writer is immediate, as if a generation were waiting to be 
written.”36
                                               
36 William Burroughs, “Remembering Jack Kerouac” in Anne Charters, ed. Beat Down to Your 
Soul: What Was the Beat Generation? (New York: Penguin, 2001), 63. 
 Echoing the sentiments of both Burke and Parkinson, Burroughs points to Kerouac’s 
writing as articulating a place or “world” in which a generation either takes place or discovers its 
own existence, as if it were waiting for the words. In the upcoming chapters dedicated to their 
thought and relationship to communication and rhetoric, I examine essays, letters, and journal 
entries that prove an interest in communication and rhetoric as a motive for their poetic and 
literary output. The second half of the dissertation focuses on two writers who applied the beat 
rhetoric but toward different ends. Diane Di Prima uses the beat rhetoric to construct an alternate 
position for women in the mid-20th century, using it to blur and interrogate conceptions of 
sexuality, body, and gender.  Amiri Baraka, writing at the beginning of the 21st century, uses the 
beat rhetoric to connect the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to a larger pattern of atrocity 
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and violence perpetuated by hierarchy and greed. In the end, this study provides a picture of the 
beat rhetoric, both in theory and in application, and in doing so hopes to present a new 
perspective on the beats as engaged with and in rhetoric. 
 As I will argue in chapter 1, the beat rhetoric is a return in some ways to the times when 
the relation between poetic and rhetoric was not strictly defined. By going back by assuming the 
role of poetic as a way of making the world for oneself, the beats are directly invoking ancient 
roles for the poetic, roles that have much more to do with what we might call rhetoric today. 
Examining the root of the “poetic” takes us to the word poesis, which translates to “making.”  In 
this sense, the beats could be seen as “beating” rhetoric back into its ancient form, or perhaps I 
am using the beats to beat out of rhetoric these dust clouds of poetic that are inside of it.  It could 
also be read as the “beat” of rhetoric that has always been with it, and perhaps is the heart of the 
rhetorical – the aesthetic dimension. Although contemporary rhetorical studies has a strong line 
of focus on the reasoned and rational production of discourse, it could be argued that there is 
nothing but an aesthetic element present – “Orators summon appearances that are not and can 
never be ‘complete’ descriptions of phenomenal being –their speech amounts to an imposition of 
aesthetic form on being. This aesthetic form is not a poor image of the true reality of the 
world.”37
                                               
37 Steve Whitson and John Poulakos, “Nietzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 79 2 (May 1993): 131-145, 137. 
 Our meanings, in other words, do not come from separate reality, but are carved from 
phenomena that we perceive. We articulate this reality to each other and agree and disagree on 
these articulations. The beat rhetoric inserts itself into this by arguing for a different way of 
articulating these attributions. 
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After tracing some of the relationship between poetics and rhetoric, I examine some of 
the works of Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg to elucidate the foundations of what I call the 
beat rhetoric.  As the heart of the theory, both writers could be said to provide the “heartbeat” of 
the rhetorical theory. Kerouac, often called the father of the Beat Generation, wrote the novel On 
the Road (1958) and was met with popular and critical acclaim.  Allen Ginsberg’s 1956 poem 
“Howl” – performed in San Francisco and published by City Lights Books – created a swarm of 
controversy and praise culminating in an indecency trial.  Both of these men, through journal 
entries and letters, as well as interviews and other writings, display concern and frustration with 
the modes of communication and rhetoric that dominate their culture.  This frustration, I argue, 
can be seen as an exigence for their literary production.  Within their literary output are elements 
of concern with rhetoric and communication. I use the two most well-known works of Ginsberg 
and Kerouac – “Howl” and On the Road – in order to demonstrate the presence of these 
theoretical concerns. I argue through criticism that these concerns can be read as a rhetorical 
theory. At the end of the first portion of the dissertation, the beat rhetoric will be established 
from these critical insights. 
The second half of the study focuses on Diane DiPrima and Amiri Baraka which show 
applications of the beat rhetorical theory.  Much beat scholarship can easily become biographical 
celebration of the individual who wrote the text, or become attempts to locate the trauma in the 
author’s life responsible for such an output. Although biographies and histories are important, I 
attend more to the texts themselves in this study in order to articulate what I see as a latent 
theory.  Since the theory is latent in Kerouac’s and Ginsberg’s work, much of it develops after its 
initial appearance.  Di Prima serves as an interesting case study in this vein since she uses the 
beat rhetoric in her writing.  Furthermore, DiPrima’s status as a woman and her engagement with 
 20 
beat rhetoric help to complicate the claim that the beat writers were a misogynist, temporary 
phenomenon centered around a particular group of young disaffected men.38
Finally, Amiri Baraka’s recent poem “Somebody Blew up America” (2001) is 
investigated in the conclusion as a barometer of the beat rhetoric’s status today.. Baraka has had 
a long history with the beat generation writers, responding to early critics of the movement.
  In this section, I 
analyze Di Prima’s Memiors of a Beatnik to see how she invokes the theory in order to craft her 
own arguments. 
39
My argument will proceed through six chapters. The arc of these chapters is to move 
from a general examination of rhetoric and the rhetorical environment of the beats to specific 
criticism of their work. The method for this study will be to use rhetorical criticism to examine 
beat texts for the presence of latent theoretical assumptions. Once these assumptions are 
elucidated, I will move to the criticism of the application in order to show how the rhetorical 
theory works in practice.  
  
Amira Baraka has adopted a number of philosophies and themes in his work over the years, but I 
will argue that he relies on the beat rhetoric to make his claims in this poem. I am not trying to 
argue that Baraka is consistently “beat” in his work, only that in this poem we find evidence that 
the beat theory still has salience for the contemporary moment. 
                                               
38 For the most recent deployment of this critique, see Manuel Luis Martinez, Countering the 
Counterculture: Rereading Postwar American Dissent from Jack Kerouac to Tomas Rivera 
(Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 2003).For additional complications to this kind of 
criticism of the beats, see Nancy M. Grace and Rona C. Johnson, Eds. Breaking the Rule of 
Cool: Interviewing and Reading Women Beat Writers (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
2004); Ronna C. Johnson and Nancy M. Grace, Eds. Girls Who Wore Black: Women Writing the 
Beat Generation (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). 
39 See Norman Podhoretz “The Know-Nothing Bohemians” Partisan Review Spring 1958: 305-
318 and the response by LeRoi Jones in a letter to the editor in Partisan Review Summer 1958. 
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In the first chapter, I examine the relationship between rhetoric and poetics in the context 
of the beats.  In the second chapter, I investigate the rhetorical environment of the beats. 
Examining their discursive environment helps to prove how they can be read as latent rhetorical 
theorists. I will also discuss the ideas of Kenneth Burke and how they are relevant to the beats’ 
rhetorical concerns. My criticism will focus on seeking out the presence of Burkean ideas about 
rhetoric as latent within their texts. 
   In the following chapter, I investigate Allen Ginsberg’s latent theory of beat rhetoric.  
First, I examine Ginsberg’s prose and public talks, as well as interviews to establish how he 
approaches rhetoric.  Secondly, I argue how these concerns generate a latent rhetorical theory 
within his poetry. My argument will be that Ginsberg percieves a lack of comfort among most 
people with the human condition of embodiment to be responsible for the political problems of 
mid-twentieth century America. Ginsberg’s solution to this problem is a reorientation toward the 
limits of the human body as a rhetorical commonplace from which to speak.  Although Ginsberg 
went through many changes, ideas, and shifts in spiritual discourses through his long career, I 
think a persuasive case can be made that the human body, its discomfort, situated-ness and 
vulnerability were “master commonplaces” for Ginsberg. Commonplaces are, according to 
Richard Lanham, “common sources of arguments.”40
                                               
40 Richard Lanham A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1991), 169. 
  In the ancient world, these sources were a 
rhetorical resource that could be memorized to use in the arguing of many common issues that 
might arise in public disputation. However, commonplaces assume a certain static in the cultural 
and social environment.  I use the term “master commonplaces” to indicate Ginsberg’s seeking 
of a commonplace that should always be used, in order to bridge nearly any cultural or social 
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difference.  This discomfort with the body is a cultural and social production for Ginsberg.  I 
argue that Ginsberg’s work suggests re-orientation to the body as vital for the survival of human 
beings.  Poetry, broadly conceived as the poetic, could reorient a failing society back toward the 
human body as the commonplace, a value that could be shared by any human being. Although 
this sounds metaphysical, it is highly rhetorical. The value of the human body, for Ginsberg, 
exists because it is limited. The embodied condition, therefore, must be made attractive through 
its limits in order to function as a “master commonplace.” 
The “Six at Six” Gallery reading, where “Howl” was read for the first time, was a 
moment of public address.  The reading  occurred on October 7, 1955, in San Francisco.  The 
night promised a reading of the six most influential new poets of the younger generation, hosted 
by Kenneth Rexroth, a central intellectual figure in San Francisco.  According to Jonah Raskin, 
“[t]he Six Gallery reading was a direct and deliberate response to the culture of the bomb and to 
American power and wealth.”41  Raskin’s read of “Howl” as addressed discourse means it can be 
read as a moment of rhetoric.  With both an actual and an audience in mind for the poem, the 
moment can be seen both as traditionally rhetorical (a rhetor addressing an audience for the 
purpose of moving them) and constitutively rhetorical as well. As Maurice Charland has argued, 
“theories of rhetoric as persuasion cannot account for the audiences that rhetoric addresses.”42
                                               
41 Jonah Raskin, American Scream: Allen Ginsberg’s Howl and the Making of the Beat 
Generation. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,2004), 3. 
 In 
order to address this gap, Charland proposes the idea of constitutive rhetoric, which creates the 
audience that it is addressing by interpolating it into being. Basing his theory on Burke and 
Althusser, Charland relies on Burke to explain why a pre-rhetorical sense of audience cannot be 
42 Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Québécois” The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 73 2 (May 1987):133-150,134. 
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a given: “Burke moves towards collapsing the distinction between the realm of the symbolic and 
that of human conceptual consciousness. From such a perspective we cannot accept the 
‘givenness’ of ‘audience,’ ‘person,’ or ‘subject,’ but must consider their very textuality, their 
very constitution in rhetoric as a structured articulation of signs.”43
 Both Parkinson and Raskin seem to suggest that the importance of the beats is due to 
their ability to create the “beat” audience through the moment of address –whether making an 
argument or clarifying the group’s ideals.  As a claim of importance by two scholars separated 
by field as well as distance, we can say that the beats are interesting because of their ability to 
not just represent, but constitute their audience. 
 This does not simply mean 
that the audience can be treated as a text as well, but that audience and text as separate entities 
that are combined, overlayed or mixed in some way is insufficient. The audience can be seen as a 
text as well, an articulation or a “speech” as such. The text is created for and by the audience, 
and the audience can be seen as created for and by the text. 
As Ginsberg explains “Howl” while looking back on that night, one gets another sense of 
the uniqueness of the moment through its connection to the American poetic tradition: 
The reading was delivered by the poet, rather surprised at his own power, drunk on the 
platform, becoming increasingly sober as he read, driving forward with a strange, ecstatic 
intensity, delivering a spiritual confession to an astounded audience – ending in tears 
which restored to American poetry the prophetic consciousness it had lost since the 
conclusion of Hart Crane’s The Bridge, another celebrated mystical work.44
 
 
In Burkean terms Ginsberg identifies his poem as a part of the American poetic tradition 
by association with Crane’s work. In associating the two, he hopes that he makes his poem 
                                               
43 Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric,” 137. 
44 Allen Ginsberg, Deliberate Prose: Selected Essays 1952-1995, Bill Morgan, Ed. (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2000), 241. 
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consubstantial with Crane’s famous work. Consubstantiality, as Burke defines it, is the goal of 
rhetoric.  “A doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any 
way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting-
together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes 
that make them consubstantial.”45
I will analyze “Howl” in the next chapter using several perspectives that both combine 
rhetorical theory and argumentation theory.  “Howl” can be analyzed not just as a moment of 
constitutive rhetoric, but as a moment of rhetorical argumentation as well. As Christopher 
Tindale claims, “[A]n argument is the discourse of interest that centers, and develops in, the 
argumentative situation,” that situation being “the dynamic ‘space’ in which arguer and audience 
interact, but interact in a way that makes them co-authors.”
 Although we can argue that “Howl” is a unique moment, 
Ginsberg frames the uniqueness by associating it with a “mystical” work of American poetry. He 
makes his “new” work “old” by associating it not directly with a mainstream poetic tradition, but 
with “mystical” Hart Crane. It isn’t so much a different work within the poetic tradition, but a 
work that accesses that tradition differently. It seems like a statement of expression, or fact, but 
at the same time it can be read that Ginsberg is arguing for a place among a particular type of 
poetry –“mystical” – for his own poem. In his discussion of the effects on the audience of his 
work as well as its location in a particular poetic tradition, he seems sensitive to a rhetorical 
reading of his poetry.  
46
                                               
45 Burke, Rhetoric, 21. 
  Although it seems like Tindale is 
defending a traditional, reasoned sense of argument, careful reading of his claim reveals the 
opposite. Tindale acknowledges that definitions of argument that assume it to be a “reason 
46 Christopher W. Tindale, Rhetorical Argumentation (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2004), 23. 
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giving use of language” and the employment of terms such as “soundness” and “validity” have 
been “seriously challenged” by scholars and in order to find a notion of argument that “changes 
how we perceive the world by changing the way we think about things” we need to “revise the 
notion of argument at its heart.”47  His revision moves argument away from the traditional view 
that argument is some sort of exchange of reasons among a rational group. “Potentially 
argumentative situations are not restricted to overt disagreements. They include situations in 
which ideas are reinforced, proposals are introduces and explored cooperatively, and parties 
struggle to achieve understanding and agreement even when the starting position of each is 
virtually unrecognizable to others.”48 As an example, Tindale draws upon Alice in Wonderland 
as an example of the inability for rational, reasoned discourse to make any headway in 
argumentative conflicts. As an alternative to more formal approaches, Tindale suggests 
“rhetorical argumentation” which “draws features from the rhetorical tradition and mixes them 
with newer innovations. . . the processes of rhetorical argumentation meld together these three 
bringing into relief, and inextricably wedding to one another in the argumentative situation, the 
arguer, audience and ‘argument.’”49
Tindale’s rhetorical argument seems apt for providng some critical insight into the 
situation of the Six Gallery reading where, “[I]n the process of reading the poem, he [Ginsberg] 
found himself forging a new identity as a public poet sharing his private thoughts and feelings 
with eager, admiring listeners. . . The poem created the poet.  The audience was transformed too 
– indifferent spectators becoming energetic participants.”
 
50
                                               
47 Tindale, 2. 
  As an argument, “Howl” offered 
48 Tindale, 3. 
49 Tindale, 20. 
50 Raskin, American Scream, 18. 
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poem and poet as argument and arguer, as well as offered an alternative, rhetorical manner of 
addressing problems where traditional, rational reasons were deemed ineffective. “Howl” is both 
constitutive and argumentative – it offers itself as its own best evidence for the rhetorical theory 
it suggests for advocacy. 
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to Jack Kerouac, and his novel On the Road.  In 
this chapter I provide a rhetorical criticism of On the Road in order to frame it as a contribution 
to the beat rhetoric.  My claim is that On the Road is Jack Kerouac’s rhetoric of kairos – the 
ancient rhetorical concept of “timeliness.” Kairos has been interpreted in a broad valence of 
ways, from “a kind of immanent, rhythmic, emboidied practice,”51 to “the right time.”52 Kairos 
is an important concept in the rhetorical tradition, usually understood as relating to the opportune 
or the appropriate. James Kinneavy defines it as the,  “right or opportune time to do something, 
or right measure in doing something.”53 For John E. Smith, kairos “points to a qualitative 
character of time, to the special position an event or action occupies in a series, to a season when 
something appropriately happens that cannot happen at ‘just any time,’ but only at that time to a 
time that marks an opportunity which may not recur.”54
                                               
51 Debra Hawhee, Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2004), 76. 
 These last two definitions come close to 
Kerouac’s understanding of time and its relation to writing. In his “Essentials of Spontaneous 
Prose” Kerouac states, “Nothing is muddy that runs in time and to laws of time – Shakespearean 
52 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 33. 
53 James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric” in J.D. Moss, Ed. 
Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning 
(Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 80. 
54 John E. Smith “Time and Qualitative Time” in Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, Eds. 
Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory and Praxis (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2002), 47. 
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stress of dramatic need to speak now in own unalterable way or forever hold tongue. . .”55
After establishing the beat rhetoric theory, I move to criticize Diane Di Prima’s novel 
Memoirs of a Beatnik due to its overt use of the term “beat” and its appearance as a memoir from 
someone inside of and influenced by the “beat writers” as Parkinson calls them. I do not rely on 
the novel for its historical accuracy or authenticity. Instead, I use the language theories of 
Bakhtin to reveal how Di Prima’s use of the beat rhetoric creates an alternative subjectivity for 
women, one where women can take control of meaning and craft their own identity. Bakhtin’s 
writings have been synthesized into a theory of language and meaning that focus on language’s 
 It is 
incredibly important to recognize the opportune and the appropriateness of time, especially when 
one sees the opportunity to speak. For Kerouac here, nothing that “fits into” the moment is 
against the laws of time, but missing the moment means you cannot speak that same sense later – 
you must hold your tongue. In the novel, Kerouac suggests that America is a complicated tableau 
of motives, beliefs and attitudes, all of which can be understood, accessed, and articulated, but 
only if one is attuned and attentive to the kairotic.  The novel becomes an inventory of different 
approaches to kairotic rhetoric, with each embodied in a particular character which is tested and 
tried out by the narrator, Sal Paradise. The end of the novel is somewhat ambivalent, as no 
particular rhetoric is favored over any other, except that one should make use of opportunity 
when one finds it, and not hang on to it permanently. 
                                               
55 Jack Kerouac, “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose,” in Ann Charters, Ed. The Beat Reader 
(Penguin: New York, 1992), 57. For more scholarly analysis on this particular work of 
Kerouac’s see Justin Trudeau “Jack Kerouac’s Spontaneous Prose: A Performance Geneology of 
the Fiction”Ph.D. Diss. Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College , 
2006. 
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inability to stay fixed. “Language, Bakhtin reiterates, is always languages.”56 This means that for 
Bakhtin, each word is permeated with its past associations and present connotations. Language is 
inherently unstable. Rhetoricians have incorporated Bahktin’s ideas as a nearly accepted part of 
the canon.57 The beat rhetoric concepts of kairos and the body as “master commonplace” are the 
starting points for Di Prima’s rhetorical intervention in her novel. Focus on the female body, as 
well as the kairotic are used to describe events and scenes that would otherwise be difficult to 
read in alternative ways.  Di Prima’s work helps to complicate readings of the beat writers as 
misogynist, characterizing women as, “things to have sex with.”58
In the conclusion, I move to the 21st century and analyze Amiri Baraka’s poem 
“Somebody Blew Up America.” Written about the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 
poem uses the kairotic and the body as sites in which to dilute the idea that the September 11th 
attacks were exceptional or unique. He crafts this argument relying on beat rhetorical theory, 
which I prove through rhetorical criticism. The poem received a violent reaction in the 
mainstream media, which prompted the State of New Jersey to convene a special session in order 
to remove Baraka from the position of New Jersey Poet Laureate. I take a selection of newspaper 
 Di Prima demonstrates that 
although there might be sexism or misogyny in beat writing, it is not endemic or necessarily a 
part of their project. Their latent rhetorical theory can be used to detach the social fixity of 
meaning and provide spaces for alternate conceptions of meaning. 
                                               
56 Gary Saul Morson & Caryl Emerson Mikhail Bakhtin (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1990), 140. 
57 But not without some theoretical problems, see John M. Murphy, “Mikhail Bahktin and the 
Rhetorical Tradition” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87:3 (August 2001): 259-277. 
58 Swartz, Omar. The Rhetorical Vision of Jack Kerouac. (Carbondale: University of Illinois 
Press, 1999). 
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articles and reports from the mass media that interpret the poem and criticize them to get a sense 
of how the beat rhetoric fares against public interpretation. 
 The Beat Generation has produced an overwhelming amount of commentary, 
analysis, discussion, and ideas related to their poetic and literary output.  Most of this corpus 
debates the literary merit, or seeks biographical grounding for a particular reading of a poem or 
novel. What is different about this study is that the beats will be read as developing theory, not 
offering only practice.  The theory they developed could also be seen as rhetorical. Rhetorical 
theory includes not only how to engage audience and how to craft message for understanding, 
but also how to create meaning and engage with other people in the world. It is also a bridge to 
the political – rhetoric can offer or take away political options.  This study argues that the Beats 
operated under a latent theory of rhetoric, and they tried to show how this rhetoric could and 
would work.  Although they obviously produced poetry and literature, the beats cannot be solely 
appreciated on those aesthetic grounds. If the communicative and rhetorical dimensions of their 
ideas are left out, a key component of the understanding of what the beats attempted to 
accomplish is lost. Their work can receive a much fuller appreciation if linked to the theoretical 
development that they themselves were trying to work through. What is at stake is an active 
appreciation for the beats as theorists, along with the passive appreciation for them as crafters of 
nice literature. With this active appreciation, the beat rhetoric can be used as a tool to address 
concerns of human subjectivity – how people interact with one another, appreciate each other, 
and reach out for connections from other humans. A focus on a different rhetorical theory opens 
up new ways of appreciating human interaction, identity, politics and cooperation. 
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 To begin, I open the study with a brief literature review of research conducted on 
the Beat Generation, which I categorize and assess.  Then I will explain the rhetorical theories of 
Kenneth Burke who is central in my understanding of the function and scope of rhetoric. 
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2.0  ASSESSING THE BEATS 
Beat Generation scholars have approached studying the beats from many different perspectives.  
I don’t attempt to represent those approaches in any sort of totality here. Rather, I think the best 
way to approach such an enormous body of literature is to examine the sources most closely 
related to the intersection of the beats with rhetoric. 
Only a few studies examine the Beats as concerned with practicing an American rhetoric, 
one that calls into question the distinctions and boundaries between discourses. Scholarship has 
focused on the Beat writers for many different reasons, viewing their texts as objects of criticism 
and analysis from various theories and has yet to view their writing as the development of a 
rhetoric – a system of encountering the phenomena of the world, articulating their meaning and 
providing the criteria for judging them. 
I begin by looking at some of the scholarly and biographical work on Kerouac and 
Ginsberg, then I move on to explain my own methods for assessing the Beats.  At the conclusion 
of this chapter I hope to have clarified the differences between other scholarship on the beats and 
the work that this study offers. 
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2.1 UNDERSTANDING JACK KEROUAC 
It is an understatement to say that Jack Kerouac has received a lot of attention from scholars.  
Kerouac is the subject of dozens of biographies, and occupies hundreds of pages in historical 
treatments of the 1950s.  Many of these studies treat Kerouac as subject of biography, attempting 
to find the elements of his life that inspired, influenced or participated in his authorial 
importance.59 This line of study of Kerouac focuses on a linear treatment of events and episodes 
in Kerouac’s life as lived, with occasional connections of life events to his literary production. 
Ann Charters argues that, “[t]hrough most of his life Kerouac played games with himself, giving 
himself new roles and identities, vanities as he called them in his last years. His belief in himself 
as writer was his main identity, and in an essential way after he left Lowell it was the only 
identity that held him fast.”60  Charters’ assessment is typical of biography, where the attempt is 
made to give as complete a picture as possible to the subject’s life. Charters is not myopic in her 
treatment of Kerouac, giving a reason why he is a figure worth studying: “To this generation 
Jack Kerouac became a romantic hero, an archetypal rebel, the symbol of their own vanities, the 
symbol of their own romantic legend.”61
                                               
59 See Nicosia, Gerald. Memory Babe (New York: Fred Jordan and Grove Press, 1983); Charters, 
Ann. Kerouac: A Biography (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1973); Amburn, Ellis. Subterranean 
Kerouac (New York: Macmillan, 1998); Clark, Tom. Jack Kerouac (New York: Thunder’s 
Mouth Press, 1984); Miles, Barry. Kerouac – King of the Beats (New York: H. Holt, 1998) and 
many others, however this list represents the key works that treat Kerouac biographically, as I 
develop in this chapter. 
 Charters underscores Kerouac’s rhetorical importance 
to a generation as a rhetorical figure – perhaps a metonymy – of the feelings people shared. 
Kerouac was and stood for an attitude of a particular time, whether or not he intended to: “He 
couldn’t understand how Jerry Rubin, Mitchell Goodman and Abbie Hoffman had evolved from 
60 Charters, Kerouac: A Biography, 20. 
61 Charters, Kerouac: A Biography, 21. 
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his work.”62 Kerouac, in the end is portrayed as a tragic figure, someone who wrote brilliantly 
and, as a complex human being, had complicated and conflicting reactions to his fame as a 
writer. As Charters concludes her biography: “His books are evidence of his presence, the young 
Jack still alive on his pages to rush on to the next adventures as long as there are people who read 
the Legend of Duluoz.”63
Charter’s biography is well-researched and gives a detailed as well as interesting account 
of Kerouac’s life. Her attention to literary details – such as what manuscript was being prepared 
when – is outstanding. I choose her work for detailed commentary because I feel that it is 
representative of biographies of Kerouac in general. Mostly, like Charters’ treatment, they attend 
to Kerouac as a person in relation to his literary production. Although significant attention is 
given to Kerouac’s work, it is always in relation to the individual’s life and times.  
 
Although there is nothing wrong with this approach, the approach I take is significantly 
different. I attempt to use Kerouac’s ideas as the source for the creation of theory. Although I do 
attend to some of his biographical details, I am more interested in reading his work as a resource 
instead of reading his work as a way to understand him – or using moments of his life as a 
heuristic that helps interpret his work.  
The literary treatments of Kerouac are more germane to the thesis that I explore here. I 
argue that Kerouac’s literary critics move through a few stages in the appreciation of his work. 
First is the read that Kerouac was a visionary – someone who could see ahead of his own time. 
These treatments range from connecting Kerouac to the larger American literary trajectory 
                                               
62 Charters, Kerouac: A Biography, 365. 
63 Charters, Kerouac: A Biography, 367. 
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including Whitman, Twain, and others to claiming Kerouac was the first postmodernist.64
Tim Hunt argues that On the Road is significant because it illustrates the presence of the 
“author” within the work: 
 The 
works most relevant to this study begin with Tim Hunt’s treatment of On the Road – Kerouac’s 
most famous novel which I analyze in chapter 4 – and Fiona Patton’s analysis of Doctor Sax in 
her doctoral dissertation. Both studies are selected not due to their accuracy or their 
comprehensive treatment of the beat generation as a social movement; but are selected due to 
their relevance for my study which attempts to create a rhetorical theory. Both works attend to 
Kerouac’s use of language, his style, and his attention to the malleability of cultural reality. 
The manuscript history of On the Road is the history of Kerouac’s development as a 
writer.  It is in large part the story of Kerouac’s attempt to resolve his conflicting sense of 
writing as a naturalistic and romantic activity, and to develop a way of writing that would 
simultaneously analyze the external world and celebrate the self’s ability to transcend that 
world imaginatively.65
 
 
Hunt’s study is a detailed examination of Kerouac’s writing style, “spontaneous prose.” Hunt is a 
defender of Kerouac’s writing, and he points out that “mistakes,” or “flaws” that other critics see 
in Kerouac’s writing should be overlooked since Kerouac is creating a new literary aesthetic.66
                                               
64 An indomitable amount of works could be listed here. The most interesting and comprehensive 
treatments of Kerouac and the beats are Tytell, John. Naked Angels: The Lives and Literature of 
the Beat Generation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976); Charters, Ann, Ed. Beat Down to Your 
Soul: What was the Beat Generation? (New York: Penguin, 2001); McNally, Dennis. Desolate 
Angel: Jack Kerouac, the Beat Generation, and America (Cambridge, MA: DeCapo Press, 
1979); Newhouse, Thomas. The Beat Generation and the Popular Novel in the United States, 
1945-1970 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2000). Although tough to distinguish, many of these 
works do not study Kerouac’s work outside of the larger beat generation social phenomenon. 
  
Hunt argues that Kerouac’s writing can be viewed as the historical record of Kerouac’s ideas 
65 Tim Hunt, Kerouac's Crooked Road : Development of a Fiction (Hamden, Conn.: Archon 
Books, 1981), 78. 
66 Hunt, Kerouac's Crooked Road : Development of a Fiction, 252. 
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about writing, literature and America.  Hunt compares On the Road to Huckleberry Finn in that 
at the end of the journey, the main character is more informed than he was before the journey 
began.67
For Patton, Kerouac’s authorial “presence” in the novel Doctor Sax is less as a great 
individual connected to other literary greats via his style, but more a rhetorician present in the 
text due to his complication of meaning through his mastery of language. Patton’s primary 
project is to argue for a “cultural stylistics” which she sees as a merger between “rhetoric, 
cultural studies and linguistics” which can help literature “navigate the high-seas of 
postmodernism.”
  Hunt’s analysis, although insightful for understanding some of the context of the 
formation of both spontaneous prose and the term “Beat Generation,” is a study focused on the 
literary value of Kerouac’s work.  While there is nothing inherently wrong with such a study (I 
would even argue this sort of work is beneficial and interesting), it necessarily places Kerouac’s 
work against other works of literature (e.g., Twain) to understand its value.  In this way, Hunt’s 
analysis is using American literature as a hermeneutic to understand Kerouac’s contribution to 
that body of discourse.  It is a study that looks inward, not just to On the Road, but also 
American literature as the point of comparison and departure.  In other words, it judges On the 
Road from within the discourses of the value of literature, not as a text that could be challenging 
the very basis for such a judgment.  On the Road for Hunt is a book that lays bare the author’s 
mind and artistic ability. 
68
                                               
67Hunt, Kerouac's Crooked Road : Development of a Fiction, 10. 
 So it is no surprise that she focuses less on Kerouac’s presence in the text and 
more of what the text presents to us.  It could be argued that she is using Kerouac’s work as 
supporting evidence for a theory that she inductively constructs. 
68 Patton, Fiona. “Style and Subversion: Kerouac and the Cultural Cold War”. Ph.D. diss., The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1999, 1. 
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Patton focuses nearly exclusively on the novel Doctor Sax for a couple of reasons. First, 
her interest is in the novel’s relationship to the cold war environment within which it was written 
and secondly, Kerouac’s prose in Doctor Sax is fantastic and radical – two of the elements that 
are necessary to blur the high/low cultural distinction she argues is clearly present during and an 
effect of cold war political rhetoric.  What is most important in Patton’s analysis is the idea that 
Kerouac and the beat literature he was producing are both incredibly complicated, and that 
oversimplified reads that favor the social or the author over other elements are non-starters. 
Kerouac offers a “rhizome” of complicated connections which are “intertwined with the very 
positions they seemed to be challenging.”69
Her attention to Kerouac’s style is informed by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, whose 
theory sees language as something combined as well as combining, a heterogonous mixture of 
meanings that change given a situation.
 The America he is supposedly interested in 
overturning is one that he is dependent upon.  The “cultural stylistics” theory, in Patton’s view, 
will tease out these complexities for the benefit of literary studies in the future. 
70 Patton’s take on this is to argue that Bakhtin is, “after a 
rhetorical approach to language that can accommodate the interplay of different utterances within 
specific contexts.”71  In the end analysis, it is Kerouac’s spontaneous prose that she attends to 
most in her study, triangulating its origin between jazz, film and comics – all popular culture 
sources. Patton also suggests that Kerouac’s “fluidity” of style is suggestive of a blend of racial 
and cultural modes of speaking.72
                                               
69 Patton, “Style and Subversion,” 6. 
 All of this is moving toward a Bakhtin-informed critique of 
Kerouac’s work Doctor Sax. Patton notes Kerouac’s complex politics when she remarks, 
70 For the most comprehensive attempt to use Bakhtin’s theory, see Morson, Gary Saul and Caryl 
Emerson Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).  
71 Patton, “Style and Subversion,” 9. 
72 Patton, “Style and Subversion,” 129. 
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“Kerouac was in many ways challenging the hypocrisy of middle-class values , in other ways he 
reproduced those same values.”73
But Patton doesn’t go down this path with Kerouac; she explores his style in order to find 
the perfect proportions of linguistics, rhetoric and cultural theory to advance literary criticism. In 
Doctor Sax, she finds many examples of the cultural stylistics that she was talking about. 
 Kerouac is struggling to find a rhetoric that advances the form 
of human communication he desires. However, that rhetoric, in order to work, must be connected 
to the discourses of the time and place of its use. It must be appropriate. 
In addition to the literary vein of scholarship on Kerouac, there is a vein that treats 
Kerouac as a rhetorician.74
  The first is Omar Swartz, whose work on Kerouac is tuned toward finding rhetorics of 
social justice.  Swartz is interested in Kerouac’s rhetoricity as a potential model for a rhetoric 
that can offer and respond to questions about social justice in its myriad of interpretations and 
meanings. Most notably, Omar Swartz has argued that Kerouac should be viewed as a “cultural 
rhetorician” who, through On the Road, suggests methods of responding to contemporary society 
via the deployment of invitational fantasy themes.  
 This is a small group of works, but the most germane for this study as 
they could provide the most relevant analyses.  
For fantasy theme critics, shared fantasy becomes the object of study.  Fantasy, in this 
context, has to do with the perception of reality by a rhetor (speaker and writer) in ways 
that create an alternative explanation for why or how things should be done.  When this 
fantasy is shared, it becomes a drama, and other people behave in ways that support the 
vision’s basic assumptions.  When people behave in this manner, they assume the 
                                               
73 Patton, “Style and Subversion,” 172. 
74 See Casey, John. “Critical Analysis of Rhetorical Choices Made in the Creation of Two 
Differing Written Modes: A Biographical Sketch and a Historical Fiction”. Ph.D. diss., New 
York University, 1982; Trudeau, Justin. “Jack Kerouac’s Spontaneous Prose: A Performance 
Geneology of the Fiction”. Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 2006;  
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positions in the initial vision.  In the case of Kerouac, the vision itself became absorbed 
by the media and exceeded the control of its original source.75
 
 
Swartz then defines three primary rhetorical visions that constitute On the Road as a cultural, 
invitational rhetoric.  The first is “The Vision of Social Deviance,” which Swartz defines as, “a 
call to action, a questioning of motivation and a suggesting for a new social reality with a 
reordering of priorities.”76  The next is “The Vision of Sexuality,” where Swartz points out the 
“faceless” impersonal female characters of On the Road as “things to have sex with.”  These 
women primarily are the sexual conquests of Dean Moriarty, who engages in amazing sexual 
encounters one after another.  Dean, in Swartz’s assessment, becomes the “holy messenger” of 
Kerouac’s vision due to the fact that he both engages in deviant behavior, and also has an 
unstoppable sex drive.77  Finally, Swartz offers “Dean as Vision,” arguing that the character of 
Dean Moriarty himself is a vision of social deviance through a “vague, ideological 
commitment.”78
Swartz’s analysis of On the Road is insightful as it is the only study to date that applies 
rhetorical theory to a Beat text to further our understanding of the value of that text.  But 
Swartz’s analysis of Kerouac’s writing is limited through his search for these fantasy themes to 
the exclusion of other moments that are also important for the book’s rhetorical value.  The 
search for Dean’s father, the months that Sal Paradise spends living with a Mexican girl on a 
  Dean’s presence in the novel is read by Swartz to be an invitation to the reader 
to participate in the rhetorical vision offered by the combination of sexual conquest and social 
deviance. 
                                               
75 Swartz, The View from on the Road, 48. 
76 Swartz, The View from on the Road, 73. 
77 Swartz, The View from on the Road, 75. 
78 Swartz, The View from on the Road, 83. 
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cotton farm, and in the final moments of the book, Sal’s rejection of Dean’s invitation for 
another road trip in favor of settling down with a woman – all of these moments don’t seem to fit 
the idea that readers are supposed to identify with Dean directly. As Fiona Paton, a Kerouac 
scholar, noted, “Swartz reduces the novel to the mindless celebration of any experience, at any 
cost, a reading that Kerouac himself vigorously resisted.”79 Paton believes that rhetorical 
criticism is necessary to understand the incredible complexities of Kerouac, as well as the “Beat 
generation” as a literary and social movement: “In this type of study, the text needs to be 
reconnected to other relevant social discourses of the moment; otherwise, one can only 
generalize about what seems to have been its cultural trajectory.”80
Fiona Paton’s own work on the oft-overlooked Kerouac novel Doctor Sax, moves in a 
more robust rhetorical direction.  Relying on the linguistic theories of Mikhail Bakhtin, Paton 
argues that, “[A]ny novel will be dialoguing, to a greater or lesser degree, with the language, and 
hence the social forces, of its cultural moment.”  She looks at Kerouac’s style, or the choices in 
syntax that Kerouac makes in order to understand the novel as a material object with aesthetic 
  Situating the textual 
production and dissemination of Kerouac’s work within the 1950s will reveal that not only are 
Kerouac and the other Beats developing a discourse, as Swartz contends, but they are providing 
the criteria for constructing such a discourse.  Swartz’s approach to Kerouac is important as it 
reveals that Kerouac’s work has rhetorical implications that extend beyond the peculiarities of 
understanding his novels. Swartz wants to extend the implications of Kerouac’s method to the 
political sphere, which is admirable even if he uses rhetoric more as a heuristic to view 
Kerouac’s work and less as a result of examining Kerouac’s work. 
                                               
79 Fiona Paton, "The View from ‘On the Road’: the Rhetorical Vision of Jack Kerouac by Omar 
Swartz," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2000): 116. 
80 Paton, "The View from on the Road," 117. 
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appeal that is directly tied to the circumstances of its cultural moment:  “The text is therefore part 
of a rhetorical exchange with the broader social sphere but in a much more fundamental way 
than historical scholarship typically represents, for this exchange is carried out at the level of the 
syntax itself, in the style of the text.”81
Paton’s analysis of Doctor Sax proceeds along a symbolic trajectory, where she deciphers 
the origins of many of the bizarre images of green-eyed heroes and giant snakes as rooted in 
anxieties about 1950s culture, as well as Kerouac’s drug habits.  While her analysis is interesting, 
it uses Kerouac’s book as a way to prove that her incorporation of Bakhtin into stylistic analysis 
would be insightful.  Doctor Sax is the experiment that demonstrates her theoretical innovation 
has merit.  Her attention to Kerouac’s style in this novel proves an interesting point about 
Kerouac’s writing – “[T]he novel both critiques and affirms popular culture by internalizing 
certain of its thematic and formal elements in a deliberate deconstruction of the literary 
establishment’s rigid high-low binaries.”
 
82 Patton goes on to offer many examples of this 
deconstructive attempt. The importance of Patton’s work is the recognition that Kerouac’s style 
is also a part of the intervention into culture that is usually attributed to the content of his works. 
Patton points out that this is fairly obvious, as Kerouac himself authored several documents 
related to his own style which he named “spontaneous prose.”83
Attention to spontaneous prose is perhaps the closest scholars have come to providing 
detail on Kerouac’s rhetorical elements.  Justin Thomas Trudeau, in his essay “Jack Kerouac’s 
 
                                               
81 Fiona Paton, "Beyond Bakhtin: Towards a Cultural Stylistics," College English 63, no. 2 
(2000): 173. 
82 Patton, “Style and Subversion,” 206. 
83 For example see “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” in Jack Kerouac, Some of the Dharma 
(New York: Penguin, 1997) as well as Kerouac’s list in Ann Charters, Ed. The Portable Beat 
Reader (New York: Penguin, 1992). 
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Spontaneous America,” seeks to analyze Kerouac’s “Essentials of Spontaneous Prose” as “a 
cultural artifact that functions as a performance genealogy, one that highlights both past 
performance-based avant-garde practices and Kerouac’s own contemporaneously connected 
practices in this regard.”84  Trudeau’s analysis is limited to Kerouac and to the “Essentials of 
Spontaneous Prose” as “the only substantive site of textual praxis to come from its 
practitioner.”85  Trudeau’s focus is on elucidating Kerouac’s prose method and the performative 
resources Kerouac drew upon to develop his prose method:  “By displacing and transforming the 
imaginative techniques of a multitude of artistic genres into his own literary work, Kerouac 
becomes a symbolic substitute and an echo of these artists acting in part, as their historical 
double in the postwar avant-garde.”86
Regina Weinreich’s book-length analysis of spontaneous prose goes in a nearly opposite 
direction from Trudeau’s. Weinreich argues that spontaneous prose is something new, on the 
level of discovery: “It [Kerouac’s composition technique] suggests a double movement in the act 
of composition, a movement that progresses and repeats at the same time. As Kerouac wrote 
  Trudeau sees Kerouac’s writing method as an opportunity 
to trace a performance genealogy through American avant-garde movements.  Although I agree 
that Kerouac was drawing on a number of ideas about performance to develop his rhetoric, he 
was also drawing on many other sources as well.  Trudeau hits upon a very important aspect of 
the Beat rhetorical delivery and style in his essay, but is much more interested in finding the 
origins of Kerouac’s method throughout American performance theory.  
                                               
84 Justin Thomas Trudeau, "Jack Kerouac's Spontaneous America: A Performance Genealogy of 
the Postwar Avant-Garde," Kaleidoscope 3 (2004): 43. 
85 Trudeau, "Jack Kerouac's Spontaneous America," 43. 
86 ———, "Jack Kerouac's Spontaneous America," 59. 
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spontaneously, the elements of past experience were revised in the act of being recorded.”87 
Kerouac’s method of spontaneous prose was “in the language of the imagination; his creation of 
himself is a self writ large in the Whitmanesque sense.”88 Weinreich sees spontaneous prose as 
not only the method but affected the results of Kerouac’s literary ambitions: “The creation of a 
new literary ethic was, in fact, the ultimate goal of Kerouac’s artistic quest, and also its 
demise.”89 For Weinreich, Kerouac was attempting a blurring of language, meaning and genre 
that is still difficult to accept on face, but provides an American subject that uses the “language 
of ascension” to describe what is a “down-journey” filled with “despair.”90 Kerouac did have an 
untimely end to his own life brought on by alcoholism, something which Weinreich discusses, 
she decides to link his lifestyle to his prose directly, claiming, “A national character is projected 
in Kerouac’s singular voice.”91
                                               
87 Regina Weinreich. Kerouac’s Spontaneous Poetics: A Study of the Fiction (New York: 
Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1987), 5. 
 Weinrich’s study is concerned with locating how spontaneous 
prose developed Kerouac’s voice in his work, and how that voice is a reflection of Kerouac’s 
personal life and views. Although difficult to separate Kerouac’s life from his works – the 
majority of which are based on shared experiences between he and his friends – I believe that 
Weinreich’s read is too reductive to provide a full appreciation of Kerouac’s work. Reading 
spontaneous prose as more Kerouac’s instrument for his own unique subject position pushes 
away understandings where spontaneous prose could be seen as a method that anyone could use. 
My analysis will show that Kerouac’s concerns in his diaries and letters can be linked to the 
88 Weinreich, 148. 
89 Weinreich, 148. 
90 Weinreich, 155. 
91 Weinreich, 148. 
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formulation of spontaneous prose as a solution to a perceived communication problem he saw in 
the 1950s. 
Furthermore, Kerouac is covered in a variety of other treatments that are important to 
mention for the parameters of this study. Stephen Davenport wants to make sure that although 
Kerouac’s road mystique gets most of the attention, “tied to his ethnic and modernist inheritance 
of loss, it is also personal and familial.”92 Davenport argues for a broader reading of Kerouac 
than just the transient, live-the-moment, road life figure he is sketched to be in the popular 
imagination.  Davenport persuasively contends that Kerouac’s prose can be read “as expressions, 
not evasions, of woundedness and grief.”93 He does this by examining Kerouac’s “overlapping 
family narratives” through Kerouac’s work, and determines that they can be and should be read 
as “a valuable midcentury melodrama of beset sonhood that might help us situation Kerouac’s 
road cure within a network of family practices that will, in turn, improve our reading of other 
wounded-son road narratives.”94 Davenport’s method is a re-reading of Kerouac that seeks out a 
familial rhetoric.  He describes this rhetoric as the creation of a “social space” where Kerouac 
can “find surrogates for his father and brother” who both died when Kerouac was a young man.95
In the end, Davenport concludes that Kerouac used his writing to “fill holes” left by the 
passing of his father and brother. Davenport’s argument, although only appreciates Kerouac’s 
work for what it could mean to him, does offer a reading of Kerouac’s work that allows for it to 
make and do rather than just report on events between he and his friends. Davenport ends up 
 
                                               
92 Stephen Davenport, “Road Work: Rereading Kerouac’s Midcentury Melodrama of Beset 
Sonhood,” in Boys Don’t Cry? Rethinking Narratives of Masculinity and Emotion in the U.S. 
Milette Shamir and Jennifer Travis, Eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 167. 
93 Stephen Davenport, “Road Work,” 168. 
94 Stephen Davenport, “Road Work,” 168-9. 
95 Stephen Davenport, “Road Work,” 176. 
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limiting the read of Kerouac, but the idea that his writing was created with the idea of “filling a 
hole” is rather Burkean: “”.  The text remains as a construction that was meant to do, not to 
reflect, culture.  Davenport does a good job of relating Kerouac in this way to other canonical 
American authors who attempted the “sonhood” story – notably Tennessee Williams and Arthur 
Miller – and gives credibility to the Burkean interpretation by suggesting that both stories can be 
used to craft similar space.  Of course, Davenport doesn’t take it as far as I do in this 
interpretation, but I do want to show the potential for a rhetorical interpretation rather than an 
interpretation that uses rhetoric in order to craft a reading of a text. 
Paul Maltby’s treatment of Kerouac in his book The Visionary Moment is the most clear 
example of this sort of use of rhetoric that I am reversing.  Maltby’s book is an investigation into 
“the flash of insight” that can “deliver spiritually redeeming knowledge.”96 Maltby seeks to 
unravel why this line of thinking still has purchase in the contemporary worldview.  He 
concludes that the visionary moment is “enmeshed in metaphysical and ideological assumptions . 
. . that by the standards of postmodern critique are theoretically untenable,” as well as, 
“irreconcilable with progressive political thinking.”97  Maltby proceeds by articulating what 
types of visionary moments there are, and divorces them from “real life” experiences, claiming 
that only through literature are we able to understand visionary moments as such: “[W]e must 
reckon with the possibility that literature itself supplies the forms that enable us to encode certain 
subjective experiences as visionary.”98
                                               
96 Paul Maltby, The Visionary Moment (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002), 
1. 
 Maltby wants to prove that there is no understanding of 
an actual visionary moment (with the exception of religious mysticism) outside of the description 
97 Maltby, 3. 
98 Maltby, 24. 
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of such a vision. “[W]e are most often acquainted with real-life visionary moments in narrated 
form. That is to say, we know them less through direct personal experience than through their 
narration by ‘visionary’ subjects,” which subject these moments to “distortion.”99
Although we will see Maltby critique Kerouac’s work in the next paragraph, this 
understanding of the visionary moment and its power is an important consideration if we are to 
consider Kerouac as crafting a rhetorical theory. That is to say, accepting Maltby’s premise that 
we cannot know a visionary moment outside of the communication of one might also be 
accepting one of Kerouac’s premises about appropriate communication. More will be said about 
this later in the detailed analysis of Kerouac’s work I will provide. 
 Maltby wants 
to ensure that we realize we are getting a mere device here and not access to an actual visionary 
experience.  
Maltby’s critique of Kerouac is divided into three sections – rhetoric of 
instantaneousness, rhetoric of eternity and rhetoric of spontaneity. Maltby understands these to 
be Kerouac’s three techniques used to convey visionary spiritual truths in his work.  The rhetoric 
of eternity is characterized as, “the point where eternity intersects with clock time.”100 The 
rhetoric of instantaneousness is marked with the use of words such as “suddenly” and 
“immediately” and pushes the belief that, “the instantaneous acquisition of knowledge is a 
hallmark of its transcendence and purity.”101
                                               
99 Maltby, 22. 
 And the rhetoric of spontaneity is marked by 
moving knowledge outside of a normal relationship to time: “Thus the reader is prompted to feel 
that the knowledge gained has its origin outside of standard, chronological time, in some 
autonomous time zone.” The value of the vision there is propped up by identifying it as a type of 
100 Maltby, 104. 
101 Maltby, 100. 
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knowledge that would be impossible to apprehend under a more “capitalist” understanding of the 
temporal.102
Maltby makes it very clear that he sees Kerouac’s rhetoric as clearly anti-capitalist:  
 
Here, then, is a form of experience whose timing cannot be managed. where the purpose 
of time management is to regulate production by the clock and increase the efficiency 
with which labor is exploited, that which occurs outside the zone of manageable time 
acquires value by virtue of belonging to an alternative, unexploitable mode of time. 
Accordingly, the spontaneity of Kerouac’s visionary moment may be said to enhance the 
status of the moment’s insight by purging it of any association with the managed time of 
capitalist production.103
 
 
Maltby concludes his study of Kerouac’s technique fairly clearly – “[T]he invocation of the 
spontaneous amounts to yet another rhetorical prop for visionary truth claims.”104
                                               
102 Maltby, 107. 
 As in the 
paragraph above, Maltby seems to see his critique as a reveal that truth is not present  in 
visionary experiences; that all we have are conventions and techniques. To this, many 
rhetoricians would quickly assent.  However, where Maltby and I differ is that Maltby sees 
Kerouac as an unwitting participant in some sort of deception that is harmful to progressive 
politics. I see Kerouac as a direct participant in an attempt to re-write the rules of appropriate 
utterance and engagement between human beings – this is my understanding of rhetoric. Maltby 
marks these moments of persuasion in his critique of Kerouac as moments where visionary 
purity and superiority collapse. To critique his own rhetoric, Maltby uses the term “persuade” or 
“persuasion” of the reader in the same way as he critiques Kerouac’s use of the terms 
“immediately” or “instantly” – they are a device used to persuade the reader of a truth claim. 
Maltby uses “rhetoric” and “persuasive” in the same manner, to persuade the reader of the truth 
claim that no eternal truth claims exist within narratives of visionary moments.  
103 Maltby, 109. 
104 Maltby, 109. 
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For my study, Maltby’s insight that Kerouac uses rhetorical devices in his work is not 
only a given, but an essential part of a text being identified as such. However, the interesting 
relationship he highlights between Kerouac’s spontaneous prose and time is one that I will 
engage directly.  I argue that Kerouac is very attuned to time in his rhetoric, and his use and 
relationship to time is a key factor in the rhetorical theory that he offers. 
My treatment of Kerouac builds upon these studies in the sense that all of them are 
attentive to the importance of Kerouac’s production of texts. My analysis of Kerouac will depend 
upon some insights from these scholars on what they broadly refer to as Kerouac’s “style.” My 
treatment differs in the sense that I am reading Kerouac as a theorist of rhetoric, which departs 
from most of these scholars, albeit not very far from some.  The important difference is the 
construction of a theory from Kerouac’s work, which only Patton comes close to articulating.  
2.2 ALLEN GINSBERG’S SCHOLARLY IDENTITY 
The amount of material on Allen Ginsberg is staggering.  Ginsberg’s work and life have been the 
subject of numerous critical and biographical as well as treatments from American and cultural 
studies.105
                                               
105 The most comprehensive biography of Ginsberg is Michael Schumacher, Dharma Lion: A 
Critical Biography of Allen Ginsberg (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994); Jane Kramer, Allen 
Ginsberg in America (New York: Random House, 1969); Thomas Merrill, Allen Ginsberg 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1969); Bill Morgan, I Celebrate Myself: The Somewhat Private Life 
of Allen Ginsberg (New York: Penguin, 2006); for the “Howl” trial see Bill Morgan and Nancy 
Peters, Eds. Howl on Trial: The Battle for Free Expression (San Francisco: City Lights 
Publishers, 2006).  
 Ginsberg’s importance as a poet and a cultural figure cannot be understated. As Barry 
Miles put it, writing about Ginsberg in 1989, “[H]e has become the most famous living poet on 
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earth, one of America’s best-known cultural ambassadors, his poetry translated into virtually 
every language. . . he changed the world a little.”106 Offering more along the same lines is 
biographer Michael Schumacher who states that, “[i]t is possible that Allen Ginsberg is the most 
widely traveled literary figure in history.”107 Schumacher goes on to claim that, “Ginsberg has 
evolved into as sort of living symbol of kindness and generosity, an artist sho has dared to make 
his own life a form of literature, opent to judgment and interpretation but never failing in its 
basic human honesty.”108 Ginsberg’s importance is as much as a symbol of himself (“Ginsberg”) 
as he is the author Ginsberg. For these two biographers at least, Ginsberg’s importance is always 
tied to his status as a symbolic figure, a living representation of the ideology of “counterculture” 
– for whatever time period Ginsberg might symbolize.109
From a communication and rhetoric standpoint, surprisingly little attention has been paid 
to Allen Ginsberg.  One of the only studies of Ginsberg is by Jonah Raskin, who seeks to, 
“explain what it was like for Ginsberg to write Howl – how he felt, what he was thinking, why he 
 For many scholars, the idea of 
Ginsberg’s figuration becomes larger than life. 
                                               
106 Miles, Barry. Ginsberg: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 533. 
107 Schumacher, Michael Dharma Lion: A Biography of Allen Ginsberg (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 678. 
108 Schumacher, 686. 
109 In this study I have little interest in addressing the beats as “counterculture” mostly because 
the term is not critical for rhetoricians  –  the only close reference would be Michael Warner, 
Publics and Counterpublics (New York: Zone Books, 2002). For the defining work on 
“counterculture” and its heuristic value see Dick Hebdige Subculture: The Meaning of Style 
(New York: Routledge, 1969). More interesting is the idea of “contraculture” as suggested by J. 
Milton Yinger, “Contraculture and Subculture” American Sociological Review 25, 5 (Oct 1960): 
625-635 which attempts what might be called a rhetorical understanding albeit from the 
sociology discipline. For Ginsberg specifically, see Anne Hartman, “Confessional 
Counterpublics in Frank O’Hara and Allen Ginsberg” Journal of Modern Literature 28 4 (2005) 
40-56. 
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wrote it and who influenced him.”110
Additionally, Raskin not only attends to the composition of Howl, but the reception of it 
as cultural myth.  This is an investigation into how Howl is read along with and through the 
rhetoric circulating at the time.  Raskin focuses his study on the invention and influence of Howl, 
although he never references it as rhetoric.  Raskin seems to be searching for a rhetorical way of 
describing the creation of Howl, but does not draw on rhetorical theory or criticism at all for his 
account.  Instead, he articulates the cultural and historical circumstances expertly. 
  Raskin is much more interested in a personal and narrative 
history of Howl than discussing its rhetorical dimensions.  However, Raskin provides some 
interesting insight into the topoi that Ginsberg included from his life and insights from fellow 
travelers he met before, during and after the initial public reading of Howl in 1956. 
Most importantly, Raskin examines Howl as a cultural moment instead of a literary one.  
He likens it to the discovery of a language – “In the act of writing Howl, he discovered the very 
language he needed – a language of everyday and of Judgment Day – a language of the mundane 
and the apocalyptic.”111
                                               
110 Raskin, American Scream, xxii. 
  Raskin’s study indicates a rich amount of material for communication 
scholars to investigate, and he makes a strong early attempt at framing what communication 
scholars can say about a figure such as Ginsberg.  However, this study focuses mainly on the 
historical exigencies of the development of Howl, and little attention is paid to the rhetorical 
workings of the text.  Kenneth Burke’s observation that, “we in cities rightly grow shrewd at 
appraising man-made institutions – but beyond these tiny concentration points of rhetoric and 
traffic, there lies the eternally unsolvable Enigma, the preposterous fact that both existence and 
nothingness are equally unthinkable,” makes rhetoric inevitable seems related to Ginsberg’s 
111 Raskin, American Scream, xxi. 
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attempt – at least in “howl” – to grapple with the unthinkable as it manifests itself in the 
everyday actions and reactions of society.112
Some scholars are not as positive or vocative as Raskin. Ben Lee argues that there is little 
new and a lot old in Ginsberg’s work: “To the extent that Ginsberg’s great poems of the 1950s, 
Howl above all, are prophecies of emergent movements and collectivities, they are also elegies 
for cherished pasts at risk of receding irretrievably, of being inconspicuously transformed and 
finally erased by narratives of progress that manage— by dint of historical victories—to limit the 
possibilities of the future.”
   
113  Lee is concerned that a full picture of where Ginsberg’s work 
stands might be obscured by flatly celebrating him as a visionary. Anne Hartman makes the same 
claim from the perspective of literature. She wishes to situate Ginsberg as a confessional poet, 
and points out that the influence, “exerted by the category needs to be situated within the context 
of a critical tradition linking confession with a form of transcendent lyricism associated with 
Romanticism.”114
For a broader understanding of Ginsberg, one has to look at the assessments from 
scholars of the Beat Generation as a whole. Allan Johnston seeks to explain the connections 
between the Beats and the 1960s counterculture via a system of shared economic and social 
theories between the writers.  Drawing on both the New York and San Francisco poetic and 
artistic movements of the 1950s, Johnston argues: 
 There’s a lot of old literary ideas as well as political in Ginsberg which cannot 
be dismissed in favor of the new or visionary potential of his work. 
From this perspective, an east-coast-centered, need-focused, secular vision of economic 
                                               
112 Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, Third ed. (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), 272. 
113 Ben Lee, “‘Howl and Other Poems’: Is there Old Left in these New Beats?” American 
Literature, 76, 2 (June 2004), 367. 
114 Hartman, “Confessional Counterpublics,” 41. 
 51 
realities—a viewpoint most strongly brought out in the writings of William S. 
Burroughs—transforms into a spiritualized attempt to escape from economic realities that 
reflects a more west-coast-centered, Buddhist-anarchic synthesis that perhaps receives its 
clearest philosophical expression in the writings of Kenneth Rexroth. These two 
perspectives create a dialectic that challenges popular economic and cultural 
assumptions, and the continuance of this dialectic into the 1960s and beyond forms a 
major part of the Beat link to the counterculture.115
 
 
Johnston clearly sees two distinct beat groupings here in relation to how they approach 
the economic realities of their time and place. The beats provided a dialectic of two different 
responses to the economic realities of the 1950s that extended at least for the next 10 years in the 
public sensibility, according to Johnston. 
Johnston concludes these shared economic and social theories were not realized by the 
Beats until the 1960s, since “Beat culture by its very nature lacked the theoretical and social 
underpinnings to develop the clarified economic or political oppositional stances that appeared in 
the 1960s counterculture. Only in retrospect, if at all, did the Beats see their lifestyle (including 
the alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, and petty thievery that it often involved) as a 
reaction against a seemingly aggressive and stifling social ethos.”116
Thus in spite of the fact that in the 1950s the Beats muted their specific political 
positions, their writings helped establish the grounds for an implicit ‘critique of the 
organized system’ that, as Paul Goodman wrote as early as 1960, ‘everybody in some 
sense agrees with.’ The Beat rejection of consumerist aspirations and the existing 
economic order helped open the way for a critical perspective on modernity that still 
influences those who feel alienated from the dominant culture. The frankness and honesty 
of this critique goes a long way toward explaining why Beat writing continues to resonate 
with those who react against our era of globalized marketing and encroaching 
  Since the Beats, according 
to Johnston, did not have a political conception of their work, it is an after-effect of their lifestyle 
that led their ideas to be significant in the 1960s: 
                                               
115 Allan Johnston, "Consumption, Addiction, Vision, Energy: Political Economies and Utopian 
Visions in the Writings of the Beat Generation," College Literature 32, no. 2 (2005): 104. 
116 Johnston, "Consumption, Addiction, Vision," 104. 
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environmental holocaust.117
 
 
For Johnston, the Beats’ system of values succeeds only through a 1960s enaction of hidden and 
politically muted personal opinions.  He traces back the politics of the 1960s counterculture in 
the statements, interviews, poems and texts of the primary Beat writers. 
Thinking of the language of the beats, Oliver Harris offers an economic perspective of 
the beats as writers through their letters. He argues that the longer view of the epistolary – 
something he feels has been understudied by scholars – complicates the public and private 
distinction of discourse in ways that make the “free-wheeling” view of the beats recalcitrant: “To 
say that the Beats – to prolong another generalization – invaded a well-policed public world with 
their wildly spontaneous private writing is to reify a categorical distinction that will not hold.”118
Harris is important for this study because of his observation that, “The Beats’ 
autobiographical impulse of self-expression therefore coincided with and was sustained by the 
epistolary dynamic of close communication.”  This dynamic, writing in the 1950s where the 
epistolary was perceived as being quickly eclipsed by alternative communication technologies, 
 
He points to the Rosenberg’s private letters to each other while awaiting death in prison as the 
prime example that demonstrates how the public operates upon the private construction of 
discourse, and how the private read back through the public confirmed the public suspicions that 
they were communist agents.  To argue that the beats are something new because they brought 
private voices into the public sphere is naïve.  
                                               
117 Johnston, "Consumption, Addiction, Vision," 122. 
118 Oliver Harris, “Cold War Correspondents: Ginsberg, Kerouac, Cassady, and the Political 
Economy of Beat Letters,” Twentieth Century Literature, 46, 2 (Summer 2000):171-192, 173. 
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“such practices become archaic, anachronisms informed by a certain nostalgia. . .”119
From the perspective of sociology, Mel van Elteren offers an amazingly thorough review 
of the ways in which the Beat Generation has been conceived as a social phenomenon.  Most 
interested in the socio-economic positioning of those members of mid-20th century U.S. society 
who called themselves “Beats,” van Elteren is not inattentive to the complexities of 
representation, dissemination and identity that the mediation of the Beats presents.  “It [The Beat 
Generation] entailed, in other words, a counterculture that was “jointly” produced by its 
members in tandem with the communications media and subcultural industries involved, aimed 
against mainstream mass culture in America.”
 The Beats 
were as influenced as anyone else in their read of various communicative methods.  They were 
not offering a pure point from which one could escape the pitfalls of the dominant 
communicative technologies or methods. They were, as I argue, attempting to carve a path 
between the old and the new, and offer a rhetorical method for speaking, communicating and 
engaging with people.  Other fields, such as the social sciences however, approach the beat 
phenomenon from the other direction – not from the beats but from the audience. 
120
                                               
119 Harris, “Cold War Correspondents,” 177. 
 Van Elteren’s argument that the “authors” of 
the movement are a blend of individual contributions and interpretations is much more insightful 
and rich than the attribution of the Beat Generation’s political or social values as derivatives of 
the individual authors associated with the movement.  This is accomplished by stretching the 
notion of “author” from the literary conception to the cultural one – that producers of media exist 
in a mediated environment, acting and reacting to the swirl of messages around them.  The 
“authors” of the Beat Generation then are not acting, but reacting when they produce texts that 
120 Mel van Elteren, "The Subculture of the Beats: A Sociological Revisit," Journal of American 
Culture 22, no. 3 (1999): 71. 
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define “generation.”  Van Eleteren is after the most complex and rewarding understanding of the 
members of the Beat Generation, but does not ignore the role of the various texts produced by 
Kerouac, Ginsberg and others: “The Beats were also creative in practicing and popularizing 
avant-garde styles like free-form ‘spontaneous writing,’ cut-ups and other forms of bricolage, as 
well as in their attempts to syncretize oral and literate forms of expression.  In their writings, 
they entertained a visceral relationship to literature, trying to reconnect language to the body, to 
the physiology of the writer.”121
This study gets very close to the important rhetorical elements of the Beat Generation, 
noting their incredible self-reflexivity in their invention and delivery of their rhetoric: “The Beats 
were involved in creating and generating mass-mediated images about themselves and, in return, 
responded to these depictions.”
  This will become an important insight in the beat rhetoric as the 
body becomes a key source of invention in the theory. 
122  The Beat Generation acts and reacts then to the “Beat 
Generation” as a symbol or symbolic system that, although partially created by the Beat writers, 
is also a shared authorship with society. The symbol then can serve as a site for the creation of 
new Beat texts:  “Despite the Beats’ avowals of individuality, the Beat spirit was very much a 
communal affair.  It distinguished itself by a strong intertextuality, manifested in the forms and 
media of dissemination that the Beats chose.  This also entailed self-celebration; the beat 
generation ended up spectacularizing itself, and offering itself to a larger audience. The beat 
sensibility was characterized as well by a mixing of the senses, and various manifestations of 
multimediality.”123
                                               
121 van Elteren, "The Subculture of the Beats," 95. 
 Van Elteren comes closest to appreciating the Beats as practitioners of 
rhetoric, but does not reference the rhetorical tradition at all.  His interest is in the economic and 
122 ———, "The Subculture of the Beats," 95. 
123 ———, "The Subculture of the Beats," 95. 
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social differences between youth who self-identify through interviews as being “Beat.” This is 
helpful, but at a bit of a distance from the consideration of the beats’ work as rhetorical theory.  
Each of these studies highlight an interesting or valuable understanding of the Beats, but 
all fall short of providing the understanding that the Beats were developing a rhetorical system 
for articulating meaning in the nexus of the ideology and anxiety of the 1950s.  In this study, I 
will argue that they offer this rhetoric through their poetic and literary production, generating a 
system to arrange and articulate belief within a society that seemed to deal with this anxiety by 
offering limited rhetorical options. 
2.3 APPROACHING THE BEAT GENERATION RHETORICALLY 
As stated previously, I approach the beat writers Kerouac and Ginsberg from the perspective of 
rhetoric.  What I hope to do is not to unseat or dismiss any of the work mentioned in this chapter, 
but to contribute to it.  For leaving out the rhetorical dimension of Kerouac and Ginsberg is to 
leave out the primary motivating factor for both of these men to create poetic work.  Both of 
them, as I will argue in later chapters, were deeply concerned with the state of human 
communication and rhetoric in the 1950s U.S.  I choose Kerouac and Ginsberg as a starting point 
because many other scholars have attended to them as central figures within the “beat 
generation.”  Another reason is that Ginsberg’s and Kerouac’s work – “Howl” and On the Road 
– are considered as central texts to the beat generation by scholars and audiences alike.  This is 
not to dismiss the contributions of other beat writers, but to begin the process of analysis with 
rather uncontroversial, centric texts to the movement. Selection of other figures within the 
movement might foreground the debate about the beat generation “club” and not the idea that 
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there is a theory being developed here. The basics of the theory, constructed around central 
figures to the movement, can then be tested with and against the writings of numerous texts 
labeled “beat” to further understanding. 
I will attempt to sketch out the alternative rhetoric that the writers suggest through their 
work. This alternative rhetoric is best understood through highlighting key terms or central ideas 
around which the beat rhetoric orbits.  The first term that the beat rhetoric is concerned with is 
“mediation.”  The beats are deeply concerned that the communicative experience be authentic. 
The rhetoric developed from Ginsberg’s and Kerouac’s works will show worry that human 
beings are not connecting with one another and are instead relying on artificial discourse, 
politeness, and material objects to substitute for this connection.  The beat rhetoric attempts to 
structure and craft a method for reaching authentic communication.   
Of course, there is a certain amount of irony and naiveté to the idea of structuring a 
method to reach a moment of authentic connection. This is not lost on the beats. They are not 
completely oblivious to the complexities involved in such an undertaking, as many of the 
scholars above have noted.  What they offer is careful attention to utterance under the guise of 
inattention and free-wheeled rambling. Key to this element of the Beat rhetoric is the strategic 
rejection of conventions of grammar, spelling, and punctuation, as well as the conventions of 
traditional genre.  The Beats, as will be seen, play with genre, often marking their texts with 
strong elements of different genre while signaling from the onset that the text belongs to one 
particular genre.  All of this is in order to call attention to alternative modes of arguing, 
communicating and conversing, which although are not “pure” communication, are argued as 
better modes of interaction than the status quo. 
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The second term for the beat rhetoric is “experience.”  Beat rhetoric’s “subjects” are the 
material and subjective lived experiences of the authors, or every day people.  The canon of 
invention is located in the lived moment.  Kerouac and Ginsberg both believed that “sketching,” 
or writing down moments, impulses and surroundings as they went through their daily lives were 
the way to approach the “doing” of literary creation.   The function of the beat rhetoric is then to 
answer the question, “How do I bring you somewhere where you can’t be?” – the rhetor finds the 
stuff of arguments in his or her experiences, then later is required to bring those experiences 
across “as experienced.” Not an easy task, but the beat rhetorical theory offers some additional 
topoi to the traditional modes, as well as refigures some of the more familiar. 
On the level of the more familiar, Jack Kerouac refigures kairos, the sophistic idea that 
“there can never be more than a contingent and provisional management of the present 
opportunity,” or “discovers in every new occasion a unique opportunity to confer meaning on the 
world.”124
The rhetor who operates mainly with the awareness of kairos responds spontaneously to 
the fleeting situation at hand, speaks on the spur of the moment, and addresses each 
occasion in its particularity, its singularity, its uniqueness.  In this sense, (s)he is both a 
hunter and a maker of unique opportunities, always ready to address improvisationally 
and confer meaning on new and emerging situations.
  The Beat rhetoric is the art of finding the everyday lived moments of experience and 
articulating, without adding to, the experience for those who will listen.  As John Poulakos puts 
it: 
125
 
 
However, if the meaning conferred upon an emerging situation is new, the rhetor must also 
prepare the audience for the kairotic moment – the audience must be ready to see and recognize 
                                               
124 Eric Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will-to-Invent (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1987), 13-14. 
125 John Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1995), 61. 
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a moment as emergent, and then be able to recognize the rhetor’s handling of the moment as an 
appropriate, and hopefully masterful, grappling with the event.  The rhetor’s words must be, in 
every sense of the phrase, well-spoken: 
If what gets said on the spur of the moment happens to fall on receptive ears and make 
unexpected sense, it will eventually find its place in the audience’s standard linguistic 
currency, and thus become part of their storehouse of appropriate responses, ready to be 
recalled at some future occasion.  In other words, what is spoken in and through the 
awareness of kairos can, in time, turn into one of the categories of to prepon.126
 
 
There are, of course, other understandings of kairos that should be considered. James Kinneavy 
tracks kairos from pre-sophistic understandings in Hesiod and Homer through to modern 
understandings of it in Aristotle.  For Kinneavy, the concept is centered around “right timing” 
and “proper measure.” This gets re-interpreted through the ancient world into the senses of 
“timeliness” and “appropriateness.”127 Additionally, Roger Thompson locates the idea in an 
American context when he describes Emerson’s work as, “articulating the need for kairos, a 
moment of spiritual insight and propriety, in the rhetorical and literary arts.”128
                                               
126 Poulakos, Sophicstical Rhetoric, 62 
 Emerson, 
according to Thompson not only called for this moment, but saw himself as the leader of the 
moment. Kairos as a concept for the beats is best defined as an awareness that any moment could 
be “momentous,” so careful and cautious attention should be taken to all surroundings. Jack 
Kerouac’s writing highlights the importance of this concept in On the Road. In that book, each 
127 James Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and Modern Theory,” in Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays 
in History, Theory and Praxis, Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, Eds. (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2002), 60. 
128 Roger Thompson, “Ralph Waldo Emerson and the American Kairos,” in Rhetoric and 
Kairos: Essays in History, Theory and Praxis, Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, Eds. (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2002), 187. 
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moment, if not properly attended to, could become disastrous in the larger project of making 
meaning out of life experience. 
The importance of “experience” as a key term for the beat rhetoric exists not only as an 
analogue to the traditional canon of invention, but also with delivery and style as well.  The beat 
text’s creation is “an experience” worthy of its own accolades, and the engagement with the text 
is a moment of deep revelation, as will be shown in the analysis.  “Experience” though, and the 
moments of “experience” are not moments that come, but are created moments.  This is the way 
I argue that the kairotic plays in the Beat rhetoric.  As it will be shown, many of the Beats edited 
and attended to their work, and did not present it as a “raw” draft. But the signs, and the 
articulation of the “draft” were carefully crafted.  A consideration of kairos as a rhetorical move, 
and not a supernatural or “apparent” phenomenon outside of the boundaries of the narrative, will 
show how the Beat writers were quite savvy about attending to their moment as well as crafting 
the “moment-ness.”  This approach, once linked to the sketches of the everyday as inductive 
traces of the “profound,” consist of the basic compositional elements of their rhetoric. 
The final term I want to consider is “body.”  The beat rhetoric is very attentive to the 
limits of the human body as a cite of productivity instead of restriction. Emotions, sickness, and 
states of emotional or sensory ambiguity are all accepted as valid modes of creating and 
understanding.  As I said earlier, the beat rhetoric strategically rejects the traditions of grammar 
and genre.  Part of that strategic rejection is to replace those conventions with those of the 
body.129
                                               
129 Rhetoric and the body consists of a copious amount of scholarship. See Barbara Stafford, 
Body Criticism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991) for the creation of body metaphors from the 
Enlightenment; Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994) for an analysis of how the body, not subordinate to the mind, 
  A “body” of text would conceivably have analogous limits as a human body.  For 
 60 
example, the appropriate (kairotic) length of an utterance would be a human breath instead of the 
grammatically correct sentence -- composed for the apprehension of the ear instead of the eye.  
This opens events such as Kerouac’s famous typewritten “scroll” of On the Road as central to the 
construction of his novel as much as his spontaneous prose.  In the beat rhetoric, the rhetor and 
the text blur, the limitations of the body or the profundity of overwhelming emotion being central 
to not only the meaning, but the crafting of the meaning explicitly.   
Since the “grammar book” of the Beat rhetoric is the human body, and the appropriate 
subject matter is the kairotic apprehension of the true human subject in everyday material 
existence,  the expression of this moment cannot appear to be edited, but must be directly 
communicated, it appears that the beat rhetoric is a fairly anti-intellectual theory of discourse 
production.  However, what the beat rhetoric ends up doing is transforming the audience.  
Instead of everyone being a potential audience member, everyone is also a potential rhetor.  The 
tenets of the Beat Generation’s rules of appropriate textual production are a percieved stripping 
away of things such as skill, talent, and careful wording.  Of course, these elements are still 
there, but are strategically blanked in favor of an “absence” of particular method.  It is a 
popularization of an art that, in the 1950s, was the province of the University elite.  According to 
Edward Brunner, the concurrent rise of both G.I. Bill University students as well as the first 
M.F.A. poetry graduates teaching in Universities pushed the New Criticism not just as one way 
of understanding a poem, but as the method of poetic “packaging” and audience “unpacking” 
complicated coded meanings in each stanza. “The packaging of formalist devices openly 
                                                                                                                                                       
becomes a site for the rethinking of dichotomies; Gail Weiss, Body Images (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) for examination from multiple theoretical perspectives as to the influence of 
the image of the body on daily thought and action.  In my chapter on Ginsberg I will offer more 
in depth discussion of rhetoric and the body. 
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displayed the poem as labor-intensive, an exquisitely balanced verbal machine crafted by 
specialists in the language arts.”130
The method that I will use to inductively construct the beat rhetoric will be rhetorical 
criticism. Rhetorical criticism as a method is, to say the least, difficult to pin down. As Jennifer 
DeWinter puts it, “everyone seems to have a slightly different version, and that difference is both 
necessary and significant.”
  The Beats, therefore, can be easily seen as hedging against 
this type of poetry with their own poetic production, but more importantly returning to an 
understanding of poetry as a persuasive, argumentative discourse, not just the plaything of the 
verbal elites. 
131  She follows this up with a definition that appears as circular as it 
is conservative – “criticism that attends to rhetoric.”132
Of course this means that rhetorical criticism isn’t bound to many specific methods. 
Rhetorical critics have relied on everything from Aristotle to Lacan for theoretical tools to 
unpack and critique the functioning of a text.
  What she means is that rhetorical 
criticism is the critical act of revealing the rhetoricity, or the rhetorical moves, modes and 
understandings that make a text “mean.” 
133
                                               
130 Brunner, Cold War Poetry, 6. 
 Some of the overarching understandings of what 
rhetorical criticism is are best reached by rejecting the question of “what is” in favor of “what 
does it seek?” Contemporary rhetorical criticism and rhetorical critics use a variety of methods 
131 Jennifer DeWinter, “A Bibliographic Synthesis of Rhetorical Criticism,” Rhetoric Review 25, 
4 (2006):388-407, 389. 
132 Jennifer DeWinter, “A Bibliographic Synthesis,” 390. 
133 For the former see Herbert A. Wilchelns, “The Literary Criticism of Oratory,” in Methods of 
Rhetorical Criticism, Robert L. Scott and Bernard L. Brock, eds. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972), also Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: Ronald Press, 
1948). For the latter see Barbara A. Biesecker, “Rhetorical Studies and the ‘New’ 
Psychoanalysis: What’s the Real Problem? Or Framing the Problem of the Real,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 84 (1998): 222-259. 
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and critique myriad objects but seek an understanding of the meaning of the text that would give 
the author no particular privilege over the possible meanings of the text. Since rhetorical 
criticism’s definition is by definition contingent upon what the critic thinks rhetoric is, it might 
be best if I locate my understanding of the method within some of the scholarship. 
The method of looking at texts and then determining how to criticize them  has been 
referred to as “Generative Criticism” and is described as finding an interesting text that seems to 
defy a straightforward, simple explanation for the reaction the text apparently generates.  “This 
kind of criticism is generative in that you generate units of analysis or an explanation from your 
artifact rather than from previously developed, formal methods of criticism.”134
This form of criticism attempts to come to terms with the values that brought the critic to 
the text, and made the critic feel that it would be valuable to criticize the text:  “One discovers 
that a particular object holds interest over against any number of other potential objects; one tries 
to understand both the object and one’s interest in it; and one decides what to say about it.  The 
complete effort we call criticism.”
  Therefore, 
generic criticism begins with the text, and attempts to find answers to the questions surrounding 
the meaning, or readings of the artifact in question.  
135
Rhetorical criticism is the most apt method to approach the creation of the beat rhetoric 
because it not only calls attention to the rhetoricity of the texts in question – “It can work to 
 In the case of this project, the interest lies in understanding 
how these works could be understood as theoretical. The works are not only to be read and 
enjoyed as they are, but they also offer a method for creating texts as well. 
                                               
134 Sonja K. Foss, Rhetorical Criticism:  Exploration & Practice, Third ed. (Long Grove, IL: 
Waveland Press, Inc., 2004). 
135 Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins, "Rhetoric, Society and the Critical Response," The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 58, no. 4 (1972). 
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understand components of rhetoric and how they work in conjunction with or against one 
another” -- but also can serve as an argument for how a text should be viewed.136 Rhetorical 
criticism does not just criticize, but advocates for a reading.  “[U]seful rhetorical criticism, 
whatever else it may be, must function as an argument.”137  What is most important about this 
understanding of rhetorical criticism is that it brings to the forefront the idea that humans are 
involved in any critical appraisal of meaning: “One should never forget that it is a person who 
makes an inferential leap, perceives a rationale, makes a choice, regulates an uncertainty, and 
risks a confrontation.”138
I will rhetorically criticize several key texts in order to advocate for a reading of the beat 
texts as more than contributions to American literary production, but contributions to the ideas of 
communication and rhetoric. I will advocate a reading of Ginsberg’s and Kerouac’s most well-
known works as not only descriptive but prescriptive – they offer a way to approach and make 
meaning of the world. 
 This posits the understanding of meaning as a negotiated process 
between human beings, who can and will view meaning differently and will justify their 
understandings.  Rhetorical criticism can be seen then as criticism that attends to the rhetorical 
(meaning-making) elements of the text, and argues how to best understand how they work given 
the context, text and situatedness of the text. 
  I will investigate Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl,” as well as Jack Kerouac’s On the Road, 
Diane DiPrima’s Memoirs of a Beatnik and Amiri Baraka’s “Somebody Blew Up America.” 
These texts are chosen for a few reasons. The first reason is that each of these texts has been 
                                               
136 Jennifer DeWinter, “A Bibliographic Synthesis,” 391. 
137 Wayne Brockriede, “Rhetorical Criticism as Argument” The Quarterly Journal of Speech 60, 
2 (April 1974): 165. 
138 Wayne Brockriede, “Rhetorical Criticism as Argument,” 166. 
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studied before by other scholars as representative of “beat literature.”  The second reason is that 
these texts are arguably the first beat texts, the ones that established the paradigm for the creation 
of other beat texts.  There is a lot of debate about the attribution of this term, and in this study I 
do not wish to engage with any dispute about authenticity.  I want to focus on these texts because 
of their perceived centrality to the beat movement. This does not mean that there will be or could 
be beat texts that offer different or similar rhetorical theories. I will argue that some of these texts 
(such as Baraka’s) are influenced by the rhetorical theory offered by the texts I am analyzing. 
The importance of this analysis is that texts that are considered to be centric to the beat 
movement can be read theoretically. And that is important for a couple of reasons. 
Seeing beat writing as theoretical points to an understanding of these writers as 
concerned with not only social norms and values, but the way these social norms and values are 
constructed.  Attention to these societal assumptions, usually hidden from direct enunciation via 
shared ideology, is important for those interested in the role of rhetoric in our society.  Such 
information is crucial for those interested in making political interventions – those who must 
choose how and to whom their intervention will be addressed.  In the next section I will sketch a 
short history of how intertwined poetry and rhetoric are as discourses in order to lay the ground 
for a fuller appreciation of what Kerouac, and Ginsberg are up to in their work. 
2.4 A BRIEF HISTORY OF POETICS AND RHETORIC 
Jeffrey Walker’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity is the most comprehensive examination of the 
development of rhetoric and poetics from ancient Athens to the beginnings of modernity in the 
middle ages. Walker’s argument is as simple in its formulation as it is revolutionary in its 
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implication:  The oft-held distinction between poetry and rhetoric does not obtain along 
historical and textual lines.  Walker understands rhetoric, “in more or less sophistic terms as 
centrally and fundamentally an art of epideictic argumentation /persuasion that derives originally 
from the poetic tradition and that extends, in applied versions of itself, to the practical discourses 
of public and private life.”139 Rhetoric did not rise out of the democratization of Athens, nor did 
poetry rise from the need to beautify or celebrate knowledge produced via other discourses.  
Poetry and rhetoric are branches of the same discursive practice, a public argumentative and 
suasory discourse that has its roots in ancient epic poets such as Homer and Hesiod. “[T]he 
conventional poetry/rhetoric distinctions of the modern mind are more likely to confuse than to 
illuminate our understanding of oral and archaic discourse practices.  We can gain a much more 
intelligible understanding by instead thinking broadly in terms of epideictic and pragmatic 
eloquence – as I have defined those terms here – and by considering the relationship between 
them.”140
Compare this understanding of rhetoric with another classical rhetorician, Charles Sears 
Baldwin, who argues, “[r]hetoric and poetic connoted two fields of composition, two habits of 
conceiving and ordering, two typical movements. The movement of the one the ancients saw as 
primarily intellectual, a progress from idea to idea determined logically; that of the other, as 
primarily imaginative, a progress from image to image determined emotionally.  This distinction 
is more fundamental than that of so-called literary forms.”
 For Walker, the role of rhetoric is one that has always been public and argumentative, 
but alters its approach to the culture and the situation at hand.  
141
                                               
139 Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), viii. 
  Baldwin argues that this difference 
140 Walker, 11. 
141 Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1959), 3. 
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in the two forms of invention was more habitual than generic, and thought of as a semi-
permeable membrane.  Audiences and authors understood that texts of one type could easily blur 
to become texts of another type, because the “habitual movement” between the two forms was 
accepted by ancient rhetors and audiences.  
Walker, on the other hand, argues that in early Greece, the discourse that we call poetic 
did not exist separate or apart from the discourse we call rhetoric. The best distinction, he argues, 
was between a form of discourse known as epidiktikon and pragmatikon.  “[T]he distinction 
between the epideiktikon and the pragmatikon comes down to this:  the epideiktikon is the 
rhetoric of belief and desire; the pragmatikon the rhetoric of practical civic business, a rhetoric 
that necessarily depends on and appeals to the beliefs/desires that epideictic cultivates.”142
In Hesiod’s world, the aoidos’ poetic/epideictic discourse is the mode of suasion that 
both establishes and mnemonically sustains the culturally authoritative codes of value 
and the paradigms of eloquence from which the pragmatic discourse of the basileus 
derives its ‘precedents,’ its language, and its power. The poetic/epideictic discourse of the 
aoidos is, in sum, what might be called the ‘primary’ form of ‘rhetoric’ in that world, 
while the pragmatic discourse of the basileus is an applied, ‘secondary’ projection of that 
rhetoric into the particular forums and dispute occasions of civic life.
  This 
has the effect of reversing the traditional understanding of rhetoric as an art or practice of civic 
engagement, and places rhetoric as the primary mode of engagement with the swirl of 
apprehendable phenomena we commonly call “the world.” Walker explains this distinction as it 
was for Hesiod using his categories of the aoidos – the eloquence necessary at a festival or 
public gathering, and the basileus, that discourse which is used in assemblies, councils, and 
courts, and which depends on the cultural store of the aoidos for its eloquence: 
143
 
 
                                               
142 Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, 10. 
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It is this ancient traditional distinction that is transformed in the 4th and 5th centuries by 
the development of society toward the polis, and the development of writing. During this 
transformation, more modern conceptions of poetry and rhetoric developed.  According to 
Walker, this distinction came as a result of poetry engaging with the cultural concerns of life in a 
polis.  Poets engaged modern problems using the well of traditional forms and altering them to 
suit their needs: “[T]he elegiac, iambic, melic, and dramatic poets of the seventh to fifth 
centuries B.C. were what we might call the ‘modernists’ of their time – appropriating, altering 
and redefining the tradition they had received from ancient aoidoi like Hesiod and Homer and 
projecting that redefined tradition as a new poetry into the cultural debates and epideictic forums 
of the developing polis.”144 The distinction between the ancient forms and the modern of the 
poetic was a cause of the rise of the term poiêsis, which means a “making” or a “doing,” and, as 
Walker points out, is an easy slide into the idea of “making up” something – anything from a 
story to perhaps a lie.145
It is this distinction between discourses where the beat rhetorical theory can be situated. It 
isn’t that the beats have found some new and unique literary formula, as a simplistic read of their 
work might indicate.  The beats return to this very discursive distinction and blur it – they offer 
serious “makings” within the form that is habitually recognized as the “makings” of something 
fantastic, non-pragmatic, and not political.  The beat rhetorical theory offers the style of the non-
serious making, but offers arguments about serious pragmatic and political concerns within it.  It 
is one of the key elements of a “canonical” read of the beat rhetoric that will be seen. 
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Walker argues that key interpretations of this ancient tradition along the lines of dialectic 
and grammar are responsible for our contemporary understandings of what counts as poetry and 
what rhetoric is “good for.”146
Plato’s engagement with poetry is often ham-handed into a complete rejection of poetry 
due to poetry’s lack of fidelity to truth or reality. But as Gene Fendt and David Rozema point 
out, Aristotle claimed we should read Plato’s work as if it were a kind of poetry.
  Before I follow Walker to the more contemporary understandings 
of poetry and rhetoric, I would like to spend a few pages engaging in my own analysis of Plato’s 
idea of the role of poetics, and Cicero’s arguments about the relationship between the “Orator” 
and the poet.  Walker does not spend any time analyzing the Republic, in which Plato is quite 
specific as to what poetry is, and what it should be, which I will later argue appears in the 
cultural sense of poetry in 1950s America.  Walker does spend quite a good amount of time on 
Cicero, but focuses primarily on Cicero’s understanding of the complicated relationship between 
poetics and rhetoric.  I would like to attend to the relation between the poet and the Orator, as 
this becomes part of the conception of the poet’s appropriate place in society. 
147
                                               
146 Walker, 311. 
  Examination 
of Plato’s Republic, in which Socrates creates a utopian state in a discussion with his 
interlocutors, reveals a much more complex relationship of poetry to other types of discourse. In 
Plato’s estimation, poetry is not to be excommunicated from society but refigured in order to tap 
the benefits of its mimetic powers.  This refiguring involves a complicated and deeply critical 
reading of Republic as well as some of Plato’s other dialogues.  What is at stake is a notion of 
poetry that is essential to understanding human relations – a reading of poetry that the beats 
share.   
147 Gene Fendt and David Rozema. Platonic Errors (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1998), 7. 
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For example, in Book Two, Socrates begins a discussion of the proper training and 
education of the Guardians, the class of people who will protect the Republic via soundness of 
mind and body. After establishing that traditional education always should begin with training in 
the arts, and that there are two major categories of discourse – the true and untrue, Socrates then 
critiques poetry focusing on the ability of the poetic to influence and shape the mind: “The young 
cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not, and the beliefs they acquire at that age 
are hard to expunge and usually remain unchanged. That may be the reason why it is most 
important that the first stories they hear should be well told and dispose them to virtue.”148
In Book Ten of Republic, Socrates addresses what sort of poetic content is appropriate, 
and turns his attention to the content of poetic arts – imitation.  Socrates argues that poetry, along 
with painting is primarily an imitative art that displays only the image of the thing it makes, not 
the thing itself. “Imitative art, then, is far removed from the truth and that is why, it seems, it can 
make everything, because it touches only a small part of each thing, and that an image.”
  Since 
the poetic can shape belief, we must be cautious with it, as it can lay the groundwork for a 
virtuous being. 
149  
Much like a man wandering about with a mirror and claiming to have created plants, buildings 
and animals by reflecting them, the poet is a simpleton who “cannot distinguish between 
knowledge, ignorance and imitation.”150
Socrates suggests that if the poet knew his subject matter, that he would choose not to 
write imitative poetry about it, but instead “devote himself to actions than to the imitation of 
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them,” and “leave behind many fine actions as memorials of himself and be eager to be the 
subject of a eulogy rather than the author of it.”151
The relationship here is more blurred and difficult than it appears. Mimesis, which is 
defined by Plato to be “the activity of the representational artist,” is a serious threat to the 
stability of the state.
  Plato is pushing the now familiar distinction 
between action and “mere” words that is to haunt our understandings of rhetoric and poetry well 
beyond ancient Athens. The move made here seems to push the poetic discourse to a lower 
importance than human action, or the discourse of good human action that Socrates is offering 
philosophically.   
152 Plato has Socrates argue against it pretty forcefully. Socrates warns that 
any representational art can easily lead to imitations in the political sphere which threaten the 
stability of the state. “Plato’s theory of mimesis is very much a theory of political life. The 
imitator is not just a bad craftsman but a danger to the health of the republic; mimesis is not just 
a matter of stories and pictures but a problem for the nature of humanity itself.”153
It is this same concern from 4th century Athens that was present in the beats’ political 
environment. Fears of communist spies that “imitated” Americans, prodded by the anxiety driven 
by the power of the atom bomb and sustained by the McCarthy hearings, made people skeptical 
of appearance.  It was not just the public, but the beats as well who expressed concern with 
“mere” appearance and sought something deeper out of 1950s America. “People never talk of the 
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things, the time and night and bigness, that separate them,” wrote Jack Kerouac in his journals as 
he puzzled over how to write to his alienated audience.154
But Plato was more saavy about the relationship than he is given credit for. Another way 
of reading concerns with imitation in Republic is that it is a ruse, designed primarily as a 
demonstration of the type of internal discipline that would make hierarchical government 
unnecessary: “The usual authoritarian interpretations of Republic completely disregard the 
literary cues, pedagogical technique, poetic effect and ethical import of Socrates’ discussion and 
so are perfect misreadings.”
 
155 What is suggested instead is that Republic is an example of what 
sort of critical approach would be necessary in thinking and teaching to make an anarchy 
functional. “This text is a model of his [Socrates] constant internal dialogue, which both 
empowers his peculiar way of teaching and is the source and goal of his anarchic politics.”156
Why is Plato’s understanding of the poetic important to the establishment of the beat 
rhetorical theory? Plato’s view not only relegates the poetic to a particular place because of its 
danger as a discourse, but also realizes that it is inevitably going to exist. His attempts to weaken 
it, or to put poetry in a subordinate role to human action are replicated in his attacks on rhetoric. 
Poetry and rhetoric are therefore united together in a different way than what Walker indicated. 
I’m not saying that Walker’s assessment is wrong, but that perhaps the relationship of rhetoric 
and poetry was and is still confusing. A variety of arguments and social beliefs keep them 
 If 
this interpretation is accepted, what is the role of mimesis and poetics in Republic? The answer is 
that Plato is practicing a poetics himself as a demonstration of its power.  
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propped up as distinct and definite entities, but upon closer examination, the discourses blur.  
What we find in the beat rhetoric is an acceptance of discursive instability.  This acceptance is 
conveyed through delivery practices, inventional practices, and a number of other specific 
approaches that will be detailed in the analysis.  An attempt to construct a beat rhetoric might 
allow us to see the beats as returning to this early notion of the poetic, and help us understand 
their writing in a different light. 
Another example from the classical canon worth considering due to his influence on 
rhetoric is Cicero. Cicero’s De Oratore is an investigation along much more pragmatic lines than 
Plato as to the condition, capabilities and status of the rhetor. For Cicero, the poetic becomes a 
key element in the education of the good orator/statesman. As Cicero argues, even the concerns 
of an attorney require the sensibility of a poet in their execution: 
Where other things of greater importance are concerned, fidelity, duty to our clients, and 
earnestness in discharging that duty; we are so much moved by such considerations, that 
even while we defend the merest strangers we can not regard them as strangers, if we 
wish to be thought honest men ourselves. But, as I said, that this may not appear 
surprising in us, what can be more fictitious than poetry, than theatrical representations, 
than the argument of a play? . . . I have often heard that no man can be a good poet . . . 
without ardor of imagination and the excitement of something similar to phrensy. 
[sic]”157
 
 
Even the client, who one might barely know in a fiduciary relationship, requires a particular 
passion in the stage of a court of law to be successful honestly and ethically with representing 
them before the jury.  The good poet, in order to convey his representations, must employ the 
same energies.  As John Dugan notes, this was not a simple matter of class or desire on Cicero’s 
part to have an aesthetically pleasing understanding of the rhetor.  “Cicero’s use of the epidictic 
mode stands as an exemplary case of how a literary form could interact with Roman political 
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reality to reveal the potentialities and limitations of attempts to shape politics through cultural 
means.”158
As Jeffrey Walker persuasively argues, “Cicero’s perfect orator is one who knows the 
discourse of philosophy – though he need not follow the school philosophers into their abstruse 
speculations, which he, like Isocrates, considers useless, and he is more likely to focus on 
questions of moral and civic wisdom. But what chiefly distinguishes this perfect orator from the 
philosopher is his possession of a virtually poetic stylistic power.”
  Cicero was interested in combining different forms of discourse to either reject or 
advance changes in the political or cultural spheres. Since one of the goals of the beat rhetoric 
might be to develop such ends, Cicero’s claims about the nature of rhetoric and its relationship to 
the poetic should be investigated. 
159
The poets must also be studied; an acquaintance must be formed with history; the writers 
and teachers in all the liberal arts and sciences must be read, and turned over, and must, 
for the sake of exercise, be praised, interpreted, corrected, censured, refuted; you must 
dispute on both sides of every question; and whatever may seem maintainable on any 
point must be brought forward and illustrated. . .A certain intellectual grace must also be 
extracted from every kind of refinement, with which, as with salt, every oration must be 
seasoned.
 The poets get a key 
mention in the list that Cicero, through one of his characters in De Oratore, voices as the 
curriculum for the good orator: 
160
 
 
Poetic, therefore is the source of the orator’s ability to refine his words, making them “palatable” 
as every oration must contain some seasoning – a reversal of the Platonic desire to rid discourse 
of any seasoning.  It does seem reasonable to see the poetic as the site of eloquence for the 
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orator; a “spice cabinet” where one can choose pinches of language to flavor one’s oration.  But 
Cicero does not limit the poetic to only the auxiliary when it comes to rhetoric:  
What reason is there why an orator should not speak most eloquently on those matters of 
which he shall have gained a knowledge for a certain purpose and occasion? For the poet 
is nearly allied to the orator; being somewhat more restricted in numbers, but less 
restrained in choice of words, yet in many kinds of embellishment his rival and almost 
equal, in one respect, assuredly, nearly the same, that he circumscribes or bounds his 
jurisdiction by no limits, but reserves to himself full right to range whenever he pleases 
with the same ease and liberty.161
 
 
Cicero separated poetry from rhetoric, of which he distinguished “the parade of declamation” 
from “oratory,” which one could participate in after, “having been instructed in all liberal 
knowledge.”162 However, after closer examination it appears that the poet and the rhetor are 
engaged in the same sort of action – offering eloquent words upon human actions, affairs, and 
situations bound by occasion and incident. Both arts offer understanding, framing, and sense to 
phenomena for human beings with little difference: “[t]hough employed about the same thoughts 
and words, yet admits of the greatest variations; and not so that some speakers are to be censured 
and others commended, but that those who are allowed to merit praise, merit it for different 
excellences.  This is fully exemplified in poets, who have the nearest affinity to orators. . .”163
                                               
161 Cicero, On Oratory, 24. 
  
Poets, like orators, are praised for differences in their abilities, yet still constitute the same 
whole.  No one praises an orator for the purity of their copy, but instead, for the fidelity of their 
words to the occasion, the time and the situation.  Poets are never praised for mimicry, but 
instead for capturing a moment, scene or feeling in words “much like” a previous poet might 
162Cicero, On Oratory, 24. 
163 Cicero, On Oratory, 199. 
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have. Jeffrey Walker takes this portion of Cicero’s argument to further unite Ciceronian 
rhetorical theory with the poetic: 
There is an undercurrent in Cicero’s argument suggesting that epideictic discourse is the 
realm of highest eloquence – where the rhetor can engage most fully with grand 
conceptions, and can approximate most nearly the ‘supreme’ poetic power of rhythmic 
eloquence, while performing upon the stage of public, civic mores.164
 
 
Walker’s assessment of Cicero indicates that poetry and rhetoric at their best is as a fusion – a 
public, performed art of language that allows for the re-conceptualization of societal values while 
standing upon their brilliance. The concern for misrepresentation, an argument we examined 
earlier in Plato’s fears of mimetic poetry and rhetoric, is dismissed by Cicero through the 
strength of rhetoric-poetic’s emotional power. As Cicero remarks,  
And that it may not appear to you extraordinary and astonishing that a man should so 
often be angry, so often grieve, and be so often excited by eery [sic] passion of the mind, 
especially in other men’s concerns, there is such force, let me assure you, in those 
thoughts and sentiments which you apply, handle, and discuss in speaking, that there is 
no occasion for simulation or deceit; for the very nature of the language which is adopted 
to move the passions of others moves the orator himself in a greater degree than any one 
of those who listen to him.165
 
 
The act of misrepresentation or misdirection could happen in someone who was not an 
“orator,” but in oratory the power of language itself as delivered from the position of the Orator 
makes misrepresentation impossible.  There can be no disconnect between the speaker and his 
powerful words – he must believe them in order for them to have suasory power in the first 
place. 
Cicero though was not myopic in his studies. He was interested in a great many of the 
arts, and attempted to write some poetry of his own, as well as translate some of the Greek epics 
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into Latin. Although his techniques and skill with the translation of the poems is good 
technically, overall his poetry was “intellectually empty” and failed “not because he was a bad 
poet, but because he was a good Roman.”166
What’s the connection between Cicero and the beat rhetoric? First, we still see the 
presence of concern in Cicero with the power of poetic discourse. Its status is not clear. It has 
some of the powers of oration, and some of its own powers, but they do blend. The fear of 
misrepresentation is linked with poetics. It is these gaps and fears about the role of poetic 
discourse that are still present in the beats’ work. This connection is not an attempt to argue for a 
direct lineage. It is only an attempt to indicate how deep the confused position of poetic 
discourse runs. It is this confusion that the beats saw as a place from which to speak their view of 
what America and American should be. 
  
I offer this broad-brush historical survey as a backdrop for the American poetic and 
rhetorical dynamics that I will cover in more detail in the next chapter, where I discuss Allen 
Ginsberg’s contribution to the Beat Generation’s rhetorical praxis.  This broad historical context 
will help demonstrate a different understanding of the beat writers.  It was not that they 
supported an “anything goes” philosophy of human action and belief; a complete upending of the 
cart of poetic or literary understanding.  It was quite the contrary: The Beats were embracing a 
poetic tradition that included the rhetorical, making them much more conservative in a larger 
historical sense – putting Ginsberg and Kerouac as “conservative” if one considers a view of 
poetic discourse more in line with Hesiod than the 1950s view.  This view of poetry is one that 
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we can use productively to understand how poems are encountered and understood by readers 
and listeners. 
For a more modern approach to the relationship of rhetoric and poetry, I turn to the work 
of Charles Bernstein, whose book A Poetics provides a late 20th Century view of the rhetorics of 
poetry.  I am not claiming that the Beats influenced Bernstein’s view – he is himself a poet. I am 
only using his idea to get a more modern sense of the continued struggle for identity between 
these two discourses. The question remains: Is poetic discourse still easy to confuse with 
rhetoric?  Bernstein attempts to answer this question by offering a theory of how poems come to 
“mean,” writing it in verse himself: 
A poetic reading can be given to any 
piece of writing; a ‘poem’ may be understood as 
writing specifically designed to absorb, or inflate 
with, proactive – rather than reactive – styles of 
reading. ‘Artifice’ is a measure of a poem’s 
intractability to being read as the sum of its 
devices & subject matters.167
 
 
Arguing that poetry should be seen as epistemic, Bernstein is concerned with both poetry 
and rhetoric.  The subjects blur when one becomes interested in how the text one encounters is 
understood through what name is given to it.  Bernstein’s belief that all texts can be given poetic 
readings, if the text is seen as having a relationship between the proactive style of reading and an 
inability to be read as just a text that transmits information or shows off interesting linguistic 
devices such as meter, rhyme or alliteration.  Artifice resists absorption at a particular point, and 
vice versa.  The relationship between both will frame the potential meanings of the poem, or the 
poetry’s inability to simply mean – it will always have meanings.  Poetry’s ability to interrupt 
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potential meanings garnered from other epistemic frames makes it more like a frame and less 
like a discourse. The conclusion is that Bernstein’s poetic is also rhetoric. The rhetorical 
considers questions of how meaning is made, how to properly construct that text to reach that 
meaning, and how to deliver it appropriately for an audience.  The poet and the rhetor have a 
shared goal, even if the poet only wants the reader to enjoy the poem for its own sake. 
This is not to say that Bernstein sees artifice and absorption as binary opposites or in 
opposition at all times.  While this can be the case, he argues that artifice – the technical 
elements of the text on the page that allow or resist easy reading and absorption –the ability of 
the poem to mean something – sometimes work in what appear to be cross purposes but allow 
for an understanding that can challenge societal meanings.  This is, for Bernstein, poetry at its 
highest form, when it serves as an epistemology – a way of knowing the world, instead of 
reflecting or commenting on it.   
The epistemic is a complicated notion that has been deeply considered in rhetorical 
theory.168
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 The debate about rhetoric’s relationship with the epistemic is ongoing and 
inconclusive. The beats – at least Kerouac and Ginsberg – seem to think their methods provide a 
way of knowing the world and the people and things in it.  In the analysis I provide a more 
detailed account of the epistemic nature of beat rhetoric and how concerns about knowing, the 
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known and the scope of the knowable motivate both Kerouac and Ginsberg to offer an 
alternative way of writing and creating meaning in the world. 
2.5 RHETORICAL CRITICISM: SQUARE OR HIP?  
Why proceed from the position of rhetorical criticism when examining the beats?  So far I have 
investigated the slippery barrier between rhetoric and poetic through several different culturally 
distinct texts. The differences in rhetoric and poetic can be investigated as the result of a 
rhetorical production themselves through the application of rhetorical criticism to beat texts. 
Kenneth Burke states, “is it not true, that whatever their differences, they also have an 
area of overlap, since either Poetry or the exercising of Rhetoric can be enjoyed for their own 
sake?”169  For Burke, rhetoric and the poetic have what he calls an identifying function – which 
is to say that both alter attitudes within the audience.  “The principles of Rhetoric, Poetics, and 
Dialectic (and the corresponding dynamics of form, or order) are to be found, mutatis mutandis, 
within the modes of symbolic action generally.”170
                                               
169 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 296. 
  Burke points out that poems, when 
considering questions of form, are asking the questions of rhetoric, while rhetors, interested in 
the limits of what speech can do to move an audience, are looking at poetics.  Burke warns 
against a hard and fast distinction between the two arts.  Critics who do so are eliminating a 
wealth of critical tools and understandings that can help them unpack a text’s potential meanings, 
as well as, “The full history of the subject has necessarily kept such a distinction forever on the 
170 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, 306. 
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move.”171
To tease out what this theory may look like I turn to rhetorical criticism. However, my 
argument is limited to extrapolating the specific rhetorical considerations and praxis of the Beat 
writers I have selected for analysis – I do not purport to offer a full and complete understanding 
of the texts that could be labeled “Beat Generation,” nor do I seek the final word on the subject.  
I will use rhetorical criticism of major beat texts in order to establish the foundations for a beat 
theory of rhetoric, one that they advanced to readers as an alternative method of communication 
with other human beings during the postwar years. 
 This continual movement of the line throughout history is the moment of opportunity 
for the beats to craft their rhetoric upon seemingly unstable ground. 
Primarily I will be using the theories of Kenneth Burke to highlight and indicate the 
rhetorical practice of the Beats in a number of ways.  There are a couple of central ways the beats 
and Burke are connected. The primary connection between Burke and the Beat writers is one of 
deep concern over the view of the human subject as primarily mechanical and animal.  For 
Burke, this manifested itself through criticism of behaviorism, and for the Beats, a deep distrust 
of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, and a praise of spiritual unity through Buddhism and 
Eastern thought.  Burke’s theories of terministic screens, representative anecdotes, the action 
motion distinction and the idea of attitude, motive and symbol are all useful ideas for unpacking 
the beats’ writing as something that offers a prescription rather than just the vision of an artist. 
Quoting Kenneth Burke:  
The treatment of the poem as act would not, by any means, require us to slight the nature 
of the poem as object.  For a poem is a constitutive act – and after the act of its 
composition by a poet who had acted in a particular temporal scene, it survives as an 
objective structure, capable of being examined in itself, in temporal scenes quite different 
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from the constitution, we can inquire into the principles by which this constitution is 
organized.172
 
  
Said another way, the poem as a constituted object gives us ways to understand principles of 
constitution.  We can see them as acts within and responding to temporally and culturally 
situated scenes.  Insight into the poem’s state can give insight into how to state a poem. Under 
Burke’s idea the beats could be seen as offering a guide or a way to put together, or constitute 
messages.  This method of production can properly be called rhetoric, as it is a productive and 
pragmatic art of making sense of the world.   
Burke’s definition of rhetoric is clear. He defines rhetoric as the dual act of identifying 
and dividing:  “Terms for identification are wider in scope than terms for killing.  We are 
proposing that our rhetoric be reduced to this term of wider scope, with the term of narrower 
scope being treated as a species of it.”173
For Burke, “[t]o identify A with B is to make A ‘consubstantial’ with B.”
 Identification – either with people, ideas, ideology or 
what have you is his definition. In this case killing something is a way of identifying with it. At 
the same time, one divides from “not killing.” It is an example of a larger mode of human 
relations – people identify and divide in a dual movement to constitute the most basic relations 
with each other. 
174
                                               
172 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
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  This notion 
of consubstantiality is key for understanding Burke’s rhetoric.  Consubstantiality is not a 
Freudian identification – it is not a perfect correspondence. Instead, Burke explains it as a 
coming together closely of attitude, motive and desire.  As Burke states, “[A] way of life is an 
acting-together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, 
173 Burke, Rhetoric, 20. 
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attitudes that make them consubstantial.”175
Burke’s theory of framing – both tragic and comic – applies to Beat rhetoric in the 
context of the 1950s.  Burke sees history as a compendium of different attitudes, embodied in 
poetic works that serve as equipment for making judgments on the quality of life. Burke’s 
definition of the tragic frame associated “crime” with human limitations.
  At the same time, the move to identify comes with 
the move to divide, or separate from.  So any identification carries its division.  And often times, 
a rhetorical identification may carry with it a number of divisions, to which the Beat rhetoric is 
no exception. 
176 The comic frame, by 
contrast, associated human limitation with being “mistaken.”177 Burke argues that the “comic 
frame” has little to do with humor – its primary characteristic is that of an ambivalent attitude. “It 
also makes us sensitive to the point at which one of these ingredients becomes hypertrophied, 
with the corresponding atrophy of the other.”178 The comic frame, for Burke, is focused on 
ambivalence, but that does not mean the frame is incapable of providing criteria for judgment.  It 
offers a maximized reflexive position from which to judge human successes and errors:  “The 
comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting.  Its ultimate 
would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness.  One would ‘transcend’ himself by 
noting his own foibles.  He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and the 
nonrational.”179
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  Instead of the frame of tragedy, where one is at the mercy of perceived wrong, 
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under the ambivalent comic frame, people can move others from their errors instead of punishing 
them for those errors.  
The difference between comic and tragic framing for Burke is one of corrective.  If things 
are framed from the comic perspective the politics are summed up in the term “mistake.” But if 
things are framed tragically, the politics are that of murder. Consider the explanation of the 
impact of tragic framing from Ott and Aoki’s Burkean analysis of Matthew Shepard’s murder in 
Wyoming: 
The shortcoming of tragic framing is that it brings about symbolic resolution without 
turning the event into a lesson for those involved. By projecting its iniquity upon 
McKinney and Henderson and attacking them, the public achieves resolution in this 
instance, but does not substantively alter its character as to insure that future instances are 
less likely. On the contrary, this mode aggressively perpetuates the status quo, cloaking 
but not erasing the public’s homophobia (and we do mean the politically loaded term 
“homophobia”) so that it can return another day.180
 
 
The conclusion of the tragic frame is one where elimination of the instance of the problem solves 
the whole problem. This ironically allows the problem to occur again. The comic frame differs 
by connecting the flaw to the larger society through the common and deeply human act of the 
mistake – this allows for more group culpability for the problem and also more of a chance to 
address the underlying flaws in the structure that led to it. 
For the beats, the idea of the mistaken appears constantly in their rhetorical theory. 
Instead of tragic moments, often characters find themelves mistaken or poetic narrators make 
mistakes and then speculate on the correctives available to the group hearing or reading the 
poem. The beat rhetoric draws upon a framing that prefers the comic to the tragic, a point that 
will be proven in the more full rhetorical criticism and theory construction to come in later 
chapters. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have offered the idea that the beats can be read as offering a rhetorical theory. I 
argue that the use of rhetorical criticism within the context of some of the scholarship done on 
the relationship of rhetoric and poetics, as well as Burkean rhetorical theory will be able to 
provide new insights about the beats and the importance of their works.  In the next chapter I will 
start the analysis by providing a historical and cultural frame for the beats, including some of the 
specifics of the time period that are important to understanding the beats as prescriptive of what 
to write in their time, not just descriptive of how they felt about their time. 
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3.0  THE RHETORICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE BEATS 
In this chapter, I will frame the beat rhetoric within the rhetorical environment of the 1950s in 
the United States. The beats have been situated within that decade culturally, socially and 
literarily.181 In this chapter, I position the beats within and alongside the rhetoric that was 
surrounding them and influencing them. I do this in order to bring relief to the exigence that the 
beat rhetoric addresses, which is the perceived lack of human presence in communicative 
moments. “Exigence” has a loaded and controversial history within rhetorical studies, most 
notably the debate between Lloyd Bitzer and Richard Vatz about the priority of the term in 
moments of rhetoric. Bitzer argues that there are “three constituents” in any rhetorical situation – 
exigence, audience and constraints – and defines exigence as, “an imperfection marked by 
urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it 
should be.”182 Not all exigencies are rhetorical; only ones that can be modified by rhetoric count: 
“An exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when positive 
modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse.”183
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 Richard Vatz disagrees, 
arguing that exigencies are not distinct from the rhetoric used to modify them: “Bitzer argues 
182 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1, 1 (winter 1968): 1-14, 
6. 
183 Bitzer, “Situation,” 7. 
 86 
that the nature of the context determines the rhetoric. But one never runs out of context. One 
never runs out of facts to describe a situation.”184 The determination that exigence is itself 
rhetorical means that rhetors not only have the power to shape the situation, but choose the 
situation they are shaping, positing it as necessary, inevitable, or  the most critical need at the 
moment. “We have ‘leaders’ or ‘bosses,’ ‘organizations’ or ‘machines,’ and ‘education’ or 
‘propaganda’ not according to the situation’s reality, but according to the rhetor’s arbitrary 
choice of characterization.”185 Scott Consigny partially agrees with this assessment when he 
writes, “The rhetor cannot create exigencies arbitrarily, but must take into account the 
particularities of each situation in which he actively becomes engaged.”186 Hoping to resolve a 
missed commonplace between the two scholars, Consigny argues that rhetoric should be 
considered an “art,” a position that inhabits a space between objective conditions and fully 
crafted conditions for rhetoric. “The real question in rhetorical theory is not whether the situation 
or the rhetor is ‘dominant,’ but the extent, in each case, to which the rhetor can discover and 
control indeterminate matter, using his art of topics to make sense of what would otherwise 
remain simply absurd.”187
I will show what sort of discursive and textual environment the beats found themselves 
and how they came to explain the environment to themselves and others. I do not seek here to 
offer a complete historical account of the 1950s, or represent all of the lines of discourse that 
 It is this sense of rhetoric as a creative engagement with the 
indeterminate to make sense of it for the rhetor and audience that I will follow in this chapter. 
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were present in that decade. Instead, I offer a limited view of the situation as the beats engaged 
it, specifically Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate 
how the beats saw their situation, and how they attempted to intervene to make sense of the 
world through the art of rhetoric. 
3.1 BEAT MOTIVES 
In the postwar world both Kerouac and Ginsberg – the two beats who I argue are advancing this 
rhetorical theory – were influenced in many ways by this environment, and also hoped to 
influence it. The beats were interested in significantly altering their rhetorical environment. By 
this I mean that they sought to change the perceived communicative practices, habits and 
assumptions of other people – practices that they thought were harmful and had to be changed.  
What they believed to be at stake was healthy human interaction – or the roots of a desirable 
society. 
The beats can be viewed as “connected critics” – defined by Michael Walzer as a critic 
who, “agitates, teaches, counsels, challenges, protests from within.”188
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 These critics do not seek 
to establish themselves as outside, distinct, or above the groups that they seek to change. For the 
beats, the changes necessary are within human communication and rhetoric. As an example, 
consider the following passage from Jack Kerouac’s novel Dharma Bums, published in 1961, 
and the first novel to be published after the runaway success of On the Road: 
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Everything was fine with the Zen Lunatics, the nut wagon was too far away to hear us. 
But there was a wisdom in it all, as you’ll see if you take a walk some night on a 
suburban street and pass house after house on both sides of the street each with the 
lamplight of the living room, shining golden, and inside the little blue square of the 
television, each living family riveting its attention on probably one show; nobody talking; 
silence in the yards; dogs barking at you because you pass on human feet instead of on 
wheels. You’ll see what I mean, when it begins to appear like everybody in the world is 
soon going to be thinking the same way and the Zen Lunatics have long joined dust, 
laughter on their dust lips.189
 
 
The fear expressed in this passage by Kerouac of “nobody talking” and dogs upset because you 
pass on “human feet” point out the changes that communication technology – in this case the 
television – brought to the minds of the beats. But the “zen lunatics” recognize the problem and 
walk within the world in order to fix it. The reference is to Kerouac’s association with Gary 
Snyder, where he “foresaw the ‘rucksack revolution’ that would lead to millions of hippies 
abandoning industrial America a decade later.”190
The rhetorical vision here is bleak – a world without human interaction. Bodies moving 
down the street are unfamiliar in a world of cars. Neighborly conversations are replaced by a 
blue glow of the television – keeping people inside and looking inward instead of looking 
outward. The human body and the human being are becoming separated and de-naturalized in 
favor of compartmentalizing machines. Ray Smith, the narrator of Dharma Bums comments on 
the character Japhy Ryder, who suggests in the novel the need for an alternative way of life apart 
from these technologies:  “I see him [Japhy] in future years stalking along with full rucksack, in 
suburban streets, passing the blue television windows of homes, alone, his thoughts the only 
  But instead of seeing this moment as some 
sort of premonition to a political reality to come, I want to highlight the rhetorical concerns in 
this paragraph. 
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thoughts not electrified to the Master Switch.”191
This quote serves as a representative anecdote for the situation the beats perceived in the 
1950s. The beats saw the 1950s communicative situation as a dire one. They perceived 
technologies of representation – such as the television and other media – as threats to human 
communication. And therefore, these were threats to humanity. Appropriate human interaction 
for the beats is critical to understanding their perspective, as well as their works.  In this chapter I 
will examine some of the theories about mass culture that were contemporary with the beats, and 
some of the literature they were examining in order to provide a full picture of the beats as 
rhetorical. Although many of the mass culture theories that I will discuss did not directly 
influence the beats, the exigencies of these scholars are based on similar exigencies – most 
notably concern about making the world intelligible and valuable for others. Their concern for 
appropriate human communication led to the development of a latent rhetorical theory for the 
preservation of human society. 
  Through such images, the reader is encouraged 
to identify with Japhy, and therefore divide from the “Master Switch,” an image of homogenous 
thinking and being. 
Presence is a word that I will use to describe the beats’ concern. For the most part, many 
of the critiques that both Kerouac and Ginsberg make of the modern situation is that the human 
presence is absent. This means that interactivity is replaced with some intermediary element, be 
it technology, distance, or the illusion of immediacy. The critique is long-ranging, and covers a 
number of different works from each author. 
For example, there is a long chapter on television in Kerouac’s novel Pic.  In the novel, 
the young African-American Pic is taken from his life with sharecroppers in South Carolina to 
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live with his brother in Harlem. In Times Square shortly after his arrival, Pic encounters a street-
corner preacher who offers his views on television: 
“Ladies and gentlemen of the world, I have come to tell you about the mystery of 
television. Television is a great big long arm of light that reaches clear into your front 
parlor, and even in the middle of the night when there ain’t no shows going on that light 
is on, though the studio is dark. Study this light. It will hurt you at first, and bombard 
your eyes with a hundred trillion electronic particles of itself, but after awhile you won’t 
mind it no more. Why?” he yelled way up loud and Slim said “Yes!” The man said, 
“Because while electricity was light to see by, this is the light comes not to see by, but to 
see – not to read by, but to read. This is the light that you feel.”192
 
  
Pic’s brother Slim is caught up in the passion and energy of the preacher as Pic reports to us the 
reactions and words of the speech. Pic’s full name is Pictorial Review Jackson, so perhaps it is 
appropriate that someone named for the magazine that privileged visual media itself provides us 
an image of this scene. Pic brings us the comments of the preacher mediated through his 
observations, almost as if the older media were viewing a critique of the newer media. The 
preacher notes prominently that the light from the television is information, not just a neutral 
passageway for information to reach audiences. 
The comments of the street corner preacher dovetail nicely with Marshall McLuhan’s 
observation that light itself is a communicative medium: 
The instance of the electric light may prove illuminating in this connection. The electric 
light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it is used to 
spell out some verbal ad or name. This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the 
content of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just 
as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is 
asked, ‘What is the content of speech?,’ it is necessary to say, ‘It is an actual process of 
thought, which is in itself nonverbal.’ An abstract painting represents direct manifestation 
of creative thought processes as they might appear in computer designs.193
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Although not completely contemporaneous with the time of Kerouac’s writing, the observations 
by McLuhan in 1964 seem apparent within Kerouac’s book, which he started writing in the 
1950s.  Although McLuhan and Kerouac clearly disagree – McLuhan was celebrating the new 
medium, while Kerouac’s characters are either negative about it, or at least ambivalent toward it 
– there are some analytic points in common. Most central is the idea that the machinery itself 
changes the way information is processed. McLuhan suggests that there is no bottom to a 
medium. The closest one can get is abstract thought. Light from the television – which the 
preacher wants us to study – is information. Exposure to it is enough to expose oneself to the 
important realization of TV, that it creates feelings among the viewers: 
It means that man has discovered light and is fiddling with it for the first time, and has 
released concentrated shots of it into everyone’s house, and nobody yet knows what the 
effect will be on the mind and soul of people, except that now there is a general feeling of 
nervousness among some, and sore eyes, and twitching of nerves, and a suspicion that 
because it has come at the same time as the A T O M there may be an unholy alliance 
betwixt one and the other, and both are bad and injurious and leading to the end of the 
world, though some optimists claim it is the opposite of the atom and may relax the 
nerves the atoms undid. Nobody knows!’ he moaned way out loud, and looked at 
ever’body frank. Well, ever’body was innerested and paid no attention to the speeches 
about repentance, and Slim agreed, most amazed.194
 
 
Anxieties about the new technologies of the television and its effects on people are tied in this 
instance to the rise of the most overt and obvious destructive technology from the post war era, 
the atomic bomb.  The prose here is suggestive of connection, but the direction remains 
ambivalent. According to Pic, everyone in the crowd, stopped paying attention and thought about 
the relationship of the new technologies, unconcerned about the more traditional religious 
message that followed. This is another representative anecdote about the period – the fear of 
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unobserved and dangerous connections – which I call “connection anxiety.” There are several 
layers to this anxiety, and many of them center on mass culture and mediation. 
The connection of the rise of television with the atom bomb and the anxiety both produce 
by altering the “nerves” and threatening the “end of the world” have rhetorical significance. 
Most importantly, the lack of “knowable” conclusions about the effects of television or its 
connections to other technologies of war produces an exigence that could be defined as a 
rhetorical situation. “Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, 
objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance.”195
Of course, television only represents a small proportion of the mass mediation of the 
period. The confluence of mass media technologies and anxiety about their connections created 
an exigence that demanded explanation. As early as 1953, Dwight MacDonald saw the period as 
a new direction for mass culture, which he defined as, “solely and distinctly an article for mass 
consumption, like chewing gum.” He further argues that mass culture, “is imposed from above,” 
and is a “vulgarized reflection of High Culture.”
 This sense of rhetorical 
situation is not purely outside of the rhetor’s control, as Consigny argues. But it does raise the 
question of whether or not Bitzer’s article establishing the idea of a rhetorical situation might 
also be an attempt to overcome this same anxiety. But casting television as one of the potential 
exigencies that constitute a rhetorical situation is helpful in identifying the beats as responding to 
this exigency.  
196
                                               
195 Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation” Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (January 1992): 1-14, 4. 
 Mass Culture was not something particularly 
new, but it was being distributed and accessed in a new, fast, and very accessible manner. For 
196 Dwight MacDonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture” in John Durham Peters & Peter Simonson, 
Eds. Mass Communication and American Social Thought (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), 344-5. 
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people such as MacDonald, this was a problem that should spark concern and worry. For other 
scholars writing around the same time, like Marshall McLuhan, the period represented a change 
in the manner of information transfer and production. “Much of the vivid energy of American 
speech and writing in the twentieth century is the result of the movement away from book-
culture toward oral communication. . .Radio in particular has encouraged the return to the panel 
discussion and the round table.”197
I think that the beats can be seen as discussing some of these changes as well. The rhetors 
that I am discussing as the sources of the beat rhetorical theory, Jack Kerouac and Allen 
Ginsberg, attempted in many works to point out the forms and meaning offered by mass culture, 
attempting to account for dangerous linkages. Looking for “origins” of the rhetoric of the beats is 
the same for the rhetorician as seeking out exigence. The exigence is always a combination of 
shared events in the society and culture as well as internal choices and positioning by the rhetor.  
As Consigny points out, the rhetor can be evaluated by how well he or she moves the fixities of 
the situation around through the contingency of the moment. Through rhetorical criticism we can 
identify where these influences stem, and what might be some of the influence for the Ginsberg, 
in his 1956 poem “America,” can serve as an example for this larger concern: 
 McLuhan differs from MacDonald in the sense that he does 
not advocate some sort of value judgment on the quality of the transition, but notes the 
differences in how we communicate and how those values are changing. 
I’m addressing you.  
Are you going to let your emotional life be run by time Magazine? 
 I’m obsessed by Time Magazine. 
                                               
197 Marshall McLuhan, “Sight, Sound, and Fury,” in John Durham Peters & Peter Simonson, 
Eds. Mass Communication and American Social Thought (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), 355. 
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 I read it every week. 
 Its cover stares at me every time I slink past the corner candystore. 
 I read it in the basement of the Berkeley Public Library. 
 It’s always telling me about responsibility. Businessmen are serious. 
  Movie producers are serious. Everybody’s serious but me. 
 It occurs to me that I am America. 
 I am talking to myself again.198
In this section from the poem “America” Ginsberg portrays one element of the mass society 
through characterizing Time magazine as simultaneously problematic and unavoidable.  He 
“slinks” past the watchful eye of Time Magazine on the corner newsstand, as if Time were some 
“big brother” always watching his movements, then later we find him in the basement of the 
public library – a nice blending of the traditionally thought of hidden space inside one of the 
most open and accessible public buildings available -- reading the pages filled with 
“seriousness.” Here we face “connection anxiety” characterized as a scene from daily life – the 
dual moment of recognizing dependence and desire for the content of these new media forms 
while at the same time being suspicious, distrustful and hateful.  Time is characterized as being 
something desired but also something dangerous as the speaker “obsesses” over it but also 
worries that it is controlling our lives.  The entire stanza is direct address at America, and ends 
with self-criticism, furthering the anxiety about the effects of mass mediation – not even the 
previously obvious distinctions between speaker and audience seem to hold steady. 
 
Although the speaker warns about our “emotional life” being controlled by Time 
magazine, he also freely admits his constant examination of every issue.  At the end of the stanza 
                                               
198 Allen Ginsberg, Collected Poems: 1947-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 
 95 
we are mired in confusion, both in how to feel about Time magazine (and maybe dependence on 
mass media for information) as well as how to know whether we are to identify with the speaker, 
learn from his mistakes, or join the chastised audience of “America,” which is also the speaker. 
While it is important to note particular aspects of the poem’s form and how it might be 
referring to or referencing other literary forms and traditions, in this study the focus is on crafting 
a rhetorical theory from these works, not a literary appraisal.  The critic cannot be attentive to 
every aspect of the text. Any inclusion is an exclusion, ad infinitum.  All the rhetorical critic can 
do is indicate how well the text identifies, conveys and speaks to the exigence that is chosen. In 
this case the poem highlights and brings forward the anxieties of dependence on mass mediated 
sources.  The poem might also offer implicit critiques or ironic reads of other poetic styles, 
however the concern in this study is not poetic form, but rhetorical theory. Instead of limiting 
one’s criticism by attending to the type of discourse that the text proports to be, I agree with 
Charles Altieri’s assessment that poetics and rhetoric perform a return of the repressed elements 
of each other when they try to remain distinct. “Rhetoric has to worry about how we frame ends 
as well as how we negotiate agreement about them. And it has to preserve terms for honoring the 
sheer exemplary impact of distinctive eloquent performance.”199
  David Zarefsky points out somewhat unintentionally that rhetorical criticism is also 
about such returns in his comments on Herbert Wilchelns’s 1925 call for a criticism of rhetoric 
distinct from the literary: 
 Rhetoric’s attempts to shore up 
its own unique value expose the repressed kernel of reliance on the other form. In rhetorical 
criticism, the critic can and should seek out these moments. 
                                               
199 Charles Altieri “Rhetoric and Poetics: How to Use the Inevitable Return of the Repressed” in 
Walter Jost & Wendy Olmsted, Eds. A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism (Malden 
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It seems unlikely that this is what Wichelns was trying to encourage. His concern, after 
all, was with criticism, not empirical measurement. Focusing criticism on effects meant 
that the questions critics were to ask were about the relationship between the text and its 
possible effects. What does the text reveal about the effects its author might have been 
seeking? How does the construction of the text invite certain reactions and discourage 
others? What frame of reference does the text assume and how does this compare with 
the frame attributed to the audience? What role might this specific text play in a more 
comprehensive campaign to modify attitudes or behavior? Who are the various possible 
audiences for the speech? These are examples of critical questions that relate to effects. 
They involve interpretation and judgment, not measurement. They are answerable not by 
empirical observation but by reasoned argument. The critic’s task is to make claims on a 
reader’s judgment and to support those claims by argument, and this is as true of 
rhetorical criticism as of any other kind.200
 
 
Here we have an attempt to argue for rhetorical criticism by effects, which is a very clear but 
somewhat limited view of rhetorical criticism. If it is only limited to the effect that it has on the 
audience, we can lose implications in the text such as relations to discourses that have come 
before it, are contemporaneous with it, or are implicitly drawn upon.  I do agree with the idea 
that rhetorical criticism is an argument, but it should not be limited to merely effects that the 
audience embodies. Instead, the argument should be a construction of the importance of a 
reading of the text, which connects rhetorical criticism to hermeneutics. 
In their essay calling for a re-assessment of the hermeneutic tradition and rhetoric, 
Michael J. Hyde and Craig R. Smith argue that “from the hermeneutical situation originates the 
primordial function of rhetoric.”201
                                               
200 David Zarefsky. “Reflections on Rhetorical Criticism,” Rhetoric Review, 25.4 (2006):383-
387, 384. 
 This primordial function, they write, is understanding. 
Rhetoric is the working out of understanding, as they trace from the hermeneutic tradition 
through life lived in language. “The development of understanding is how human beings work 
201 Michael J. Hyde and Craig R. Smith “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen But Unobserved 
Relationship” Quarterly Journal of Speech 65.4 (December 1979): 347-363, 347. 
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out the linguistic possibilities that constitute and are projected in understanding.”202 The role of 
rhetoric in relation to hermeneutic is to make meaning from this understanding. “Rhetoric’s 
ontological relationship with hermeneutics occurs when understanding becomes meaningful, 
when interpretation shows it ‘as something.’ This showing of understanding by interpretation, 
such that meaning is made known, is rhetoric in the purest sense; it is how rhetoric originates as 
a fundamental condition of human existence.”203
If this understanding of the hermeneutic and rhetoric is combined with the understanding 
of exigence and rhetoric that I argued earlier, a sense of the function of criticism can be 
established. Criticism can be seen as advocacy of meanings from within a text based upon the 
understanding of the text. This activity can be extended quite far – as Burke would have it to all 
living things – but rhetorical criticism has a more narrow focus. Rhetorical criticism is the 
passing of judgement on this meaning making, not just effect-itveness as Zarefsky indicates, but 
qualitative judgment as well. This is what Edwin Black is getting at when he argues, “The 
implied author of a discourse is a persona that figures importantly in rhetorical transactions. 
What equally well solicits our attention is that there is a second persona also implied by a 
discourse, and that persona is an implied auditor.”
 If our ontological condition as humans is one of 
understanding things, then rhetoric is making those understandings known to others and 
ourselves. 
204
                                               
202 Hyde and Smith, “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric,” 351. 
 Black accepts that his observation is not 
new, but argues its implications for criticism are vital. Instead of arguing that texts are crafted for 
particular, given audiences, Black argues that the meanings within a text craft and create the 
203 Hyde and Smith, “Hermeneutics and Rhetoric,” 354. 
204 Edwin Black “The Second Persona,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56.2 (April 1970): 109-
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ideologies and positions held by the implied auditors. This “second persona” of a text allows a 
critic to judge the text on a moral level by arguing what sort of politics follow from that sort of 
meaning making. “The critic can see in the auditor implied by a discourse a model of what the 
rhetor would have his real auditor become. What the critic can find projected by the discourse is 
the image of a man, and though that man may never find actual embodiment, it is still a man that 
the image is of. This condition makes moral judgment possible, and it is at this point in the 
process of criticism that it can illuminatingly be rendered.”205
Using this idea of criticism, one can expose the implicit theories about who or what the 
rhetoric pushes the auditor (or reader) to be. Once that can be identified, then I believe a theory 
of rhetoric can be extrapolated from it. This is not a universal claim about criticism, but more a 
method for studying the beat rhetoric. Some of the Ginsberg poem that I have been discussing in 
this chapter can be read through my understanding of criticism to get a sense of what I will do in 
future chapters. 
  What Black seeks is rhetorical 
criticism that can be used to judge the value of potential interpretations that could be made from 
the text. 
Ginsberg produced a lot of prose in the form of essays that specifically reference the 
exigence of mass media. Ginsberg is much more up front with his appreciation of the mass 
society: “Suppression of sensory awareness, alteration of ratio of sense, stereotyping of 
conscious awareness in language formulae, homogenizing of communal imagery via mass-
media, creation of mass hallucinations (headlines) are present condition of megalopolis.”206
                                               
205 Black, “The Second Persona,” 113. 
  
Clearly this is more in line with the sort of “knee jerk” criticism of mass media that we might 
206 Allen Ginsberg Deliberate Prose: Selected Essays 1952-1995, ed. Bill Morgan (New York: 
Harper Collins, 2000), 49. 
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expect from a “beat.” What I will show in more detail in the chapter on Ginsberg is that his mass 
media sensibility roots the problem with massification within the media’s relationship to 
language.  That is, Ginsberg critiques the mass media for limiting discursive options.  This is a 
critique of the rhetoric of mass media, which Ginsberg responds to with his own poetic-rhetoric, 
as can be seen in the stanza discussed above.  The poem and the essay both, through a mixed 
combination of style, and oddly combined concepts seem to push the reader not so much toward 
a particular political position, but a re-evaluation of political positions that are available.  
Ginsberg and Kerouac were questioning not the position people took about issues such as mass 
culture, but instead how those positions were formed. They brought into question the manner in 
which people judged these issues. 
In order to read the beats as rhetorical theorists, an appreciation for some of their 
rhetorical environment should be established. The beats were writing in a complex period which 
hosted a huge number of discursive trajectories, from civil rights to mass media, and from 
consumer society to international nuclear politics. I don’t propose or even suggest that I will be 
comprehensively examining all of these lines. What I will examine are the lines that are closely 
related to what Kerouac and Ginsberg were writing about, as well as some of the lines of rhetoric 
influencing them from other avenues. 
 To begin I will examine the limits of the discursive, and what counts as discourse 
for the purposes of this study, as well as the terms communication and rhetoric.  All three terms 
and their understanding have important implications for this study. 
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3.2 COMMUNICATION, DISCOURSE, RHETORIC 
The terms communication, discourse, and rhetoric I seem to throw around quite loosely, but the 
meanings of these terms do have important distinctions.  These distinctions are important 
because they provide a structure for the understanding of culture, society, and human motivation.  
It is my contention that Ginsberg and Kerouac wrote as an intervention into rhetoric and 
communication as they saw it in the 1950s. 
The study of communication has a very long and complicated history that I do not 
propose to wrestle with here.  Suffice it to say that for this study, I agree with scholars such as 
Amardo Rodriguez and John D. Peters who have argued that the study of communication suffers 
from an overemphasis on its “economy” and not other dimensions of human communication. 
According to Rodriguez, “human beings are assumed to have no spiritual striving that 
communication constitutes. We assume that the origins of communication reside in necessity and 
utility.”207 Peters offers a study that traces the development of the term communication in order 
to provide a historical grounding of how communication has been seen as, “a problem of power, 
ethics and art.”208
John D. Peters avoids giving a specific definition of communication, labeling it instead as 
“a registry of modern longings,” that invokes a variety of meanings from religious 
(“communion” is “an act of receiving, not of sending; more precisely, it is to send by receiving”) 
  Like these scholars, the beats were interested in a richer, non-machnaistic 
model of communication.  
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to a “blanket term for the various modes of symbolic interaction.”209 Peters believes that 
communication is a deep concept, bound with notions of membership, exchange, performance 
and representation. Careful not to dismiss all the variety of meanings lodged in the term’s 
etymology, Peters does narrow the scope of communication to speech and language: “Although I 
am skeptical that the word ‘communication’ can ever fully shake the ghosts of wordless contact, 
the term marks out a marvelous zone for inquiry: the natural history of our talkative species. 
Communication theory claims this zone.”210
Communication in the bulk of Peters’s study is not a panacea and not a complete enigma 
either. His central argument is that although communication is a perennial problem, it still sparks 
human thought and creativity: 
 Peters limits his study to this understanding of 
communication in order to flesh out what communication can bring even though the possibility 
of knowing the mind of others perfectly is illusory. 
“Communication,” whatever it might mean, is not a matter of improved wiring or freer 
self-disclosure but involves a permanent kink in the human condition. In this James was 
right. That we can never communicate like the angels is a tragic fact, but also a blessed 
one. A sounder vision is of the felicitous impossibility of contact. Communication failure, 
again, does not mean we are lonely zombies searching for soul mates: it means we have 
new ways to related and to make worlds with each other. My emphasis on the debt that 
the dream of communication owes to ghosts and strange eros is intended as a corrective 
to a truism that is still very much alive: that the expansion of means leads to the 
expansion of minds.211
 
 
This “permanent kink” is something the beats were puzzling over in their work as well as in their 
concerns about how and why to produce their work. Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg left 
copious notes on their ideas about process, problems, and approaches to the art of getting what 
you mean across to others. In this study the term communication will refer to this rich and 
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complex term as laid out by Peters, especially the notion that the inability of perfect 
communication drives human beings to craft new ways of interacting and thinking together. I 
argue that these various modes of interacting and thinking, driven by the need to communicate, 
are rhetoric.  Rhetoric, in its earliest definition from Aristotle is, “not to persuade, but to see the 
available means of persuasion in each case . . .”212 Aristotle is discussing the function of rhetoric 
here, which is not exactly a definition, but more a description of what rhetoric does. In a modern 
interpretation of Aristotle’s functional assessment, Thomas J. Farrell offers that rhetoric, “is the 
art, the fine and useful art, of making things matter.”213 Farell is most interested in developing a 
system of commonplaces for discussing magnitude, but does offer a sense of rhetoric important 
to this study – “to challenge and change the normative content in any system of criteria is, of 
course, a distinctly rhetorical undertaking.”214
The beats saw humans as communicative beings, fundamentally and centrally pressed to 
express their spirits and minds through expression, both performative and textual.  Their concern 
in the 1950s was the evaporation of what they felt were necessary human means of interaction 
and communication. For John Lardas, this idea provides the exigence for the rise of the beats as a 
response to communicative corruption. “According to the Beats, the crises of America and self 
 Rhetoric is not only the art of effectively engaging 
other minds within the social and cultural interpretation of what communication is understood to 
be, but can challenge that normative sense of the communicative. To challenge what is found to 
be good human interaction and good persuasion is itself rhetorical. It could be argued that 
Peters’s book is a study of how these norms become challenged and changed. 
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had been initiated, in part, by a growing appetite for abstraction in expression and 
communication. They believed that language, the substance of reality, had been corrupted.”215
  They were also not “anything goes” spiritualists. Kerouac had a deep commitment to 
Catholicism, although he read his belief through an autodidactic Buddhism. Lardas is interested 
in tracking the beats’ spiritual roots and their understanding of spirituality. For him, Kerouac’s 
religious belief is an unstable mixture of spiritual understandings. “Kerouac’s religiosity was 
constant in focus yet unstable, complex, and even contradictory in mood and motivation. His 
interest in Buddhism was a continuation and rejection of his past beliefs, both Spenglerian and 
Catholic.”
 
The beats’ criticism of their period is coupled with an alternative method of language use. It 
should be made clear though that the Beats were not “doomsday” critics of mass media – on the 
contrary, some of it they directly participated in, making recordings of poetry readings, 
broadcasting readings on the radio, and marketing and publishing inexpensive paperback books 
of poetry and stories.  Still, the beats were cautiously optimistic that if a more conservative and 
human focus was given to mass communication it had the potential to save humanity from self-
destruction. Although not complete rejecters of the mass society, they participated only as a way 
of connecting with broader audiences. 
216  Ginsberg remained somewhat loyal to his Jewish roots throughout his spiritual 
explorations of the 1960s, although his spiritual explorations went well beyond Kerouac’s.217
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The complexity of explaining the Beats rests partially on the fact that they were deeply 
immersed in their own complicated questions.  The Beats were interested in literature, art, and 
poetry but also politics, issues of class, sexuality and gender. The beats saturated themselves 
with philosophy and literature of all kinds.  One way that rhetoricians can seek to understand 
connections between all of these different interests is to examine them using the concept of 
ideology.  Ideology, as understood by rhetoricians specifically, is very helpful in providing a 
place upon which the beats’ ideas about rhetoric and communication can be explicated. 
What is ideology? This question has been examined from literary and philosophical 
perspectives by several influential theorists.218 In this study, I limit my interest in ideology only 
to those most communicative and rhetorical in scope. Michael Calvin McGee noted that most 
scholars of rhetoric use ideology, “innocently, almost as a synonym for ‘doctrine’ or ‘dogma’ in 
political organizations; others use the word in a hypostatized sense that obscures or flatly denies 
the fundamental connection between the concept and descriptions of mass consciousness.”219  
McGee sought a deeper theoretical connection between the insights into human activity garnered 
by rhetoric and the explanatory power of ideology in human history. He defines ideology as, “a 
political language, preserved in rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and 
control public belief and behavior.”220
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theoretical descriptions of the same phenomenon. . . I do believe, however, that each of us has 
erred to the extent that we have conceived the rubrics of symbolism as an alternative rather than 
supplemental description of political consciousness.”221 What he was eager to see was a mix of 
both perspectives, which would bring strength not to any particular politics within a theory, but 
to the explanatory power of both rhetoric and ideology.  To this end, McGee proposes a 
rhetorical sense of political truth and political falsity: “The falsity of an ideology is specifically 
rhetorical, for the illusion of truth and falsity with regard to normative commitments is the 
product of persuasion.”222
What I gain from McGee is an understanding of rhetoric and ideology as intertwined.  
Ideology and rhetoric are nearly inseparable in their function.  The ideograph is an 
operationalized unit of ideology for the purposes of doing larger rhetorical criticism of society 
and cultural norms.  In this study, McGee’s theory of the ideograph will be used to identify key 
moments in Beat texts that use the ideographic moment to argue for alternative modes of being. 
The beats, seen through ideographic moments, can be seen as rhetorically creating sites of 
contested meaning in order to bring attention to the problems they perceive in contemporary 
communication. 
 
McGee’s blending of ideology and rhetoric in the ideograph is useful, but in order to 
engage the rhetorical and ideological situation in 1950s America further theoretical investigation 
is required.  Davi Johnson builds upon McGee’s idea with special concern for the materialist 
aspects of the ideograph. “[C]ritical applications of the ideograph have tended to privilege the 
historical, or diachronic, aspects of the concept, in some cases neglecting its material dimensions 
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almost entirely.”223 Johnson seeks to reconceptualize the ideograph around the idea of the meme, 
or “surface” materiality, which broadens the analytic unit to be inclusive of more than 
representational language. “[T]he meme is both a supplement and an alternative to McGee’s 
ideograph. . . . critical deployment of the ideograph exhibits an historical trajectory that is 
thrown into bold relief when contrasted with the geographical meme.”224
I would like to situate these rhetorical understandings of ideology with Sacvan 
Bercovitch, who offers a unique formulation of the relationship between rhetoric and ideology 
within the United States.  Bercovitch is interested in the particular operation of ideology, 
language, and literature in the United States.  This is not toward exceptionalist ends per se, but 
more toward the ends of how and why exceptionalism rises as a discursive form in America. 
 The meme includes 
“flat” practices, as Johnson argues, that don’t engage in the rich symbolic depth that the 
ideograph gravitates toward. I blend both concepts in my method because the beats were very 
conscious of the material. Kerouac highlights the geography of America in his writings, often 
using materiality or the trace of material practices around him in order to develop his work. 
Allen Ginsberg relies heavily on the geography and materiality of the human body, connecting 
the flatness of the “meme” with the richness of “ideographic” articulation. 
For Bercovitch, the primary motivating force in human affairs is ideology. For him, 
ideology serves as the terrain in which culture can be best understood: 
In its usual meaning ideology precludes dialogue. It implies a programmatic exclusivism, 
a closed system developed in opposition to alternative explanations and militantly 
committed to its particular set of truths. To deny the links between ideology and art is one 
such form of exclusivity. To see the problematic inescapability of those links may enable 
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us to use ideological analysis to precisely the opposite ends: to turn the current barbarism 
of critical debate into a dialogue about common conflicts.225
 
 
Instead of ideology being an ending point, or the thing uncovered by critical work, Bercovitch 
seeks to make ideology the starting point for understanding human conflicts and motives.  This, 
as we shall see, puts Bercovitch in conversation with Kenneth Burke, and also with the Beats.  
The common link is rhetoric – as Bercovitch explains, the way ideology holds its key place of 
exclusivity is through defining the alternatives out via persuasive framing: 
Ideology, we have seen, arises out of historical circumstances, and then re-presents 
these, rhetorically and conceptually, as though they were natural, universal, 
inevitable, and right; as though the ideals promulgated by a certain group or class . . . 
were not the product of history but the expression of self-evident truth. The act of 
representation thus serves to consecrate a set of cultural limitations, to recast a certain 
society as Society, a certain way of life as utopia in process.226
 
 
Ideology and rhetoric go hand-in-hand. For it is framing that leads to the success of any 
ideology.  Ideology must portray itself as fact, truth, or nature or else is allows for a space of 
reconsideration.  Ideology is at its best when it does not appear to be ideology.  Ideology, 
similarly, is never concerned with itself, but perhaps concerned with its negative – for the 
negating idea is most often exposed as ideology, something unnatural or counter to the “natural” 
or “true” system of belief that the dominant ideology frames itself as. 
Bercovitch argues here that the currency of ideology is the symbolic – that is, the realm 
of the standing in for, standing up for, or standing in place of.  A rhetorical understanding of the 
“symbolic,” provided by Kenneth Burke, defines it as a key aspect of the rhetorical: “For rhetoric 
as such is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It [rhetoric] is rooted in an essential 
function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the 
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use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols.”227
Bercovitch argues that ideology, as he defines it would be at the heart of the symbol-
using-animal, as Burke calls human beings: 
 Here we see Burke and Bercovitch fitting nicely together – ideology requires 
cooperation for its continuation, and to achieve cooperation it relies on symbols, which in turn, 
require rhetoric in order to provide reasons and motives for human adherence. The rhetorical 
critic identifies and explicates these connections by attending to both ideographs and memes as 
they emerge in practices and texts. 
In each case, freedom is a function of consensus. And lest I seem to have exempted 
myself form that process, I would like to declare the principles of my own ideological 
dependence. I hold these truths to be self-evident: that there is no escape from 
ideology; that so long as human beings remain political animals they will always be 
bounded in some degree by consensus; and that so long as they are symbol-making 
animals they will always seek to persuade themselves and others that in some sense, 
by relative measure if not absolutely, the terms of their symbology are objective and 
true.228
 
 
Rhetoric works to maintain ideology by framing it as natural, good and true.  Rhetoric 
also works to expose ideology as “mere,” and tout other ideologies in its place.  In the United 
States, the symbol “America” is the key rhetorical battleground around which the human drama 
of persuasion, debunking, agreeing and believing occurs.  The key to understanding the function 
of rhetoric in the United States is “America,” as symbol and rhetorical trope.  Serving as both, 
“America” provides both opportunities and restrictions upon the rhetor.  
In the previous quotation Bercovitch points to literary and poetic texts as the exemplars 
of ideological thought and action. In America, according to Bercovitch, traditional hermeneutics 
                                               
227 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), 43. 
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were “inverted,” providing a rhetoric that used history as material for the interpretation of 
spiritual desires.229
Colonial hermeneutics bridges the considerable gap between christinic auto-machia and 
Promethean self-creation in several important ways. It secularizes the scope and direction 
of the auto-machia; it recasts self-creation in terms of exegesis; and it obviates the 
traditional dialectic between secular and sacred selfhood by fusing both in the framework 
of auto-American-biography. For both Edwards and Emerson, the image of the New 
World invests the regenerate perceiver with an aura of ascendant millennial splendor.
 This allowed for an interpretation of the American identity that could be 
adapted to the events of the moment in order to continue to provide a vision of the American 
individual as prophetic and leading the world into spiritual improvement. These connections for 
Bercovitch connect Puritan governance with Emerson’s more “prophetic” view of the American: 
230
 
 
For Bercovitch, the role of hermeneutics becomes, for Americans, the methods of reading their 
geography, place, and existence in order to make themselves the agents of spiritual global 
improvement.  This is a connection throughout American history since colonization. This 
rhetoric is deployed through the model of the American jeremiad – a “political sermon” that 
“inverts the doctrine of vengeance into a promise of ultimate success, affirming to the world, and 
despite the world, the inviolability of the colonial cause.”231 The jeremiad, as a discursive form, 
not necessarily a specific format, became the groundwork for a national mission in place of a 
national identity. “The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand – 
which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process.”232
                                               
229 Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 112. 
 This initial model of the jeremiad is not 
the one that Bercovitch runs with through his entire analysis. He argues instead that it serves as 
the prototypical social ritual performed to make sense of situations for Americans. The jeremiad 
230 Bercovitch, Puritan Origins, 157. 
231 Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 
6-7. 
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serves as a standard rhetorical model which itself transforms in order to keep articulating the 
national mission of America in the world: “It is a long way . . .  to the flowering of civil religion 
in America, and we shall see that the jeremiad was considerably affected by a variety of social 
and intellectual changes. But through all change the persistence of the rhetoric attests to an 
astonishing cultural hegemony, one that the rhetoric itself reflected and shaped.”233
In Bercovitch’s sense of America, the contradictions in the meaning of “America” co-
exist as a part of the normal operation of ideology.  If the superstructure of ideology is used to 
support contradictory ideas, why doesn’t the entire system fall apart?  The answer is in the 
special status of American ideology, an ideology constructed upon and around consensus to 
argue: 
 The rhetoric 
adapts itself to the situation to adapt the “mission” to the situation. This is the way Bercovitch 
sees rhetoric – as the maintainer of cultural beliefs and a cultural practice in itself. 
The American ideology suggests something almost allegorical – some abstract corporate 
monolith – whereas in fact the American ideology reflects a particular set of interests, the 
power structures and conceptual forms of liberal society in the United States, as these 
evolved through three centuries of conflict, upheaval, transformation, and discontinuity. 
So considered, ‘America’ is not an overarching synthesis, e pluribus Unum, but a 
rhetorical battleground, a symbol that has been made to stand for diverse and sometimes 
mutually contradictory outlooks.234
 
 
The role of “America,” as ideograph/meme in American discourse is as a middle manager for 
rhetorical struggle.  The fight over the good is mediated in American discourse by a solid 
grounding in what would be good for “America.” In Bercovitch’s analysis, the ideology is not 
universal, but there is consensus among struggling ideologies as to what terms are central to the 
conflict. 
                                               
233 Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, 28. 
234 Bercovitch, Rites of Assent, 355. 
 111 
Even though the American ideology is one that functions counter intuitively, Bercovitch 
makes sure to point out that even with the entire ideological struggle over the key terms 
supporting the ideals of “America,” the consensus-based model of ideology has been very 
effective:“I would urge that, in spite of all that diversity and conflict, the American ideology has 
achieved a hegemony unequalled elsewhere in the modern world. For all its manifold 
contradictions, it is an example par excellence of the successful interaction between restriction 
and release.”235
Restriction and release, for Bercovitch, are counterparts in the function of ideology. The 
American consensus model works so well, he argues because there is discursive play between 
key words.  No matter if a text is conservative or radical, the consensus model of ideology means 
that both sides will use the same terminology at the root of the difference.  Both sides, for 
example, will claim to be returning to “America’s roots” which have been abandoned by the 
opposition side.  Within this frame, even the most radical positions wind up conserving the limits 
of the American ideology – for they are always going to value freedom, democracy or other 
central terms for understanding “America.”  
 
It is within this rhetorical conception of ideology that the beats should be understood. The 
beats are writing and working within a rhetorical environment that will terministically limit their 
project. Although my argument will be that the beats are struggling to reorient the way terms 
function on the rhetorical level – that is, how do we best communicate with one another – the 
beats have to “beat back” the overwhelming rhetorical sediment of the culture of concensus, 
where even uniquely created terms such as “beat generation” will be read within the consensus 
ideology. 
                                               
235 Bercovitch, Rites of Assent, 355-6. 
 112 
Compare Norman Podhoretz’s understanding of beat to Kerouac’s. Podhoretz (1958) 
argues, “Being for or against what the Beat Generation stands for has to do with denying that 
incoherence is superior to knowledge; that the exercise of mind and discrimination is a form of 
death. It has to do with fighting the notion that sordid acts of violence are justifiable so long as 
they are committed in the name of ‘instinct.’ It even has to do with fighting the poisonous 
glorification of the adolescent in American popular culture. It has to do, in other words, with 
being for or against intelligence itself.”236 Podhoretz lines up the beat generation values with the 
larger and more consensus conflict of the role of intellectuals in the United States. Russell 
Jacoby describes the period as replacing the idea of a rebellious youth with one of the 
“delinquent” – “The persistent mourning for the passing of rebellious youth has to be set against 
its opposite, the national mobilization against juvenile delinquency. For the public of the 1950s, 
‘juvenile delinquency’ supplanted a memory of a rebellious, even unconventional youth. A 
thousand conferences, agencies, committees, and newspapers alerted the country to the danger. 
Juvenile delinquency was the only rebellion around, and it had to be stopped.”237
                                               
236 Norman Podhoretz, “The Know-Nothing Bohemians” in Matt Theado, Ed. The Beats: A 
Literary Reference (New York: Caroll & Graff, 2001), 81. 
 By associating 
the beats with juvenile delinquency, Podhoretz is able to rhetorically constrain what the beats are 
up to within the accepted categories of the controversial. To contrast, here is Kerouac explaining 
what it means to be beat: “Maybe since I’m supposed to be the spokesman of the Beat 
Generation (I am the originator of the term, and around it the term and the generation have taken 
shape) it should be pointed out that all this ‘Beat’ guts therefore goes back to my ancestors who 
were Bretons who were the most independent group of nobles in all old Europe and kept fighting 
237 Russell Jacoby, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (New York: 
Basic Books, 1987), 62-3. 
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Latin France to the last wall . . Breton, Wiking, Irishman, Indian, madboy, it doesn’t make any 
difference, there is no doubt about the Beat Generation, at least the core of it, being a swinging 
group of new American men intent on joy . . . Irresponsibility? Who wouldn’t help a dying man 
on an empty road?”238
As an example of this not related specifically to the beats, Bercovich analyzes some of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s work from the perspective of consensus ideology: 
  Here Kerouac anchors beat in both family and national identity, a far cry 
from delinquent juvenile behavior or anti-intellectualism.  Kerouac tries to connect his definition 
to the valuable concepts of family heritage, pride in national origin, and the somewhat 
contradictory yet acceptable “blending” of these identities in to American-ness. Perhaps the 
Podhoretz definition could be contrasted with Kerouac’s as being a debate about what 
responsible behavior means for Americans. Either way, Kerouac attempts to push through the 
consensus toward a recognition of a seeming selfless joy at the same moment of pride in national 
origin can become “flattened” into a more comfortable consensus debate about intellectualism by 
Podhoretz. 
The appeal of Emersonian dissent lies in an extraordinary conjunction of forces: its 
capacity to absorb the radical communitarian visions it renounces, and its capacity to 
be nourished by the liberal structures it resists. It demonstrates the capacities of 
culture to shape the subversive in its own image, and thereby, within limits, to be 
shaped in turn by the radicalism it seeks to contain.239
 
 
Emerson’s rhetoric functions within the American ideology for Bercovitch because it is flexible.  
The pliability of his call, since it is rooted in the consensus-driven American ideological 
discourse, allows some play to more radical notions – such as communitarianism – but only if 
they remain within the confines of the American consensus ideology. Scholars such as Richard 
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Teichgraeber see Bercovitch’s view as “reductive” even though it attempts to re-read Emerson as 
a transformative thinker.240   Teichgraeber argues that Emerson, as well as Henry David Thoreau 
can and should be read as “connected critics.” Emerson, in Teichgraeber’s view had “a conscious 
determination to locate his ideals within social practices and institutions he criticized and then to 
persuade his contemporaries to recognize those same ideals as their own.”241 Thoreau is a 
“connected critic” through a careful and clever strategy of parody and stylized self-inclusion in 
his own criticism.242 Both understandings rely on Michael Walzer’s argument that social 
criticism as a practice must necessarily be connected to the society from which it emanates.243
I’ve said much about American ideology being driven by consensus. How radical, 
individualistic notions of the American subject could be motivated at the root by an implicit 
decision as to what is central and important seems paradoxical. Here Bercovitch clarifies how 
consensus works to raise the fences of the American ideology.  And, there should be little 
surprise that rhetoric is involved: 
 
Kerouac’s inclusion of his family history as well as his popular culture references and personal 
anecdotes in his defense of beat point to a read of Kerouac as a similar sort of connected critic, 
with the exception that instead of criticizing social issues, his target is rhetorical practices. 
Hence the importance of the rhetoric of consensus. It served then, as always, to blur 
such discrepancies. But in doing so, the rhetoric provides us with a map of social 
reality that is no less accurate in its way than any quantitative chart. It locates the 
sources of social revitalization and integration. It helps explain how the majority of 
people kept the faith despite their day-by-day experiences. It reminds us that although 
the concept of hegemony involves the dialectics of change, the directions of change 
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are in turn crucially affected by the terms of hegemonic constraint. And in this case 
the effect was demonstrable in the way that the rhetoric of consensus molded what 
was to all appearances the most heterogeneous ‘people’ in the world into the most 
monolithic of modern cultures.244
 
 
Bercovitch here taps into the idea that the study of rhetoric, both formal and daily practiced 
discourse can yield a map of the ideological constraints and permissions available in society.  He 
suggests a complex model of ideology and rhetoric as a sort of feedback loop:  Ideology sets the 
limitations and the constraints of permissible action within the society.  Rhetoric frames these 
limits persuasively as natural, good, or even paradoxically as revolution, revolt or escape.  
Rhetoric supplies the necessary pliancy within the grip of ideology that prevents the complete 
turnover of the ideology of the society on a daily basis.  For without it, the cracks in the 
ideological regime would provide stark inconsistencies, contradictions and impossible limitations 
that would prohibit people from getting on with their day.  In short, this would lead to the 
destabilization of society and the inability for community to form at all. 
To extend on the power of rhetorical framing to keep order and stability within the 
American ideological system, Bercovitch turns to “revolution” for a clear example of the extent 
of the power of rhetoric: 
I refer to the uneasy association in the United States of revolution with America. 
Americans honor their Revolution as the shaping influence in their history, ye they 
shrink from accepting revolution as a defining American characteristic; or more 
typically, they accept it by contrasting the American Revolution with other modern 
revolutions. It is as though the term ‘American’ altered the very meaning of 
revolution, while the term ‘revolution’ conferred some special honorific status on the 
meaning of America.245
 
 
                                               
244 Bercovitch, The Rites of Assent, 47. 
245 Bercovitch, The Rites of Assent, 170. 
 116 
The challenge, therefore, facing those who wish to challenge dominant ideology or offer 
new modes of engagement between people and the material reality comes from the unique 
position of rhetoric and ideology in America.  Bercovitch argues later in his book that the key 
move for radicals is to dispense with having the debate or discussion come down to consensus-
driven American values.  In his example of early feminist argument, Bercovitch points out that it 
is nearly impossible to bend the key terms away from the superstructure of ideology no matter 
how the argument is offered: 
Probably some of these feminists believed that they were merely using patriotism, 
manipulating the rhetoric of the republic for ulterior radical ends. But if so, they were 
miscalculating the relation of ends and means. In effect (as events proved), they were 
conforming to a ritual of consensus that defused all issues in debate by restricting the 
debate itself, symbolically and substantively, to the meaning of America.246
 
 
Restricting the debate via the choice of substantive terms to those that clarify and are clarified by 
the term “America” is a failing proposition for radical change in the ideology.  This is a problem 
we will see when it comes to what the Beats offer.  However, the Beats come up in what is quite 
literally a discursive stew of rhetorical commonplaces in the discursive stew of explanations and 
accounts in the post-war U.S.  The importance of the ideograph/meme “America” was the 
subject of several influential monographs.247
This is the point where Bercovitch’s model of American consensus ideology breaks down 
– the point where the ideology itself is in the state of near complete refiguring. David Harlan 
 This rise of large amounts of justification, 
grounding, and explanation of the role of America is a sign of the ideological crisis that appeared 
post-war. 
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argues that Bercovitch’s entire approach of rhetorical typology to explain American history 
flattens and removes any relief from the map of the conflicts that make and shape America: 
“Bercovitch does not think of American culture or American texts as pluralistic, many-layered, 
multi-vocal conversations; nor does he think of them as overpopulated with a multiplicity of 
voices, past and present; it does not occur to him that in their hidden spaces and interstices he 
might find traces of other books, other speakers, other voices.”248
None of our classic writers conceived of imaginative perspectives radically other than 
those implicit in the vision of America. Their works are characterized by an 
unmediated relation between the facts of American life and the ideals of liberal free 
enterprise. Confronted with the inadequacies of their society, they turned for solace 
and inspiration to its social ideals. It was not that they lacked radical energies, but that 
they had invested these in a vision which reinforced (because it emanated from) the 
values of their culture. Their quarrels with America took the form of intracultural 
dialogues – as in Thoreau’s Walden, where ‘the only true America’ beckons to us as a 
timeless images of the country’s time-bound ideals (minimal government, extra-
vagrant economics, endless mobility, unlimited self-aggrandizement); or in 
Whitman’s Leaves of Grass, which offers the highest Romantic tribute, the process of 
poetic self-creation, as text-proof of America’s errand into the future. In these and 
other key instances, the autonomous act that might have posed fundamental 
alternatives, imaginative or actual, became instead a mimesis of cultural norms.
 Harlan’s critique does point 
out that Bercovitch’s theory can be seen as too closed a circuit. However what Harlan misses in 
Bercovitch’s argument that the jeremiad is a rhetorical typology – not a template.  The typology 
serves as unavoidable influence for American discourse since the Puritans – the hermeneutic 
reversal of Bercovitch offers an argument as to why America’s most radical writers were never 
able to spur the revolutionary sentiment that they seemed to advance: 
249
 
 
The strategy of trying to “re-claim” America from an America that has gone off the rails, so to 
speak, is a failing strategy in Bercovitch’s mind.  The reason why, as he elucidates in this 
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paragraph, is because America’s great writers inescapably end up having an intracultural 
dialogue – that is, the value of the culture and the ideology of the American culture at large is 
never a question that can come to the table.  Instead, only surface ideological conflicts come 
under examination, and one can never work around the pervasive rhetorical typology Bercovitch 
identifies.   
What I turn to now is to examine the 1950s as a point where there is much discourse 
produced about “America,” justifying and explaining the place of the country by using the 
ideograph.  Bercovich’s study only covers American rhetoric and ideology up to the Civil War.  
Although I don’t propose to make such an investigation in this study, perhaps the 1860s might 
have served as another moment where Americans and America as an ideology needed re-framing 
and re-examination.  The post-war crisis of American rhetoric, identity and ideology was the 
moment where two of the founding members of the Beat Generation articulated their ideological 
vision for America, Americans and humanity within the technological, cultural and social 
whirlwind that the United States found itself in after 1945. 
3.3 THE DISCURSIVE STEW OF THE 1950S 
In the 1950s, particular historical and material conditions arose that offered rhetorical exigency.  
As Gerald Nicosia frames the situation from the perspective of Jack Kerouac: 
On a ride to Grand Island, Nebraska, listening to an old rancher talk about men who rode 
the rails during the Depression, Jack noted that his own life was falling in with another 
American tradition, that of the man who moves on out of necessity, when living 
conditions in one place become unbearable, or when the land itself can no longer support 
life.  The rancher told him about the great dustclouds that choked the Great Plains during 
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the thirties. Jack’s generation was fleeing a different cloud, made of atomic particles and 
shaped like a mushroom – a cloud so powerful that even the threat of it was stifling.250
 
 
The fear and threat posed by the presence of the atomic bomb was a very extant and real problem 
to the minds of post-war Americans.251
What the expansion of the atomic program did assure to Americans was the changed 
nature of America’s place in the world.  Slowly and somewhat grudgingly, Americans 
absorbed the first lesson of their atomic age education: this was a very different world 
from that which had existed before the war, a world in which preparation for peace 
became indistinguishable from preparation for war, a world in which atomic bombs were 
considered ‘weapons for peace.
 According to Margot Henriksen, the presence of the 
atomic bomb was fundamental to the re-thinking of America’s position in the world: 
252
 
 
Atomic weapons permeated many facets of American discourse, and discourse about America. 
The power of the atomic bomb made America both great and threatening. Atomic weapons were 
not just for anyone, they required containment; likewise one’s discourse about America had to be 
“contained” as well. “The battle waged internally by so many during the cold war – between 
spiritual and forensic testimony, public and personal loyalty, recounting and recanting, speech 
and silence – created a test of character. No matter how complex and self contradictory the social 
text, the individual was supposed to read it and choose correctly.”253
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complex social texts that required careful hermeneutic practices in order to properly place 
oneself within the culture. 
The atomic bomb could be seen as the ultimate of these contradictory rhetorical 
commonplaces. The bomb ensured peace by guaranteeing ultimate destruction.  The building of 
extremely efficient weapons of death was seen as only appropriate to preserve American purity 
and goodness against external threats: 
The chaos of a world threatened by disease, poverty, and an expanding Soviet sphere of 
influence impelled America toward interventionism and military preparedness.  The 
postwar Soviet Union with its vast army of soldiers, its large territorial gains and 
potential for further conquest, and its alien ideology and totalitarian form of government 
stood as the only power that could knock America off its perch at the top of the world, 
the only power that could seriously threaten America’s vision of a postwar world shaped 
in its own image.  A war-torn world swarming with displaced and destitute persons was 
perceived as vulnerable to the revolutionary doctrines of Soviet communism, and such 
vulnerability imperiled America: the only way to preserve the security of a free and pure 
American way of life in an era of lost geographic isolation was to create a world 
amenable to American ideologies.254
 
 
This environment required rhetorical finesse to craft a way of speaking, framing and 
understanding America.  People faced a situation where it was necessary to praise the destructive 
as the thing that would prevent devastation.  As Henriksen explains, the Truman administration 
was quite good at developing the foundations of this rhetoric: 
Truman crafted an American conception of the cold war world which precluded any other 
response than the one he offered: a limitless American defense of freedom whenever and 
wherever it was threatened by the enslaving forces of communism.  Truman spoke 
gloomily of a world frighteningly and dangerously but clearly divided between the 
purveyors of good and evil, light and darkness.  Conjuring all the drama of this universal 
struggle, Truman made it imperative that every nation ‘choose between alternative ways 
of life.’ . . . Having cleaved the world into diametrically opposed camps, Truman 
committed America to a policy of containing the communist camp and defending the 
democratic camp against contamination; in this world there was no middle ground, and 
Truman reiterated his pledge to brook no compromise with evil.255
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No overarching description of the era will suffice to account for how the atom bomb was 
read. Some saw it as a great evil, others as a great protector. The only suitable conclusion is to 
identify the atom bomb as a central exigence for the rhetoric of the period. As an exigence, 
atomic weapons served as a point of contest in the development of an appropriate vocabulary for 
the period. According to Burke, “Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of 
reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any 
selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality.”256 As a 
natural element of this, a representative anecdote is present from which the meanings of the 
vocabulary stem or derive. Burke believed that if you can find the representative anecdote, you 
can critique the entire vocabulary. “If the originating anecdote is not representative, a vocabulary 
developed in strict conformity with it will not be representative. This embarrassment is usually 
avoided in practice by a break in the conformity at some crucial point; this means in effect that 
the vocabulary ceases to have the basis which is claimed for it.”257
The rhetoric of daily life represented one of these breaks.  Youth were trained from an 
early age to be excellent consumers. “The culture had accommodated itself (although not without 
guilt) to luxurious affluence and to the corporation. Public school had also achieved this 
accommodation. It became less and less the place to train the mind, and ever more the place 
 This critique targets the 
amount of the deflection and whether or not that deflection leaves out too much for the 
vocabulary to remain useful. 
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where the culture’s managers and consumers were prepared.”258
The values that would turn most of these youths into highly manageable consumers, of 
course, did not come purely from school. Rather, the educational system was one of several 
mainlines for this ethos.  Other contributing institutions included the family and the mass 
media (particularly the new marketing-obsessed medium, TV). Church, too, grew in its 
shallow materialism in this period . . . All these institutions were the membranes passing 
cultural messages to the young. The main currents of witch hunting, of nuclear terrorism, 
corporate bureaucracy, sexual doublethink, surrender to authority, and loss of individualism 
all vibrated through these means.
  However, the schools did not 
work in isolation, nor were they homogenous in what they presented – all aspects of society 
functioned to create a norm of consumerist behavior among youth: 
259
 
 
The representative anecdote of American individuality lost its stability in the face of the 
move to mass consumer materialism pushed by all sectors of the society. The loss of 
individualism as “individualistic” is a contradiction that the beats attempt to expose about this 
representative anecdote. The merging of all discourses of the society toward this sort of stability 
was seen as a problem for the beats. 
One of the larger changes, as hinted at earlier was the television. “One of the most powerful 
of all postwar entertainments – the television set – sat squarely in people’s living rooms. By the 
1950s, televisions were selling at a rate of over five million a year.”260
As historian George Lipsitz noted, situation comedies in the postwar years, especially 
those aimed at ethic or working-class audiences, eased the transition from a depression-
 Television was not just a 
new way of receiving old entertainment – it was a participant in re-writing the American post-
war life. Television helped persuade Americans as to what was normal and acceptable in the 
post-war economy: 
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bred psychology of scarcity to an acceptance of spending. In shows like “I Remember 
Mama,” or “The Honeymooners,” the dramas of daily life revolved around the purchase 
of consumer goods for the home. Characters in these programs urged each other to buy 
on installment, “live above your means – the American way,” and spend rather than 
save.261
 
 
Although many scholars were addressing the concerns of mass culture, television, and the rise of 
consumer society, I will examine the idea of mass culture briefly. “Mass Culture” as a term is 
contemporaneous with the beats, as they were writing in an environment where the term had 
taken on some new meanings. As one scholar has noted, there is an exigence around the term 
“Mass Culture” as an object of study: 
Until the 1930s, there were few instances where the words ‘mass’ and ‘culture’ were used 
together in English. The phrase ‘mass culture’ became part of common parlance only 
after World War II, and then, chiefly with a negative connotation. In such a brief span, 
‘mass culture’ had come to designate a system of popular leisure practices and arts that 
were considered wholly new to urban and industrial society. And the system was believed 
to be almost synonymous with social corruption and decay.262
 
 
The appearance of “Mass Culture” as a phrase is not new, but the appearance of it in the daily 
language as a negative is a notable shift. What matters is not the actual, historical accounting of 
the history of the phrase, but rather the transformation of something innocuous, via rhetoric, to 
something dangerous.  The motives of why people were engaged in such practices needed 
accounting – the new practices of consumption and engagement of arts and information required 
a rhetorical bent that brought it under and into the larger discussions of what America and 
Americans’ value to the world would be in the post-war era. Part of that accounting happened in 
the altering meaning of “mass culture.” The phrase can be read as a trope for what unhealthy 
communication looks like, but implies a normative sense of healthy communication through it. 
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(Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 2. 
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Since it is my argument that the beats are pushing for a rhetoric that advances healthy 
communication, they can be considered as participating in the mass culture discussion. 
  For rhetoricians, the shift of meaning in a phrase indicates a need to persuade, account, 
and normalize practices that defy contemporary explanation – that is, the frame, language and 
usual motives for human behavior seemed inadequate to make a persuasive account for why 
people were behaving in this manner.  For Burke, this shift can indicate a problem with the logic 
of the representative anecdote upon which the larger economies of the language are based. 
Mass Culture as a rhetorical turn in the consensus-driven American ideological stew of 
the 1950s should help explicate the rhetorical environment that produced the Beats, as well as the 
way they were received, discussed, admired, and criticized.  As I examine their ideas, I may 
gesture toward linkages that will be seen in later chapters when I critique Kerouac’s and 
Ginsberg’s work from the assumption that they can be read as rhetorical theorists. 
3.4 MASS CULTURE: TROPE FOR COMMUNICATION 
As suggested above, “mass culture” was undergoing a flip in meaning during the postwar years 
through the 1950s.  However, this does not mean that scholars and theorists did not have a 
foundation from which to work.  Scholars since the early 20th century have attended to the idea 
of “mass communication” which, for various reasons, held the same attention and concern of 
thinkers for a number of reasons.  As Peters and Simonson note, the twentieth century holds 
particular interest because it was the “heyday” of the biggest mass communication forms still 
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with us – “radio, film, television, newspapers and magazines.”263 Other scholars have provided 
studies of the historical grounding of the term and its emergence from the perspective of 
history.264
It is these forms that were and continue to be “genuinely mass media in every context: in 
their content, which was aimed at middle-range cultural tastes; in their audiences, ranging in the 
millions; and in their mode of production, which was industrialized, bureaucratized, and 
organized in output.”
 What I investigate here is the use of the term as a trope in discourse about the place of 
America. 
265
The change was present in almost every avenue of print. In the field of publishing, less 
expensive and more easily available reading and listening material was precipitated somewhat by 
the war effort, which required rationing in everything used for the production of books and 
newspapers, giving Americans a taste for the paperback book once the war was over.
  This flow of information needed naming and summary in order to 
provide a way of attributing value to it. The phrase “mass culture” began to stand in for this 
complicated phenomenon among scholars and laypeople alike.  
266  For 
Lawrence Ferlinghetti, this allowed him to open his own printing press to publish inexpensive 
translations of modern foreign poetry in America.267
                                               
263 John Durham Peters and Peter Simonson, eds., Mass Communication and American Social 
Thought (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 1. 
 For others, it allowed the publication of 
seemingly valueless works that were seen as anti-intellectual and dangerous. Outside of the 
264 “Mass Culture” has had a rigorous treatment outside of rhetoric as a historical phenomenon. 
See David Paul Nord, Faith in Reading: Religious Publishing and the Birth of Mass Media in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) for the 19th century origins; Michael Denning, 
The Cultural Front (New York: Verso, 1997) for the continued emergence of “mass culture” up 
and through the 1930s in the United States. 
265 Peters & Simonson, 1. 
266 James West, American Authors and the Literary Marketplace since 1900 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 130. 
267 See Barry Silesky, Ferlinghetti: The Artist in his Time (New York: Warner Books, 1990). 
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world of print, the rise of television, popular film, and the distribution of music was celebrated 
by some scholars, and feared by others. As Dwight Macdonald argued, the existence of mass 
culture was not to be feared per se, but the particularities of American society mean that mass 
culture has distinct advantages when it appears to be high culture:  
Masscult is not merely a parallel formation to High Culture, as Folk Art was; it is a 
competitor. The problem is especially acute in this country because class lines are 
especially weak here. If there were a clearly defined cultural elite here, then the masses 
could have their Kitsch and the classes could have their High Culture, with everybody 
happy. But a significant part of our population is chronically confronted with a choice 
between looking at TV or old master, between reading Tolstoy or a detective story; i.e., 
the pattern of their cultural lives is ‘open’ to the point of being porous. For a lucky few, 
this openness of choice is stimulating. But for most, it is confusing and leads at best to 
that middlebrow compromise called Midcult.268
 
Macdonald argues that the openness of culture in America of the 1950s is such that it gives 
enormous opportunity to the individual to access the best works of all time, but as a double-edge, 
the individual has equal opportunity to dive into culturally repulsive works as well. Not wanting 
to completely discredit the masses as completely foolish, he articulates a middle position of 
“Midcult” – works that appear to be high culture, but only contain signs of the form, possessing 
none of the content of a work of High Culture.  Macdonald can be read here as Socrates talking 
to Phaedrus, warning him of confusing mere ornamental speech with the type of speech pleasing 
to the Gods. Richard Weaver believes the dialogue to be about the question, “if truth alone is not 
sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately added?”
 
269
                                               
268 Dwight MacDonald, Against the American Grain (New York: Random House, 1962), 34. 
 Stretching a bit 
here, perhaps the question facing Macdonald and other concerned intellectuals of the period, 
what can be legitimately added to High Culture if its existence is not enough to warrant attention 
to it? Macdonald is thinking of the issue this way, and arrives at the unacceptable 
269 Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1985), 15. 
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commercialization of the tropes of High Culture in order to forward an inferior cultural product. 
Like Plato, Macdonald is nervous about allowing any and all expressions to be valuable, but 
recognizes that some persuasive addition must be made to High Culture to get people who have 
nearly unlimited choice interested in it. Thinking along these terms can help reveal the 
communicative anxieties within the Mass Culture debate. 
The concerns about mass culture have a long history. As Peters and Simonson note, “the 
specter of democracy turning sour and breaking up into a society of masses is an old concern 
within American thought, raised in one way by Founding Father James Madison in the 
Federalist Papers and noted by the distinguished French visitor Alexis de Tocqueville in his 
Democracy in America. The coming of television simply gave a new urgency to old themes.”270
The gamut runs the extreme around “mass culture.” Max Horkheimer and the Frankfurt 
School represent probably the most well known critics of massification. Their concerns circulate 
around the elements of commodification and commercialization in mass culture.  As early as 
1941 Horkheimer railed against mass culture, arguing it had usurped true art and replaced it with 
an infantile and dangerous alternative: 
  
In many ways, the concerns over democracy and the mass society could be seen as a key point of 
contention where Bercovitch’s American consensus ideology is played out. I will examine a few 
“massification” critics and scholars in order to support the claim that “mass society” or “mass 
culture” serves as a trope for the discussion of human communication and rhetoric at large. The 
discussion of appropriate, effective and essential communicative practices is the central theme of 
almost all mass culture and mass society critique. 
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The generation that allowed Hitler to become great takes its adequate pleasure in the 
convulsions which the animated cartoon imposes upon its helpless characters, not in 
Picasso, who offers no recreation and cannot be ‘enjoyed’ anyhow. Misanthropic, spiteful 
creatures, who secretly know themselves as such, like to be taken for the pure, childish 
souls who applaud with innocent approval when Donald Duck gets a cuffing. There are 
times when faith in the future of mankind can be kept alive only through absolute 
resistance to the prevailing responses of men. Such a time is the present.271
 
 
Clearly Horkheimer saw direct connections between violence and the popular choice of 
entertainment over proper artistic production.  What is more specific is his claim that the 
massification of culture threatens vital human communication. “Today art is no longer 
communicative,” argues Horkheimer, and he points out that in the past people had access to an 
“inner life.”272  This inner life, now usurped by the “pleasures of the ball park and the movie, the 
best seller and the radio,” allowed people a power to “conceive a world different from that in 
which he lives. This other world was that of art.”273
Contemporary art for Horkheimer reverses the ability of art to serve as the 
communication conduit for ways of re-arranging the world. This is the place where Horkheimer 
 Horkheimer here represents a view that 
perhaps does not recognize the long term issue of mass culture, and perhaps focuses on the 
recent “bubbling up” of the problem from the perspective of institutions of higher education. 
Horkheimer speaks from a position of immediacy – recognizing the mass culture problem as an 
acute issue in society, when some of what he recognizes as a problem go back a bit farther. His 
contribution to the mass culture discussion is different from Macdonald, who recognizes some 
compromise must be made, but that the current compromise is unacceptable. Horkheimer would 
perhaps categorize Midcult as Masscult, not recognizing its rhetorical saavy. 
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is most clear about the function of high culture.  “To the extent that the last works of art still 
communicate, they denounce the prevailing forms of communication as instruments of 
destruction, and harmony as a delusion of decay.”274  The last, proper works of art could help 
communicate another way of life, but in the current climate, “the gulf between art and 
communication is perforce wide in a world in which accepted language only intensifies the 
confusion. . .”  For Horkheimer, the public opinion is “determined. . . always by their 
representatives in other social strata,” and the individual person “within humanity is as solitary 
and abandoned as humanity with in the infinite universe.”275
One day we may learn that in the depths of their hearts, the masses, even in fascist 
countries, secretly knew the truth and disbelieved the lie, like katatonic patients who 
make known only at the end of their trance that nothing has escaped them. Therefore it 
may not be entirely senseless to continue speaking a language that is not easily 
understood.
  Still, perhaps communication 
should still be attempted as the best-case scenario for the future is layed out by Horkheimer: 
276
 
 
Horkheimer’s argument via analogy to a “katatonic” patient is not the most hopeful image one 
would like to see, but it is an effective one.  It seems that for him mass culture’s highest crime is 
the dissolution of human communion through the elimination of people’s communication with 
humanity.  It effaces the necessary rhetorical connection to a larger, more timeless humanity with 
a very shallow, immediate connection to the contemporary. Mass culture distracts, disconnects, 
and disrupts the human ability to imagine a better world and share that image with others.  In the 
world of the 19th century this was possible because people still had an inward capacity to critique 
and imagine a better world.  In the 20th century, that better world is external, and realized 
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through the pure pleasures of sports, cartoons and radio dramas.  Art cannot compete with such 
distractions, and at best, merely forces people to seek out more “enjoyment.” 
What is interesting about Horkheimer’s critique is the central role human communication 
takes in an essay that is supposedly about the failures of popular art forms. The term “mass 
culture” is how it often serves as a trope, or a rhetorical stand-in for the larger, and much more 
slippery subject of human communication.  I believe that most of the critics of mass culture, 
Horkheimer included, were using mass culture as a point of contention from which to argue for 
better communicative and rhetorical practices in society as a whole. The phrase “mass culture” 
then serves as a trope that unites these concerns into one, and uses it as a way of articulating the 
need for better communicative practices. As Lynn Spillman argues, “the commonsense meanings 
of culture still current today echo the history of the idea.”277 The idea of High Culture, extending 
from the 19th century, is the one that Horkheimer is pushing in his references to a pure or higher 
form of art, music or literature. “When we talk about art, or popular culture, or folk culture, or 
even mass culture, we are echoing an idea which first emerged to help map the massive social 
changes occurring within European societies as modern economic and political institutions were 
born.”278
                                               
277 Lynn Spillman Cultural Sociology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 4. 
 Of course, Horkheimer is not only speaking from this vocabulary which attempts, in 
Burkean terms, to deflect a particular (maybe dangerous) access to art by lower classes, but 
reflect a different way of speaking and communicating about the values of a culture. Coming out 
of the tradition of George Simmel and Max Weber, his analysis indicates a view of a highly 
structured order to society, perhaps to the point of forcing these cultural changes into that 
278 Spillman, 3. 
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hierarchical view, instead of at least acknowledging some fluctuations to at least the appearance 
of the structure, as Macdonald did.279
C. Wright Mills offers another perspective on mass culture and communication. Patricia 
Cormack argues that Mills is seeking to redefine sociology as a middle term in the gap between 
meaning and daily existence. “Mills claims that sociology drives a wedge between the promise 
of popular utterances and the nihilism of mass culture.”
 
280
At the opposite extreme, in a mass, (1) far fewer people express opinions than receive 
them; for the community of publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who 
receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The communications that prevail are so 
organized that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back immediately 
or with any effect. (3) The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities 
who organize and control the channels of such action. (4) The mass has no autonomy 
from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, 
reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of opinion by discussion.
  In his book, The Power Elite,  Mills 
argues that mass is distinct from the traditional sense of a public: 
281
 
 
Here we see Mills’s chief concern could be called communicative. The problem with the mass is 
the restriction of sharing of ideas to a receiving of them, and a restriction of discussion between 
members, which leads to a loss of autonomy in decision making. As we will see, the lack of 
shared engagement between people is a concern of the beats as well. The perceived replacement 
of the personal with impersonal in the “mass” means we lose a lot.   To spell out the changes in 
even greater detail, Mills uses communication as the litmus test to prove the acidity of the mass 
society: 
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The public and the mass may be most readily distinguished by their dominant modes of 
communication: in a community of publics, discussion is the ascendant means of 
communication, and the mass media, if they exist, simply enlarge and animate discussion, 
linking one primary public with the discussion of another. In a mass society, the 
dominant type of communication is the formal media, and the publics become mere 
media markets: all those exposed to the contents of given mass media.282
 
 
The mass media’s unidirectional, reception oriented model of the public is a clear break 
from previous conceptions of the relationship of the public to the media and to the society at 
large. The effect of this mass culture on the individual is a stunning detachment from political 
and personal engagement with society: 
In a curious adaptation, ‘the public’ often becomes, in fact, ‘the unattached expert,’ who, 
although well informed, has never taken a clear-cut, public stand on controversial issues 
which are brought to a focus by organized interests. . . What the public stands for, 
accordingly, is often a vagueness of policy (called open-mindedness), a lack of 
involvement in public affairs (known as reasonableness), and a professional disinterest 
(known as tolerance).283
 
 
This model of the public is seen by Mills as an unhealthy communicative situation.  Kerouac and 
Ginsberg were highly disturbed by the shift that Mills is chronicling here.  They both discuss it in 
their own work, as we shall see in later chapters.  For now though, Mills articulation of the mass 
society is one that can help us understand the level of concern about the new mediation and the 
effects it has not only on the public, but on the way we think and speak about the public in the 
United States.  Sounding like the stereotype of the “Beat,” Mills explains the rise of disinterest 
among people in political engagement: 
It is because they do not find available associations at once psychologically meaningful 
and historically effective that men often feel uneasy in their political and economic 
loyalties. The effective units of power are now the huge corporation, the inaccessible 
government, the grim military establishment. Between these, on the one hand, and the 
family and the small community on the other, we find no intermediate associations in 
which men feel secure and with which they feel powerful. There is little live political 
                                               
282 Mills, 304. 
283 Mills, 306. 
 133 
struggle. Instead there is administration from above, and the political vacuum below. The 
primary publics are now either so small as to be swamped, and hence give up; or so large 
as to be merely another feature of the generally distant structure of power, and hence 
inaccessible.284
 
 
For Mills, the concern was access to the social structure, and the influence that people could have 
on their society. The rise of the mass in mass culture means that people are less able to 
participate in the power structure. For the beats, the same exigence is at play. Ginsberg and 
Kerouac were sensing the same sort of exigence, but responded to it differently. Mills 
understanding, seen along side Macdonald and Horkheimer displays the differing reactions that 
the same exigence can cause. It also shows how each thinker is ultimately concerned about 
communicative issues. This places the beats as both connected to these thinkers and distinct. 
They are connected because the same exigence – mass culture – necessitated for each a 
reconsideration of the relationship people have with culture, and how culture is understood. 
Secondly, the beats are distinct because they address the issue as a rhetorical one – that is, 
instead of centering their concern on the quality of culture or the loss of power due to a 
refiguring of the cultural, they find the issue to be one of how to evaluate quality or how to 
connect with other people in society. Their answers lie in how our speech and writing are 
figured, and how that figuration constructs the valuable. 
As a final figure responding to mass culture, Marshall McLuhan is an important one for 
this study.   McLuhan reads poetry and other forms of literary production as mediation.  This 
insight allows us to understand the beats as offering an implicit rhetorical theory in their work. 
McLuhan is a theorist of media and how different media influence different 
understandings.  Here he argues that blank verse can be read as a broadcasting medium: 
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What is especially significant is the discovery of blank verse as a broadcasting 
megaphone and the consciousness that jigging rhymes cannot provide the sweep and 
volume of public utterance that is resonating in the new age. Blank verse to the 
Elizabethan was as exciting a novelty as the ‘close up’ in a Griffith’s movie, and the two 
are much alike in the intensity of amplification and exaggeration of feeling.  Even 
Whitman, impelled by the new visual intensities of the newspaper of his time, did not 
devise a louder vehicle for his barbaric yawp than blank verse.285
 
 
This will be interesting for this study, as Ginsberg – an avid admirer of Whitman’s poetry – also 
saw poetry as the most appropriate vehicle for the rhetorical and communicative.  Blank verse is 
compared to film here on the rhetorical level – that is, the medium of blank verse has tropes and 
turns unique to it as a form of communication that separate it from other forms.  At the same 
time, these unique tropes and turns to the medium irreversibly change the content, adding 
elements to it that would not be present if the message was articulated within an alternative 
medium.  Of course, I am not arguing that the beats were composing blank verse, or that blank 
verse is the only type of poetry that could be read this way.  If poetry is conceptualized as a type 
of media in one case, can it not be generalizable to all cases? McLuhan explains this effect by 
comparing sixteenth century blank verse to the alternative, verse poetry of the time: 
But the paradox is that the blank verse, being one of the first kinds of “spoken,” as 
opposed to sung, poetry is very much faster than song, or perhaps even than speech itself. 
It is very safe, however, to commence with the consideration that blank verse, unlike 
rhymed poetry, answered the new need of the vernacular to have recognition and 
implementation as a public address system.286
 
 
Blank verse as public address was an effect of the rise of the vernacular, but also didn’t take the 
place of speech. It was like public address, and also like poetry, but had the effect of neither.  It 
filled a need within the culture for a new rhetorical form with which to convey feeling, idea and 
aesthetic sensibility.  It was like film or television, a new technology of communication due to 
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the rhetorical abilities it had that other forms did not.  It wasn’t better or worse; just different.  
McLuhan is trying to get across the idea that changes in media require new ways of thought and 
explanation, and reliance on the old ways causes us to miss important features of the new 
rhetoric, or worse, ignore the potential dangers.  This is clear when he moves blank verse into the 
1950s, showing what the newest changes in mass media bring: “Blank verse was a means to 
make English roar and resonate in a way suited to the new extension and consolidation of the 
vernacular by typography. In our own century as the vernacular has met the non-verbal 
competition of photo, film and television, a reverse effect has occurred.”287
The rise of television and film have caused the vernacular to cease roaring. This is one of 
the major effects of print for McLuhan: 
 
Everybody is familiar with the phrase, ‘the voices of silence.’ It is the traditional word for 
sculpture. And if an entire year of any college program were spent in understanding that 
phrase, the world might soon have an adequate supply of competent minds. As the 
Gutenberg typography filled the world the human voice closed down. People began to 
read silently and passively as consumers. Architecture and sculpture dried up too. In 
literature only people from backward oral areas had any resonance to inject into the 
language – the Yeats, the Synges, the Joyces, Faulkners, and Dylan Thomases.288
 
 
McLuhan adds a final piece to my attempt to understand mass culture as concerned with 
communication and rhetoric. In his final analysis, different forms of media offer and remove 
particular ways of understanding the world. In the rise of print, as he argues here, the importance 
of public address diminishes. Blank verse and its power as a broadcast medium is lost in the turn 
toward typography. McLuhan provides a theoretical position on mass culture that allows a read 
of the beats as challenging the shift in understanding brought about by mass culture. Within the 
context of mass culture as exigence, the beats can be seen as offering a different medium in 
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which to appropriately communicate with people. Although they do not address the issue of mass 
culture specifically as these scholars did, the beats feel the same exigence as a need to offer their 
writing.  
In the next chapter I begin with this idea, examining Kerouac’s letters and journals for 
evidence of his interest in the communicative problems posed by massification. Then I will 
examine On the Road for its implicit rhetorical theory, revealing the rhetorical assumptions of 
the text through criticism. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined communication as a concept and how that term could be understood 
in the 1950s. I examined communication, discourse and rhetoric, providing understanding from 
Peters that communication is a “kink” that inspires human beings to interact with each other in 
varied ways in order to make contact. Rhetoric, from Kenneth Burke, is a complicated notion of 
meaning, persuasion, and human interaction centered around identification.  Rhetoric has also 
been theorized as an important part of ideology, and ideology has been theorized as containing 
rhetorical implications. I examined the work of Michael Calvin McGee and Sacvan Bercovitch in 
order to forward the sense of ideology that I will be using when discussing the 1950s and the 
discourses of the period. These terms are central to understanding beat writing as rhetoric – 
situated discursive strategies for changing attitudes in other people. Rhetorical criticism, my 
method for revealing the implicit rhetorical theory of the beats, was explained as not only a study 
of effects, but also analysis of the text for the implicit auditor. It is my contention that this sort of 
criticism can sketch out an implicit rhetoric among the work of the beats. For the beats to be 
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offering a rhetoric they need an exigence, and  in the 1950s, a key exigence was that of mass 
culture. I offered the views of Dwight Macdonald, Max Horkheimer, C. Wright Mills and 
Marshall McLuhan as examples of the varied response the “massification” of culture had during 
the period. In closing, I suggest that the beats have their own unique response to this exigence in 
the implicit rhetorical theory they offer in their poetry and prose, and how communication and 
rhetoric were concerns in their journals, letters and essays. 
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4.0  THE KAIROTIC RHETORIC OF JACK KEROUAC’S ON THE ROAD289
“How would you define Beat?” 
 
“Sympathetic.” 
- Steve Allen and Jack Kerouac, The Steve Allen Show, 1959 
 
Jack Kerouac always seemed uneasy with the fame that accompanied his success. After the 
publication of On the Road in September of 1957, he achieved nearly instant fame.  As Ann 
Charters explains, “the interviews he gave the press or on television were so candid, so personal, 
that he became a ‘personality’ as immediately recognizable as a movie star.”290 This created a 
cycle of self-perpetuation where Kerouac would often find himself in front of the cameras or 
before the reporter’s notebook. “In order to face the interviews and public appearances he 
inevitably got drunk, and when he was drunk he was usually a shamble: out of control, maudlin, 
sentimental and childish,” Charters writes. “Even among other writers where he could have been 
taken more seriously, he panicked and turned himself into a clown.”291
Part of the reason might have been that, “Kerouac’s fans mistook him for the Dean 
Moriarty character, and didn’t realize he was the timorous Sal Paradise.”
  
292
                                               
289 There is no substantive relation between this chapter and my M.A. thesis. 
  This identification 
meant that Kerouac was seen as a symbol of rebellion against authority and society by his fans. 
Kerouac had great difficulty in attempting to correct this misconception due to his increasing 
290 Ann Charters, Kerouac: A Biography (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), 298. 
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alcoholism, which started years before On the Road was published. “[f]ame didn’t change his 
behavior; it just made him feel guilty about his actions because of their increased visibility.”293
Kerouac’s inability to handle his mistaken identity (or identification) can be seen as a 
communication problem.  The best example is a television interview he gave shortly after the 
publication of On the Road, where Hunter Thompson and other fans gathered at the West End 
Café in New York to watch the interview.  They saw Kerouac as a “‘Spokesman’ for everyone in 
the fifties.” Kerouac thought differently since he brought liquor to the interview and “did not 
suspect that he was changing people’s lives.”
 
294  Kerouac was completely disheartened by his 
inability to convey his beat vision to others.  He remarked as early as February of 1958 that he no 
longer liked On the Road.295
His anxiety over his own media appearances speak to a more general anxiety about 
mediation and communication present in post-war America. In his later novel Big Sur, Jack 
Duloz comments on an appearance on the Steve Allen show from where the opening quotation of 
this chapter is taken: 
 Amburn believes this is because the audience could not separate the 
novel from its author – both were “read” as synonyms. But the argument could be made that On 
the Road failed to accomplish one of the things Kerouac hoped it would – addressing the 
disconnected human experience by providing a new way to “write” and “read” our relationships 
with one another. 
remembering that awful time only a year earlier when I had to rehearse my reading of 
prose a third time under the hot lights of the Steve Allen Show in the Burbank studio, one 
hundred technicians waiting for me to start reading, Steve Allen watching me expectant 
as he plunks the piano, I sit there on the dunce’s stool and refuse to read a word or open 
my mouth, ‘I don’t have to REHEARSE for God’s sake Steve!’ – ‘But this last time, I’ll 
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let you off the dress rehearsal’ and I sit there sweating not saying a word for a whole 
minute as everybody watches, finally I say ‘No I can’t do it’ and I go across the street to 
get drunk) (but surprising everybody the night of the show by doing my job of reading 
just fine, which surprises the producers and so they take me out with a Hollywood starlet 
who turns about to be a big bore trying to read me her poetry . . .296
 
  
The distaste Kerouac’s narrator expresses with being under the lights, rehearsing (in all capital 
letters, no less), leaving to go to the bar, and the eventual surprise of the producers that the job is 
done right on the first go, reveals a tension surrounding the demands and requirements of 
mediation. This mediation, the requirements of television production, is made to look torturous 
and foolish, while at the same time Kerouac (or his novelistic stand in) is able to (or at least 
portrays himself as able to) prepare for his televised moment by relaxing at a bar. 
This is not to say that this one moment is able to convey the entire communication 
anxiety of the era.  In fact, it is a fairly common reaction for authors, musicians and other artists 
to distrust or even recoil from mediated moments. What I use this story to convey is Kerouac’s 
rhetoricity through the use of what Burke would call a representative anecdote.  
According to John Durham Peters, communication in the twentieth century is wrought 
with concerns about fragmentation – of bodies as well as messages. “The dream of 
communication is the dream of identical minds in concert. Media of transmission and recording, 
however, drove a wedge between the copy and the original by inadvertently revealing everything 
that the copy had missed. . .”297
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 Kerouac, as someone immersed in this environment that Peters is 
describing, becomes frustrated with the dislocating and disorienting process of rehearsal and 
seeks communion with other humans directly in the bar.  As a representative anecdote, the story, 
297 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 240. 
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whether true or not, points out the flaw in the dominant theory that keeps the idea circulating.  As 
Burke explains, “The informative anecdote, we could say, contains in nuce the terminological 
structure that is evolved in conformity with it. Such a terminology is a ‘conclusion’ that follows 
from the selection of a given anecdote. Thus the anecdote is in a sense a summation, containing 
implicitly what the system that is developed form it contains explicitly.”298
  Such anxiety about proper communication is apparent in Kerouac’s work.  This is not a 
reason why Kerouac’s work is individual, unique or special.  It is an argument that Kerouac’s 
work can be productively read as a rhetoric which can engage some of the communication 
problems he perceived as acute and dangerous in his time.  I argue in this chapter that Kerouac’s 
concerns are rhetorical ones, about appropriate ways of communicating meanings to other minds. 
Taking the definition of rhetoric established earlier as Burkean identification and division, this 
chapter will show how Kerouac’s novel can be read as a book of strategies of how to accomplish 
consubstantiality in the American 1950s.  As John Durham Peters points out, the 20th century is 
awash in concerns about these very questions, with the rise of mass culture through technologies 
of dissemination such as television threatening the traditional understanding of identity. “Our 
faces, actions, voices, thoughts, and transactions have all migrated into media that can 
disseminate the indicia of our personhood without our permission. Communication has become 
 The story of the 
television interview, read as a representative anecdote, points out the flaw in the televised form - 
it is a medium designed to convey personal interaction with large numbers of people, but this 
production requires an alienating, stressful and bizarre alienation.  The communication doesn’t 
allow for communion between individuals, and Kerouac’s story illustrates this absence nicely. 
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disembodied.”299
Kerouac’s story about preparation for television can be read as communicative anxiety 
such as Peters talks about. The producers’ concern for rehearsal indicate their awareness of the 
fragmentary and incomplete picture presented by the television.  Kerouac disagrees: The 
intimacy of other people in the environment of the bar is superior preparation for the 
communication of ideas to other people, even against the disembodiment forced by television.  
Of course, this is just one potential reading.  What I am trying to do is demonstrate how a 
reading informed by rhetorical criticism can bring new perspectives to Kerouac’s work pushing 
it as an interaction and reaction to the communicative situation arising in the 1950s. 
 The rise of these new ideas about communication was read as a threat to the 
human condition by Kerouac, and he attempted to offer “equipment for living” through his book 
On the Road.  It will be argued that Kerouac’s rhetoric is a Burkean rhetoric, structured around 
the idea that literature serves as “equipment for living,” by providing us with situations and 
corresponding motives.  The central idea at work in his rhetoric is the idea of kairos, which can 
be defined as the opportune or appropriate moment, opposed to a sense of time that is linear and 
progressive. Kairos is situational and responsive – the rhetor must take advantage of it when 
present. 
I propose reading Kerouac as working with propriety and style in response to the 
assumed communicative frame of the 1950s. In this chapter I argue that Kerouac’s writings 
suggest an interest in rhetorical concerns and communicative breakdown that Peters identifies. 
Kerouac’s work is best understood as a rhetoric – an attempt to offer the means of proper and 
appropriate words to establish effective communication.  Given the situation of mass media, 
television and the proliferation of new communication technologies, On the Road can serve as a 
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guide to readers’ attempts to become consubstantial with other people. As I discussed previously, 
the beat rhetoric circulates around the key terms of body, experience, and mediation. It is these 
three central concepts that, through rhetorical criticism, the beat rhetoric can be constructed. 
Kerouac’s letters, private journals, and works indicate that he thinks about 
communication and rhetoric, albeit implicitly.  Even though he was not a scholar or had any 
exposure to the works of Burke, Richard Weaver, or others working on the questions of rhetoric, 
the existence of these moments in his journals and letters suggest that a rhetorical read would be 
productive. Kerouac’s writing was heavily influenced by a lacunae in human relations related to 
our ability to communicate, specifically in the ability of people to offer each other compelling 
stories that inspire and cement notions central to identifications of Americans. He perceived this 
absence as a serious concern, and attempted to address it in his writing. I argue that On the Road 
can and should be read as an engagement with these concerns, implicitly offering a theory of 
rhetoric. 
I will make this argument by offering some of Kerouac’s journal writings as evidence, 
and then analyze Kerouac’s most famous book, On the Road, showing how it can be read as an 
offer of a rhetoric for 1950s America.  In the conclusion to this chapter I will review some of 
Kerouac’s argumentative rhetoric in a 1958 Playboy article about the proper way to understand 
the “beat generation” – as a rhetorical mode instead of a state. This might help us be able to 
understand the written production of the Beats as Kerouac did, “A revolution in manners in 
America.”300
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 But before that, I want to clarify some terms and give some perspective to this work 
so that the criticism can be better understood. 
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4.1 THE RHETORICAL AND COMMUNICATIVE ENVIRONMENT OF THE ‘50S 
As discussed earlier, the 1950s were a time of communicative anxiety.  In this section, I would 
like to highlight how the 1950s were an era not only of change in economics, foreign policy and 
family life, but in rhetoric as well.  What I mean by this is a central rhetorical assumption – that 
when conditions change, people must explain these alterations. The decade of the 50s was an era 
of rhetorical instability where new explanations had to be created to account for and justify the 
differences in daily life that surrounded them. 
The first major change I want to discuss is the presence of the atomic bomb.  Many 
scholars believe that the bomb is the most significant change of the post-war era. As Miller and 
Nowak argue, “By 1950, the nuclear bomb was an integral part of American culture. It was much 
more than the underpinning to an international cold war. From the first it was a power so huge 
and raw it obliterated any and all moral trappings. Systems of good and evil, sensitivity to cruelty 
or the ridiculous, all became distorted to the wielder of atomic arms. Moral, ideological, even 
pragmatic concerns weakened. The American mind was reshaped in many ways. For with the 
bomb the cold war was not a conflict over ideology nor over maintaining any global power 
balance. It was about upsetting that balance.”301  For Miller and Nowak, the presence of atomic 
weapons in U.S. and in Soviet hands meant that the U.S. government must “convince people 
both to trust the bomb and to be in terror of it, a most interesting contradiction.”302
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  In order to 
accomplish this, new vocabularies were introduced – a new rhetoric for discussing the place of 
such deadly weapons in daily life: “Nuclear bombs were depicted as casual, even friendly. 
302 Miller and Nowak, 46. 
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Nuclear euphemisms sprang up: the ‘sunshine unit’ as a measure of Strontium-90 levels, small 
nuclear bombs affectionately dubbed ‘kitten bombs.’”303 Not just mere semantics – they conclude 
that such changes are more than just clever vocabularies. “These examples are not merely the 
clever word games of big business and government. Such bland semantics reveal a very real 
process: the violence being wrought upon language as upon the minds of its audience.”304
They are not alone in this judgment. The shifts of the era of communist fear not only 
necessitated a change in how one used rhetoric, but how one understood rhetoric.  The era called 
attention to the slippery nature of words and meanings.  As Alan Nadel argues, “Since social 
contracts rely upon rhetorical contracts, the problem is one of language. But communism, 
according to its accusers, acknowledged neither the same social nor rhetorical contracts. . . 
because no court recognizes a contract binding on only one party, in dealing with those outside 
the social and rhetorical contracts the traditional constitutional rules no longer applied.”
 They 
would agree that these rhetorical changes are metrics of social changes. For them, the potential 
violence the bomb represented created the need for linguistic violence upon minds. 
305
                                               
303 Miller and Nowak, 47. 
 The 
limits of who can produce meaning, and who gets access to the ability to create meaning in a 
legal sense were key questions with regard to “loyalty oaths” and other public expressions of 
identification or division with communist ideas. The idea of who, or what, sort of creature can 
create meaning became a matter of national security and constitutional interpretation. The idea 
that the Soviets were evil and also possessed the greatest weapon ever developed was such an 
impossible situation, even top leaders had difficulty accepting such a fact: “Truman never 
304 Miller and Nowak, 47. 
305 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1995), 77 
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completely accepted the fact that the Russians had the bomb; in 1953 when his presidency was 
over, he told a group of reporters, ‘I’m not convinced that Russia has the bomb. I’m not 
convinced that the Russians have achieved the know-how to put the complicated mechanism 
together to make an A-bomb work.’”306
Other aspects of American life were also affected by the rhetorical struggle over the 
atomic bomb. According to Elaine Tyler May, the rise of nuclear families can be linked to fear of 
atomic war: “Americans were well poised to embrace domesticity in the midst of the terrors of 
the atomic age. A home filled with children would create a feeling of warmth and security 
against the cold forces of disruption and alienation. Children would also be a connection to the 
future and a means of replenishing a world depleted by war deaths. Although baby boom parents 
were not likely to express conscious desires to repopulate the country, the devastation of 
thousands of deaths could not have been far below the surface of the postwar consciousness.”
 The difficulty of accepting the bomb both as greatest 
protection and greatest threat was an important and central rhetorical struggle of the time. 
307 
The decision to marry and raise a large family – a definite difference between this generation and 
the previous – might have been influenced by the threat of atomic destruction. May argues that 
the reason this generation was so keen on marriage and family even though birth control was 
increasingly more available than ever seem to indicate that the ideal home life was linked to the 
perceived dangerous circumstances as a way of showing public commitment to civic values.308
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The pressures of altering a war-driven economy toward a consumer-driven economy 
created the need for persuasive discourses identifying consuming, shopping, and purchasing with 
being American.309
Most of these reactions were not overtly known to the participants as direct engagement 
with the rhetorical struggle the atom bomb created. However, there were many who saw the 
changes throughout culture and responded with dissent. Margot A. Henriksen argues that a 
“culture of dissent” confronted the changes in American propriety ushered in by the 
contradictory reliance and fear of atomic weapons: “Whether relying on deadly and apocalyptic 
A-bombs for its power, allying with former enemies against former friends, or scrutinizing 
citizens’ lives in order to gauge loyalty, the United States seemed to be paying a high ethical 
price for its fight against evil. The culture of dissent saw the figures and symbols of American 
authority as tainted and the American way of life as no longer innocent. Success and supremacy 
bought at the cost of morality and idealism appeared hollow; the crisp distinctions between 
innocence and guilt, good and evil, had blurred, and ‘knowing sin’ became the disillusioning 
way of life in the America envisioned by the culture of dissent.”
   
310
                                               
309 See Elizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Post War 
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003) for the conflation of the rhetoric of good citizen 
with good consumer.  
 The uprooting of the 
rhetorical norms of good, bad, moral, and immoral as perceived by some inspired them to 
produce texts that highlight this murky environment. Henricksen relies mostly on film to prove 
her point that the “culture of dissent” worked to highlight the flaws in the rhetoric of the time. 
Although she doesn’t reference Burke, it could be argued that the “culture of dissent” sought 
through the device of “perspective by incongruity” to highlight the serious flaws they saw in the 
310 Margot A. Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 20. 
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new justifications and defenses of American life. Kuznick and Gilbert take issue with the idea 
that the threat represented by atomic war was a singular cause. However, they find the frame of 
the Cold War responsible for the deepest influences of the period:  
We take strong issue with those observers who have found the Cold War to be 
responsible for every change and cultural distortion occurring during these years. 
Nevertheless, the vividness of the perceptions suggests that the principal effect of the 
Cold War may have been psychological. It persuaded millions of Americans to interpret 
their world in terms of insidious enemies at home and abroad who threatened them with 
nuclear and other forms of annihilation. Seeing the world through this dark, distorting 
lens and setting global and domestic policies to counter these fanciful as well as real 
threats was and is, then, the largest impact of the Cold War.311
 
 
The Cold War, for these scholars could be said to serve as a Burkean “terministic screen” by 
which he means that “any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels 
rather than others.”312
The ‘logological,’ or ‘terministic’ counterpart of ‘Believe’ in the formula would be: Pick 
some particular nomenclature, some one terministic screen. And for ‘That you may 
understand,’ the counterpart would be: ‘That you may proceed to track down the kinds of 
observation implicit in the terminology you have chosen, whether your choice of terms 
was deliberate or spontaneous.’
 Burke chooses to define the phrase “terministic screen” with reference to 
the phrase “believe that you may understand”: 
313
 
 
The Cold War, therefore, served as a terministic screen, a limit not just on the potential 
responses, but on the potential ways of seeing the world and the people in it. In this way, the 
Cold War becomes a frame for the entire era, although some scholars disagree: “The Cold War 
was fought primarily at an elite level. It pervaded and shaped the experience of ordinary 
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Americans far less than historians would have us believe. Although government leaders, social-
science experts, and media commentators set the terms of public discourse – and also of public 
policy – most citizens to a surprising degree defined their world in personal terms.”314
Others suggest that the rise of an easily identifiable enemy in Communist Russia led 
intellectuals, civic and government officials to persuasively spread the need for conformity and 
silent similarity as our first and best defense from Communist takeover. The rise of 
McCarthyism is a good index of the rhetorical changes this fear initiated. As David Halberstam 
puts it, “McCarthyism crystallized and politicized the anxieties of a nation living in a dangerous 
new era. He took people who were at the worst guilty of political naiveté and accused them of 
treason. He set out to do the unthinkable, and it turned out to be surprisingly thinkable.”
 Although 
Filene is right to warn of oversimplifying the era, the idea of the terministic screen risks no such 
causal fallacy. What it attempts to show is how the choice of description of environment leads to 
the depiction of that environment within the terms set by the description. Certain options for 
thinking and perceiving are simply unavailable.  
315
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Concerns over corruption from within sparked Americans to place vigilance against communism 
above most other values. “In recent years the anticommunism impulse has been toned down, 
though it still profoundly affects American attitudes and policies. But the fact that hysterical 
belief in the Red menace reached its historic heights at mid-century makes it most important to 
the decade of the fifties. Its impact on that era can be seen in a variety of ways: the conformity, 
the search for security, the sizable return to religion, the celebration of the family and middle-
class virtues, the absence of an effective left, the docility of labor unions, the ‘silent generation’ 
315 David Halberstam, The Fifties (New York: Villard Books, 1993), 52. 
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of college students, the widespread political apathy, the cold war, the arms race, the reliance on 
nuclear supremacy.”316
  The communist “threat” was a powerful persuasive force in all aspects of daily life. 
Joseph McCarthy’s rhetoric is explained in simple terms by David Halberstam: “China had 
fallen, not because the forces of history were against the old feudal regime, which was collapsing 
of its own weight. Rather, it was because of Soviet military and political hegemony. If events in 
the world were not as we wanted them, then something conspiratorial had happened. . . Our 
control of events was limited because sinister forces were at work against us.”
 Miller and Nowak here point to the power of the anti-communist belief 
within most of the larger political decisions of the time, and how the beliefs of that time still 
effect contemporary thought. 
317 A rhetoric based 
on sinister enemies and corruption from within is what Richard Hofstadter identified in the 1960s 
as the “paranoid style” in political rhetoric – “The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of 
conspiracy in apocalyptic terms – he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole 
political orders, whole systems of human values.”318
W.T. Lahmon reminds us, “because they diminish complexity, consensus agreements 
about an era are themselves serious problems. Like any other time, the decade of the fifties had 
 I don’t seek to redo or repeat Hostadter’s 
brilliant analysis of McCarthy’s rhetoric here. What is significant is the ability of one style of 
rhetoric to create an unfortunate political reality. 
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many parts, none of them dammed for long.”319 Lahmon finds the 1950s an “oppositional” 
culture at every turn, and marking the center of the era the rise of civil rights in 1955.320 The rise 
of civil rights was another site of rhetorical struggle in the 1950s, both celebrated and feared. The 
rise of popularity of black popular culture through jazz and other music during the era was 
punctuated with the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that the 
country should integrate with all “deliberate speed.” Lahmon sees the phrase as emblematic of 
the decade. “The real importance of the phrase is how it caught and crested a welling American 
mood. . . risen from a larger momentum running deep in the national life at mid-century. In many 
ways the state was catching up with and codifying the already deliberately speeding society – 
which in its turn was cuing off black culture.”321
Each of these moments serve to highlight the rhetorical struggles of the time. Although 
other factors are no doubt involved, the struggle over how to articulate the appropriate and 
normal is the struggle that gives salience to reading On the Road as rhetorical theory. Rhetoric, 
seen as a style, or manner of engagement appropriate to situated events, is not a new idea. As 
Robert Harriman suggests:  
 Lhamon’s analysis points to the hard work 
occurring under the public image of civil rights in the period to orchestrate protest and call 
national attention to the plight of black people. But for the purposes of this study, the civil rights 
movement functioned as another ambivalent site of meaning, where the acceleration of the 
culture was not reflected in the legal status of the people providing much of the impetus for new 
cultural forms.  
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Traditionally, the search for the ability to achieve power by speaking led to an inventory 
of the techniques of verbal composition, and the recognition that discourse has to be 
appealing if it is to be effective led to an account of the aesthetic economies available to 
speakers in particular situations. From this perspective, style ultimately is a significant 
dimension of every human experience.  More commonly, it is a particular expertise 
disposed, like any technē, to displace any other kind of intelligence.322
 
 
Technē, as discussed previously, was a term surrounded by a lot of discussion and interest by the 
ancient Athenians. Here Hariman takes the view that technē is a type of expertise that becomes 
normalized and displaces alternatives.  This means that rhetoric, as a technē of style, reaches into 
most areas of human life.  Style becomes the expertise of particular sets of aesthetic conditions 
that make certain words recognizable as appealing, and thereby, increases their effectiveness.  
Such uses of style are not just wanton grabs for power, but complicated systems of speaking, 
acting, and writing that set up the conditions for being appropriate, normal, and equal. As 
Hariman sees it, “As style succeeds, it articulates specific rules of usage for the composition of 
self and others in relations of equity and subordination. We then face certain choices. . . . We 
need to be aware that by weakening modernist discourses . . . one can place some peoples at 
grave risk.”323
Hariman argues that our political experience is “relations of control and autonomy . . . 
negotiated through the artful composition of speech, gesture, ornament, décor, and any other 
means for modulating perception and shaping response.”
  As I discussed above, these moves for naming, explaining, and justifying the 
relationship of America to the world, or Americans to atomic weapons, privilege and exclude 
those who are not persuaded by the explanations.  
324
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 Thinking of rhetoric this way, and in 
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the light of the rhetorical struggles of 1950s American life, perhaps Kerouac’s novel – which led 
to him being named the father of the Beat Generation – can be seen as another attempt at 
developing a system of appropriate actions and interactions for a confusing era.  Using Kenneth 
Burke’s theories of rhetoric, and also keeping in mind Harriman’s discussion of the relationship 
between rhetoric and style, I seek to read On the Road as a book that establishes a rhetoric for 
Americans in the 1950s, establishing style as well as motives for achieving consubstantiality in a 
very murky rhetorical environment. 
4.2 KEROUAC’S EXIGENCE AND THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM 
With Hariman and Burke influencing my understanding of rhetoric, how does Kerouac fit in as a 
developer of rhetorical theory?  Using a combination of these ideas, I will argue that On the 
Road is an attempt to create a system of identification and accounting for motives rooted in style 
and propriety. On the Road can therefore be seen as a sourcebook for living properly in 1950s 
America.  In this section I will examine some of Kerouac’s letters and diary entries to show that 
the rhetorical drift of the period frustrated him as he sought to become a writer. The way 
Kerouac saw daily human interactions shows a man who is frustrated at a perceived lack of 
“real” communication going on between others around him. 
The 1950s phenomena generated great anxiety for Kerouac that I characterize as about 
appropriate communicative frames.  His letters and journal entries up to the publication of On the 
Road indicate Kerouac’s deep concern with problems of human communication.  I will analyze 
Kerouac’s notebooks to indicate his interest in what he perceived as problems with daily 
communication. More specifically, Kerouac’s rhetorical contribution to solve this perceived 
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issue is best understood as a concern with kairos, or the timely, opportune and possibly fleeting 
moment.  I will first turn to Kerouac’s journals to develop this argument. 
 Kerouac is concerned with the problem of “serious understanding” of the world and how 
to live in it.  He expresses this concern in his journals: “Is this the way the world is going to end? 
In indifference? Where are the serious, consequential, undeniable true fires? Where are the old 
prophets and scriveners of the Scriptures? Where is the Lamb? Where are the little ones? What 
has happened to parable? – to the Word? – even to mere tales and seriousness?”325   Kerouac 
feels that there is a lack of rhetors – the serious prophets, who apparently spread the message of 
the Christian gospel.  Kerouac’s entry, titled “Lamentations” can be read as despair about the 
absence of appropriate rhetoric to combat the dangers of indifference, an indifference that 
Kerouac blames “social science” for: “Everybody in America sitting in the movie, avidly 
watching the crazy-serious gray screen – for what it has to show. It is so much better to explore 
things like that than silly imaginary questions like ‘Should teenage girls marry?’ – better and 
more intelligent, the ‘social scientists’ to the contrary.”326
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  The idea of indifference of people to 
important issues suggests a rhetorical reading of On the Road. Here Kerouac criticizes the 
detachment of “social scientists” from immediate human activity – mass culture, in this case the 
film industry.  Kerouac is much more interested in the reasons behind why, in his view, everyone 
likes the movies, rather than the more abstract, and somewhat detached, generic questions of 
what people should or should not be doing. Kerouac’s interest here is one of particular versus 
general, indicated by his use of “imaginary” to describe the abstract imperative question of 
appropriate marriage age.  Kerouac expresses some disdain for research questions that don’t 
326 Kerouac, June 28, 1949, Journals, 200. 
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appear to him to be directly attached to the here and now of human experience. Indifference in 
lived human activity becomes a focal point for Kerouac in his journal writing. 
His concern about indifference and dullness in the world also extends to his faith: “If 
only the devil did exist! Nothing of the sort can exist in such a dull, sensual, absentminded 
world, and would be laughed at.”327
The tyranny of human indifference and lack of attentive minds was the problem Kerouac 
hoped to address in his writing: “And all we have left is details – pfui! This is why I say I don’t 
care for naturalism, or that is, why I should write.”
 Kerouac, a devout Catholic even through his years of 
studying Buddhism, is not questioning the existence of the devil here.  Rather, he is questioning 
how to get the contemporary audience to accept and believe in such a concept in his time. The 
world is too dull to even entertain the possibility of such a belief, and it frustrated him. 
Kerouac’s thought here can be characterized as rhetorical – a doubt that the devil, in all of the 
important symbolic power that figure represents – is not nearly enough to get attention from the 
dull, indifferent contemporary masses. 
328 The existence of a fragmented world of 
details in his view necessitated explanation, or writing, as a solution. This decision spelled out in 
the pages of his journal was a decision to commit to a “fever of understanding. . . which will 
bridge and transcend from this life to the others, some serious, final and unchangeable sight of 
the universe.”329  The “fever of understanding” is in opposition to, or at least a necessary addition 
to the scientific factual world: “Reason and the body of facts, science and truth, do not make me 
feel and do not bridge eternity, and in fact choke me like stale, close air.”330
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figures, is too bland and has no heat behind it.  Reason, facts, and scientific truth have replaced 
“understanding,” and Kerouac hopes to write in order to contract – perhaps spread – this “fever” 
to others. This suggests that Kerouac saw limits in the scientific style of his time and wanted to 
create an alternative to the elements of indifference.  It seems here that indifference is opposed to 
understanding, and understanding cannot be achieved without a perspective that reaches beyond 
accepted facts, scientific truth and reason. 
Kerouac posits a vibrant if not clear conception of “understanding” that he wishes to 
advance against what could be called absent-minded existence:  
 
I feel that I’m the only person in the world who doesn’t know the feeling of calm 
irreverence – the only madman in the world therefore – the only broken fish. All the 
others are perfectly contented with pure life.  I am not.  I want a pure understanding, and 
then pure life. What is that woman thinking on the doorstep across the street? She wants a 
husband.  To understand love and the consciousness of love with him? – to enter into a 
conspiracy concerning eternity with him? 
No – to absentmindedly, greedily screw in bed; and absentmindedly raise 
children; and absentmindedly die; to lie in an absentminded grave – and let God worry 
about the rest. 
Not for me. 
I’m going to decide the thing myself, even if I have to burn in the attempt.331
 
 
Kerouac goes on to state at the end of this passage in parenthesis, “So now I’m a psychotic 
finally.”  How do we read such a quote? I suggest that in this quote we find that Kerouac’s great 
fear is that we are interacting with others, even in our romantic relationships, absent-mindedly.  
Although fully from his own subjective perspective, and also a bit pompus for putting thoughts 
into the head of another person, then judging them, we can still get a sense of the motives at play 
here. He, in a rather sophomoric way, decides that he must be the only person who is not content 
with life as it is. Echoing thinkers such as Henry David Thoreau and Immanuel Kant, Kerouac 
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sees other’s lives as “quiet desperation” that he can perceive, and account for if he had “pure 
judgment.” The important element here is that Kerouac expresses the idea that he can create an 
alternative system of decision making that is outside of what he sees as mainstream. He marks 
this idea in two ways as being outside the norm: First, he calls himself broken, as well as 
psychotic, and secondly he, perhaps unfairly, accounts for the motives of others by using the 
woman across the street as a metonymy for all women, and maybe even people, in society. He 
attributes his understanding of the contemporary rhetoric upon her and then uses it as a foil for 
his own ideas. 
Kerouac’s sense that something is seriously wrong in mainstream thought, leading to the 
problem of indifference, leads him to the conclusion that he must create text to solve it.  He feels 
that his writing will reclaim a missing agency from human thought. To “decide the thing myself” 
even if he “burns in the attempt” is the recognition that his writing should be in stark opposition 
to the values of the world. In claiming to “decide the thing” for himself, Kerouac points out the 
danger he perceives in crafting an alternative rhetoric. Explained in Burkean terms, it could be 
said that without recourse to accepted means of attempting consubstantiality with others, he risks 
losing the ability to identify at all. Of course, for Burke we are never in a place where we do not 
identify and divide. Kerouac here is attempting to divide completely from what he perceives as 
the norms of judgment for his time. In doing so, he is identifying with ways of thinking outside 
his time and place, and begins to reference some of the things he has read that are influencing his 
thinking. 
For example, Kerouac spends much time considering what symbolic action would be 
most effective: “No matter what one may say about pure life and joy, I don’t believe it is enough, 
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I just don’t believe any of it . . . the insouciance.”332  He questions “Why were these workingmen 
digging great holes?” in reference to the opening moments of this journal entry.  He watched a 
construction project while pondering “the adolescent question of ‘why do men go on living,’” 
thinking about the purpose, “and wondered why. That’s enough.”333 The threat indifference 
brings is to devalue “wonder” – Kerouac points out the question is considered adolescent – but 
“wonder” is enough of a reason to keep on living.  The idea of “wonder” is linked to the term 
“contact” - Kerouac vows to “be in contact with as much of this world (through means of variety 
of sensuality, i.e., experience of loves of all kinds) and I must be in contact with the Holy Final 
Whirlwinds that collect the ragged forms into one Whole Form.”334
Kerouac’s use of the term “contact” comes from a quote of Balzac that he uses in his 
journal in order to establish a theory as to why he feels he is psychotic, depressed, and doesn’t 
belong.  The Balzac quote, as Kerouac interprets it, discusses how human thinking power may be 
best understood as electrical at its root: “Men of science will recognize the great part played by 
electricity in human thinking power.”
  
335
When I am on the verge of suicide (as today), perhaps it is just something like a power 
failure because I have lost contact with the whole of the Universe? Why do I lose 
contact? And why, after years of depressions and moods like these, have I not come up 
with an answer to it? 
  Kerouac makes much of this idea, theorizing as to why 
he feels the way he does: 
Life is not enough if you lose contact with the other world, which is simply the 
perspective we have never seen but which apprises us of the intention of the whole of the 
universe – which is eventual contact among all things, the electrical togetherness of 
actual eternity.336
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For Kerouac, contact with eternity is the normal state of the healthy human mind, because it 
helps us stay in tune with the universe.  Without this connection, without being “plugged in” to 
the current of the whole, one would feel there is no place for him or her in the world.  The 
solution then would be to find a way to stay “plugged in:” “When I say I want to burn and I want 
to feel and I want to bridge from this life to the others, that is what I meant: -- to go to the other 
world, or that is, keep in contact with it till I get there. . . my happiness depends on the 
recognition of the other world while I am in this one, or I cannot stand this one.”337
Sounding a bit like a Catholic esthetic mystic, Kerouac taps into the ideology of his faith 
in order to describe his vision of the ultimate goal of his writing.  Kerouac’s Catholic faith was 
part of an assemblage of religious tropes that informed not only his writing, but perhaps other 
Beats as well.  Robert Ellwood described the Beat relationship to religion as a sort of 
underground economy of many symbols, which fits this quote from Kerouac:
 
338
I shall keep in contact with all things that cross my path, and trust all things that do not 
cross my path, and exert more greatly for further and further visions of the other world, 
and preach (if I can) in my work, and love, and attempt to hold down my lonely vanities 
so as to contact more and more with all things (and kinds of people), and believe that my 
consciousness of life and eternity is not a mistake, or a loneliness, or a foolishness, -- but 
a warm dear love of our poor predicament which by the grace of Mysterious God will be 
solved and made clear to all of us in the end, maybe only.
  
339
 
 
Here Kerouac’s higher purpose is a mix of holy vision and proselytization of a very Christian 
message of conversion through love.  He sees his position as one of explanation and correction 
through “preaching” if possible the importance of connection between all people and things.  He 
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believes this task is an important one for the eradication of the belief that life is foolishness or a 
mistake.  It is through a faith that existence is a mystery that will be revealed one day that 
Kerouac places the importance of his writing. 
 It can be seen that Kerouac is concerned with one of the great issues of the twentieth 
century: “The possibility of communication is the twentieth century’s version of the mystery of 
faith.”340
At around the same time, Kenneth Burke was writing about the significance of symbolic 
action as necessary for human beings who are by nature always at a distance from one another. 
Burke’s engagement with the problem of communication is, like Kerouac’s, rhetorical: 
 Kerouac’s solution is to combine the two: Communication is necessary to preserve the 
value of life in the face of indifference, as it keeps one connected to one’s place in the universe. 
Identification is compensatory to division. . . If men were wholly and truly of one 
substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence. It would not be an 
ideal, as it now is, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by these 
same conditions; rather, it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those ideal 
prototypes of communication, the theologian’s angels, or ‘messengers.’341
 
 
Kenneth Burke’s observation of the necessity of rhetoric is similar to Kerouac’s understanding of 
the importance of writing. Burke’s ideal communicators, the angels, have no need of 
explanation, rhetoric or justification – they simply know each other’s minds. Kerouac feels that 
the mystery of existence will be revealed only if people wonder and avoid the dangers of 
indifference, which is possible if they wonder and write. Kerouac and Burke are both concerned 
with the question of how to get across meaning, identity and value in a world that materially 
frustrates the contact of minds, hearts and souls. On the Road, analyzed from a Burkean 
rhetorical perspective, is Kerouac’s attempt at a solution to the recalcitrance of embodied 
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humans attempting to forge relationships together in society.  According to Burke, society is an 
amalgam of “manifestations of the creative impulse” in human beings, and that collectively we 
could, “go from any point in the series to any other point in the series without ellipsis,” although 
we “might arrange our steps.”342
The conclusion we should draw from our thesis is a belief that the ultimate metaphor for 
discussing the universe and man’s relations to it must be the poetic or dramatic metaphor. 
Many metaphors are possible. . .And though any of these simplifications can serve as a 
postulate from which important and useful considerations (usually called ‘proof’) will 
follow, we suggest that the metaphor of the poetic or dramatic man can include them all 
and go beyond them all.
 This arrangement has taken on many forms depending on who is 
doing the writing, but for Burke, the dramatic or poetic arrangement (taken in the loose 
etymology of poetic from the Greek “poesis” or “creating”) is the one that cannot only account 
for human motives and interests, but can account for arrangements of those interests as well. In 
his concluding remarks of an earlier book, Permanence and Change, Burke offers reflections on 
the thesis that to believe thoughts and acts are affected by interests is to bring up an 
overwhelming amount of implications: 
343
 
 
Burke’s argument attempts to solve the gaps in disembodied communication attempts by 
grounding them rhetorically.  He sees the poetic metaphor as containing a vocabulary “of tropes 
(as formulated by the rhetoricians) to describe the specific patterns of human behavior.”  This 
does not mean that human existence and behavior is a purely imagined or verbally created 
enterprise – many times humans come up against material resistance, or recalcitrance. Burke 
feels that the world is crafted through a poetic and dramatic negotiation of our motives with the 
world, which produce attitudes, or responses among people. This world-building is not a pure 
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social construction idea, but one that incorporates and understands material limits as a part of 
ethics.  “It [the idea of universe building through statements] does not imply that the universe is 
merely the product of our interpretations. for the interpretations themselves must be altered as 
the universe displays various orders of recalcitrance to them. We are emphasizing the fact that 
the ethical bent from which one approaches the universe is itself a part of the universe, and a 
very important part.”344
Given this notion of the recalcitrant world and human attitude as the elements involved in 
creating reality, Burke’s idea of the poetic metaphor as the master trope for explanation of 
human motives makes sense.  It is the rhetorical idea of adaptation – that people are always 
adapting their statements in hopes of gaining adherence from interlocutors – that is forgotten 
when more simplistic metaphors are used to account for human action. As Burke explains:  
   
Social life, like art, is a problem of appeal, the poetic metaphor would give us invaluable 
hints for describing modes of practical action which are too often measured by simple 
tests of utility and too seldom with reference to the communicative, sympathetic, 
propitiatory factors that are clearly present in the procedures of formal art and must be as 
truly present in those informal arts of living we do not happen to call arts.345
 
 
Burke believes that since life requires appeal in order for it to be conducted, an art such as poetry 
can give assistance to understanding the twists and turns of human behavior in life that are not 
present in alternative metaphors. This assistance comes from an appreciation of the formal 
methods the art has developed in order to answer the question of appeal. The poetic metaphor 
emphasizes the “participant aspect of action rather than its competitive aspect” which permits a, 
“prompt basis of objection” when economic motives “force us to overstress competitive 
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attitudes.”346  Most importantly, the poetic metaphor would lead to a new understanding of 
communication as something humans are posited within, and not a tool of their own design and 
mastery: “A study of communication which necessarily emphasizes the social nature of human 
adjustment, should combine these methods, considering men as possessed, and men as the 
inventors of new solutions – but these two frames would be subdivisions in a larger frame, men 
as communicants.”347
Burke’s specific definition of rhetoric as a broad frame to understand human interaction 
has several points in common with Kerouac’s ideas on the problems of the 1950s.  Kerouac’s 
larger goal appears to be finding a way to reach others who he perceives as totally indifferent to 
the importance of wonder and connection to larger purpose. Burke’s larger goal, that of the 
purification of war, or finding ways around violent confrontation is through inducement via the 
symbolic.  This is Burke’s definition of rhetoric.  On the Road, critiqued from the perspective of 
Burkean rhetoric, can give an appreciation of the book as a source of alternative strategies for 
identification and symbolic interaction. 
 
4.3 KEROUAC’S METHOD  
Earlier I suggested a dual understanding of rhetoric – concerned with both style and Burkean 
identification. In this section I will explain Kerouac’s method of “spontaneous prose” and how it 
factors into understanding style, propriety and rhetoric as interconnected. 
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Kerouac’s writing method of spontaneous prose has been examined by many scholars, 
but few from the perspective of rhetoric.  Spontaneous prose for Swartz is, “the vehicle of this 
freedom’s expression and vision,” which “enacts a merger between content and experience.”348  
Justin Trudeau analyzes Kerouac’s “Essentials for Spontaneous Prose” as a pivotal moment in 
the culmination of American performance theory and methods.  Trudeau argues that Kerouac is 
best understood as understanding writing as a culmination of a long history of American 
performance traditions.349
Kerouac realized that the problem of understanding American communication was a 
problem of multiple voices. Writing to Neal Cassidy in 1950, he states, “The modern young 
writer is now faced with the problem of many voices in America.  A book always has a voice . . . 
Well, since Mexico, I’ve been trying to find my voice.”
  
350  Kerouac argues that the best writing is 
the writing that allows voices to exist without artifice and construction on the part of the author: 
“My important recent discovery and revelation is that the voice is all. Can you tell me 
Shakespeare’s voice per se? – who speaks when Hamlet speaks? HAMLET, not Will 
Shakespeare, whose voice we’ve never really heard.”351
You, man, must write exactly as everything rushes into your head, and AT ONCE.  The 
pain of writing is just that. . . physical cramps in the hand, nothing else, of course. . . 
What I’m going to do is let the voices speak for themselves.  I’m going to write one book 
in nigger dialect, another in bum dialect, another in hip-musician dialect, another in 
French-Canadian dialect, another in American- Mexican dialect, another in Indian 
  Kerouac’s solution is to let each of these 
voices speak for themselves through a particular style of writing:  
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dialect, another in cool dialect, and I might one day write a slim little volume narrated by 
an effeminate queer.352
 
 
This sort of observation for us today is easy to dismiss as rather sophomoric. However, it is 
important to take seriously for understanding Kerouac’s rhetorical theory. This sentiment 
expressed in the quote can be compared to the nineteenth century senses of communication as an 
“electrical connection between distant individuals.”353
Kerouac’s laundry-list of projects is a roll call of 1950s marginalized perspectives, 
peoples whose voices Kerouac felt he could channel by enduring “physical cramps of the hand.” 
There was no concern in his method for the effects of mediation. Kerouac’s dream of speaking 
for these others in an attempt to identify with them directly has been the dream of pure 
communication since at least the nineteenth century: “The dream of communication only upped 
the longing for an escape from the morally intractable condition of plurality, that is, of life 
among other creatures whose perspectives are both hidden from us and never exactly our 
own.”
 Kerouac saw writing as a way of 
contacting distant minds by pretending to speak as those minds.  This is a formidable rhetorical 
challenge, and one that might be considered impossible given the inability of escaping one’s 
distinct positionality in the world.  However, he seems to think that he can channel these 
attitudes and voices by merely writing without editing.  
354
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 Kerouac felt he could establish a connection via the technē and technology of writing, 
and spontaneous prose was the method he developed in an attempt to reach these other minds.  
On the Road is the end result of this development, passed on to the reader not only as an electric 
engagement with the multiple voices of America, but as a persuasive moment. On the Road can 
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be seen through a Burkean lens as a metaphor, or a perspective by incongruity that he hoped 
would make Americans more mindful of how they speak to each other.  As Burke states, 
“Metaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of something else. It brings out the thisness 
of a that, or the thatness of a this.”355 On the Road could be summarized with the phrase, “That is 
how America communicates, and this is how it should communicate.” In between, one finds the 
similarity through the difference; the consubstantiality of American voices. This is very similar 
to how Jeffrey Murray reads Burke’s master trope of irony – “Ultimately, irony depends upon 
the perspectives of Others— of other symbol users—and is thus an explicitly dialogical rather 
than rhetorical trope. Moreover, this inclusion of the voices of Others in the construction of 
‘truth’ distinguishes irony as ethical.”356
4.4 THE PRODUCTION OF ON THE ROAD 
 Kerouac hoped to bring other voices in by avoiding the 
potential pitfalls of mediation in representing their voices.  Spontaneous prose can be seen as a 
rhetorical device that hoped to avoid the problems of mediation and speaking for others by 
circumventing editing.  Spontaneous prose was a method Kerouac felt would give him access to 
the other – or realize the dream of perfect communication. 
Kerouac’s solution to the problem of a world of unseemly rhetoric led to his development of a 
writing style he called spontaneous prose which attempts to leave nothing out of the final 
product.  It is unlikely that Kerouac “spontaneously” wrote On the Road, as many of the 
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passages correspond with pages from his earlier journals, and the fact that Kerouac never 
codified his spontaneous prose technique until well after On the Road had been published.357
He didn’t write to know the world, but to know his visions of the world, to examine the 
various stages of his awareness of things.  On the simplest level, he was trying to find the 
mental components that added up to a writer’s personality. ‘Sketching’ put the writer at 
the very center of the composition.  Plot and theme were reduced to the passage of 
perceptions across his sensorium.  Thus, the focus of the writing was narrowed to a 
single, sharply delimited point of view: this particular writer’s peephole into reality.  
Nevertheless the technique also granted an incredible freedom, since there was no longer 
any reason to exclude from one’s writing any detail that came to mind.
 But 
Gerald Nicosia once again offers a nice framing for Kerouac’s ideological method of writing: 
358
 
 
As Nicosia sees it, Kerouac’s writing technique was deeply concerned with perspective and the 
opportunity writing gave to achieve knowledge and understanding.  Beat political style, as 
Hariman might call it, involved great attention to detail as the writer, or rhetor, perceived it – 
placing fidelity to the objective and neutral reality second, at best. 
Analyzing On the Road is a difficult and selective matter. The novel is dizzying in its 
complexities of characters and events.  As Nicosia argues, “Any attempt to merely enumerate 
themes would not do On the Road justice, for the book operates on many levels.  It also provides 
a comprehensive social criticism of post-World War II America.  This criticism ranges from a 
mild satire of greed. . .to a serious concern with conformism . . . to a horror at the increasing 
violence, repression of healthy pleasure, and militaristic mania. . .”359
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attempt to extract the central or even key themes of On the Road. Instead, what I will do is 
provide a rhetorical criticism of the novel from the Burkean understanding of rhetoric to 
implicity craft Kerouac’s contribution to a beat rhetoric.  The beat rhetoric is an implicit theory, 
and my analysis will extract rhetorical concepts and ideas from the text, and argue for their 
position within a larger theory of rhetoric.  I also hope that thinking of Kerouac as offering a 
rhetoric or a system of understanding, speaking, writing and engaging, opens up a new way of 
appreciating his work, as well as a new way of understanding the appeal of the Beat Generation. 
4.5 ON THE ROAD: A COMPARATIVE AMERICAN RHETORIC 
First is the question of the character of Dean Moriarty.  Dean could be seen as the focus of the 
book and its main character. On the Road centrally concerns the characters of Dean Moriarty and 
Sal Paradise. Sal narrates the story and records his first impressions of Dean when he meets him 
in New York: 
To him [Dean] sex was the one and only holy and important thing in life, although he had 
to sweat and curse to make a living and so on. You saw that in the way he stood bobbing 
his head, always looking down, nodding, like a young boxer to instructions, to make you 
think he was listening to every word, throwing in a thousand “Yeses” and “That’s rights.” 
My first impression of Dean was of a young Gene Autry – trim, thin-hipped, blue-eyed, 
with a real Oklahoma accent – a sideburned hero of the snowy West.360
 
 
Dean, already described as a hero – specifically described as if he walked out of a Western 
movie - by Sal indicates that he already admires him, and we will see that admiration come 
through primarily through Dean’s choices of framing and response, both, I argue, key elements 
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of the rhetoric Kerouac is forwarding. Here he has Sal describe dean through the rhetorical 
commonplace of a celebrity, as well as from the West, which functions as an American trope for 
discovery, adventure, and individuality in the imaginary. Sal goes on to explain that Dean’s 
“nature” is one of the reasons that he admired him so: 
I wanted to know Dean more, and because my life hanging around the campus had 
reached the completion of its cycle and was stultified, but because, somehow in spite of 
our difference in character, he reminded me of some long-lost brother; the sight of his 
suffering bony face with the long sideburns and his straining muscular sweating neck 
made me remember my boyhood in those dye-dumps and swim-holes and riversides of 
Paterson and the Passaic.  His dirty workclothes clung to him so gracefully, as though 
you couldn’t buy a better fit from a custom tailor but only earn it from the Natural Tailor 
of Natural Joy, as Dean had, in his stresses.361
 
 
Here Sal highlights that the markings of Dean’s body – his physical appearance and clothing, 
indicate Dean is quite different from Sal.  However, the differences seem to spark a mutual 
desire to identify.  Jennifer Luongo argues that this mutual identification can be read as a to the 
United States as it transitioned from the Fredrick Jackson Turner thesis that frontier defined 
America, but with one key difference: “Sal can see his own social past when he looks at Dean 
much as Turner’s frontiersman is able to view the untamed land that gives way to the society in 
which he lives. However, unlike the wild American land that eventually gave way to settlements, 
Dean’s character is like an ever receding frontier line; ultimately he remains untouched by 
‘civilization.’”362
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 Dean’s distance from civilization coupled with the familiar and happy moments 
he sparks in Sal evoke the Burkean moment for the appearance of rhetoric:  “Put identification 
and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and 
362 Jennifer Luongo, Memory, History and the Journey West in the Twentieth-Century Novel. 
Ph.D. Diss., Fordham University, 2006, 128. 
 170 
the other beings, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric.”363 Identification for 
Burke means being “substantially one with a person other than himself.”364
For Burke, rhetoric is the study of competitive struggle, when man “surrounds himself 
with properties that name his number or establish his identity, man is ethical.”  This construction 
is always at risk of being in conflict with other structures of identity: “Its relation to other entities 
that are likewise forming their identity in terms of property can lead to turmoil and discord.”  It 
is this unavoidable situation that for Burke must be studied by rhetoric: “Here is par excellence a 
topic to be considered in a rhetoric having ‘identification’ as its key term.”
 Identification in 
Burke’s sense is always paired with its “ironic counterpart,” division. Sal seems to recognize this 
right away in his interaction with Dean.  Dean has clothes from the tailor of “Natural Joy,” yet 
like a young boxer, Dean has had to fight to get everything.  Dean looks like Gene Autry, but 
also reminds Sal of his Patterson boyhood, when he played on the Passaic riverbank. The 
ambiguity of Dean’s familiarity with his foreignness sparks Sal to engage with Dean in order to 
“place” him as similarly motivated.   
365
So in the meeting of Dean and Sal we have an invitation to rhetoric, or a struggle of how 
identification and division work to create stable relations out of something nearly unintelligible, 
yet cannot remain that way. The relationship of Dean and Sal serve as a template for 
identification and division.  As Sal and Dean identify and become consubstantial – as well as the 
moments when they divide from each others’ motives – inventories of motives are created for the 
reader and serve as an index of rhetorical options. In short, rhetorical options are strategies of 
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how to identify with others and reach consubstantiality within a particular discursive 
environment. 
Dean serves as the primary figure of identification in the novel.  A key moment is when 
Dean arrives at Sal’s house in order to learn how to write.  “He came right out to Patterson, New 
Jersey, where I was living with my aunt, and one night while I was studying there was a knock 
on the door, and there was Dean, bowing, shuffling obsequiously in the dark of the hall, and 
saying, ‘Hel-lo, you remember me – Dean Moriarty? I’ve come to ask you to show me how to 
write.’”366
All my other current friends were ‘intellectuals’ – Chad the Nietzschean anthropologist, 
Carlo Marx and his nutty surrealist low-voiced serious staring talk, Old Bull Lee and his 
critical anti-everything drawl – or else they were slinking criminals like Elmer Hassel, 
with that hip sneer; Jane Lee the same, sprawled on the Oriental cover of her couch, 
sniffing at the New Yorker. But Dean’s intelligence was very bit as formal and shining 
and complete, without the tedious intellectualness.  And his ‘criminality’ was not 
something that sulked and sneered; it was a wild yea-saying overburst of American joy; it 
was Western, the west wind, an ode from the Plains, something new, long prophesied, 
long a-coming (he only stole cars for joy rides). Besides, all my New York friends were 
in the negative, nightmare position of putting down society and giving their tired bookish 
or political or psychoanalytical reasons, but Dean just raced in society, eager for bread 
and love; he didn’t care one way or the other, “so long’s I can get that lil ole gal with that 
lil supin down there tween her legs, boy,’ and ‘so long’s we can eat son, y’ear me? I’m 
hungry, I’m starving, let’s eat right now!” – and off we’d rush to eat, whereof, as saith 
Ecclesiastes, ‘It is your portion under the sun.’
  Here Dean is divided from Sal, but wants to learn from him the very thing that divides 
them – Dean perceives Sal as much more “intellectual,” while Sal finds Dean’s lack of 
intellectual-ity the most interesting thing about him.  In this quote, Dean is further “identified” 
via Sal’s nice division of Dean from everyone else who is in his circle of friends at the time of 
their introduction: 
367
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Dean is clearly positioned as valued for his anti-intellectualism and wild appreciation for the 
embodied pleasures of life, such as sex and food. Sal is not interested in critiquing American 
society, but being a part of it; being in society instead of above it.  He finds himself 
consubstantial with Dean because he believes Dean to have the proper relationship to society – 
Dean is not dividing himself from American society, but living in it; being American.368
These moments proliferate in the book.  Sal, near the end of the novel, offers some 
concern that perhaps Dean’s rhetoric of constant movement might be unsustainable: 
 
‘I want to marry a girl,’ I told them, ‘so I can rest my soul with her till we both get old. 
This can’t go on all the time – all this franticness and jumping around. We’ve got to go 
someplace, find something.’ 
‘Ah now, man,’ said Dean, ‘I’ve been digging you for years about the home and marriage 
and all those fine wonderful things about your soul.’ It was a sad night; it was also a 
merry night.369
 
 
Here is a great example of Kerouac’s savvy approach to the anxieties surrounding 
communication in 1950s America. Sal muses that perhaps the idea of having a home and a 
traditional family will be the end result of their constant going. Dean makes the interesting 
response that he has appreciated these aspects of Sal’s approach to life, but he stops short of 
agreeing with him. For Sal, there is recognition of happiness and sadness due to this exchange: 
Happiness because they both identify with each other, but sadness because the gap between them 
is reified by the exchange.  Dean and Sal cannot be each other – the source of sadness.  However, 
through a rhetorical response of “digging” the other’s perspective, the night can still be happy.  
Steve Wilson makes a similar observation about On the Road, noting that, “Kerouac’s search for 
                                               
368 See George Mouratidis, “Into the Heart of Things”: Neal Cassidy and the Search for the 
Authentic in Howard Cunnell, ed. On the Road: The Original Scroll (New York: Penguin, 2008), 
69. 
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truth would involve ‘digging’ the lives of the dispossessed  - not merely studying Blacks, 
Mexicans, criminals, but attempting to become them for a time, as Buddha sought to contain all 
walks of life within the Self.”370 Unfortunately, as Wilson points out, there are serious limits to 
such a project that he links to Kerouac’s future disappointment and depression with the book: “In 
the end, then Kerouac’s direction in these two early autobiographical works [On the Road and 
The Subterraneans] will be to trace his increasing awareness, and deepening despair, that life as 
a writer will make him only at best a Bodhisattva – one guiding others to possible enlightenment 
– always describing what he can never himself obtain.”371
Some of the more interesting moments of the book are when communication and 
rhetorical practices take center stage. In one scene, Dean and Carlo Marx – an intellectual poet 
and friend of both Dean and Sal - conduct a series of “communication experiments” where they 
attempt to reach, in Burkean terms, “perfect communication.” They want to know the content of 
the other’s thoughts purely, like mind reading.  These interactions between characters in On the 
Road I read as persuasive demonstrations of the failure of alternative methods to connect to 
 Wilson’s comparison of Kerouac’s 
project to Buddha’s philosophy has interesting insights for my analysis – if we think of Buddha 
as representing perfect communication, then a Boddhisattva, someone who postpones 
enlightenment in order to enlighten others – we can see the distinction between perfect 
communication and rhetoric. Perfect communication doesn’t need rhetoric, as rhetoric is the 
process of making one’s motives consubstantial with others in order to form relationships. 
Kerouac cannot achieve transmission through rhetoric – so perhaps Wilson is right. But he can 
achieve consubstantiality, which is as good as identification gets in Burke’s view. 
                                               
370 Steve Wilson, “Buddha Writing: The Author and the Search for Authenticity in Jack 
Kerouac’s On the Road and . . .” Midwest Quarterly 40, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 302, 303. 
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others, and Kerouac’s humorous tone seems to point out the impossibility.  Dean comes to 
Carlo’s apartment late at night and the two characters attempt to know each other’s minds in a 
direct and pure way.  Carlo offers this description of the experiments to Sal: 
‘Dean and I are embarked on a tremendous season together. We’re trying to communicate 
with absolute honesty and absolute completeness everything on our minds.  We’ve had to 
take Benzedrine.  We sit on the bed, crosslegged, facing each other. I have finally taught 
Dean that he can do anything he wants, become mayor of Denver, marry millionaires, or 
become the greatest poet since Rimbaud. But he keeps rushing out to see the midnight 
auto races.  I go with him.  He jumps and yells, excited. You know, Sal, Dean is really 
hung-up on things like that.’ Marx said ‘Hmmm’ in his soul and thought about this.372
 
 
Carlo, like Old Bull Lee who I will discuss later in this chapter, serves as a representative of the 
type of discourse that Sal rejects as “intellectual” and pokes fun at in comparison to the attitude 
that he and Dean forge together on the road.  Carlo’s statement here is a clear parody of 
American egalitarian educational discourse which asserts that the young American can “do 
anything if they put their mind to it.” Carlo’s liberation of Dean is clearly a preparation for him 
to achieve normal visions of success, which Dean tosses to go watch late night car races.  Carlo 
believes he can accomplish all this through a specialized form of communication intrigues Sal, 
who decides to go to Carlo’s apartment to observe one of these late night sessions: 
It was like the room of a Russian saint: one bed, a candle burning, stone walls that oozed 
moisture, and a crazy makeshift ikon of some kind that he had made.  He [Carlo] read me 
his poetry. It was called ‘Denver Doldrums.’ Carlo woke up in the morning and heard the 
‘vulgar pigeons’ yakking in the street outside his cell; he saw the ‘sad nightingales’ 
nodding on the branches and they reminded him of his mother.  A gray shroud fell over 
the city.  The mountains, the magnificent Rockies that you can see to the west form any 
part of town, were ‘papier-mâché.’ The whole universe was crazy and cock-eyed and 
extremely strange.  He wrote of Dean as a ‘child of the rainbow’ who bore his torment in 
his agonized priapus.  He referred to him as ‘Oedipus Eddie’ who had to ‘scrape bubble 
gum off windowpanes.’ He brooded in his basement over a huge journal in which he was 
keeping track of everything that happened every day – everything Dean did and said.373
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Sal offers an interesting picture of Carlo’s life in Denver, most notably disbelief at his rhetorical 
framing of the world.  Sal seems amazed that the “magnificent” Rocky Mountains, the landscape 
of America are merely paper mâché in Carlo’s words. The magnificent geography of the United 
States, so important to Sal, is artificial in Carlo’s rhetorical frame. Sal seems not to understand 
Carlo’s work, but perhaps Kerouac is doing some spoofing of romantic poetry here. There is an 
apt argument from Wayne Booth that captures the relationship between Sal Paradise, Kerouac 
and the reader. In his discussion of types of narrators in fiction that are effective, Booth identifies 
one type where, “though the narrator may have some redeeming qualities of mind or heart, we 
travel with the silent author, observing as from a rear seat the humorous or disgraceful or 
ridiculous or vicious driving behavior of the narrator seating in front. The author may wink and 
nudge, but he may not speak.”374
In the first scene with the communication “experiments” between Carlo and Dean, we see 
Sal’s narrative “driving” as a potential moment of Kerouac ribbing. Carlo broods in a dark bare 
  The quote is a good description of the sincere but perhaps 
naive or faulty picture we get of characters or moments during the book from Sal. The quote 
becomes even more eerily apt when examining the driving scenes, as Dean always drives the car 
and Sal carries on silent reflection or critique of the way Dean drives.  Although many scholars 
interchangeable swap Kerouac for Sal Paradise (Wilson notes this), Booth indicates what might 
be lost in such an easy exchange. We might lose the deliberate misdirection of the narrator as a 
part of the creation of the story.  In our case, we might lose a vital part of the subtle rhetorical 
strategies that Sal’s motives can provide. 
                                               
374 Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1983), 300. 
 176 
room fit for medieval religious martyrs and dutifully collects data on the phenomena of daily life.  
Carlo’s approach to the world is at a distance, distinct from the world of Dean and Sal from the 
beginning of the experiment.  Carlo is the consummate intellectual, who Dean and Sal attempted 
to break from at the beginning of the book. As it starts, Sal sets up the scene: 
“Then they got down to business.  They sat on the bed cross-legged and looked straight at 
each other. I slouched in a nearby chair and saw all of it. They began with an abstract 
thought, discussed it; reminded each other of another abstract point forgotten in the rush 
of events; Dean apologized but promised he could get back to it and manage it fine, 
bringing up illustrations.”375
 
 
The experiment begins with the tone and style of a business meeting, or professional interaction.  
Sal considers the points “abstract,” a nice wink from Kerouac that Sal does not get the point of 
what’s going on.  The discussion continues, and Sal lets us hear some of the conversational 
experiment in progress: 
“Of course that isn’t it! Because you forget that – But I’ll stop accusing you. Yes is what 
I said. . .” And on, on into the night they talked like this.  At dawn I looked up.  They 
were tying up the last of the morning’s matters.  “When I said to you that I had to sleep 
because of Marylou, that is, seeing her this morning at then, I didn’t bring my peremptory 
tone to bear in regard to what you’d just said about the unnecessariness of sleep but only, 
only, mind you, because of the fact that I absolutely, simply, purely and without any 
whatevers have to sleep now, I mean, man, my eyes are closing, they’re redhot, sore, 
tired, beat . . .” 
“Ah, child,” said Carlo 
“We’ll just have to sleep now. Let’s stop the machine.” 
“You can’t stop the machine!” yelled Carlo at the top of his voice. The first birds sang. 
“Now when I raise my hand,” said Dean, “we’ll stop talking, we’ll both understand 
purely and without any hassle that we are simply stopping talking, and we’ll just sleep.” 
“You can’t stop the machine like that.”376
 
 
The “machine” of direct mental knowledge, to Carlo, is beyond the control of either of them.  It 
is not something that can be put off even for biological needs, such as sleep. Carlo’s rhetoric is 
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beyond the needs of the “now.” For Dean, it is appropriate to attend to the needs of the moment 
based on situational exigency.  For Carlo, the “machine” must press on no matter what the 
situation; it is inappropriate to try to stop something larger than ourselves.  This scene seems to 
offer a criticism of mainstream ideas about communication, mechanistic and operating in spite of 
the limits of human biology. In Burke’s terms, Carlo’s communication theory is unethical as it 
fails to adjust its parameters for the recalcitrance of sleepiness.  As Sal chimes in, the critique is 
somewhat clarified: 
“Stop the machine,” I said. They looked at me. 
“He’s been awake all this time, listening.  What were you thinking, Sal?” I told them that 
I was thinking they were very amazing maniacs and that I had spent the whole night 
listening to them like a man watching the mechanism of a watch that reached clear to the 
top of Berthoud Pass and yet was made with the smallest works of the most delicate 
watch in the world.  They smiled. I pointed my finger at them and said, “If you keep this 
up you’ll both go crazy, but let me know what happens as you go along.”377
 
 
The machine analogy is extended and offered as a superimposed watch atop the geography of 
Colorado. Sal attempts a permutation of ideas, one that shows how their machine can be 
beautiful and fit into America’s geography at the same time.  However, Sal does jokingly warn 
that they may “go crazy” pursuing this, but requests details of the trek into insanity. The 
“amazing maniacs” impress Sal but they are also engaged in something that seems trivial to him, 
although beautiful. It’s not as serious or as good a model as being out on the road and engaging 
American others directly.  It’s hard to read Sal’s reaction. One moment we think that Sal sees the 
experiment as beautiful, but ill-suited for its goal. Another interpretation is that Sal is perhaps 
lampooning the experiment as about as useful as a watch the size of Colorado. Sal becomes 
much more interested in Dean as the model rhetorician, praising Dean’s ability to account, 
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describe and articulate the most complicated phenomena they encounter on their road trips.  
Although Sal certainly likes Carlo, he looks upon Carlo’s style as silly and possibly naive. 
Reading the scene from the rhetorical critic’s perspective, Sal sees the combination of their 
rhetorical styles as a potentially beautiful machine, but questions its utility. Comparing rhetorics, 
Sal prefers Dean’s approach, since he characterizes Carlo’s as stemming from an ancient, 
monastic ethos. 
As Sal continues his relationship with Dean, it is apparent that what interests Sal the most 
is Dean’s sense of timing. I will now compare Dean’s timing to the ancient concept of kairos, 
defined as timing, appropriateness, and opportunity, to name just a few of the interpretations 
scholars have offered.378
                                               
378 Kairos is a rich concept that has been studied across multiple fields. The trajectory I am using 
stems from its treatment in rhetoric. See James Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical and Modern 
Theory,” and John Poulakos, “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions,” both in Phillip 
Sipiora and James S. Baumlin, Eds. Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory and Praxis 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); Eric Charles White, Kaironomia: On the 
Will to Invent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); and for more theological background see 
Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).  
 Dean is primarily concerned with the time throughout the book, and 
what they are going to do at what time.  Dean is overly concerned with accurate time and 
frustrated when he feels that time is being wasted. Kairos, as multiple scholars have argued, is an 
essential concern of any rhetorical practice. As I discussed in a previous chapter, kairos is best 
understood as a situational timing or opportunity not just for appropriate words, but for the 
identification of a situation of invention. Kerouac places timing and timeliness throughout his 
book, indicating its situational, cultural and specific nature again and again. Dean arrives in New 
York City from Colorado to meet Sal, and immediately his sense of timing and timeliness is the 
first moment where Sal gives us incredible detail about Dean: 
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All this time Dean was telling Marylou things like this: “Now, darling, here we are in 
New York and although I haven’t quite told you everything that I was thinking about 
when we crossed Missouri and especially at the point when we passed the Boonville 
reformatory which reminded me of my jail problem, it is absolutely necessary now to 
postpone all those leftover things concerning our personal lovethings and at once begin 
thinking of specific worklife plans . . “ and so on in the way that he had in those early 
days.379
 
 
Here Dean displays a sense of timing related to notions of appropriateness and location, or scene. 
Dean is concerned about things such as “worklife” plans over concerns about “lovethings,” since 
the demands of the situation of being in New York require a concern with getting a job and 
making money.  Dean is also keenly aware that the moment is shaping these needs, but that he is 
in control of shaping the needs of the moment with his words. For example, he determines what 
is “absolutely necessary” in this moment by referring to a past moment with his girlfriend where 
he chose not to fully discuss an even more distant moment. The moment is again characterized 
with time by Sal who adds that this is how Dean behaved in “those early days,” again marking 
his discourse as momentary. Dean seems the embodiment of Eric White’s understanding of 
kairos as a combination between the arts of archery and weaving. White takes the ancient view 
of these arts to argue that the meaning of kairos is understood best through its relationship with 
contingency -- “that there can never be more than a contingent and provisional management of 
the present opportunity.” He argues that kairos is an art of recognizing beginnings – “As a 
prescription concerning the basis on which thought can begin to intervene in the world, kairos is 
offered with the understanding, then that thought must always be willing, as circumstances 
change, to begin again.”380
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 Dean, through the course of the book, is the master of seizing 
380 Eric Charles White, Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987), 13, 17. 
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opportunity to begin again, often in the style that Sal displays for us early in the book.  Sal’s 
attention to the detail of exactly how Dean delivers his words – marking visually the signs of 
accent and hesitation – show that the verbal intervention is as important as the moment of its 
delivery. Sal is attuned and fascinated by Dean’s kairotic sensibility. 
Dean is often characterized in the book as someone obsessed with time and timing, and 
doing things when they are the most opportune.  As Sal describes an interaction Dean has with 
his girlfriend, explaining why he must go out in the middle of the night: 
“It is now” (looking at his watch) “exactly one-fourteen.  I shall be back at exactly three-
fourteen, for our hour of reverie together, real sweet reverie, darling, and then, as you 
know, as I told you and as we agreed, I have to go and see the one-legged lawyer about 
those papers – in the middle of the night, strange as it seems and as I tho-ro-ly 
explained.” (This was a coverup for his rendezvous with Carlo, who was still hiding.) “So 
now in this exact minute I must dress, put on my pants, go back to life, that is to outside 
life, streets and what not, as we agreed, it is now one-fifteen and time’s running, running . 
. .”381
 
  
Dean’s attentiveness to the exact minute of departure and return, as well as scheduling his lover 
as if she were a laborer, speak to the characterization of time that Dean Moriarty comes to 
represent at the beginning of the novel. As Sal says, “There was always a schedule in Dean’s 
life.”382
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 Dean’s concern with timing could be seen as his desire to never miss moments of 
opportunity.  Dean’s deception of his girlfriend under the guise of seeing a lawyer about 
divorcing his wife for her is a cover for engaging in communication experiments with Carlo 
Marx in his basement apartment. Dean’s concern with timing is linked to concern for 
opportunity, and his words are crafted in order to maximize his own perceived opportunities. 
Dean has little concern with the time or opportunities of others, unless it is connected to his own. 
382 Kerouac, On the Road, 42. 
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In another example, Dean comes to see Sal in Denver, Colorado, in order to take a trip to 
Mexico. As soon as Dean arrives, he begins to plan the trip and experiences with an urgent eye 
toward the clock: 
“Yass, yass. Well, Sal old man, what’s the story, when do we take off for Mexico? 
Tomorrow afternoon? Fine, fine. Ahem! And now, Sal I have exactly sixteen minutes to 
make it to Ed Dunkel’s house, where I am about to recover my old railroad watch which I 
can pawn on Larimer Street before closing time, meanwhile buzzing very quickly and as 
thoroughly as time allows to see if my old man by chance may be in Jiggs’ Buffet or 
some of the other bars and then I have an appointment with the barber Doll always told 
me to patronize and I have not myself change over the years and continue with that policy 
– kaff! Kaff! At six o’clock sharp! – sharp, hear me? – I want you to be right here where 
I’ll come buzzing by to get you for one quick run to Roy Johnson’s house. . .”383
 
 
Dean’s obsession with precise timing could also be seen as a mockery of discourses of 
punctuality and responsibility in the 1950s.  His concern with punctuality might be seen as a 
concern with how to “waste time” properly, having fun and being irresponsible, which would be 
an inversion of the values of the dominant discourses of time during the 1950s. As Erik 
Mortenson argues, the post-war success of corporations such as U.S. Time and the Timex watch 
indicate that Americans were developing and enjoying a new relationship to time: “United States 
Time’s success is telling because it demonstrates the degree to which post-war America was 
becoming time-conscious. This company’s name alone conjures up images of monolithic 
proportions, of a standard time that all Americans could set their lives by. In a booming post-war 
economy, such an attention to time was indeed necessary to ensure that everything ‘ran 
smoothly.’ After all, Benjamin Franklin's dictum still rang true: Time is money.”384
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 Mortensen 
sees Kerouac’s book as “an attack on the corruption of time by capitalism.” Along with this, 
Dean could also be read as a characterization of all of the appropriate rhetorical options of the 
384 Erik Mortensen, “Beating Time: Configurations of Temporality in Jack Kerouac’s On the 
Road” College Literature 28, 3 (2001): 51-67,51-52. 
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1950s pushed to their logical extreme. Joshua Kupetz argues that Dean’s obsession with time is 
an attempt to escape from its demands by conforming to them. A close cooperation with the 
demands of time might provide some degree of liberation from the system: “Cassady’s 
techniques for operating outside of time, however, rely upon his strict adherence to it. In 
representing Cassady’s timetables and ubiquitous schedules, Kerouac illustrates what Michel 
Foucault calls the ‘exhaustive use’ of time, a technique that subjugates the actor to time while 
promising emancipation from it.”385
Additionally, the importance of timing is lost in this read. Dean is not simply obsessed 
with accounting for every minute. If he were, this would give a lot of credibility to Kupetz’s 
analysis. Instead, Dean’s obsession with the clock is one symptom of a much larger goal to seek 
opportunity for experiences.  Dean’s obsession with the temporal, opportunity and timing 
increases throughout the book. One of the places where Dean’s concern with kairos really stands 
out is in moments where Sal details Dean’s ability to drive, creating opportunity in the face of 
death:  
 This analysis is good, and there are some moments where 
Dean appears to be doing exactly as Kupetz argues, becoming more a prisoner to the demands of 
the temporal even as he tries more vigorously to extract more freedom from them.  However, 
Booth’s concept of the role of the narrator is lost on Kupetz.  He uses Cassady and Kerouac as 
synonymous with the characters of Dean and Sal. By substituting the actual people for the 
characters, an important dimension of reading the text is lost – the “wink” from the author, as 
Booth put it. It is impossible to read the nuances of Sal in his quest for finding identification with 
Dean if we read him as simply Kerouac. 
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At a narrow bridge that crossed one of these lovely little rivers he shot precipitately into 
an almost impossible situation. Two slow cars ahead of us were bumping over the bridge; 
coming the other way was a huge truck-trailer with a driver who was making a close 
estimate of how long it would take to negotiate the bridge, and his estimate was that by 
the time he got there they’d be over. There was absolutely no room on the bridge for the 
truck and any cars going the other direction. Behind the truck cars pulled out and peeked 
for a chance to get by it. Dean came down on all this at 110 miles an hour and never 
hesitated.  He passed the slow cars, swerved, and almost hit the left rail of the bridge, 
went head-on into the shadow of the unslowing truck, cut right sharply, just missed the 
truck’s left front wheel, almost hit the first slow car, pulled out to pass, and then had to 
cut back in line . . . all in a matter of two seconds, flashing by and leaving nothing more 
than a cloud of dust instead of a horrible five-way crash with cars lurching in every 
direction. . . I couldn’t get it out of my mind, also, that a famous bop clarinetist had died 
in an Illinois car-crash recently, probably on a day like this.386
 
 
Dean is able to maneuver the car with the finest sense of kairos imaginable. Dean is not just 
quick, or fast, but he is quick and fast at the exact right moment. Sal is very clear to divide 
Dean’s ability from mere luck, pointing out that this is Dean’s skill at work here.  Dean has a 
sense beyond most anyone else of the kairos of the car.  Sal’s mind wanders to a jazz musician 
after this maneuver not by accident.  Sal sees this sort of fine timing in Bop jazz as key to 
understanding the world.  Even a jazz musician, someone with impeccable timing in Sal’s mind, 
can still die in an auto accident. Dean exhibits mastery of this timing in his driving just as the 
jazz clarinetist exhibited fine timing in the rhetoric of his music. 
Dean also continuously mentions the limits that time holds upon human beings. He is 
aware of the importance of time, but not in a simplistic, managerial way as Kupitz suggests. 
Conversely, Dean suggests that the power of time is rhetorical. Time serves as a terministic 
screen, filtering out possibilities of being via constricting language. Constantly through the 
novel, Dean states that he “knows time,” usually in reference to some desirable activity that 
remains unaccomplished: 
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“And we’ll all go off to sweet life, ‘cause now is the time and we all know time”’ He 
rubbed his jaw furiously, he swung the car and passed three trucks, he roared into 
downtown Testament, looking in every direction and seeing everything in an arc of 180 
degrees around his eyeballs without moving his head. Bang, he found a parking space in 
no time, and we were parked.  He leaped out of the car. Furiously he hustled into the 
railroad station; we followed sheepishly.  He bought cigarettes. He had become 
absolutely mad in his movements; he seemed to be doing everything at the same time. It 
was a shaking of the head, up and down, sideways; jerky, vigorous hands; quick walking, 
sitting, crossing the legs, uncrossing, getting up, rubbing the hands, rubbing his fly, 
hitching his pants, looking up and saying “Am,” and sudden slitting of the eyes to see 
everywhere; and all the time he was grabbing me by the ribs and talking, talking.387
 
 
Dean’s fury of behavior indicates his almost panicked condition due to his “knowing time.” This 
could be read as concern with the limits of time, but Sal is careful to point out how Dean is 
constantly acting – always doing something. It takes Dean literally “no time” to find a parking 
spot, and can see 180 degrees around him, almost like magic. This is not the ability of someone 
who is concerned about micromanaging the clock, but someone who, in the words of Paul 
Tillich, “Time is an empty form only for abstract, objective reflection, a form that can receive 
any kind of content; but to him who is conscious of an ongoing creative life it is laden with 
tensions, with possibilities and impossibilities, it is qualitative and full of significance.”388
Not everyone is as impressed with Dean’s timing as Sal is. His obsession with time is 
questioned by other characters in the middle portions of the book quite frequently; in this 
example Carlo Marx confronts Dean’s kairotic panic in his alternative rhetoric, his new “voice”:  
 Dean 
seems to meet Tillich’s understanding of kairos as a primarily qualitative understanding of time 
– that is, time is ours to manipulate and use for our benefit. Dean’s panic over using every 
minute is not a passive submission to time, but an awareness that time is not a fixed quantity, that 
time is significant if people work to make it so.  
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In these days Carlo had developed a tone of voice which he hoped sounded like what he 
called the Voice of the Rock; the whole idea was to stun people into the realization of the 
rock. “You pin a dragon to your hats,” he warned us; “you’re up in the attic with the 
bats.” His mad eyes glittered at us.  Since the Dakar Doldrums he had gone through a 
terrible period which he called the Holy Doldrums, or Harlem Doldrums, when he lived 
in Harlem in mid-summer and at night woke up in his lonely room and heard “the great 
machine” descending from the sky; and when he walked on 125th Street “under water” 
with all the other fish.  It was a riot of radiant ideas that had come to enlighten his brain. 
He made Marylou sit on his lap and commanded her to subside. He told Dean, “Why 
don’t you just sit down and relax? Why do you jump around so much?” Dean ran around, 
putting sugar in his coffee and saying, “Yes! Yes! Yes!”389
 
 
Dean’s rhetoric of “rushing around” is juxtaposed by Carlo’s focus on the body. Carlo believes it 
to be unnatural to rush around and constantly be active as Dean appears to be to him.   Here we 
can read the confrontation through Sal’s eyes as two different rhetorical strategies for 
identification – Dean’s focus on pure kairos contrasted with Carlo’s attentiveness to the 
recalcitrance of human biology.  At the end of this scene, Dean’s concern with temporality is 
directly challenged by Carlo’s alternative approach. Carlo prefers a stronger sense of absolute 
time, with fixed points: 
Carlo watched this silly madness with slitted eyes. Finally, he slapped his knee and said, 
“I have an announcement to make.” 
“Yes, Yes?” 
“What is the meaning of this voyage to New York? What kind of sordid business are you 
on now? I mean, man, whither goest thou? Wither goest thou, America, in thy shiny car 
in the night?” 
“Whither goest thou?” echoed Dean with his mouth open. We sat and didn’t know what 
to say; there was nothing to talk about any more. The only thing to do was go.390
 
 
Sal quickly identifies with Dean’s confusion by interpreting the answer to the question as an 
obvious imperative – “let’s go!” However, there is more here than what Sal interprets. What is 
offered here is a clash of two terministic screens – Dean’s kairos and Carlos’s alternative 
rhetoric.  For Carlos, the group is identified as “America,” and he clearly wants to hear an 
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articulation of the purpose and point of their trip. This question is totally lost on Dean, and Sal 
believes it to be a conversation ender. The two perspectives are incompatible.  Carlo divides 
himself from the kairotic in favor of a more static and consistent notion of time. For Dean, the 
question makes little sense if the only way of knowing the point of the trip is through crafting 
moments of opportunity via experience. 
After getting back on the road, there is a passage which I think could serve as an answer 
to Carlo’s question: 
“And of course now no one can tell us that there is no god. We’ve passed through all 
forms. You remember, Sal, when I first came to New York and I wanted Chad King to 
teach me about Nietzsche. You see how long ago? Everything is fine, God exists, we 
know time. Everything since the Greeks has been predicted wrong. You can’t make it 
with geometry and geometrical systems of thinking. It’s all this!” He wrapped his finger 
in his fist; the car hugged the line straight and true. “And not only that but we both 
understand that I couldn’t have time to explain why I know and you know God exists.”391
 
 
Dean’s explanation comes from the moment. Only at the moment of the gesture is the 
understanding of life possible. For Dean, the moment in the car apprehending the gesture is proof 
enough of the existence of God for him. Sal makes sure to point out that the car stays the course 
even though Dean takes his hands from the wheel – perhaps indicating that Sal is not as 
completely “in the moment” as Dean is. 
 Knowing time, in this case, seems to refer to the knowledge that time, as a terministic 
screen, sets the course for failed predictions.  Kairos, as I’m describing Dean’s perspective, is to 
recognize within these limits the moments of opportunity for a more “pure” understanding.  
Dean’s rhetoric is based on taking advantage of the momentary as the source of meaning. This is 
similar to Kenneth Burke’s argument that rhetoric should be included as a type of action. “We do 
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make a pragmatic distinction between the ‘actions’ of ‘persons’ and the sheer ‘motions’ of 
‘things.’ The slashing of the waves against the beach, or the endless cycle of births and deaths in 
biologic organisms would be examples of sheer motion. Yet we, the typically symbol-using 
animal, cannot relate to one another sheerly as things in motion. Even the behaviorist, who 
studies man in terms of his laboratory experiments, must treat his colleagues as persons, rather 
than purely and simply as automata responding to stimuli.”392
As the novel progresses we get more moments where Dean is given a chance to articulate 
his theory. Of course, this theory cannot be articulated plainly, as was demonstrated in the 
confrontation with Carlo earlier. When Dean does talk about his perspective, it is to Sal, and 
what he says is fragmentary at best. What happens though is a sort of mystification of Dean’s 
perspective, as is clear in this quote: “I’ve decided to leave everything out of my hands. You’ve 
seen me try and break my ass to make it and you know that it doesn’t matter and we know time – 
how to slow it up and walk and dig and just old-fashioned spade kicks, what other kicks are 
there? We know.”
 The motion/action distinction 
discussed here by Burke is similar to Dean’s kairotic rhetorical practice. For Dean life consists of 
making certain that one doesn’t miss timely opportunities to live. Carlo’s question, focused as it 
is on goals for the journey, misses Dean’s perspective, which is that the goals will be crafted out 
of opportunity, as long as he is there to recognize and capture those moments. 
393
                                               
392 Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1966), 53. 
 Dean attempts to avoid the dangers of mediation of his perspective. 
Explaining the “kicks” is not necessary at all - Sal already knows everything. Dean proclaims 
that he is not going to control his life anymore, because he “knows time.” He tells Sal they can 
slow things down and enjoy a life of experiences. This is Dean’s kairos - a recognition that 
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planning and control are not necessary if you can look around in your present moment. There is 
plenty of joy if one can slow down and see the opportunities around. 
The reference to “spade kicks” again indicates the unusual position the African-American 
experience has for Kerouac, highlighting that perhaps Dean feels he has reached the level of 
understanding the special communicative abilities of African-Americans. Some of this attitude 
Dean expresses has been traced in American history by Kevin J. Mumford as “slumming,” which 
he defines as “travelling to foreign, exotic, supposedly inferior cultures,” within one’s own 
culture.394 These slums were the products of racist policy, poverty and the rise of urban areas at 
the turn of the twentieth century – Mumford calls them “interzones,” and his study argues that 
since the Harlem Renaissance, interzone sites have been seen as objects of erotic or otherized 
fantasy by bohemian whites. “White authors also relied on blackness to draw distinctions, 
dramatize differences, and eroticize their contexts. Whether a form of leisure or a literary 
expedition, and usually both, ‘urban slumming’ became critical to the rise of American sexual 
modernism.”395
Dean’s kairotic approach is so attractive to Sal because Sal is himself possessed with 
questions of time, timing and opportunity. This comes out when Sal gives us exposition and 
images of the world from his perspective: 
  Later we will see this operationalized in Sal’s mind as he reflects for the reader 
on what he is missing out on in life by not being a part of the eroticized, urban other.  In short, 
Dean here indicates that he is after all experiences, for any of them could provide good 
opportunities to get IT. 
At this time, in 1947, bop was going like mad all over America.  The fellows at the Loop 
blew, but with a tired air, because bop was somewhere between its Charlie Parker 
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Orinithology period and another period that began with Miles Davis.  And as I sat there 
listening to that sound of the night which bop has come to represent for all of us, I 
thought of all my friends from one end of the country to the other and how they were 
really all in the same vast backyard doing something so frantic and rushing-about.396
 
  
Sal connects his group of friends and bop, a style of jazz music as an analogy. The music makes 
Sal think of the rushing around of his friends all through the country, and he realizes that in all of 
their separation and isolation, the “rushing about” connects them all. What seems disconnected 
and fragmented, like bop, is actually a unity with its own harmony. The connection is through 
timing, and the opportunity Sal has at the moment of hearing the music to recognize the harmony 
in the discordant way his friends are moving about the country. Sal perhaps realizes they are 
consubstantial, engaged (in Burkean terms) in the Scramble in the same human backyard (or 
barnyard).397
The spontaneity of jazz music, especially the bop that inspires Sal, is another layer to the 
kairotic rhetoric found in On the Road. Kerouac’s method of “spontaneous prose” borrows from 
the idea that this music is of the moment, with little attention to correction, editing, and planning. 
Regardless of the actual amount of editing and changes, this belief in spontaneity is a part of the 
kairotic rhetoric offered in On the Road. George Dardess connects Kerouac’s belief in the 
powers of spontaneity to the work of Thoreau and Emerson: “For both Emerson and Thoreau 
spontaneous writing is a comprehensive act; it is for them the energetic attempt to summon 
together during the moment of inspiration all their functions, psychological, intellectual, and 
moral, as if the truth about the world cannot be uttered unless the source of utterance contains the 
world’s complexities. Because they do not make a distinction in kind between the writer and his 
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subject, both Emerson and Thoreau speak about writing in the same hortatory tone as they do 
about other conduct; they are moral even towards the act of moralism itself. In this respect, 
Kerouac is much like them.”398
Furthermore, John Shapcott argues that the surviving tape recordings of Kerouac and 
Neal Cassady reading and discussing writing serve as material evidence for the importance of 
spontaneity in Kerouac’s writing: 
 This also seems to be the theory that Sal and Dean support, that 
life experiences are not a fixed set, but something crafted through careful apprehension of the 
moment. This is what I call the kairotic rhetoric being offered in On the Road. 
Bebop's emphasis on immediacy and spatial intimacy promotes those spontaneous 
outbursts of expression of appreciation or encouragement during the course of 
performance that are replicated in the tapes. The linear and referential structure of the 
taped speeches resembles that of improvised jazz solos, providing meaning, both for the 
receptive listener}reader and for the performer. Whereas bebop’s nuances of rhythm, tone 
and timbre could not be transposed readily into printed musical notation, and therefore 
made aural transmission of primary importance, Kerouac nevertheless undertook the 
exploratory task of representing the spontaneity of everyday conversation in a print that 
bore the speaker's distinct psychological signature.399
 
  
Although Shapcott’s work does not include On the Road, his research using the surviving tapes 
of Kerouac and Cassady discussing writing and reading drafts to each other display the 
importance of improvised sound in the process of creating texts for Kerouac. 
Recognizing the opportunity to gain insightful experience and communicate it to others is 
one aspect of how kairos functions in the novel. The idea of kairos is also tied to the idea of 
consubstantiality, the Burkean concept of identifying with another’s motives. Seeing kairos as 
much more than just a speaker taking advantage of an audience through keen perception of 
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opportunity, Sheard argues that Burke’s conception of rhetoric is founded on a notion of kairos 
that places people as the center and the limit of potential meaning: 
 And like Gorgias, Burke is not a blind optimist. Rather, he is acutely aware of the limits 
of language and the extent to which all argument is ‘false’ because it is grounded 
rhetorically, governed by kairos. Burke’s theory of dramatism submits that all meaning is 
relational and that ultimately experience is comprised of dissoi logoi; Hence tragedy 
lurks about the fringes of comedy, war about the fringes of peace, ignorance about the 
perimeter of knowledge, change on the horizon of stability. Rather than see these 
paradoxes as disturbing or threatening, however, Burke embraces them as sources of 
ambiguity and uncertainty that provide the very opportunity -- as well as the necessity -- 
for rhetoric.400
 
  
Burke’s rhetorical theory is based on the contingency of human experience and therefore is 
always mired in ambiguity. However, rhetoric is necessary to clarify and call for understanding - 
and to create commonality among individuals - this is what he calls consubstantiality. It is mostly 
in Sal’s discourse that a sense of kairos as this complicated idea of “managed contingency” 
comes out.   Kerouac offers many moments where the activities of music and celebration end up 
as kairotic moments where Sal reaches for identification and consubstantiality with others. In 
this example, Sal attends a party that spontaneously forms in an abandoned miners’ shack: 
There was no music, just dancing. The place filled up.  People began to bring bottles.  We 
rushed out to hit the bars and rushed back.  The night was getting more and more frantic.  
I wished Dean and Carlo were there – then I realized they’d be out of place and unhappy. 
They were like the man with the dungeon stone and the gloom, rising from the 
underground, the sordid hipsters of America, a new beat generation that I was slowly 
joining.401
 
 
Sal makes rhetorical moves to distance himself from the people at the party.  He wishes 
for his friends to be there, but realizes they would not fit in or even enjoy this type of celebration. 
They are up to something else, something different from the identifications going on between 
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those at the party.  For Sal, the party is empty, it has no meaning; it is misplaced. He mentions 
that he is joining a “new beat generation,” a reference to one of the many definitions of “beat” 
offered by Kerouac - “being beat and down in the world.”402
Great laughter rang from all sides.  I wondered what the Spirit of the Mountain was 
thinking, and looked up and saw jackpines in the moon, and saw ghosts of old miners, 
and wondered about it. In the whole eastern dark wall of the Divide this night there was 
silence and the whisper of the wind, except in the ravine where we roared; and on the 
other side of the Divide was the great Western Slope, and the big plateau that went to 
Steamboat Springs, and dropped, and led you to the western Colorado desert and the Utah 
desert; all in darkness now as we fumed and screamed in our mountain nook, mad 
drunken Americans in the mighty land. We were on the roof of America and all we could 
do was yell, I guess – across the night, eastward over the Plains, where somewhere an old 
man with white hair was probably walking toward us with the Word, and would arrive 
any minute and make us silent.
 Sal seems almost satisfied in his 
division/identification, but the contingency of the moment complicates his position: 
403
 
 
Sal’s realization that he is joining a new beat generation is assaulted almost immediately by the 
contingency of his moment. Surrounded by laugher emanating form everywhere and nowhere, as 
well as the history of his location and the hint of pagan spirits threaten any clear or simple 
identification. Sal has to use rhetorical resources to “pan out” in order to make the situation 
meaningful to himself. After placing the party as in the center of America, the continental divide 
(from his view anyway) he then makes the point that sense is both difficult and certain - difficult 
because being on the “rooftop of America” the only thing they could do (or did) was incoherent 
yelling, and that silence either through death or some revelation of transcendence would arrive at 
any minute. Sal seems hopeful that the moment is pregnant with meaning, but he seems unable to 
find it, or to make it (not the disappointed “I guess” about the yelling). 
Compare this vision to an earlier geographic vision from the start of the novel:  
                                               
 
403 Kerouac, On the Road, 55. 
 193 
I thought all the wilderness of America was in the West till the Ghost of the Susquehanna 
showed me different.  No, there is a wilderness in the East; it’s the same wilderness Ben 
Franklin plodded in the oxcart days when we was postmaster, the same as it was when 
George Washington was a wildbuck Indian-fighter, when Daniel Boone told stories by 
Pennsylvania lamps and promised to find the Gap, when Bradford built his road and men 
whooped her up in log cabins. There were not Great Arizona spaces for the little man, 
just the bushy wilderness of eastern Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, the 
backroads, the black-tar roads that curve among the mournful rivers like Susquehanna, 
Monongahela, old Potomac and Monocacy.404
 
 
Here Sal has a very clear and permanent vision of the West and America. There is no confusion 
here about the meaning of wildness or of American for Sal. The party though in Colorado - 
identified as the borderland of the West by Sal - threatens his earlier read with contingent 
variables that he could not predict. It could be that Sal is struggling to identify with “the West” 
as a pungent rhetorical topos of identity, and having little success finding consubstantiality with 
this image of America. As Gregory Clark argues, “The national culture teaches Americans to 
experience certain places in their homeland rhetorically – to encounter for themselves those 
places as potent symbols of a concept of national community they are to claim as their own.”405
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Sal has an imaginary sense of “the West” but when he is in Colorado he fails to find 
identification with those at the party. His mind drifts to his separated friends who constitute a 
“whole” by their action, not their location. It is this moment where Sal begins to constitute he 
and his friends as a beat generation – a group that through their similar activities, not geography, 
create meaning. But, Sal is not Dean and cannot fully live the implications of the moment. He 
wonders about the approach of chronological time, which eventually renders everyone silent. 
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What the party scene shows is Sal attempting to embrace Dean’s kairotic rhetoric and facing the 
difficulties of apprehending it in a contingent world.   
Sal attempts to embrace different rhetorical perspectives throughout the book.  When Sal 
first goes west, he’s enamored with the idea of it, and finds very simplistic examples of the 
western sensibility:  “Then Omaha, and, by God, the first cowboy I saw, walking along the bleak 
walls of the wholesale meat warehouses in a ten-gallon hat and Texas boots, looked like any beat 
character of the brickwall dawns of the East except for the getup.”406
Sal and Dean can be seen as testing out many ways of life in the novel, trying to never 
miss a moment of kairotic experience. After a party at Rollo Greb’s house, one of Sal’s eccentric 
New York friends, Dean indicates his own desire for identification with Greb: 
 He begins to see similarity, 
and then difference as he spends more time in the west.  The party in Colorado pushes Sal to 
search for a more complete rhetoric of America than a simple geographic deterministic model. 
Sal begins to struggle with his identification with America, as well as with Dean. 
“That’s what I was trying to tell you – that’s what I want to be. I want to be like him.  
He’s never hung up, he goes every direction, he lets it all out, he knows time, he has 
nothing to do but rock back and forth. Man, he’s the end! You see, if you go like him all 
the time you’ll finally get it.” 
“Get what?” 
“IT! IT! I’ll tell you – now no time, we have no time now.”407
 
 
The pursuit of “IT” takes up a considerable amount of the middle of the novel and is not well 
described or discussed in specific detail by any of the characters.  IT’s relationship to time is 
two-sided: First, IT is so important that it must be pursued immediately and without delay.  
Secondly, IT is so important that to describe it would be to violate it – the time would be better 
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spent in pursuing IT or working toward acquiring IT.  In the back of a car, while hitchhiking, 
Dean finally has a chance to explain IT in detail to Sal: 
“Now, man, that alto man last night had IT – he held it once he found it; I’ve never seen a 
guy who could hold so long.” I wanted to know what ‘IT’ meant. “Ah well” – Dean 
laughed – “now you’re asking me impon-de-rables – ahem! Here’s a guy and 
everybody’s there, right? Up to him to put down what’s on everybody’s mind. He starts 
the first chorus, then lines up his ideas, people, yea, yea, but get it, and then he rises to his 
fate and has to blow equal to it. All of a sudden somewhere in the middle of the chorus he 
gets it – everybody looks up and knows; they listen; he picks it up and carries. Time 
stops. He’s filling empty space with the substance of our lives, confessions of his 
bellybottom straining, remembrance of ideas, rehashes of old blowing. He has to blow 
across bridges and come back and do it with such infinite feeling soul-exploratory for the 
tune of the moment that everybody knows it’s not the tune that counts but IT” – Dean 
could go no further; he was sweating telling about it.408
 
 
For Ben Giamo, IT represents a mixture of Christian and Buddhist beliefs about the cycle 
of life. Life in these two faiths is punctuated by fleeting moments of joy and sorrow. “The 
oscillation between ecstasy and suffering -- elation and rejection -- appears to be the maxim of 
the novel.”409 Giamo discusses IT as a moment where the pressure of regular temporal existence 
is relieved through transcendent awareness of the now.  “The only reprieve from the terminus of 
chronological time is a high-octane mixture of speed and desire embodied in IT. IT, a 
transcendent state of pure excitement, stops the felt experience of linear time screeching in its 
tracks.”410
My interpretation differs from Giamo’s as I read IT to be necessarily a temporary 
moment that provides a moment of recognition of contingency that allows for identification and 
consubstantiality. Here “IT” becomes the theory of kairos in the beat rhetoric. Dean describes a 
 Giamo’s understanding of IT is that it is a sought after state by the characters, a place 
that they want to occupy and live within. 
                                               
408 Keroauc, On the Road, 207-8. 
409 Ben Giamo, Kerouac the Word and the Way: Prose Artist as Spiritual Quester (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 19. 
410 Giamo, Kerouac, 29. 
 196 
scene of jazz improvisation where the musician, much like a rhetorician, approaches his or her 
audience with the familiar and then develops it based on what people “get.” But after a 
successful moment of identification in his jazz rhetoric, the musician must rise beyond that 
moment in order to bring the audience the substance of their lives. This leads to a moment where 
time stops, and the unification of the audience, moment and musician is complete and universal. 
The connection is merely temporary, and can only be reached and comes from a very personal 
place - the musician “blows” from the depths of his body and the substance of his old memories 
and experiences.  This “tune of the moment” has to end, and as suddenly as we see a glimmer of 
what IT can be, Dean stops speaking. He appears to be overcome with emotion, and unable to 
continue his description - almost as if he hit and then lost the moment of unity that he was 
describing. Dean not only describes a kairotic moment in jazz, but then performs one in speech, 
physically drained from the intensity. Kerouac too performs a beat kairotic moment textually, 
choosing to keep the full expression of IT from us verbally by limiting Dean’s description. IT 
becomes somewhat clear, but remains murky due to what IT is - the contingent moment, 
expressible only then and with fitting words. 
   Kairos is fleeting, momentary and bound by time, but even so it feels like a moment of 
cosmic connection to Dean where everything becomes one.   Sal gets caught up in the pursuit of 
IT as well: “Then I began talking, I never talked so much in all my life. . . We were telling these 
things and both sweating. We had completely forgotten the people up front who had begun to 
wonder what was going on in the back seat.”411
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 Hitchhiking, they become caught up in the 
moment of conversation and physically it drains them —  they are laboring together to maintain 
the momentary connection they have reached. 
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One of the most rhetorically stunning and strange moments of On the Road celebrates 
kairos in an unusual way.  Instead of simply seeing it as the recognition by a rhetor of a unique 
opportunity, this moment celebrates kairos as a way of recognizing the contingent nature of 
reality as a commonplace among all human beings: 
I walked around picking butts from the street. I passed a fish-‘n-chips joint on Market 
Street, and suddenly the woman in there gave me a terrified look as I passed; she was the 
proprietress, she apparently thought I was coming in there with a gun to hold up the joint. 
I walked on a few feet.  It suddenly occurred to me this was my mother of about two 
hundred years ago in England, and that I was her footpad son, returning from gaol to 
haunt her honest labors in the hashery.  I stopped, frozen with ecstasy on the sidewalk. I 
looked down Market Street. I didn’t know whether it was that or Canal Street in New 
Orleans: it led to water, ambiguous, universal water, just as 42nd Street, New York, leads 
to water, and you never know where you are. . . And for just a moment I had reached the 
point of ecstasy that I always wanted to reach, which was the complete step across 
chronological time into timeless shadows, and wonderment in the bleakness of the mortal 
realm, and the sensation of death kicking at my heels to move on, with a phantom 
dogging its own heels, and myself hurrying to a plank where all the angels dove off and 
flew into the holy void of uncreated emptiness, the potent and inconceivable radiances 
shining in bright Mind Essence, innumerable lotus-lands falling open in the magic 
mothswarm of heaven.412
 
 
This passage moves from a very specific, time-bound, narrated encounter from the perspective of 
Sal to a disembodied, universal experience out of knowable time and space.  Giamo reads this 
scene as “another form of ecstasy, an enlightened sense of IT, one that, though not a controlling 
principle in the novel, works momentarily to suggest what is missing from the first definition, 
that is, the ‘ragged and ecstatic joy of pure being.’”413
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  Giamo’s limitation of IT as a state or 
feeling misses the rich moment of invented connection Sal has for the stranger in the shop. IT 
seen as kairos allows for the interpretation of the scene as exploring the possibilities of 
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consubstantiality if one is aware and willing to recognize fleeting moments of meaning within 
the contingencies of daily life. 
Sal’s recognition that the woman in the shop could be his mother from the past opens an 
opportunity for him to recognize that all streets are the same, then all water, and finally, all time 
and existence.  He recognizes the power of recognition to shape beliefs about relationships, 
status and being in the world, and he identifies it as the moment holding us back from 
communion with each other. The angelic visions of unity at the end of the passage indicate, for 
Sal, the transcendence is necessarily temporary, but that is what makes the moment important, 
and pushes him ahead on his journey in the book. 
Of course this is only one part of the potential rhetorical theory offered in On the Road.  
And like all the other rhetorical styles that Kerouac displays for Sal, Dean’s multivariate rhetoric 
of IT has flaws as well.  Dean is called to account for his rhetoric near the end of the novel by the 
women who were his friends, or in relationships with his friends due to his lack of responsibility: 
“I think Marylou was very, very wise leaving you, Dean,” said Galatea. “For years now 
you haven’t had any sense of responsibility for anyone. You’ve done so many awful 
things I don’t know what to say to you.” 
And in fact that was the point, and they all sat around looking at Dean with lowered and 
hating eyes, and he stood on the carpet in the middle of them and giggled – he just 
giggled. He made a little dance. His bandage was getting dirtier all the time; it began to 
flop and unroll. I suddenly realized that Dean, by virtue of his enormous series of sins, 
was becoming the Idiot, the Imbecile, the Saint of the lot. 
“You have absolutely no regard for anybody but yourself and your damned kicks. All you 
think about is what’s hanging between your legs and how much money or fun you can get 
out of people and then you just throw them aside. Not only that but you’re silly about it. 
It never occurs to you that life is serious and there are people trying to make something 
decent out of it instead of just goofing all the time.” That’s what Dean was, the HOLY 
GOOF.414
 
 
                                               
414 Kerouac, On the Road, 194. 
 199 
In this, one of the most famous passages in the book, Sal realizes that the reason he 
cannot understand his friend sometimes is because Dean is a saint. Sal categorizes him this way 
not just to praise him, as is the obvious interpretation, but more to account for the failure of his, 
up to this point, fairly effective rhetorical frame. Dean always had women, friends, and “kicks,” 
but was now on trial with a jury of those very people he used to persuade, Sal interprets the scene 
as one of misunderstanding between the terrestrial jury and the holy defendant: 
There were earlier days in Denver when Dean had everybody sit in the dark with the girls 
and just talked, and talked, and talked, with a voice that was once hypnotic and strange 
and was said to make the girls come across by sheer force of persuasion and the content 
of what he said. This was when he was fifteen, sixteen. Now his disciples were married 
and the wives of his disciples had him on the carpet for the sexuality and the life he had 
helped bring into being.415
 
 
We are far removed from a novel that suggests “anything goes,” and wild parties are the way to 
live your life.  Here we are confronted with the unanticipated results of effective rhetoric, and the 
material consequences of persuasion.  Dean’s rhetoric of American kairos cannot persuade 
everyone to overcome the chronos of American society.  He is rejected by the very people who 
used to praise him, except for Sal who dutifully records the incident for the reader. 
Occasionally Dean tries to drop his rhetorical view in favor of blending into the dominant 
rhetorical discourses of American life, but fails miserably.  It is at these moments that Sal 
becomes frustrated with Dean and wants nothing to do with him. Here’s an example from life in 
San Francisco where Dean, Sal and Dean’s girlfriend are living together: 
Dean did the most ridiculous thing of his career the few days I was there. He got a job 
demonstrating a new kind of pressure cooker in the kitchens of homes. The salesman 
gave him piles of samples and pamphlets. The first day Dean was a hurricane of energy. I 
drove all over town with him as he made appointments.  The idea was to get invited 
socially to a dinner party and then leap up and start demonstrating the pressure cooker. . . 
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‘Keep it up, Dean,’ I said. ‘Maybe someday you’ll be mayor of San Francisco.’ He had 
the whole cookpot spiel worked out; he practiced on Camille and me in the evenings.416
 
 
An overtly rhetorical and persuasive moment in the book is termed “ridiculous” by Sal, due to 
the fact that Dean is entering the dominant discursive modes of persuasion for consumerist 
purposes.  Sal even makes fun of Dean in an ironic way, praising him and indicating that one day 
he could be Mayor, a position that would be more like a prison sentence for the rhetor of the 
kairotic.  
 Dean’s rhetoric is not the only one offered in the novel; Kerouac has Sal encounter many 
different rhetorical frames in America. Sal tries many of them on, and compares them to the 
rhetoric Dean offers. Examination of some other rhetorical options drives Sal toward and away 
from Dean. 
Kerouac advocates for his rhetoric by comparing Dean and Sal not only against each 
other, but against other potential rhetorical frames.  One significant example is during the portion 
of the book where Sal lives with Terry, a Mexican woman who is a migrant worker.  After 
meeting her in a bus station, he travels with her to meet her family where he believes that he will 
be able to find work: 
Rickey had a bottle. “Today we drink, tomorrow we work, Dah you go, man – take a 
shot!” Terry sat in back with her baby; I looked back at her and saw the flush of 
homecoming joy on her face.  The beautiful green countryside of October in California 
reeled by madly.  I was guts and juice again and ready to go. 
“Where do we go now, man?” 
“We go find a farmer with some manure laying around. Tomorrow we drive back in the 
truck and pick it up.  Man, we’ll make a lot of money. Don’t worry about nothing.” 
“We’re all in this together!” yelled Ponzo.  I saw that was so – everywhere I went, 
everybody was in it together.  We raced through the crazy streets of Fresno and on up the 
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valley to some farmers in back roads.  Ponzo got out of the car and conducted confused 
conversations with old Mexican farmers; nothing, of course, came of it.417
 
 
Sal notices that everyone is “in it together” but at the same time points out he realized that the 
work would not materialize – “of course” nothing came of it.  The approach of relaxing, drinking 
and enjoying the day is fantastic in Sal’s view for making people consubstantial.  The problem is 
the division from the ability to make ends meet.418
The consubstantiality of the migrants with the rest of America is also evident to Sal, as he 
spends a Sunday with Terry, her brother, and his friend.  Again, in this example, Sal points out 
the near perfect identification, but also understands the serious implications of a rhetoric that 
ignores the recalcitrance of material conditions: 
 
“What we need is a drink!” yelled Rickey, and off we went to a crossroads saloon.  
Americans are always drinking in crossroads saloons on Sunday afternoon; they bring 
their kids; they gabble and brawl over brews; everything’s fine.  Come nightfall the kids 
start crying and the parents are drunk.  They go weaving back to the house.  Everywhere 
in America I’ve been in crossroads saloons drinking with whole families.  The kids eat 
popcorn and chips and play in back.  This we did.  Rickey and I and Ponzo and Terry sat 
drinking and shouting with the music; little baby Johnny goofed with other children 
around the jukebox.  The sun began to get red.  Nothing had been accomplished.  What 
was there to accomplish? “Manana, man, we make it; have another beer, man, dah you 
go, dah you go!”419
 
 
Sal begins to be persuaded by this approach to American life as he wonders what exactly does 
need to be accomplished in the course of a day. Furthermore, Sal’s own experience indicates this 
trip to the bar reminds him of very American practices that he has witnessed all over the U.S.  At 
the same time, Sal experiences division from the pressing need to work, to produce, to 
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accomplish things in the day.  Sal is further persuaded by this perspective through his 
relationship with Terry: 
Guitars tinkled.  Terry and I gazed at the stars together and kissed. “Manana,” she said. 
“Everything will be all right tomorrow, don’t you think, Sal-honey, man?” 
“Sure, baby, manana.” It was always manana. For the next week that was all I heard – 
manana, a lovely word and one that probably means heaven.420
 
 
Sal’s ignorance of the meaning of the Spanish word for tomorrow allows the reader some 
amusement due to the ironic twist of the distance of this rhetorical approach from the more 
familiar anxiety that one might be “wasting time.”  Of course, in a way tomorrow is heaven, a 
place without consequences and without problems, for it never takes place. The rhetoric of 
Terry’s brothers is a nice and comfortable way of living a life of infinitely deferred 
responsibility.  Sal enjoys it, but then the fall comes, and the limits of this rhetoric are exposed.  
Unfortunately for Sal, he begins to notice the change in the temperature and realize that there is 
nothing but starvation in his future unless some work can be found.   
The experience that Sal has with Terry is ignored in much analysis of On the Road. 
Swartz doesn’t mention it in his study, and most skim past it. It is easy to avoid analysis on 
something that seems like a pause in the action of the book, a waiting period between trips.  
However, this supposed interlude serves as important contrast between various rhetorical 
approaches.  Terry and her family have the attitude and approach to life that is, as Sal proves, 
American. How does it measure up? Unfortunately, even stability of family and celebration of 
such cannot avoid the need to eat and work.  Additionally, Kerouac uses the strained relationship 
between Sal, a white man, and Terry, a Mexican woman, to highlight the difficulties of 
communication across cultural boundaries: 
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We drove to Terry’s family’s shack.  It was situated on the old road that ran between the 
vineyards.  It was dark when we got there.  They left me off a quarter-mile away and 
drove to the door.  Light poured out of the door; Terry’s six other brothers were playing 
their guitars and singing. The old man was drinking wine. I heard shouts and arguments 
above the singing.  They called her a whore because she’d left her no-good husband and 
gone to LA and left Johnny with them.  The old man was yelling. But the sad, fat brown 
mother prevailed, as she always does among the great fellahin peoples of the world, and 
Terry was allowed to come back home. The brothers began to sing gay songs, fast. I 
huddled in the cold, rainy wind and watched everything across the sad vineyards of 
October in the valley. My mind was filled with that great song ‘Lover Man’ as Billie 
Holiday sings it; I had my own concert in the bushes.421
 
 
Sal finds solace in singing to himself a traditional jazz song in an African-American style while 
he experiences the segregation and exclusion that most minorities experienced in 1950s America. 
As Terry’s family seeks to understand why she abandoned her familial duties and involved 
herself with a white man, Sal provides his own interpretation as to what happened through the 
lens of Spengler’s Decline of the West – a very influential book for Kerouac.  As Robert Holton 
argues: 
Adapting the term fellahin from Spengler, Kerouac employs it very generally to designate 
all those peoples-in North America and throughout the world-who appeared to him to be 
culturally situated outside the structures and categories, the desires and frustrations, of 
modernity. Whatever their own problems, problems of which he seems for the most part 
unaware, Kerouac's fellahin appeared to exist in a more authentic, more real and vital 
space beyond the confines of a consumer culture.422
 
 
It seems at least to Sal that the mother wins the approval of the family in accepting Terry into the 
family because of her connection to a more authentic mode of being. However, what is clear is 
that they have not accepted Sal, as they begin a celebration with happy songs, and Sal is left on 
his own, singing his own song in his head. The fellahin have a more authentic access to 
communication, but even that access cannot bridge certain divides. Sal is left out of their 
                                               
421 Kerouac, On the Road, 98. 
422 Robert Holton, "Kerouac among the Fellahin: On the Road to the Postmodern," Modern 
Fiction Studies 41, no. 2 (1995): 266-7. 
 204 
experience, and, as Holton notes, Kerouac is left at a distance from the authentic communication 
that he really desires: “Rather than offering a renewed sense of the authentic reality, this 
fascination with the fellahin tends instead to obscure in nostalgia and cliché the real historical 
conditions of their lives.”423
Holton’s critique is applicable if we buy that Sal is Kerouac and that Kerouac, as a writer, 
has no rhetorical savvy. He just simply transplants his perspective into the novel, and this 
perspective is over simplistic in its engagement with others. Assuming this, why did Kerouac 
write fiction instead of journalism? By placing them in the frame of fiction, Kerouac can expose 
for the reader what’s really at stake in authentic experience – the way that experience is 
communicated.  Sal, often times, changes his mind, gets confused, and misunderstands while 
being misunderstood by the other characters.  Such complexity seems to indicate that Holton’s 
critique fails to take into account the dissonance between character attitudes and Kerouac’s 
attitude.  I believe a more useful understanding of Kerouac’s work can be found if we distance 
the man’s attitude from the attention to attitude he conveys to us through his works. 
 Kerouac’s use of Spengler allows him to pick up their rhetoric and 
deploy it for his own comfort, without any critical reflection of his own position of privilege and 
power in society. Once accessed, their culture is for him to use. 
I have two examples to back up my claim.  The first is when Sal naively thinks to 
himself, in a moment of loneliness, that things would be better off for him if he were an African-
American: 
At lilac evening I walked with every muscle aching among the lights of 27th and Welton 
in the Denver colored section, wishing I were a Negro, feeling that the best the white 
world had offered was not enough ecstasy for me, not enough life, joy, kicks, darkness, 
music, not enough night. I stopped at a little shack where a man sold hot red chili in paper 
containers; I bought some and ate it, strolling in the dark mysterious streets. I wished I 
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were a Denver Mexican, or even a poor overworked Jap, anything but what I was so 
drearily, a ‘white man’ disillusioned. All my life I’d had white ambitions; that was why 
I’d abandoned a good woman like Terry in the San Joaquin Valley. I passed the dark 
porches of Mexican and Negro homes; soft voices were there, occasionally the dusky 
knee of some mysterious sensual gal; and dark faces of the men behind rose arbors. Little 
children sat like sages in ancient rocking chairs. A gang of colored women came by, and 
one of the young ones detached herself form motherlike elders and came to me fast – 
“Hello Joe!” – and suddenly saw it wasn’t Joe, and ran back, blushing. I wished I were 
Joe. I was only myself, Sal Paradise, sad, strolling in this violet dark, this unbearably 
sweet night, wishing I could exchange worlds with the happy, true-hearted, ecstatic 
Negroes of America.424
 
 
At first glance this seems simple desire for the eroticized other.  Sal believes things would be 
much better for him if he didn’t follow “white ambition” anymore, and therefore connect with 
people who really understand what it is like to be happy. Examining it closer, Sal could also be 
seen pining for rhetorical stability.  Instead of a simple correspondence with racial attributes, the 
focus is on the social – “ambition” is the culprit here.  Sal attributes his failure and 
disappointment to following white ambition – and feels a life apart from white ambition would 
be better.  The young woman who runs up to him, mistaking him for Joe, is not necessarily 
black, but Sal wishes he was Joe – someone who had exchanged ambition.  Sal wishes to 
transplant the motives of whiteness with another set of motives. This scene is an example of 
Sal’s naive perspective and perhaps Kerouac is again letting Sal drive the story in order to prove 
a point. Kerouac’s wink might be that Sal is still hopeful to gain some way of finding his 
identity, or a mode of identification. He wants to identify with the happy “colored women” but 
lacks the means. Sal has not had the full experience of Dean’s kairotic perspective yet. 
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To further demonstrate this complex assessment of Kerouac, there is a fascinating 
passage where Sal and Terry walk among the citizens of Los Angeles, and Sal offers his 
assessment of the people: 
South Main Street [LA], where Terry and I took strolls with her dogs, was a fantastic 
carnival of lights and wildness.  Booted cops frisked people on practically every corner.  
The beatest characters in the country swarmed on the sidewalks – all of it under those soft 
Southern California stars that are lost in the brow halo of the huge desert encampment 
LA really is.  You could smell tea, weed, I mean marijuana, floating in the air, together 
with the chili beans and beer.  That grand wild sound of bop floated from beer parlors; it 
mixed medleys with every kind of cowboy and boogie-woogie in the American night.  
Everybody looked like Hassel.  Wild Negroes with bop caps and goatees came laughing 
by; then long-haired brokendown hipsters straight off route 66 from New York; then old 
desert rats, carrying packs and heading for a park bench at the Plaza; then Methodist 
ministers with raveled sleeves, and an occasional Nature Boy saint in beard and sandals.  
I wanted to meet them all, talk to everybody, but Terry and I were too busy trying to get a 
buck together.425
 
   
Sal’s desire to commune, to know each of these characters contrasts with his fast and loose 
assessments of the motives and attitudes of every type of person they saw.  Of course, Sal points 
out that real friendship and knowing is impossible, because the material demands of money and 
survival interfere.  There is no possibility of a pure communication, fantasized of by Sal (and 
many of the readers in 1950s America) as a pure knowing of the authentic person behind the 
initial encounter. Everyone looks like “Hassel,” a friend, but they also are “brokendown” and 
“rats” – a mixture, just like the music that mixes melodies along with the odors of intoxicants 
and food.  It is perfect in its overwhelming mix of stimuli and types of different people, as well 
as the unseen demands for material resources.  Sal is struggling to find what motivates them, and 
his solution, aside from being able to commune with them, is to find an adequate way to express 
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his desire for communication – a detailed, momentary sketching of the people he encounters. He 
does not commune with them, and finds himself distant and unreachable due to fiscal concerns.  
Another rhetorical frame that Sal ends up rejecting is the rhetorical perspective of Old 
Bull Lee, a friend of both Dean and Sal who lives in New Orleans.  Old Bull Lee is introduced to 
the readers by Sal as they drive to meet him at his house: 
Bull had a sentimental streak about the old days in America especially 1910, when you 
could get morphine in a drugstore without prescription and Chinese smoked opium in 
their evening windows and the country was wild and brawling and free, with abundance 
and any kind of freedom for everyone. His chief hate was Washington bureaucracy; 
second to that, liberals; then cops.  He spent all his time talking and teaching others.  Jane 
sat at his feet; so did I; so did Dean; and so had Carlo Marx.  We’d all learned from him. 
He was a gray, nondescript-looking fellow you wouldn’t notice on the street, unless you 
looked closer and saw his mad, bony skull with its strange youthfulness – a Kansas 
minister with exotic, phenomenal fires and mysteries.  He had studied medicine in 
Vienna; had studied anthropology, read everything; and now he was settling to his life’s 
work, which was the study of things themselves in the streets of life and the night.426
 
 
Bull is presented as a throwback, someone who has great nostalgia for the America of 
old.  Bull is also a teacher, and a talker – someone who has a persuasive goal, or at least a desire 
to make sure that others see America from his point of view.  Sal says everyone has learned from 
him in the past.   Bull can be seen as a mysterious character, a scholar of American ways of 
being, and that is how Kerouac will contrast Bull to Dean – the mysterious and the mystic 
rhetorics will be contrasted.  Old Bull Lee represents a nostalgic discourse, or a rhetoric that 
attempts to “see beyond” the problems of the contemporary by wishing for a return of the “good 
old days.”  This rhetoric will be tested against Dean’s vision of constant movement toward the 
next opportunity – the kairotic versus the chronic. 
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Sal’s first observations are about the geography of the place Bull lives, with emphasis on 
how different familiar sights appear: “And here for the first time in my life I saw my beloved 
Mississippi River, dry in the summer haze, low water, with its big rank smell that smells like the 
raw body of America itself because it washes it up.”427
Dean and I were yelling about a big night in New Orleans and wanted Bill to show us 
around. He threw a damper on this. “New Orleans is a very dull town.  It’s against the 
law to go to the colored section. The bars are insufferably dreary.” 
  Here we are going to be exposed to a 
raw, almost unsanitary “washing up” of what America is in the presence of Old Bull Lee. Almost 
immediately, Dean and Sal find themselves in conflict with Bull’s perspective on the 
appropriate: 
I said, “There must be some ideal bars in town.” 
“The ideal bar doesn’t exist in America. And ideal bar is something that’s gone beyond 
our ken.  In nineteen ten a bar was a place where men went to meet during or after work, 
and all there was a long counter, brass rails, spittoons, player piano for music, a few 
mirrors, and barrels of whiskey at ten cents a shot together with barrels of beer at five 
cents a mug. Now all you get is chromium, drunken women, fags, hostile bartenders, 
anxious owners who hover around the door, worried about their leather seats and the law; 
just a lot of screaming at the wrong time and deadly silence when a stranger walks in.” 
We argued about bars. “All right,” he said, “I’ll take you to New Orleans tonight and 
show you what I mean.” And he deliberately took us to the dullest bars.428
 
 
Sal suspects foul play on the part of Old Bull Lee, who is apparently stacking the deck and 
making sure that he proves his point to Dean.  Sal can’t accept that things might be the way Old 
Bull Lee describes them, or perhaps Sal is not convinced by Bull’s position on the lapse of the 
ideal bar.  Either way, it is a fascinating contrast between Bull’s rhetoric – that America’s ideal 
moment has passed (even in the excess of the perfect bar) and Dean’s rhetoric, that America 
exists in the seizing of the momentary opportunities for human communion.  Bull feels the 
scenes or locales for such interaction no longer exist; Dean feels that these can be created. 
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Bull hopes through his words and actions to almost suspend chronos.  This also contrasts 
with Dean, who realizes that chronos cannot be suspended, but instead must be accounted for.  
That is to say, chronological time will always haunt you, so you’d better make good use of the 
present moment.  As an example of this, examine Bull talking to Sal about his wish to suspend 
the advancement of time.  In this scene, Bull has found some wood that he believes to be sturdy 
enough to allow for the transcendence of aging and decay: 
“When I get these nails out of this I’m going to build me a shelf that’ll last a thousand 
years!” said Bull, every bone shuddering with boyish excitement. “Why, Sal, do you 
realize the shelves they build these days crack under the weight of knick-knacks after six 
months or generally collapse? Same with houses, same with clothes. These bastards have 
invented plastics by which they could make houses that last forever. And tires. 
Americans are killing themselves by the millions every year with defective rubber tires 
that get hot on the road and blow up. They could make tires that never blow up. Same 
with tooth powder. There’s a certain gum they’ve invented and they won’t show it to 
anybody that if you chew it as a kid you’ll never get a cavity for the rest of your born 
days. Same with clothes. They can make clothes that last forever. They prefer making 
cheap goods so’s everybody’ll have to go on working and punching timeclocks and 
organizing themselves in sullen unions and floundering around while the big grab goes 
on in Washington and Moscow.” He raised his big piece of rotten wood. “Don’t you 
think this’ll make a splendid shelf?” 
It was early in the morning; his energy was at its peak. The fellow took so much junk into 
his system he could only weather the greater proportion of his day in that chair with the 
lamp burning at noon, but in the morning he was magnificent.429
 
 
Here Sal praises the magnificence of Bull’s rhetoric – how great it sounds in the morning at the 
start of the day.  Sal also, again, ironically critiques Bull’s rhetoric by indicating that Bull is 
holding up “rotten” wood and discoursing about its permanence and ability to pass a thousand 
years as a bookshelf.  Bull’s listing of all the perfect products that have been made and shelved 
for profit is an obvious critique of capitalism through the notion of “planned obsolescence,” an 
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idea rooted in the rhetoric of conspiracy theory as well as business conspiracy sense.430
Sal takes a moment during the stay at Bull’s house to try to communicate with the 
Mississippi river one night: 
  Bull 
feels that decay and corruption by the march of time has already been overcome by science, yet 
capitalism forces people to continue to toil their lives away.  Sal undercuts the brilliance of his 
analysis by limiting it only to the start of the day – this rhetoric ingests so much heroin by 
afternoon that it no longer has persuasive force.  Indeed, in order to keep sane under the constant 
march of unstoppable chronos, Bull must drug himself to make it through the rest of the day.  
The raw body of American nostalgia is washing up at the mouth of the Mississippi river. 
Doors kept opening around the crooked porch, and members of our sad drama in the 
American night kept popping out to find out where everybody was.  Finally I took a walk 
alone to the levee. I wanted to sit on the muddy bank and dig the Mississippi River; 
instead of that I had to look at it with my nose against a wire fence. When you start 
separating the people from their rivers what have you got? ‘Bureaucracy!’ says Old Bull; 
he sits with Kafka on his lap, the lamp burns above him, he snuffs, thfump. His old house 
creaks. And the Montana log rolls by in the big black river of the night. ‘Tain’t nothing 
but bureaucracy. And unions! Especially unions!’ But dark laughter would come again.431
 
 
As if an embodiment of evidence for Bull’s position, a fence separates Sal from communing with 
the river, the same river that “washes up” the entire body of America.  Split by material 
restrictions from direct communication with the raw body of America, Sal is frustrated.  His 
mind immediately goes to Bull’s rhetoric to help him account for and frame what he considers to 
be an abomination – the separation of Americans from the most American river, or 
metaphorically, the separation of Americans from the American flow of bodies, ideas and of 
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course, communion with one another.  Bull blames a generalized bureaucracy and unions, 
apparently, for the fence that separates communication between the body of America and Sal 
(presumably the American body via synecdoche).  Bull’s accusation though is rhetorically 
unsound, as his house creaks and some interaction is happening (A log from Montana comes 
down the river during this fantasy).  Sal realizes the depressing nature of the accusation with no 
solution, so indicates that “dark laughter” will return soon. As to what this dark laugther might 
be, we are left wondering.  Perhaps the alternative mode of address in Bull’s rhetoric of America 
is just to laugh in the darkness as a type of either comfort or response to the ridiculousness of a 
system that puts fences around rivers. Alternatively, it could also be a sign of positive change, 
shrouded in unpredictability.  
However Bull’s views on communication and the rhetoric he develops in order to provide 
for effective communication has elements worth celebrating.  Sal and Bull decide to drive out to 
the racetrack to gamble on horses one afternoon, and Sal has a sense of what horse to bet on: 
We examined the Racing Form. I hadn’t played the horses in years and we bemused with 
all the new names. There was one horse called Big Pop that sent me into a temporary 
trance thinking of my father, who used to play the horses with me. I was just about to 
mention it to Old Bull when he said, “Well I think I’ll try this Ebony Corsair here.” 
Then I finally said it. “Big Pop reminds me of my father.” 
He mused for just a second, his clear blue eyes fixed on mine hypnotically so that I 
couldn’t tell what he was thinking or where he was. Then he went over and bet on Ebony 
Corsair. Big Pop won and paid fifty to one.  
“Damn!” said Bull. “I should have known better, I’ve had experience with this before. 
Oh, when will we ever learn?” 
“What do you mean?” 
“Big Pop is what I mean. You had a vision, boy, a vision. Only damn fools pay no 
attention to visions. How do you know your father, who was an old horseplayer, just 
didn’t momentarily communicate to you that Big Pop was going to win the race? The 
name brought the feeling up in you, he took advantage of the name to communicate.  
That’s what I was thinking about when you mentioned it. . .” [my ellipsis] “Ah, let’s go. 
This is the last time I’ll ever play the horses with you around; all these visions drive me 
to distraction.” In the car as we drove back to his old house he said, “Mankind will 
someday realize that we are actually in contact with the dead and with the other world, 
whatever it is; right now we could predict, if we only exerted enough mental will, what is 
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going to happen within the next hundred years and be able to take steps to avoid all kinds 
of catastrophes.  When a man dies he undergoes a mutation in his brain that we know 
nothing about now but which will be very clear someday if scientists get on the ball. The 
bastards right now are only interested in seeing if they can blow up the world.”432
 
 
Bull, like Sal and Dean, hopes for a world of pure communication between individuals at the 
spiritual level.  Bull views the importance of the communicative at a broader political level, 
involving over political institutions, such as nuclear scientists, into his exigence for the need to 
change the way we communicate.  For Bull, the stakes are the survival of future catastrophes 
which we can learn about by developing a communication with the dead.  As John Durham 
Peters notes, this is the dream of communication from its inception – to really capture what 
another person means, to commune with their soul. Sal’s thought that the horse reminds him of 
his father is seen as a communicative act from the spiritual world by Bull, complete with intent 
and meaning.  For him its evidence that communication goes beyond extant people and beyond 
lived lifetimes.  For Sal, it is an eerie moment where Bull’s rhetorical posture overlaps with 
Dean’s – Bull feels he lost “the moment” where Sal’s father “took advantage” of a similar name 
to communicate a belief to him.   
The visit must end at some point, and while leaving Old Bull Lee and his wife at their 
house Sal is overwhelmed again by the swirling phenomena of existence:  “It was sad to see his 
tall figure receding in the dark as we drove away, just like the other figures in New York and 
New Orleans: they stand uncertainly underneath immense skies, and everything about them is 
drowned.  Where go? What do? What for? – sleep. But this foolish gang was bending onward.”433
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perceived by human beings.  As Sal leaves behind the rhetorical perspective of Bull, he feels 
adrift again, but somehow knowing that eventually moving forward would offer him the solution 
he seeks. The momentary panic of seeing the size and disconnected “drowning” of individual 
human lives makes Sal think the only result of all of this living is death, or “sleep.” But as fools, 
they continue on in an attempt to avert this inevitability.  What we end with is a sense of Sal’s 
partial dissatisfaction with these comparative frames, and he continues to go back to Dean and 
his sense of the kairotic. But Dean has some challenges ahead to his rhetorical perspective that 
do not stem from alternative rhetorics, but from technology. 
4.6 TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNĒ IN ROAD 
In addition to the comparative rhetorical frames that we find in On the Road, Kerouac has Sal 
comment on multiple technologies of memory and communication throughout the book. I argue 
Kerouac does this in order to forward his technē of immediacy in his rhetoric over the 
competitive technē of the 1950s.  Sal offers commentary on moments when he and Dean or 
others encounter technologies of communication and often Sal critiques them, sometimes 
implicitly. 
In Long Island, Dean shows Sal pictures of Camille and his baby, as well as other 
pictures of his loved ones on the other side of America: 
I realized these were all the snapshots which our children would look at someday with 
wonder, thinking their parents had lived smooth, well-ordered, stabilized-within-the-
photo lives and got up in the morning to walk proudly on the sidewalks of life, never 
dreaming the raggedy madness and riot of our actual lives, or actual night, the hell of it, 
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the senseless nightmare road.  All of it inside endless and beginningless emptiness. Pitiful 
forms of ignorance.434
 
 
Dean shows these pictures to Sal to communicate his love and caring for his family, but all Sal 
sees is disconnection, a failed communication without proper memory of the disorder, feeling, 
and loss of the experiences.  Omar Swartz reads this passage as Kerouac’s realization that his 
rhetorical vision, like any, “Pressed to their limits, the visions become abusive and ruinous and 
fall apart in the disparity between the ideal world of a seldom-maintained euphoria, on the one 
hand, and the constrictions of the larger social system on the other.”435
Susan Sontag argues, “To photograph is to confer importance. There is no subject that 
cannot be beautified; moreover, there is no way to suppress the tendency inherent in all 
photographs to accord value to their subjects.”
  I argue that Sal might feel 
that way, but Kerouac, having Sal react to these photographs, is indicating the limits of a 
particular type of communication technology.   
436
                                               
434 Kerouac, On the Road, 254. 
 It might be this automatic valuing without 
explanation, or more importantly, without a connected moment of importance that Kerouac’s 
critique of the photograph makes sense. Perhaps the photograph’s special ability to potentially 
obscure history from viewers is also part of the critique. Sal and Dean go to great lengths to have 
experience, and here are photographs that stand-in for such moments. The photograph’s techne, 
is one of the mark of pure equality and, like its medium, a flattening one.  “In the mansions of 
pre-democratic culture, someone who gets photographed is a celebrity. In the open fields of 
American experience as catalogued with passion by Whitman and sized up with a shrug by 
435 Omar Swartz, The View from on the Road: The Rhetorical Vision of Jack Kerouac 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 98. 
436 Susan Sontag On Photography (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 28. 
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Warhol, everybody is a celebrity. No moment is more important than any other moment; no 
person is more interesting than any other person.”437
Kerouac displays how his spontaneous writing can capture and offer experience in a 
superior form to the photograph. He does this through Sal’s realization that perhaps more than 
photographs will be needed to communicate effectively the meaning that Sal feels must be 
conveyed. “raggedy madness” cannot be conveyed through a photograph, but perhaps writing 
about it might.  The other consideration that lurks in Sal’s suspicion of the photos is that they are 
crafted in a way to leave something out – that the photographer manipulates the image by 
selecting (thereby deflecting) elements of the moment that might be vital to its meaning. “Even 
when photographers are most concerned with mirroring reality, they are still haunted by tacit 
imperatives of taste and conscience. . . In deciding how a picture should look in preferring one 
exposure to another, photographers are always imposing standards on their subjects.”
 Dean’s photographs could be shown to 
anyone, at any time, making them a perfect chronology, and making Sal a bit suspicious and 
depressed by their existence. 
438
There is a second example of photography in the book that Swartz passes over, but I feel 
is important to understanding On the Road’s importance not just as a novel that offers a 
rhetorical vision, but as a novel that makes an argument for an alternative rhetorical approach to 
 Sontag 
here points out that the photographer’s selection of a subject is not just a simple recording, but a 
manipulation of it to fit the idea of what they want the picture to look like in the end. Sal prefers 
writing without thought as it allows him to capture the moment in all its detail, and is suspicious 
of photographs that are planned, limited, and by virtue of technology, exclusionary.   
                                               
437 Sontag, On Photography, 28. 
438 Sontag, 6. 
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communication. Dean and Sal have just been kicked out of Camille’s apartment in San 
Francisco, and they stand on the street determining what to do next: 
Out of the tenement next to Camille’s house filed eleven Greek men and women who 
instantly lined themselves up on the sunny pavement while another backed up across the 
narrow street and smiled at them over a camera. We gaped at these ancient people who 
were having a wedding party for one of their daughters, probably the thousandth in an 
unbroken dark generation of smiling in the sun. They were well dressed, and they were 
strange. Dean and I might have been in Cyprus for all that. Gulls flew overhead in the 
sparkling air.439
 
 
In a moment of instability and insecurity, Sal and Dean witness an act of firm resolution and 
confidence in the future. Sal notes that these people are both “well dressed” yet “strange,” again 
letting the contradictions of identification/division invite readers to rhetoric. Images of the 
unbroken dark generation smiling under sunlight further the contradiction.  Dean and Sal are 
foreigners in their own country, unable to participate or even understand the point of 
photographing the event.  At once, the familiar is permeated with the unfamiliar. Familiar in the 
sense that the action is a common one, but unfamiliar to the way Dean and Sal approach the 
world, one without such connections to stability. The stability of the generation that remains dark 
and unbroken, even in sunlight, is solidified by the act of the photograph.  The photograph is 
necessarily incomplete; it cannot ever note the presence of Dean and Sal just outside the frame, 
gaping at unrecognizable stability in this performance of family. 
The moment of photography, however, also indicates the presence of a rival frame of 
understanding, that of Kerouac’s rhetoric.  Sal indicates all of these things about the photograph 
that the photograph cannot – he and Dean’s gape, the indeterminacy of geography (they might as 
well be in Greece, for nothing indicative of America is present in the image), the family’s 
                                               
439 Kerouac, On the Road, 190. 
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military precision of assembly for the photograph – all are conveyed through the “sketch” of 
spontaneous prose, and implicitly argued against: The prose captures that which the camera 
cannot, and therefore is a better technē of communication than the photo will be.  Experience 
drops out in the photograph but can be saved (and maybe savored) through the technē of writing. 
Kerouac doesn’t have a complete hatred for photography. This makes the argument in On 
the Road a bit ambivalent. In his introduction to Robert Frank’s book The Americans, Kerouac 
offers more insight into the role he feels photography can play: “That crazy feeling in America 
when the sun is hot on the streets and music comes out of the jukebox or from a nearby funeral, 
that’s what Robert Frank has captures in these tremendous photographs taken as he traveled on 
the road around practically forty-eight states in an old used care (on Guggenheim Fellowship) 
and with the agility, mystery, genius, sadness and strange secrecy of a shadow photographed 
scenes that have never been seen before on film.”440 Kerouac’s praise of Frank’s work is rooted 
in the spontaneity the photos suggest. To Kerouac, it appears that the photos were taken in secret, 
without any planning, orchestration, or set up. “What a poem this is, what poems can be written 
about this book of pictures some day by some young new writer high by candlelight bending 
over them describing every gray mysterious detail, the gray film that caught the actual pink juice 
of human kind. whether ‘t is the milk of humankind-ness, of human-kindness, Shakespeare 
meant, makes no difference when you look at these pictures. Better than a show.”441
                                               
440 Jack Kerouac, “Introduction to The Americans: Photographs by Robert Frank” in Good 
Blonde & Others Donald Allen, Ed. (San Francisco: Grey Fox Press, 1993), 19. 
 Here 
Kerouac indicates that the photos are starting points for poems, because they capture unedited 
moments of real life – the sort of experiences that Sal and Dean seek for their own rhetorical 
exigencies. 
441 Kerouac, “Introduction to The Americans,” 20-1. 
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How do we reconcile Kerouac’s positive view of Frank’s photos and the ambivalent, 
negative leaning reaction of Sal to the photographic moments of On the Road? Perhaps the 
resolution is in the idea of staged photos versus spontaneous photos. Of course, we can never 
know if Frank’s photos were completely unplanned shots or not. But the appearance of the 
photos as spontaneous is the reason that Kerouac likes them so much. Sal shows ambivalence to 
the photos because they are planned, or crafted in some way, and therefore the encounter with 
the photo is as flat as the image. Something is missing for Sal.  
Opposed to such technologies is the technē of writing. Not mentioned very much in On 
the Road, it is generally overlooked for the road trips, parties, and other moments of the book.  It 
is easy to forget that the reason Dean wants to befriend Sal and hang out with him is that Sal is a 
professional writer, and Dean wants to learn how to write from him: 
He came right out to Paterson, New Jersey, where I was living with my aunt, and one 
night while I was studying there was a knock on the door, and there was Dean, bowing, 
shuffling obsequiously in the dark of the hall, and saying, “Hel-lo, you remember me – 
Dean Moriarty? I’ve come to ask you to show me how to write.”442
 
 
Sal’s advice to Dean is to “stick to it with the energy of a benny addict,” because Dean, 
according to Sal’s early impressions, “didn’t know what he was talking about; that is to say, he 
was a young jailkid all hung-up on the possibilities of becoming a real intellectual, and he liked 
to talk in the tone and using the words, but in a jumbled way, that he had heard from ‘real 
intellectuals. . .’443
                                               
442 Kerouac, On the Road, 3. 
  Dean is obviously in need of some rhetorical training, a method of putting the 
words in the appropriate order – an order that would allow for identification with “intellectuals.” 
Sal points out that Dean’s supposed deficiency is not mental, but attitudinal: “he wasn’t so naïve 
443 Kerouac, On the Road, 3-4. 
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as that in all other things, and it took him just a few months with Carlo Marx to become 
completely in there with all the terms and jargon.”444
 The desire to learn to write might be considered as a desire for a technē in a world 
that disparages art for the superiority of technology: 
 Dean might want to learn how to write in 
order to expose and explore more kairotic moments in daily life.  That is, the writing, unlike the 
planned photograph, captures the moment and all of its kairotic opportunity in a superior 
manner. 
He watched over my shoulder as I wrote stories, yelling, “Yes! That’s right! Wow! 
Man!” and “Phew!” and wiped his face with his handkerchief. “Man, wow, there’s so 
many things to do, so many things to write! How to even begin to get it all down and 
without modified restraints and all hung-up on like literary inhibitions and grammatical 
fears. . .” 
“That’s right, man, now you’re talking.” And a kind of holy lightning I saw flashing from 
his excitement and his visions, which, he described so torrentially that people in buses 
looked around to see the ‘overexcited nut.’ In the West he’d spent a third of his time in 
the poolhall, a third in jail, and a third in the public library.445
 
 
In this passage, Dean admires Sal’s ability to write stories that push through convention, that 
manage to capture the momentary importance of the event without being bogged down with 
grammatical restraint. Likewise, Sal admires Dean’s dismissal of social norms in his torrential 
rhetoric in public which marks him in the eyes of others as crazy. Sal attributes this ability to 
Dean’s identity as a product of three American institutions: bars, prisons and libraries. These 
three institutions name Dean’s number as the perfectly imperfect American subject, crafted 
completely from public institutions. Dean is the subject who at once is exemplar and distinct 
from his own identity.  As the book develops we will see the full Burkean implications of Dean 
Moriarty as the ideal subject not, as has been said, to identify with, but instead to divide from and 
                                               
444 Kerouac, On the Road, 4. 
445 Kerouac, On the Road, 4-5. 
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in so doing, create a compulsory identification and eventually a consubstantial relationship with 
America. 
This appreciation for technē over technology in writing is important for this 
understanding. It extends beyond the admiration Dean has for Sal’s writing ability. Sal, after 
returning from a long trip out west with Dean returns to New York City during rush hour: 
Suddenly I found myself on Times Square. I had traveled eight thousand miles around the 
American continent and I was back on Times Square; and right in the middle of a rush 
hour, too, seeing with my innocent road-eyes the absolute madness and fantastic hoorair 
of New York with its millions and millions hustling forever for a buck among 
themselves, the mad dream – grabbing, taking, giving, sighing, dying, just so they could 
be buried in those awful cemetery cities beyond Long Island City. The high towers of the 
land – the other end of the land, the place where Paper America is born.446
 
  
Here Sal makes a distinction between the America he has just been traveling in and around, and 
“Paper America,” which, as a term, remains meaningfully vague.  It should be no surprise by 
now that Sal does not criticize or disparage New York City; he calls it fantastic and mad, both 
positive terms in his rhetoric. However, he does convey a certain sadness that the people of 
Times Square are rushing around just to be buried in awful cemeteries.  This is tempered with the 
realization that they are pursuing their own “mad dream.” There is a comparison of rhetorics 
here: One being the pursuit of “Paper America” – the chase for American Dollars, and the other 
being the Paper America of the written page, perhaps a reference to publication and its concern 
for profit, rather than the concern for writing and capturing the opportunities hidden in 
momentary experience. One is a conception of chronological time, the other of kairotic time. 
“Paper America” is clearly associated with a society obsessed with chronological time, but also 
                                               
446 Kerouac, On the Road, 107. 
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is ambivalent — it leaves a space open for identification and division, as such a complex text like 
New York City probably would. 
It has been argued that these pages demonstrate the “death tinge of stationary urban life,” 
which is inferior to the “frantic mad dream of Dean and the road – even as lonesome, tiring, and 
depressing as it could be. . .”447
As an example, I will analyze a few of the more direct exchanges surrounding the idea of 
kairos between Dean and Sal.  Sal’s last interactions with Dean in California prove to be 
instructive, as Dean has advanced to the status of “mystic” in Sal’s eyes: 
  What is left out is that Sal leave it somewhat open, seeing Times 
Square with “innocent road-eyes” provided him with a different perspective on life in the city. 
Instead of one being favored over another, Sal shows how stance plays into meaning, and 
different meanings are revealed through different experiences. Kerouac’s rhetorical approach 
here to contrasting the differences of being out on the road with the return home.  It indicates the 
rhetorical complexities of being the American subject.  It is not a simple comparison, as 
Henriksen argues, but an insight into the Burkean operations of identification/division, and how 
perspective, framing, and attitude can reverse a division into an identification, and the 
subsequent loss of consubstantiality with those who share in the divided-from perspective. As 
Burke argues, it is not possible to have perfect identification between human beings, and that is 
why we must depend upon rhetoric. This is why it is difficult to read Sal’s relationship with 
Dean as the book progresses — but easier to see the rhetorical theory of kairos offered. 
Furthermore, we know America, we’re at home; I can go anywhere in America and get 
what I want because it’s the same in every corner, I know the people, I know what they 
do. We give and take and go in the incredibly complicated sweetness zigzagging every 
side.’ There was nothing clear about the things he said, but what he meant to say was 
somehow made pure and clear. He used the word ‘pure’ a great deal. I had never dreamed 
                                               
447 Henriksen, Dr. Strangelove's America, 176-7. 
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Dean would become a mystic.  These were the first days of his mysticism, which would 
lead to the strange, ragged W.C. Fields saintliness of his later days. 448
 
 
This mysticism is ironically represented through Sal’s perspective, who freely admits that what 
Dean is saying doesn’t make a lot of sense, but it uses the words “pure” and “clear” frequently.  
This rhetorical wink indicates to us that Sal wants dean to be a mystic – “somehow” what Dean 
says is made understandable, but he’s not sure how. 
Dean’s advancement through Sal’s eyes can be read as Sal’s attempts to come to 
understand and accept Dean’s rhetoric. When they first become friends, Dean’s early rhetorical 
position is one that could serve as a representative anecdote of several alternative American 
discourses.  Here is an example that is rather lengthy, but also a good example of how Sal sees 
Dean as someone who is a rhetorical model: 
“All right now, children,” he said, rubbing his nose and bending down to feel the 
emergency and pulling cigarettes out of the compartment, and swaying back and forth as 
he did these things and drove. “The time has come for us to decide what we’re going to 
do for the next week.  Crucial, crucial. Ahem!” He dodged a mule wagon; in it sat an old 
Negro plodding along. “Yes!” yelled Dean. “Yes! Dig him! Now consider his soul – stop 
a while and consider.” And he slowed down the car for all of us to turn and look at the 
old jazzbo moaning along. “Oh yes, dig him sweet; now there’s thoughts in that mind that 
I would give my last arm to know; to climb in there and find out just what he’s poor-ass 
pondering about this year’s turnip greens and ham.  Sal, you don’t know it but I once 
lived with a farmer in Arkansas for a whole year, when I was eleven. I had awful chores, 
I had to skin a dead horse once.  Haven’t been to Arkansas since Christmas nineteen-
forty-three, five years ago, when Ben Gavin and I were chased by a man with a gun who 
owned the car we were trying to steal; I say all this to show you that of the South I can 
speak. I have known – I mean, man, I dig the South, I know it in and out – I’ve dug your 
letters to me about it. Oh yes, oh yes,” he said, trailing off and stopping altogether, and 
suddenly jumping the car back to seventy and hunching over the wheel. He stared 
doggedly ahead. Marylou was smiling serenely. This was the new and complete Dean, 
grown to maturity. I said to myself, My God, he’s changed.  Fury spat out of his eyes 
when he told of things he hated; great glows of joy replaced this when he suddenly got 
happy; every muscle twitched to live and go.449
                                               
448 Kerouac, On the Road, 121. 
 
449 Kerouac, On the Road, 113. 
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Dean has matured and is now capable of producing his own rhetoric, not merely copying the 
sounds of the “intellectuals” he associated with the first time they met in New York.  No longer 
willing to be purely mimetic, Dean now was able to articulate his own understandings of 
phenomena he encounters in the world instead of relying on the framework of those intellectual 
others. 
Sal’s admiration for Dean is neither pure nor constant throughout the book, and many 
moments with Dean are punctuated with tension injected from Sal’s perspective.  Here we see 
tension from Sal watching Dean interact with a jazz musician in a nightclub: 
Dean was in a trance. The tenorman’s eyes were fixed straight on him; he had a madman 
who not only understood but cared and wanted to understand more and much more then 
there was, and they began dueling for this; everything came out of the horn, no more 
phrases, just cries, cries, ‘Baugh’ and down to ‘Beep!’ and up to ‘EEEEE!’ and down to 
clinkers and over to sidewasy-echoing horn-sounds. He tried everything up, down, 
sideways upside down, horizontal, thirty degrees, forty degrees, and finally he fell back 
in somebody’s arms and gave up and everybody pushed around and yelled, “Yes! Yes! 
He blowed that one!” Dean wiped himself with his handkerchief.450
 
 
In this scene, we see Dean reduced through Sal’s eyes to almost pure essence.  Dean becomes a 
part of the jazz composition, moving around like the notes under the jazzman’s control.  Sal 
notes that phrases are reduced to cries – there is no longer a higher structure to the 
communication, we are now more in a moment of communion between the two figures. Dean, at 
his best, has bridged through his rhetorical practice the very limits surrounding communication, 
becoming one with his interlocutor on a primal level of noise. 
                                               
450 Kerouac, On the Road, 198-9. 
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Dean is often a chameleon, someone who is best described to us through Sal’s reference 
to popular culture.  Visiting Dean in California, Sal encourages him to take another road trip, and 
within moments Dean begins to transform in his preparations to journey with Sal: 
I heard Dean’s maniacal giggle across the house, together with the wails of his baby. The 
next thing I knew he was gliding around the house like Groucho Marx, with his broken 
thumb wrapped in a huge white bandage sticking up like a beacon that stands motionless 
above the frenzy of the waves. Once again I saw his pitiful huge battered trunk with 
socks and dirty underwear sticking out; he bent over it, throwing in everything he could 
find. Then he got his suitcase, the beatest suitcase in the USA. . . That thumb became the 
symbol of Dean’s final development. He no longer cared about anything (as before) but 
now he also cared about everything in principle; that is to say, it was all the same to him 
and he belonged to the world and there was nothing he could do about it.451
 
 
Dean had hurt his thumb before Sal arrived, and Sal uses the injured thumb, poorly bandaged, as 
a synecdoche for Dean as a rhetorical figure. The poor bandage job shows Dean’s usual lack of 
specific attention to detail, but that he cares in a broader sense of the term. Sal’s reference to 
Dean taking on the characteristics of Groucho Marx is a comic framing of Dean’s attitude, and 
one that helps us see his rhetorical positioning of himself toward the world.  Dean’s acceptance, 
in Sal’s mind, is that he is a part of the world, not apart or external from it or above it.  However, 
this is Sal’s vision of Dean’s final development, and the other characters (perhaps even readers) 
are not so easily persuaded that Dean is rhetorically savvy.  In defending himself and his desire 
to travel with Sal, leaving his girlfriend and new baby alone, the limits of his rhetorical form are 
exposed: 
Then a complete silence fell over everybody; where once Dean would have talked his 
way out, he now fell silent himself, but standing in front of everybody, ragged and broken 
and idiotic, right under the lightbulbs, his bony mad face covered with sweat and 
throbbing veins, saying, ‘Yes, yes, yes,’ as though tremendous revelations were pouring 
into him all the time now, and I am convinced they were, and the others suspected as 
much and were frightened. He was BEAT – the root, the soul of Beatific. What was he 
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knowing? He tried all in his power to tell me what he was knowing, and they envied that 
about me, my position at his side, defending him and drinking him in as they once tried to 
do.452
 
 
Sal frames this last confrontation with the San Francisco crowd as a moment of jealousy where 
only he can understand Dean’s great thoughts.  Again, Dean’s body is highlighted as the sign that 
deeper things are going on in his mind than we can understand.  But from a rhetorical point of 
view, the importance and greatness of this knowledge cannot be communicated. Sal suspects that 
the other people in the room recognize and understand that Dean is receiving superior spiritual 
knowledge.  However, all of Dean’s power is not enough to convey properly the realizations that 
he is having.  Sal classifying this moment as the “soul” of Beatific has a dual rhetorical purpose 
as well – it communicates to the reader that just reading about Beat and knowing about it is not 
enough; it is something that should be directly experienced.  Here Sal serves as Kerouac’s 
rhetorical vehicle for his initial motive for the book – to chronicle experiences and maintain the 
connection to the universe as a whole.  Leaving part of the rhetorical positioning of Beat 
mysterious might be a sign to the reader that description might not be enough to teach the 
perspective of Dean. 
As the book closes, Sal meets a girl and decides he wants to settle down with her, turning 
down Dean’s last offer for a final trip.  Dean has clearly reached the end of his rhetorical 
effectiveness, as Sal aptly demonstrates in this scene where Dean has shown up weeks before Sal 
was expecting him: 
As in a dream I saw him tiptoe in from the dark hall in his stocking feet.  He couldn’t talk 
anymore. He hopped and laughed, he stuttered and fluttered his hands and said, “Ah-ah-
you must listen to hear.” We listened, all ears. But he forgot what he wanted to say. 
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“Really listen-ahem. Look, dear Sal – sweet Laura – I’ve come – I’m gone – but wait – 
ah yes.” And he stared with rocky sorrow into his hands.453
 
 
Dean who once was able to explain eloquently everything to Sal now has trouble even finding 
the basic words with which to communicate with him.  Sal is beginning to move into a more 
normalized rhetoric, one of settling down with a partner and not constant travel as Dean would 
have it.  At the end of the book, Sal watches Dean walk away, “ragged in a motheaten overcoat 
he bought specifically for the freezing temperatures of the East, walked off alone, and the last I 
saw of him he rounded the corner of Seventh Avenue, eyes on the street ahead, and bent to it 
again.”454
However, the identification is not without division, as Sal points out when “the sun goes 
down and I set on the old broke-down river pier watching the long, long skies over New Jersey 
and sense all that raw land that rolls in one unbelievable huge bulge over to the West Coast, and 
all that road going, all the people dreaming in the immensity of it,” he keeps Dean in mind.  “I 
think of Dean Moriarty” is the last line of the book.  Sal may have stopped engaging in Dean’s 
rhetorical style, but he is conscious of it.  At the end of the book, Sal becomes the rhetorical 
model for the reader – keep Dean in mind when you try to make sense of America because it is 
so vast and immense you must have a frame in which to encounter it.  Sal is able to have a stable 
relationship and a stable life in New York due to his encounter and engagement with the variety 
  Sal remarks to his worried girlfriend Laura that Dean will “be all right,” a marked 
difference from Sal’s earlier attempts to follow and identify completely with Dean’s attitude.  
Now Sal places Dean via his own identification with the more normalized relationship he has 
developed without Dean. 
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of rhetorical approaches to America available.  In the end, he has to reject Dean’s style – or 
divide with it, in order to identify more fully with America on his own terms. 
In this chapter I have analyzed On the Road from the rhetorical perspective, arguing that 
it can be seen as a rhetorical guidebook to America for readers if seen as a site of competing 
discourses about how to be American.  In the next chapter I will further prove this position by 
examining Kerouac’s later defense of the Beat Generation, arguing that Beat is not a state but a 
practice, and best understood as a rhetorical practice. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that Jack Kerouac was deeply concerned with questions about 
human communication. Like Kenneth Burke, Kerouac felt modern rhetoric inadequate to the task 
of accounting for and recognizing the human condition. On the Road can be seen as an implicit 
rhetorical theory, or a way of engaging in communication with other human beings.  In the novel 
an implicit rhetorical theory of kairos is explored, enacted in the seeking of opportunities for 
identification and division in momentary experiences that do not follow chronological time. This 
rhetorical theory helps individuals connect and become consubstantial in an environment that 
appeared contingent, hostile and confusing for many. 
Kerouac and Burke both felt that attribution of motives is central in the understanding of 
why people do what they do. Kerouac felt that exploring this question was central to the 
understanding of American life post-war.  In order to provide a new understanding, he gave 
readers a comprehensive rhetorical study of American motives and attitudes encapsulated in 
ways that people speak to each other about the world. 
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Kerouac’s novel On the Road seen as a collection of various rhetorical approaches makes 
sense in the climate of the 1950s anxiety about new technologies and fears.  Kerouac’s 
exploration of the various American rhetorical approaches to time becomes a sourcebook that 
readers could use to perform their own American sensibilities.  At the end, Kerouac concludes 
that being “beat” is a particular awareness of or for the moment, or in Burkean terms, the 
situation allows for the appropriate rhetorical response.  Attention to kairos, is key as well as 
understanding forged through explorations of style and dichotomy are also central to his 
rhetorical contribution. 
As John Durham Peters notes, “To live is to leave traces. To speak to another is to 
produce signs that are independent of one’s soul and are interpreted without one’s control.”455
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Kerouac’s attempts at defending the Beat rhetoric are indeed noble and his passion is profound. 
However, most readers have probably noticed that Kerouac’s view, for what is represented in On 
the Road can be read as naive. Peters is instructive in this regard, pointing out that whether or not 
one believes in the pre-communicative status of an individual or not, the utterance is always 
independent and should be interpreted as such. In the end, Kerouac’s difficulty is one inherent in 
the communicative situation to begin with – we cannot lay our souls bare for the other’s 
inspection. Kerouac was at the same time mystified and frustrated by this recalcitrant fact of 
existence.  In his novel, kairos serves as a tool that allows Dean and Sal to identify with others 
who would remain at a distance from them, seperate and unknowable. Kerouac could be seen as 
trying to “solve” what Peters posits not as problem, but as status. With the kairotic rhetoric 
offered by Dean, Kerouac implicitly suggests a rhetorical strategy that can help people 
apprehend and deal with this communicative distance. Like Sal at the end of the novel, we are 
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often left with the image of the interlocutor, still mystified as to who or what he or she really is – 
left only with traces, all we can do is ponder their authentic identity. 
Jack Kerouac relied on timing and opportunity to unite others he saw as needing 
unification and connection. Allen Ginsberg proposed a focus on the innate human state of 
embodiment as a resource for bringing distinct and different human beings together on the plane 
of meaning. In the next chapter, I investigate Ginsberg’s contribution to the beat rhetoric – the 
human body and its productive limits. 
 230 
5.0  ALLEN GINSBERG’S POETIC-RHETORIC OF EMBODIMENT 
In 1959, Allen Ginsberg wrote his opinion about poetry in the San Francisco Sunday Chronicle.  
The article was not solicited, but the editor felt that the work should be published due to 
Ginsberg’s ethos on the issue of proper poetry: “While we feel it is a curiosity piece rather than a 
profound social or literary criticism, it is nonetheless a revealing statement by the most 
publicized, and perhaps most talented, of the younger poets practicing under the avowedly ‘Beat’ 
banner.”  Ginsberg’s opinion carried significant rhetorical weight due to one poem still at the 
center of controversy in San Francisco and the United States – “In effect, it is another Howl from 
Ginsberg.”456
The debate in the paper over poetry was about authentic poets and inauthentic poets, 
much like the distinctions drawn by Thomas Parkinson that I discuss in the introduction.  
Whatever the context or supposed purpose of the debate, Ginsberg’s “second Howl” can help us 
to understand the first Howl – the poem published by City Lights Books that, in the words of one 
scholar, “played a small part in changing the world itself by collapsing cultural boundaries at the 
height of the Cold War and by encouraging cultural rebellion around the world – from San 
Francisco to Havana, New York to Mexico.”
 
457
                                               
456 Matt Theado, ed., The Beats: A Literary Reference (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2001), 255. 
  Two years previous to this publication, San 
 
457 Jonah Raskin, American Scream: Allen Ginsberg's Howl and the Making of the Beat 
Generation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), xx. 
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Francisco was the site of an obscenity trial against Howl, which Lawrence Ferlinghetti, the 
publisher, ended up winning.  The memory of the controversial event was not that old when 
Ginsberg’s argument appeared in the city newspaper.  But instead of taking one side or the other, 
Ginsberg offered a new position – that poetry’s authenticity comes from mass mediation, not in 
spite of it.  He begins his argument sweepingly, with a characterization of history:  
Recent history is the record of a vast conspiracy to impose one level of mechanical 
consciousness on mankind and exterminate all manifestations of that unique part of 
human sentience, identical in all men, which the individual shares with his Creator.  The 
suppression of contemplative individuality is nearly complete.458
 
   
This mechanical consciousness is the mass media, which through technology and pervasive 
scope are able to sever the more natural state of consciousness of human beings.  The mass 
media, for Ginsberg, distorts reality in an undetectable and universal manner. “The only 
immediate historical data that we can know and act on are those fed to our senses through 
systems of mass communication.  These media are exactly the places where the deepest and most 
personal sensitivities and confessions of reality are most prohibited, mocked, suppressed.”459
                                               
458 Theado, The Beats, 255. 
 For 
Ginsberg, reality is not accessible outside of mass communication. This is the only conduit to 
“immediate” history that is available due to mass media’s colonization of communication.  This 
pushing down, or elimination of natural or healthier means of communication and epistemic 
function can only spell disaster.  For without access to these realms of communication, the future 
looks grim.  For Ginsberg, the mass media of 1950s America is literally causing American 
identity to suffer from psychological pathology:  “Because systems of mass communication can 
 
459 Theado, The Beats, 255. 
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communicate only officially acceptable levels of reality, no one can know the extent of the secret 
unconscious life.  No one in America can know what will happen.  No one is in real control. 
America is having a nervous breakdown.”460
The nervous breakdown, for Ginsberg, is his growing sense that the technologies of mass 
communication and mass culture were presenting a post-war vision of America that was in 
conflict with daily lived experience. The inability of mass communication to fill the gap is where 
poetry can express its superiority as a discourse:  “Poetry is the record of individual insights into 
the secret soul of the individual, and, because all individuals are One in the eyes of their Creator, 
into the soul of the World. The world has a soul.”
 
461
Poetry as a “record of individual insights” has a distinct advantage in Ginsberg’s view.  
Poetry gives one access to the “soul of the world” – not a giant, metaphysical Truth we must all 
follow, but instead, the simple truth that human beings are all in the same place – we are all 
connected through this thing we have in common: insight. 
 The tension between the power of the 
individual and his or her importance and the connection to the divine universal is striking, but it 
indicates how central the individual body is for Ginsberg. The individual, although distinct and 
secret, forges a connection to the universal through this distinct status. Therefore, access to the 
individual soul is a matter of divine, universal connection. 
“Insight” is not well explained by Ginsberg.  His rhetoric indicates that everyone has 
insights, but not everyone can see that all people have insights – the soul of the world – and 
therefore, only small communities of individuals have made this realization: “San Francisco is 
one of the many places where a few individuals, Poets, have the luck and courage and fate to 
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glimpse something new through the crack in mass consciousness.”462
Those of the general populace whose individual perception is sufficiently weak to be 
formed by stereotypes of mass communication disapprove and deny the insight. The 
police and newspapers have moved in, mad movie manufacturers from Hollywood are at 
this moment preparing bestial stereotypes of the scene.
 His reference to what has 
been called the San Francisco renaissance clearly limits who can see through the mass media 
screen, but also locates this ability in their actions. They are poets, and this is why they have 
been able to crack through the mass consciousness.  These individuals are lucky, but they are 
also threatened by those who do not have full insight:  
463
 
 
Ginsberg’s argument is that the system has a nuanced and multivariate way of shutting down the 
insights provided by poetry.  Not only does it stop these insights by force with the police, but the 
newspapers are a part of the police.  This combination is a strange one, but rhetorically clever. 
Associating the police and the newspapers in the same breath forces the readers to think of how 
newspapers and police could be identified, at least as far as their interests are the same – shutting 
down a revelation that indicts both the traditional forms of mass mediation and the larger 
governmental structure that endorses those forms.  Those who cannot share in the insight will 
dismiss it, having been brainwashed by the mass mediated environment.  And the film directors 
have come in to “manufacture” (as opposed to create) films that will be used to further that 
deception.  These are not the artists; they are the creators of “bestial” texts that “stereotype.”  
Although his immediate focus is to call attention to the San Francisco poets’ uniqueness, 
hopefully sparing their work from media corruption, I generalize here in order to call attention to 
the implicit theory Ginsberg offers of mass media, poetry and rhetoric. He paints a society in 
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deep conspiracy that has a circumference as wide as the broadcast strength of any TV tower, and 
is as intimate as a conversation. Yet, poets are the ones who have the potential to uncover this 
conspiracy, no matter the breadth of its power. 
What is the result of being one of the people who is experiencing these deep 
communications with the soul of the Earth?  
The poets and those who share their activities, or exhibit some sign of dress, hair or 
demeanor of understanding, or hipness, are ridiculed. Those of us who have used certain 
benevolent drugs (marijuana) to alter our consciousness in order to gain insight are 
hunted down in the street by police. Peyote, an historic vision-producing agent, is 
prohibited on pain of arrest. Those who have used opiates and junk are threatened with 
permanent jail and death. To be junky in America is like having been a Jew in Nazi 
Germany.464
 
 
Ginsberg’s rhetoric classifies hallucinogenic drugs as a part of the American and human spiritual 
tradition by couching them as the commonplace technologies of self-discovery.  That is, these 
drugs can be used to understand the soul – communicate with the depths of one’s own self.   
Through the argument, we move from ridicule to the death camps of Nazi Germany – a 
hyperbole to be sure, but a powerful one from the perspective that drug use is a part of spiritual 
practice, and to ban that practice would be to extinguish the holy communicators – the poets – 
from society.  It is also a nice turn on the idea that America, which envisions itself as saving the 
world from the threat of the Nazi holocaust, is now practicing that same holocaust on members 
of its own society, at least through the means of social control. 
Ginsberg’s assertion that the police and the newspapers, generally considered to be 
distinct institutions by most readers of the time, are two halves of the same whole is an 
application of the rhetorical topos of contrast. It could also be what Burke names “perspective by 
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incongruity,” which “is powerful because, if successful, it jars people into new perceptions about 
the way reality can be constructed and may encourage people to question their pieties. 
Perspective by incongruity encourages people to reclassify their outlook on the social world; as 
Burke argued.”465
The use of drugs is apparently common among this group of poets and it is one of the 
causes of their persecution.  Ginsberg places drug use not only in a context of mere “inspiration” 
but also as a part of the history of human religious inspiration.  The poets are being hunted down, 
therefore, because of their consistency with human history in the ways they seek inspiration. It is 
a productive rhetorical move, especially in a society where drug use is a crime in itself as well as 
established as the motive for criminal acts.  For the poets, it is as natural and accidental as being 
Jewish in this argument. 
  Ginsberg’s depiction of institutions usually seen as distinct as deeply 
connected offers such incongruity. He contrasts this association of institutional power with a 
power derived from individuals interacting. Both are systems of “communication” in one sense – 
they are methods or ways of establishing order and meaning.  However the distinction that 
Ginsberg offers is that the poets’ communication – established through the contact of individual 
bodies – is not only superior, but a direct threat to the hierarchical modes of communication 
represented by newspapers and the police. 
Ginsberg begins an association of poetics with mass communication as an oppositional 
relationship. Networks of communication derived from individual poets sharing measured words 
are compared to the hierarchical and state-authorized systems of mass communication 
throughout the rest of the piece: “A huge sadistic police bureaucracy has risen in every State, 
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encouraged by the central government, to persecute the illuminati, to brainwash the public with 
official Lies about the drugs, and to terrify and destroy those addicts whose spiritual search has 
made them sick.”466
Deviants from the mass sexual stereotype, quietists, those who will not work for money, 
fib and make arms for hire, join Armies in murder and threat, those who wish to loaf, 
think, rest in visions, act beautifully on their own, speak truthfully in public, inspired by 
Democracy – what is their psychic fate now in America? 
  The primary function of the police is to spread “official” lies about drugs, 
destroy those who have become sick from their “spiritual search” (addicts) and to make sure the 
public has no sympathy for drug users. Ginsberg is beginning the crescendo of the argument 
here, one that ends in what appears to be an enthymeme: 
An America, the greater portion of whose Economy is yoked to mental and mechanical 
preparations for War?467
 
 
The enthymeme here doesn’t exactly fit the mold of the proper enthymeme due to the 
run-up of progressio or perhaps auxesis – the phrases rise in intensity as Ginsberg describes two 
ways of being in America.  The difficulty of pinning down the figures at use here characterizes 
Ginsberg’s poetic argumentative style.  He has more in common with what Jeffrey Walker has 
identified as the argumentative style of early Greek poets in the “enthymematic cap” – a phrasing 
that is not quite properly enthymeme, but more properly en thymos; the argumentation hitting 
you aesthetically as well as reasonably.468
                                               
466 Theado, The Beats, 255. 
  The cap here is the question left open at the end as 
perhaps the implicit answer to the question right before it - that the fate of these beautiful truth-
speakers is somewhat set. The argumentative structure itself, in its poetic dimension, makes a 
case for a poetic sensibility in its own construction. 
467 Theado, The Beats, 255. 
468 Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 172-173. 
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Ginsberg makes these sentiments known not only through his overt argument, but also his 
own argumentative style: 
Literature expressing these insights has been mocked, misinterpreted, and suppressed by 
a horde of middlemen whose fearful allegiance to the Organization of mass stereotype 
communication prevents them from sympathy (not only with their own inner nature but) 
with any manifestation of unconditioned individuality.  I mean, journalists, commercial 
publishers, book review fellows, multitudes of professors of literature, etc., etc. Poetry is 
hated. Whole schools of academic criticism have risen to prove that human consciousness 
of unconditioned Spirit is a myth. A poetic renaissance glimpsed in San Francisco has 
been responded to with ugliness, anger, jealousy, vitriol, sullen protestations of 
superiority. 
And violence. By police, by customs officials, post office employees, by trustees of great 
universities. By anyone whose love of Power has led him to a position where he can push 
other people around over a difference of opinion – or Vision.469
 
 
Ginsberg uses the long lists of those who are opposed to the revolution in poetic 
sensibility as a contrast to the simplicity of the realizations of the poets. Capitalized words 
almost set concepts up as arch enemies in this section – we have Power and Vision struggling 
over the technologies of poetry and literature for the control of human consciousness.  
Containing such a grand conflict in such a small amount of text requires a rhetorical finesse – 
which Ginsberg displays here by making his argument sound and look more like a poem than an 
opinion piece.  Ginsberg plays with the dominant discourse of the newspaper and the result is 
more performed and aesthetic than rational.  The paragraph shift between the reactions of 
“vitriol” against the San Francisco poets, “And violence,” does nothing short of force the reader 
to pause and consider the categorical distinction between those two different universes of 
reaction.  It almost seems as if Ginsberg would like this piece read aloud by those holding the 
newspaper – he seems to force their voice. 
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Finally in this essay, Ginsberg ends with a claim to the inevitability of the spiritual 
insight revealed via poetry – “And all men at one time or other enter that Spirit, whether in life or 
death.”  Placing America in denial, Ginsberg closes with a series of questions –  
When will we discover an America that will not deny its own God? Who takes up arms, 
money, police and a million hands to murder the consciousness of God? Who spits in the 
beautiful face of Poetry which sings of the Glory of God and weeps in the dust of the 
world?470
 
 
Clearly, the solution is the embracing of Poetry which not only connects with the highest of 
sacraments – we’ve seen it not only in the pure service of God, but also the communicative 
technology that unites all human beings with the soul of the world – but it is a humble concept as 
well, weeping in the lowest form of matter on the planet, dust. The last line is a phrase directly 
from the Bible.  What exactly is Ginsberg advocating in this essay?  What is his understanding of 
the relation of poetry to society as a whole? 
On the one hand, Ginsberg’s critique of the mass media is not very complex, nor 
nuanced.  It is a popular and rather expected critique – mass mediated forms of communication 
are dangerous; they prohibit more natural, or “present” interactions between human beings.  
Such fears have been around, and have been expressed, in unusual and interesting ways, such as 
spirits and undead voices being carried through electric transmissions during the birth of the 
telegraph.471
                                               
470 Theado, The Beats. 
  On the other hand, Ginsberg in this piece displays a rhetorical sensitivity and 
finesse that comes out in his carefully constructed argument, resting on aesthetic enthymematic 
connections and broad gestures toward the infinite possibilities located in human communion. 
471 John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication 
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Ginsberg’s critique, as I developed it from his “second Howl” is that institutions within society 
work together to establish an official opinion and reading on human nature. Ginsberg is not 
optimistic on the role of these institutions such as universities and newspapers; he sees mass 
mediated communication as interrupting and destroying basic human functions. And from this I 
move to my larger argument: Ginsberg is concerned with human connection as Kenneth Burke 
saw it - identification and division. 
As I previously discussed, Kenneth Burke defined rhetoric as the always present dual 
move of identification and division in any human attempt to connect.472
In this chapter I will analyze Ginsberg’s writing via rhetorical criticism to reveal his 
contributions to the beat rhetoric.  Ginsberg’s contribution to the beat rhetoric will be one of 
embodied communication – what I mean by that is a focus on the body as both limit and resource 
of effective, meaningful rhetoric.  The term I borrow from Kenneth Burke, “consubstantiality,” 
which, previously explained, is the alignment of one person’s motives, or views of the world, 
with another’s. For Burke, this is the realm of rhetoric, and rhetoric is essential for human 
cooperation. Ginsberg sees the limits of the body as a commonplace from which we can identify 
with others, and divide from those things that deny our bodily limits.  Also, he sees the 
  Rhetoric, defined as 
“identification/division” is central to beings who lack the biological ability to connect to other 
minds – we are all distinctly separate and autonomous nervous systems – but we are beings that 
have the innate drive and desire to use symbols to induce action or belief in others.  Ginsberg’s 
essay suggests that this process is being interrupted with a too easy surrogate, and ruining the 
processes of communication – in Burke’s terms, a quest for consubstantiality.   
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recognition of the human body as a limit on our abilities to be the very thing that will allow for 
the best sort of human relations. 
Ginsberg’s contribution is one not only to the Beat philosophy, but one also to rhetoric as 
a whole. He is focused mainly on embodied beings, including the nastiness, frustration, desires 
and discomfort which an embodied state brings. His attempts to reveal the problems with his 
contemporary communicative environment also highlight his trouble speaking from a recognized 
position in his society as a homosexual. His turn toward poetry as the way to argue his position 
was a way of placing himself in a recognizable position as a rhetor, while at the same time 
deflecting criticism of his words and beliefs. In this way, Ginsberg is a rhetorical theorist and 
practitioner of a new American rhetoric that attempts to solve problems with reaching 
consubstantiality in the 1950s. Ginsberg, seen as a theorist and practitioner of a new American 
rhetoric, has more in common with massification theorists and Kenneth Burke than with other 
contemporary poets. 
Placing Ginsberg alongside other thinkers on this issue could be productive by providing 
new ways to read his poems.  I conclude this chapter by suggesting an outline of Ginsberg’s 
rhetorical theory – its main components and theoretical assumptions, and then I will turn my 
attention to examining “Howl” in the next chapter for a more concrete explanation.  In this 
chapter I examine the prosaic and more overt political prose that Ginsberg produced during his 
life. 
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5.1 GINSBERG’S RHETORICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Allen Ginsberg, throughout his young life, was confronted with the material horror that comes 
with possessing a human body. As Peters notes, communication technologies rising from the 
nineteenth century – the telephone especially - at their core mask the horrors of the embodied 
interlocutor, making it easy to avoid “the uncanniness of proximate bodies, the ickiness of the 
other, the recognition that there are hair and moles on the arms and perhaps sweat in the armpits 
and that the person is breathing, metabolizing, and secreting even as we speak.”473
Ginsberg’s most discussed moments of his youth involve his relationship with his 
mother, and his homosexuality. Both require some further analysis so that the importance of 
Ginsberg’s rhetorical contributions can be understood. 
 We can see 
Ginsberg through his rhetorical work attempting to find comfort with the body, as the twentieth 
century continues the pattern of communication technology effacing the body. 
Ginsberg’s mother Naomi was in and out of psychiatric treatment for all of Ginsberg’s 
young life.  Before Ginsberg’s birth, Naomi, “suffered a nervous breakdown, manifest from her 
hypersensitivity to light and sound.”  She tried to overcome this illness by, “lying in a dark room 
and hoping that whatever afflicted her would pass.”474
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  Unfortunately, it never permanently went 
away, and Naomi was institutionalized several times in hopes to treat her.  During her time at 
home she regularly accused family members of engaging in conspiracies against her, held pots to 
her ears to keep voices from influencing her, and regularly walked around in front of her son 
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naked.475
Instead of arguing with her, Allen tried to prove her fears unfounded. When Naomi 
complained that the painful sticks were located near her shoulder blades, Allen rubbed 
her back, as if trying to find them; when she asserted that she could not specify the names 
of her would-be assassins for fear of being overheard, Allen handed her a pad and a 
pencil and asked her to write down the names. As Naomi told him that the apartment had 
been bugged by the government, that wires in the ceiling were transmitting their 
conversation to her enemies, Allen stood on a chair and tapped the ceiling with a broom 
handle. “There’s no place for wires,” he suggested. “They’re smarter than you are,” 
Naomi replied, rejecting all of Allen’s attempts to reason with her.
  She attempted suicide while Allen was in high school and was again institutionalized.  
Most significant in Ginsberg’s mind were two specific incidents: One involved a seizure his 
mother had which he witnessed and wrote about, another occurred when he attempted to 
persuade his mother that her concerns were unfounded.  Ginsberg’s experience in persuading his 
mother that her concerns were merely a paranoid symptom ended in disaster as Ginsberg learned 
the recalcitrance of human situations to reason.  After sitting her on the bed to ask her 
“specifically what she was complaining about,” she responded by detailing her paranoid belief 
that doctors were poisoning her and controlling her movements through electronic sticks in her 
back. Ginsberg attempted to reason with her that her concerns could not possibly be true: 
476
 
 
Ginsberg, in an attempt to solve her unsolvable issues, took her on a long trip to a rest 
home where she was soon evicted due to her paranoid condition.  In many poems Ginsberg 
attempted to make sense of these teenage experiences using his poetic as an epistemic frame in 
order to uncover, structure, or explain these events with his mother to his satisfaction.  
Eventually, Naomi Ginsberg was lobotomized, and it was Allen Ginsberg who authorized the 
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procedure.477
There were, of course, other influences on Ginsberg. Not much needs to be said about his 
relationships with Jack Kerouac and William S. Burroughs.  Burroughs was a resource for 
Ginsberg in the same way he was for Kerouac – he was a touchstone of the canon of thoughtful, 
important books that, through Burroughs’ ethos, became a canon for Ginsberg.  For example, 
Ginsberg tempers his embrace of the body as the root of healthy human interaction with a 
warning from Burroughs: 
 The impossibility of reason and rational discourse to sway Naomi to see her 
concerns as unfounded haunted Ginsberg, and perhaps motivated his turn toward the study of 
human interaction through words.  
If you consider sex from a Hindu, Buddhist, Hare Krishna, even Christian fundamentalist 
viewpoint – a warning about the body and warning about attachment itself – it becomes 
interesting.  Burroughs has actually written about it at length in a way which hip people 
and even radicals have found very interesting: the sex ‘habit’ – sex as another form of 
junk, a commodity, the consumption of which is encouraged by the state to keep people 
enslaved to their bodies.  As long as they’re enslaved to their bodies, they can be filled 
with fear and shock and pain and threat, so they can be kept in place.478
 
 
Even the naturalness of the body can be twisted and turned into a commodity instead of 
an end-in-itself as Ginsberg would have it. The pleasure of the body, of being in harmony with 
the embodied state can also be used to keep people docile just as mass mediation can.  
Ginsberg’s appropriation of Buddhism here as well as Burroughs’s famous rhetorical use of 
terms like “habit” and “junk” to criticize addiction to bodily processes are used by Ginsberg to 
set limits and restrictions on proper uses of the body.  Properly, the body as an accident of 
existence concurs with body as the totality of existence, i.e. I cannot imagine existing in an un-
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bodied state. Ginsberg cuts through the accident/totality problem with a correlative: The body 
can be used itself as a medium or topos that can provide insights about this dilemma. We will see 
more about how this becomes the center of his rhetorical theory when I analyze “Howl” in the 
next chapter.  For now, I will explore Ginsberg’s theory through his prose, interviews and essays 
in order to provide the grounding for the rhetorical analysis of his poem. 
5.2 GINSBERG THE POET OR GINSBERG THE THEORIST? 
How can Allen Ginsberg, one of the most famous American poets of the twentieth century, be re-
read as an architect of a complex new rhetorical system?  Much evidence from his personal life 
and public activity testifies to a Ginsberg who is a master of direct and effective communication: 
One of his friends has called Ginsberg the central casting office of the underground. He 
enters the name, address, and phone number of anyone he meets who plays, or is apt to 
play, a part in what he things of as the new order – or has information that might be 
useful to it – in the address book that he always carries in his purple bag, and he goes to 
considerable trouble putting people he likes in touch with each other and with 
sympathetic and influential Establishment characters who might be helpful to them. In 
this way, Ginsberg has managed to create a network of the like-minded around the world. 
. . Ginsberg’s passion for an entirely comunicado underground has made him the most 
practically effective drop-out around.479
 
 
Ginsberg apparently believed that effective contact between people – though attempts at 
communication between them – was the way to establish the kind of political and social change 
he wanted to see in the world.  Ginbserg also spent a considerable amount of time thinking and 
writing about communication and rhetoric. One only has to attend to his interviews, lectures and 
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personal notes to see that Ginsberg was deeply concerned with questions that are at the center of 
the rhetorical tradition, although he was unaware of the tradition as we might understand it. 
Ginsberg’s rhetorical perspective takes the human body as its focus.  Ginsberg is at once 
awed by and also horrified by the embodied condition of the human subject.  Whatever the cause 
– and I have suggested two potential influences – Ginsberg adapts words and rhetorical concepts 
in order to address this need.  In a lecture, Ginsberg addresses this concern of embodiment by 
associating those concerns with questions often pondered by rhetorical scholars. He turns to the 
questions of identity and audience: 
The problem of being the center of attention, like now, or being famous is an identity 
problem no different from anybody’s identity problem because of the vastness of all of 
our identity problems: ‘Who am I,’ like ‘Who’re you?’ What’s the actual identity, what’s 
the actual inner person, is there even an inner self, is there any identity? Anybody’s 
identity problem is the entire universe, it’s as vast as the entire universe.  Yours as well as 
mine.  So actually in the grand scale with which we’re dealing, my identity problem is 
not any bigger than yours.480
 
 
The deep concern over identity is one of the foundational questions Ginsberg uses to construct 
his need for a poetic approach to the universe.  The “universal” question of identity is one that is 
clearly slippery – being famous raises the question just as being “anybody” because the question 
is ultimately unanswerable.  It is a set part of the universe as a whole, and it’s a question that 
everyone must encounter.  At the root of it is a contradiction – the one thing that makes us all 
compatible, at first, is that we all have the exact same problem: None of us know how to identify 
ourselves.  We are bodies that quite literally bump into each other, and we require explanation, 
justification and reasons to frame our encounters. 
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With this as the starting point, the crisis of identity as I will call it, human beings almost 
naturally wish to reach out to each other.  This brings us to considerations of audience – who or 
what is an audience of people with identity as their primary motivation? Ginsberg reveals his 
sense of audience through a question and answer exchange: 
Q: Isn’t there a difference though in the awareness which you have of your audience and 
the balance of awareness coming back to you? 
 
AG: Uh, I don’t know.  I assume, actually, that there is one consciousness that we all 
share on the highest level, that we are all one Self, actually, that we are all one Self with 
one being, one consciousness. 
 
Q: So the awareness between you and other persons is virtually the same as between me 
and us? 
 
AG: Yes.  When we all address ourselves to the highest awareness possible, to the 
highest awareness that we can conceive of among ourselves. So in a situation like this I 
try to address myself to that one consciousness, I try to pay attention or keep it in mind at 
least, conceptually if not heartwise, as much as possible, try to keep my body in a 
condition of the highest possibility of awareness, or keep that as the touchstone of the 
relationship, and so can’t go wrong – trusting, however, that others do recognize this 
gleam in themselves.481
  
 
Amazingly similar to the concept of the Universal audience put forth by Chaim Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, Ginsberg could be seen as agreeing that the best way to address the audience 
is to compose arguments for, “a universality and unanimity imaged by the speaker, to the 
agreement of an audience which should be universal. . .”482
                                               
481 Ginsberg, Allen Verbatim, 5. 
  The rhetoric in question is to be 
formulated with support that ensures anyone understanding it should assent to it:  “The 
individual, with his freedom of deliberation and of choice, defer to the constraining force of 
reason, which takes from him all possibility of doubt.  Thus, maximally efficacious rhetoric, in 
482 Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1969), 31. 
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the case of a universal audience, is rhetoric employing nothing but logical proof.”483  Of course, 
this is not to be confused with logic as developed in the discipline of philosophy.  This logic is 
culturally and contingently bound, not metaphysical, timeless, and consistently applicable.  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, after reviewing some philosophical arguments with an eye 
toward finding a universal standard of adherence, decide it would be better to flip the question: 
“Instead of believing in a universal audience, analogous to the divine mind which can assent only 
to the ‘truth,’ we might, with greater justification, characterize each speaker by the image he 
himself holds of the universal audience that he is trying to win over to his view.”484 Said another 
way, instead of seeking a universal standard of adherence from which to characterize arguments, 
find a standard of adherence within the characterization of the arguments from a particular 
author.  “The study of these variations would be very instructive, as we would learn from it what 
men, at different times in history, have regarded as real, true and objectively valid.”485
Of course, the universal audience theory can easily be manipulated into a justification for 
unethical or immoral ends.  The concept of the undefined universal audience is used to check this 
potential harm.  “[The undefined universal audience] is invoked to pass judgment on what is the 
concept of the universal audience appropriate to such a concrete audience, to examine, 
simultaneously, the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who comprise 
  Each 
speaker or writer, in other words, constructs arguments with a rhetoric that attempts to, upon 
being understood, compel adherence.  It does this by properly sorting existing categories of ideas 
into proper places for the audience, relying on observations, facts, and information that the 
audience believes to be beyond interrogation. 
                                               
483 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 32. 
484 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 33. 
485 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 33. 
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it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether this criterion is legitimate. It can be said that 
audiences pass judgment on one another.”486
This structure of audience has some similarities to what Ginsberg is advancing.  The 
central question facing them is similar – what is the proper mode of addressing the audience? 
Both answer with the idea that a proper mental construction of who the members of the audience 
are is a prior act.  Ginsberg’s construction is quite rhetorically sophisticated, positing the 
audience that one should address as essentially consisting of one universal being. This is the idea 
of “contemplative individuality” that the media is flattening with their one-size-fits-all approach 
to communication, as he mentions in his defense of contemporary poetry I cited at the beginning 
of this chapter.  Ginsberg’s rhetoric is a way of not only addressing the audience, but doing it in 
an ethically consistent way.  One reflects upon incredibly local ethical standards – since one 
thinks of one’s own human experience in order to formulate messages, then thinks of the 
implications to the one/universal being. Of course, Ginsberg does note that this depends on the 
audience “recognizing the gleam in themselves,” which Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca note as a 
valid rhetorical strategy of division for those audience members who don’t agree: “If 
argumentation addressed to the universal audience and calculated to convince does not convince 
everybody, one can always resort to disqualifying the recalcitrant by classifying them as stupid 
or abnormal. . . There can only be adherence to this idea of excluding individuals from the 
human community if the number and intellectual value of those banned are not so high as to 
make such a procedure ridiculous.”
 
487
                                               
486 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 35. 
  Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca then recommend, if the 
487 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 33. 
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numbers of recalcitrant audience members are high, to align one’s argumentation with the “elite” 
or highly enlightened discourse of those who have a special understanding: 
If this danger exists, recourse must be had to another line of argumentation, and the 
universal audience must be set against an elite audience, endowed with exceptional and 
infallible means of knowledge. Those who pride themselves on possession of a 
supernatural revelation or mystical knowledge, as well as those who appeal to the 
virtuous, to believers, or to men endowed with grace, show their preference for an elite 
audience; this elite audience may even be confused with the perfect Being.488
 
 
In outlining his ideas about audience, Ginsberg is masterful on this point.  He excludes by 
including – the members of the audience who do not “get it” are those who are not in tune with 
the idea that many are one.  In Burkean terms, Ginsberg “divides by identifying,” placing those 
outside as inside, but clueless.  Ginsberg’s attitude toward these individuals is also worth noting, 
they are not evil; they just misunderstand.  Ginsberg’s attitude is a comic one, as the audience is 
assumed to be in tune with at least the sliver of universal identity within them.  
Ginsberg’s attentiveness to his universal audience as embodied fragments of a 
universalizing consciousness or “Being” extends to his understanding of language use.  Ginsberg 
clearly delineates a difference between language and voice, which he attempts to distinguish by 
embodying one and disembodying the other.  This distinction also helps him negotiate the 
audience problem of misunderstanding by placing some of the responsibility on the rhetor’s 
choices of how to broadcast that message. 
To explain this, we must understand that meaning for Ginsberg comes primarily from the 
embodied production of speech from one human being to another:  
Most public speech is pseudo-event in the sense that it is not the product of a literal 
human being; it’s literally non-human.  It’s passed through so many hands and so many 
machines that it no longer represents a human organism inspiring and expiring, inhaling 
                                               
488 Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, 33. 
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and exhaling, rhythmically.  The sentence structure no longer has any relation to any 
affect that could be traced along the lines of inhalation and exhalation – in other words, 
sad to say, the voice can finally be separated from the body.  If the voice is completely 
separated from the body, it means that the rhythm will be fucked up, it means the affect 
will be fucked up, it means it no longer has any human content, actually.  It probably 
means it doesn’t mean anything, even, finally – by mean, anything that could be 
connected back to the physical universe or the human universe.489
 
 
The transmission of speech via mediation, including the reporting of one’s speech to another, 
destroys the important element of what makes meaning possible to begin with.  Is this a simple 
defense of intention? Not exactly, as Ginsberg is critiquing the invention of the public speech 
rather than its transmission.  For Ginsberg, the physical creation of the speech, the breathing, 
rhythm and other signs of human presence are as critical as word choice in the making of 
meaning.  This is evident through Ginsberg’s own reflection on his poetry, which he describes as 
an attempt at catalyst with the reader by mirroring breathing patterns, and hence mental patterns 
in his poetry: 
MA: Has your own use of mantra done anything that you can be very specific about in 
your poetry? 
AG: Yea a lot, now. Mainly it’s made me conscious of what I had been doing with long 
lines in ‘Howl.’ And . . . made me conscious of what I’d been doing with breathing as in 
the Moloch section of ‘Howl,’ or parts of ‘Kaddish‘ — that the . . . rhythmic. . . units . . 
that I’d written down . . were basically . . breathing exercise forms . . . which if anybody 
else repeated. . . would catalyze them in the same pranic breathing . . . physiological 
spasm . . . that I was going through . . . and so would presumably catalyze in them the 
same affects or emotions. that’s putting it a little bit too . . . rigorously, but . . that’s the 
direction.490
 
 
                                               
489 Ginsberg, Allen Verbatim, 28. 
490 Allen Ginsberg, “Michael Aldrich, Edward Kissam, and Nancy Blecker November 28, 1968” 
in David Carter, Ed. Allen Ginsberg Spontaneous Mind: Selected Interviews 1958-1996 (New 
York: Perennial, 2001), 141. 
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Ginsberg reflects here on his intent in the composition of “Howl,” and how he tried to create 
consubstantiality via the patterns of his own breathing and voice. The reader, he assumed, would 
naturally pick up on these patterns and enter a simliar mental state as the poet, therefore not 
interpreting the meaning of the poem, but experiencing something similar to the state of mind 
during poetic invention.  Amy Hungerford notes in her article about Ginsberg’s search for a 
supernatural poetic language, “Interpretation was far from Ginsberg's notion of how poetry 
worked. Though one could certainly talk about poems (and Ginsberg did, at great length) that 
talking would never be the equivalent of the specific syllables of the poem itself—endowed, as 
they were, with Ginsberg's ‘white magic.’”491
This puts Ginsberg’s sense of the importance of vocalized discourse in line with Steve 
Whitson and John Poulakos’ Nietzschean-based aesthetic rhetoric: “When a subject speaks, it 
does so not to announce what it knows about things, but where it stands in relation to them.”
 Ginsberg saw his poetry as a way of reaching a 
level of identification that was beyond mediated explanation. It was, as I will argue, an ideal of 
consubstantiality. The “white magic” she refers to in this quote is Ginsberg’s belief that the oral 
production of peaceful chanting can set up peaceful mindsets in others just by vibration. 
492
Aesthetic rhetoric puts on its best face in oral performance. Its charm and impact cannot 
be greater than when the human voice, in all its resonances, its tempi and rhythms, 
  
For Whitson and Poulakos, language use is always rhetorical, for it is always the creation of 
signs that point to a preferred understanding of reality.  For them, as for Ginsberg, this is best 
shown through the bodily production of language: 
                                               
491 Amy Hungerford, “Postmodern Supernaturalism: Ginsberg and the Search for a Supernatural 
Language” Yale Journal of Criticism 18 2 (Fall 2005): 269-298, 289. 
492 Steve Whitson and John Poulakos, “Neitzsche and the Aesthetics of Rhetoric,” Quarterly 
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allows. Even in its written dress, it follows the rules of speaking as dictated by the 
physiology of the ears, the larynx, and the lungs.493
 
 
Ginsberg is in partial agreement with this sentiment – that proper rhetoric orients humans 
to a proper life.  He is in complete agreement that the oral register is the place where rhetoric is 
in most mimetic harmony with the biological production of speech.  Of course, he doesn’t see 
speech as a biological operation – seen in simple correspondence to the human being is to see 
language in an improper way.  Language is actually very disconnected from reality, and to 
believe that language can replace real experience is to impede healthy understanding. 
Ginsberg offers an example of how language might get in the way of meaning (which 
comes from embodied vocalization): 
What might be a big color event to us wouldn’t be nuthin’ to a dog ‘cause dogs see black 
and white.  And a bee sees more myriad facets.  So it’s our particular sense that 
collaborate with whatever’s going on outside to make an event to begin with.  And then 
when we reduce everything from whatever went on outside, plus whatever we could pick 
up of it with our scanning patterns, with our senses, plus the further remove of what we 
reduce it to when we say ‘It was an explosion,’ or ‘It was a music concert,’ or ‘It was a 
big bust, a big university bust’ – by the time we’ve reduced it to just a word description 
it’s so far removed form anything that might have ever happened in eternity that we can’t 
claim to be talking about anything coherently real.494
 
 
Ginsberg notes that a description is not the event, but merely references the existence of 
the event.  Rhetoric is always one step removed from sensory experience.  The human state is to 
always be one step removed from knowable, true reality.  Reality, in this sense, is always an 
arm’s length away from knowledge.  Although this seems a commonplace assumption, I am 
establishing Ginsberg’s ontology here. In order to understand Ginsberg’s rhetorical theory his 
assumptions about the nature of reality and language must be investigated. 
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Since language is removed from the event, the next best thing for the verification of the 
authenticity of language is the signature of vocal production.  Here is where Ginsberg fully 
embraces one of his rhetorical ideals – that language marked by the effects of production can 
generate clues to how to understand that discourse: 
Another aspect of language is not generally taken up in discussing the use of language to 
communicate knowledge, is not generally considered when we try to dissect and analyze 
what language is, how it’s functioning and what it’s being used for: the tone of voice or 
affect with which it’s pronounced (if the language is pronounced aloud), because that 
makes it different from when it’s just eye-read.  You can use the same words and say 
them with different tones, from ‘I love YOU?’ to “I love you.’ Two people can say 
exactly the same thing with the same intention and one person really mean it and the 
other not mean it and you can tell the difference by whether the voice comes form the 
center of the body or whether the voice is just a little superficial weakened yak from the 
top of the larynx center.495
 
 
Immediately one is reminded of Kenneth Burke’s sense of inflection being connected 
with attitude. However, Ginsberg roots the ability to determine meaning based on the markings 
of production from the center of the body (a traditionally held seat-of-the-soul) and the “top of 
the larynx center,” back of the throat or dangerously close to the seat of the intellect, the head, 
where also one conceives of ways to deceive.  Much has been said about the human body as a 
prototype for hierarchy.  Stallybrass and White argue that, “cultural categories of high and low, 
social and aesthetic . . . also those of the physical body and geographical space, are never entirely 
separable.”496
                                               
495 Ginsberg, Allen Verbatim, 27. 
  They argue that arrangements of geography, cities, festivals, and other bodies 
(distinctions between the clean and the dirty body for example), as well as distinctions in literary 
canon, purview and importance all stem from assumptions about the “proper” orientation of the 
“proper” human body.  They explain in greater detail: 
496 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: 
Methuen, 1986), 2. 
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The high/low opposition in each of four symbolic domains – psychic forms, the human 
body, geographical space and the social order – is a fundamental basis to mechanisms of 
ordering and sense making in European cultures. Divisions and discriminations in one 
domain are continually structured, legitimated and dissolved by reference to the vertical 
symbolic hierarchy which operates in the other three domains. Cultures ‘think 
themselves’ in the most immediate and affective ways through the combined symbolisms 
of these four hierarchies. Furthermore . . . transgressing the rules of hierarchy and order 
in any one of the domains may have major consequences in the others.497
 
 
Stallybrass and White argue that the base mechanisms for judgment – an activity associated with 
rhetorical faculties throughout the history of at least the Western world – derive from assumed 
orders of high and low in apparent material conditions.  For example, the head is above the 
genitals, therefore intellect is “purer” than sex, or the head is generally clean while the genitals 
are generally considered dirty. 
Strategically, cultures work to reify their patterns of appropriate and inappropriate social 
expression and interaction by allowing and forbidding particularities of practice.  For example, 
the practice of the carnival, associated with religious observances, was something controlled, 
then permitted and then banned in order to generate a new relationship between society, the 
individual and the body.  The exploration they offer of the carnival and its importance in 
understanding transgression is based on the works of Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin is of particular 
importance due to his theory of language, which has been influential in the field of rhetoric.498
Language, for Bakhtin, is a living thing, deeply permeated with all possible societal 
meanings.  The fundamental unit of language, the utterance, is a unique act, as each speaker will 
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utter, intonate and speak in his or her specific “alien discourse.” In our daily lives we regularly 
shift discourses to talk to friends, family, authority figures and subordinates. The novel is the 
place where these discourses can be dialogized, that is, put into the wrong situations, situations 
that compare and clash particular types of utterances, and from these collisions new 
understandings of meanings can emerge.  As he puts it: 
Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well 
as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and 
decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance 
not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment 
of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an 
active participant in such speech diversity. And this active participation of every 
utterance in living heteroglossia determines the linguistic profile and style of the 
utterance to no less a degree than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a 
unitary language.499
 
 
Bakhtin attempts to get us to understand that the meaning of a word, or an utterance – a 
statement that is made – is more than just a matter of simple correspondence to denotation. The 
utterance exists in a universe of all the previous uses, as well as the universe of all attempts to 
control, reduce, expand, or limit the meaning of the utterance.  These forces act upon the possible 
interpretations available to interlocutors based on time, geography, culture and experience.  In 
short, the quest for meaning is also the quest to understand a living organism, one with a 
complex and elusive system of organs allowing it to function. 
It is this theory that Stallybrass and White base their own theory of transgressive politics 
upon. For them though, the situation is much more complex than Bakhtin’s analysis indicates. 
For example, the carnival – a site of ambivalence regarding social and cultural value hierarchies 
– is a place where these values are for the most part maintained.  The carnival functions as a site 
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for transgression if the dominant order becomes unstable: “The most that can be said in the 
abstract is that for long periods carnival may be a stable and cyclical ritual with no noticeable 
politically transformative effects but given the presence of sharpened political antagonism, it 
may often act as catalyst and site of actual and symbolic struggle.”500
We will see more of Stallybrass and White’s theory of transgression in the next chapter 
where I will give a rhetorical analysis of “Howl,” and will draw on these theoretical similarities 
between Ginsberg and the theories mentioned above. For the next part of this chapter, I want to 
attempt to solidify some of the clearer elements of Ginsberg’s rhetorical theory.  Now that we 
see Ginsberg as a rhetorical theorist who foregrounds the role of the human body in 
communication and rhetoric, what critical vocabulary can be garnered from his ideas? 
 
5.3 GINSBERG’S KEY THEORETICAL TERMS 
Ginsberg relies on certain terms n in his discussions of language, the body, and the production of 
what I am calling rhetoric.  One of the terms used frequently is “rhythm.”  Here, Ginsberg details 
some of the important elements of rhythm and its relation to language: 
So there’s tone, or affect, or feeling of the voice, and that’s connected very much with the 
rhythm of the language – whether it’s a natural rhythm of language or whether it’s a 
forced artificial bureaucratic dry rhythm affected by multiple machinery, affected by its 
being passed through many typewriters, whether it’s an authentic human personal voice 
talking, or whether it’s a voice that has been filtered through so many machines that the 
human rhythm has been lost.501
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Rhythm is a key component to language, and the human rhythm is in danger of being lost via 
mechanical circulation and distribution of language.  For Ginsberg, rhythm is always present in 
language, and can be manipulated.  Human beings give a relief to their utterances that can 
contain signs of sincerity, belief or presence.  What worries Ginsberg is the replacement of those 
stylistic trappings with those of machines, a rhythm that eliminates or flattens the marks of a 
body-made discourse with one that is machine made. 
This change of rhythm in language, for Ginsberg is something that deserves attention. 
Alteration of the rhythm of language from the human body to the machine skews human focus 
from embodiment to other concerns: 
The Hindu proposition is that there are faculties for body sound language that have 
atrophied in the transient and very recent temporary cultures that substitute mechanical 
reproduction of imagery for interpersonal communication of imagery.  Sort of in 
McLuhan’s terms, the very nature of reading and linear thinking and reproduced 
language – language images reproduced and read silently – has tended to abstract 
language communication and thin it out, actually, give it less body, less meaning.  And so 
faculties of body sound and rhythmic deep-breathed language behavior have atrophied.502
 
 
Ginsberg links embodied rhetoric with cultures that are ancient, such as the “Hindu culture,” and 
temporary, mechanical-language cultures with our own.  Ginsberg believes that abstracting 
language from the body provides less meaning to the utterances, and actually eliminates 
categories of meaning that are available only by recognizing language as a part of the human 
body.  Once the connection is severed between language and the human body, one loses capacity 
to properly “mean.” Types of embodied meaning making are lost to cultures that abstract 
language from the body and put it in print form.  Ginsberg is setting up a theory of language here 
that requires a serious alteration of the norms of genre and discourse. There doesn’t seem to be 
                                               
502 Ginsberg, Allen Verbatim, 28. 
 258 
any indication that Ginsberg was familiar with the work of Eric Havelock or Walter Ong on the 
differences in how oral cultures and literate cultures communicate or make meaning. The 
reference to McLuhan does indicate that Ginsberg is thinking about language along the same line 
as these scholars, the central question being: Do modern technological changes in 
communication affect how we communicate?503
The spoken word proceeds from the human interior and manifests human beings to one 
another as conscious interiors, as person, the spoken word forms human beings into 
close-knit groups. When a speaker is addressing an audience, the members of the 
audience normally become a unity, with themselves and with the speaker. If the speaker 
asks the audience to read a handout provided for them, as each reader enters into his or 
her own private reading world, the unity of the audience is shattered, to be re-established 
only when oral speech beings again.
 For Walter Ong, the question was undoubtedly 
centered around the human body:  
504
 
 
Ong argues that the connectedness provided by the human voice during speech is 
shattered by the rise of literacy, and again changed by the rise of print culture. These changes for 
Ong are about the place of the body, of human embodied experience.  For cultures that do not 
have writing or print, the role of spoken language deeply defines existence: 
In a primary oral culture, where the word has its existence only in sound, with no 
reference whatsoever to any visually perceptible text, and no awareness of even the 
possibility of such a text, the phenomenology of sound enters deeply into human beings’ 
feel for existence, as processed by the spoken word. For the way in which the word is 
experienced is always momentous in psychic life. The centering action of sound (the field 
of sound is not spread out before me but is all around me) affects man’s sense of the 
cosmos.505
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The relationship of sound to the body, and the human psyche is responsible for helping to define 
the ontological, according to Ong.  Since sound envelops the body, and writing “lays it all out” in 
front of the body, the relationship of the human to the universe differs between cultures. “The 
ancient oral world knew few ‘explorers,’ though it did know many itinerants, travelers, voyagers, 
adventurers, and pilgrims.”506
Ong waffles on whether oral or literate or print culture is superior to the other. All he 
argues is that we should be aware of the differences in thinking made possible (or impossible) 
due to the presence (or absence) of print or literacy. Ginsberg, on the other hand, offers his 
position through his usual enthymematic approach: 
  The orientation, as Burke would call it, is not only brought about 
by a terministic screen, but by the terminus in the access to language as well.  
Whether our system’s an advantage or not I don’t know.  As it stands, it seems to be 
ruining the planet.  The very nature of our power of abstraction dooms us to lose touch 
with detail.  And therefore the very roots of the trees are shriveling, withering, and the 
oceans are being polluted simply because we have reduced everything to a language 
which can be passed through machines.  Obviously machines aren’t sophisticated enough 
to take account of all variables, aren’t as sophisticated as men and women in that sense.  
We’ve lost our world by pursuing our kind of language specialization.507
 
 
Absence of grounding for language in the body’s productive origin allows us to abstract 
language to a point where the initial reference of language to material reality is completely 
effaced.  Language as a completely uprooted machine allows for a particular type of ignorance of 
the limits and fragility of the embodied existence on the material plane. This abstraction, brought 
about by mechanistic communication, further separates the limits of the body from our purview. 
This in turn separates us, in Ginsberg’s estimation, from the limits of what the environment can 
handle. In Burkean terms, we avoid accepting recalcitrance of the world because we no longer 
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center our communication between human bodies. The distance in the communicative act has 
distanced us not only from ourselves, but from the limits of ourselves and our world. 
Similarly developed is the next term in Ginsberg’s rhetoric – spirituality. One of the most 
significant influences on Ginsberg was the poetry of William Blake. The so-called “Blake 
Vision,” which has been commented on by every biographer or critical study of Ginsberg’s 
work, would seem to not need any new analysis.508
The “Blake vision” as it is most frequently referred to occurred in 1945. Ginsberg 
apparently heard the voice of Blake reading to him after masturbating while reading Blake’s 
poetry in his Harlem apartment.  Ginsberg describes the incident in rich detail in an interview 
with The Paris Review: 
 But examining the Blake vision through a 
rhetorical perspective allows a total re-framing of Ginsberg’s entire poetic project along the lines 
of rhetorical theory.  Ginsberg’s vision allowed him to identify with previous divisions, allowing 
him to craft a poetics that he hoped would facilitate universal understanding of the world and 
humanity’s place in it. By seeing Ginsberg through a Burkean lens, an alternative understanding 
of his writing can emerge. 
So anyway – there I was in my bed in Harlem . . . jacking off. With my pants open, lying 
around on a bed by the windowsill, looking out into the cornices of Harlem and the sky 
above.  And I had just come.  And had perhaps hardly even wiped the come off my 
thighs, my trousers, or whatever it was.  As I often do, I had been jacking off while 
reading [. . .]And just after I came, on this occasion, with a Blake book on my lap – I 
wasn’t even reading, my eye was idling over the page of ‘Ah, Sun-flower,’ and it 
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suddenly appeared – the poem I’d read a lot of times before, overfamiliar to the point 
where it didn’t make any particular meaning except some sweet thing about flowers – and 
suddenly I realize that the poem was talking about me. [. . .]Now, I began understanding 
it, the poem while looking at it, and suddenly, simultaneously with understanding it, 
heard a very deep earthen grave voice in the room, which I immediately assumed, I didn’t 
think twice, was Blake’s voice; it wasn’t any voice that I knew, though I had previously 
had a conception of a voice of rock, in a poem, some image like that – or maybe that 
came after this experience.509
 
 
This vision rocked Ginsberg, and allowed him, according to his own narrative, to divide from his 
former distinctions he held between the outside world, his physical existence, and his conception 
of spirituality: 
Simultaneous to the voice there was also an emotion, risen in my soul in response to the 
voice, and a sudden visual realization of the same awesome phenomena.  That is to say, 
looking out at the window, through the window at the sky, suddenly it seemed that I saw 
into the depths of the universe, by looking simply into the ancient sky. The sky suddenly 
seemed very ancient. And this was the very ancient place that he [Blake] was talking 
about, the sweet golden clime. I suddenly realized that this existence was it!510
 
 
Ginsberg goes on at great length describing the realization that his reality and Blake’s are 
simultaneous – that is, temporally concurrent with no distance between them.  He recognizes this 
through an identification/division move:  Realizing that the ancient sky he is seeing is the same 
sky Blake wrote about, and that sky was ancient for Blake as well.  The time dividing them is 
bridged through the rhetorical identification with the sky; both authors are consubstantial in their 
realizations.  
The power of this new identification allowed Ginsberg to recognize the spirituality 
behind all phenomena:  
                                               
509 Tom Clark, “The Art of Poetry No. VIII,” in Allen Ginsberg: Spontaneous Mind, Selected 
Interviews 1958-1996, ed. David Carter (New York: Perennial, 2001), 35. 
510 Clark, “The Art of Poetry,” 37. 
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I began noticing in every corner where I looked evidences of a living hand, even in the 
bricks, in the arrangement of each brick. Some hand placed them there – that some hand 
had placed the whole universe in front of me.  That some hand had placed the sky. No, 
that’s exaggerating – not that some hand had placed the sky but that the sky was the 
living blue hand itself. Or that God was in front of my eyes – existence itself was God.511
 
 
Ginsberg’s perspective becomes one where the world is rich in motive and expression, not mere 
contingency. The conclusion is that the expression of the world is the living God. Immediately, 
Burke’s assessment of the rhetorical positioning of Spinoza comes to mind: “The philosophy of 
the whole could thus be considered as an enterprise for so changing our attitude towards the 
world that we can be in the direction of peace rather than in the direction of war. The change is 
to be prepared by vigorous intellectual means rather than by a mere ‘change of heart.’ And to 
grasp the quality of the freedom of action aimed at, I think it relevant to remember tha in the 
mediaval terminologies of motives contemplation is an act. And although Spinoza’s ideas of 
action are close to the Baconian knowledge-power equation, they are much nearer to the 
mediaeval ideals of contemplation than to the notions of action that go with our current political, 
commercial, and technological pragmatisms.”512
                                               
511 Clark, “The Art of Poetry,” 38. 
 Burke identifies Spinoza’s terminology of 
contemplation as being in the realm of action, therefore political. Ginsberg’s freedom to re-
imagine the content of the world through the contemplation of Blake works in a similar way. 
Ginsberg attempts to free contemplation as a re-imagining, and a way of finding evidence for 
connection everywhere. The change in terms from a contingent, separate world to one which is 
an expression of a living being means that humans can attempt to find identification with that 
expression and become consubstantial with it. 
512 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of 
California Press, 1969), 142. 
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Ginsberg concludes by announcing this vision as a powerful rhetorical exigence for his 
writing:  “My first thought was this was what I was born for, and second thought, never forget – 
never forget, never renege, never deny. Never deny the voice – no, never forget it, don’t get lost 
mentally wandering in other spirit worlds or American or job worlds or advertising worlds or 
war worlds or earth worlds.”513 This was to be Ginsberg’s mission, and it is apparent that it has a 
decidedly rhetorical dimension – to make certain that this understanding of place in the universe 
was communicated: “[T]hat’s the way I began seeing poetry as the communication of the 
particular experience – not just any experience but this experience.”514
The “Blake vision” has been treated by a number of scholars, but the insights of Alicia 
Ostriker are of particular importance to my investigation of Ginsberg’s rhetoric. Tracing the 
connection of Blake and Ginsberg through the terms “prophet” and “shaman,” Ostriker argues 
that, “the idea of the prophetic role clearly forms the core of Blake's influence on Ginsberg, and 
he is the only one of Blake's modern disciples who publicly assumes such a mantle or 
burden.”
  Ginsberg then began to 
root his practice within the terministic screen offered by this experience – to never leave the 
interconnected understanding that was revealed to him through the “Blake Vision.”  Ginsberg’s 
poetic-rhetoric he extracted from the “Blake Vision” allowed him to see poetry as a conduit 
between moments in time. Poetry, imagined in this way, then becomes a way of reaching 
audiences well beyond one’s own lifetime. 
515
                                               
513 Clark, “The Art of Poetry,” 37. 
 Such a role must be seen as a rhetorical one, since the prophet or the shaman require 
an audience in order to hear their prophecy or experience their cures or palliatives. The 
514 Clark, “The Art of Poetry,” 41. 
515 Alicia Ostriker “Blake, Ginsberg, Madness, and the Prophet as Shaman” in William Blake and 
the Moderns (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 113. 
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interpretation of their work then becomes one of understanding persuasiveness, or how each 
writer attempted to engage with others in order to move people toward acceptance of their 
visions:  
To say that William Blake and Allen Ginsberg are poet-prophets means a few rather 
precise things. First, it means that they experience personal visions of a potential divine 
life for humanity, while in a state which normal persons in our society would call trance 
or hallucination, and which in other ages has been called revelation or illumination; 
second, that they commit themselves as writers to the establishment of such life on earth, 
and dedicate their work to this end rather than to what is usually understood as literary 
success.516
 
 
Ostriker establishes her criteria for evaluating prophetic writers with these three categories, 
separating her analysis from what might be done to understand a writer interested in traditional 
literary success. She believes that understanding these prophetic poets requires understanding 
their work as having the aim of transformation, or alteration of attitude in order to make the 
world fall in line with their visions of perfection. 
 Ostriker’s analysis therefore brings into focus the rhetoric of the two poets in order to 
better grasp what their visions are and how their poems make an argument for those visions. She 
concludes that they both depart from the traditional mode of the prophet and end up more as 
healers, seeing their work as shamanistic: 
The prophet of Old Testament tradition and the shaman of primitive culture have in 
common the capacity for visionary experience and the gift of verbal expression of it. 
Blake and Ginsberg alike deviate from the role of the prophet in their avoidance of the 
rhetoric of curse and punishment, their rejection of a god of wrath. By the same token, 
they approach the pattern of the shaman in their stress on healing which appears to be 
magically accomplished through the ecstatic personal engagement of the poet, and , 
finally, in their willingness to identify with the ills which they attempt to cure, even to the 
point of madness.517
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For Ginsberg and Blake, the relationship is one where both want to cure a society perceived as 
full of ills. The cure, in this case, is deeply intertwined with the sickness, risking madness for 
anyone who attempts to craft medicine. Ostriker concludes that Ginsberg’s discourse is heavily 
influenced by Blake, but at the same time both poets have their own particular illnesses and cures 
they prioritize.  
Seeing Ginsberg as a disciple of Blake is helpful for grasping how a poem functions for 
Ginsberg. One way is that it allowed him to see poetry as an instrumentality, something that can 
“do.” In this case, it is a communicative tool: 
The thing I understood from Blake was that it was possible to transmit a message through 
time which could reach the enlightened, that poetry had a definite effect, it wasn’t just 
pretty, or just beautiful, as I had understood pretty beauty before – it was something basic 
to human existence, or it reached something, it reached the bottom of human existence.  
But anyway the impression I got was that it was like a kind of time machine through 
which he could transmit. Blake could transmit, his basic consciousness and communicate 
it to somebody else after he was dead – in other words, build a time machine.518
 
 
Ginsberg sees poetry arranged around his key terms as a technology that is capable of 
transcending the limits of the present age and its communicative limits. This observation is one 
that is shared. The application of Blake to forms of communication that compress time and space 
was also shared by cultural critic Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan’s observations on what Blake 
was up to are surprisingly similar to Ginsberg’s: 
Newton, in an age of clocks, managed to present the physical universe in the image of a 
clock. But poets like Blake were far ahead of Newton in their response to the challenge of 
the clock. Blake spoke of the need to be delivered ‘from single vision and Newton’s 
sleep,’ knowing very well that Newton’s response to the challenge of the new mechanism 
was itself merely a mechanical repetition of the challenge. Blake saw Newton and Locke 
                                               
518 Clark, “The Art of Poetry,” 27. 
 266 
and others as hypnotized Narcissus types quite unable to meet the challenge of 
mechanism.519
 
 
Seeing other brilliant minds of his time corrupted by one-dimensional, poorly modeled 
understandings of a brilliant and complicated universe upset and worried William Blake.  As a 
counter, Blake used a recognizable form of media in a new way to directly counter the 
mechanistic vision of the universe as well as implicitly counter that vision by avoiding the trap of 
wording the alternative in the master rhetoric of the problem.  Blake’s vision of an organic 
universe simply cannot be articulated in the language of mechanics advanced by Newton. 
Likewise, Ginsberg’s organic communication theory cannot be articulated in the sterile 
mechanical forms of American mass media.  Ginsberg sees poetic-rhetoric as the healthier 
alternative to mechanistic-rhetoric, what might be called Newtonian communication, that 
separates and disjoints human communion into fragments. 
As a final observation on Blake, McLuhan points out the correlatives between Blake’s 
time and our own: 
Blake’s counterstrategy for his age was to meet mechanism with organic myth. Today, 
deep in the electric age, organic myth is itself a simple and automatic response capable of 
mathematical formulation and expression, without any of the imaginative perception of 
Blake about it. Had he encountered the electric age, Blake would not have met its 
challenge with a mere repetition of electric form. For myth is the instant vision of a 
complex process that ordinarily extends over a long period. Myth is contraction of 
implosion of any process, and the instant speed of electricity confers the mythic 
dimension on ordinary industrial and social action today. We live mythically but continue 
to think fragmentarily and on single planes.520
 
 
                                               
519 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media in Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone, Eds., 
Essential Mcluhan (New York:Basic Books, 1995), 163. 
520 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 163-4. 
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McLuhan flips the prospects of resistance to the contemporary mechanistic mass media 
on its head.  Instead of arguing for a mythic response to a mechanical discourse, McLuhan 
suggests that we should adapt to the mythical situation in our thought processes.  When the 
mundane has achieved the mythic, speaking in those terms only replicates the same problems 
faced by Blake in his project to critique Newton.  Ginsberg understood this, and his response – a 
communicative theory based in poetics – responds to McLuhan’s call to think beyond the 
fragmentary while avoiding the electric trap of instant communication.  Electric communication 
confers mythic status on the everyday by simplifying it. Poetry, especially as a basis for a 
rhetoric, avoids the simple in favor of the ambivalent, the complicated and most importantly, the 
slow. 
Ginsberg’s spiritual component to his rhetoric also comes from the influence of Zen 
Buddhism. This is, as Allan Watts reminds us, merely an influence and not a transformation or 
expression of the religion itself: “Beat Zen is a complex phenomenon. It ranges from a use of 
Zen for justifying sheer caprice in art, literature, and life to a very forceful social criticism and 
‘digging of the universe’ such as one may find tin the poetry of Ginsberg and Snyder, and, rather 
unevenly, in Kerouac. But, as I know it, it is always a shade too self-conscious, too subjective, 
and too strident to have the flavor of Zen.”521 Watts doesn’t discredit Ginsberg’s poetry; he 
writes to indicate differences in the Zen tradition and American reads of that tradition. 
Ginsberg’s interest in Zen Buddhism blossomed in April of 1953 where he “embarked on an 
ambitious study plan and took out more than seventy books on the subject from the Columbia 
University library alone.”522
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 Ginsberg’s study led him to Chinese painting and inspired him to 
522 Barry Miles Ginsberg: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 153.  
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write a different form of poetry. Ginsberg’s study of Buddhism reinforced ideas he held about 
the nature of proper communication: “I think probably the meditation experience just made me 
more and more aware of the humor of the fact that breath is the basis of poetry and song – it’s so 
important in it as a measure. Song is carried out on the vehicle of the breath, words are carried 
out through the breath, which seems like a nice ‘poetic justice,’ (laughs) – that the breath should 
be so important in meditation as well as in poetics. I think that must be historically the reason for 
the fact that all meditation teachers are conscious of their spoken breath, as poets are. That’s the 
tradition, the Kagu tradition, that the teachers should be poets. . . because they can’t teach unless 
they’re poets – they can’t communicate.”523
With rhythm and spirituality as key terms, the third should be poetry.  Poetry for 
Ginsberg is something as complicated as the rhetorical situation which deeply concerned 
Ginsberg.  Ginsberg throughout his career posited poetry and poetic invention as a more natural 
form of communication than the technologies of mass communication: 
 The link between breath, poetry and communication 
is a certain link for connection and identification in Ginsberg’s rhetoric.  
The Hindu proposition is that there are faculties for body sound language that have 
atrophied in the transient and very recent temporary cultures that substitute mechanical 
reproduction of imagery for interpersonal communication of imagery.  Sort of in 
McLuhan’s terms, the very nature of reading and linear thinking and reproduced 
language – language images reproduced and read silently – has tended to abstract 
language communication and thin it out, actually, give it less body, less meaning.  And so 
faculties of body sound and rhythmic deep-breathed language behavior have atrophied.524
 
 
Ginsberg’s turn to the East for alternative ways of understanding led him to conclude that 
harmony with one’s embodied state was crucial to the essential communicative act – realizing 
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this existence.  Relating the effective poetic stanza to the breath, and the limits of the body 
instead of the page produced less a poem and more a rhetoric – a way of putting symbols forward 
in an attempt to reach consubstantiality with fellow human beings.  If one were to find a place 
for humans to have common ground, the pleasures a body affords might be an effective starting 
place. 
 As John Durham Peters has noted, communication technologies directly affect the way 
we perceive of communication’s limits and importance. In the twentieth century, communication 
was characterized by an acute lack of physical presence: “The chief challenge to communication 
in the twentieth century is contact with beings that lack mortal form.”525 Peters sees the twentieth 
century as wrought with anxiety for situations where communication was not impossible, but 
omnipresent, available to beings beyond the human. “Communication has become disembodied. 
More precisely, the rise of the concept of ‘communication’ is a symptom of the disembodiment 
of interaction. The intellectual history of this notion reveals a long struggle to reorient to a world 
in which the human is externalized into media forms.”526 The struggle, as Peters sees the large 
debate about the limits and purpose of communication throughout the twentieth century is, “the 
very field on which to sort out the place of the human in the great network of being.”527
Ginsberg fits very well into this period, imagining disembodied hands arranging the 
entire phenomenological world around him, and lamenting the inability to “commune” with 
these beings who have arranged the universe with such obvious care and compassion.  His 
 Some of 
the examples of such disconcerting communication technologies were the telephone, the radio 
and the television.  
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solution is to develop an art of communicating these realizations with others, and perhaps, to 
ensure that his hands do not wind up disembodied.  Apparently, Blake’s “time machine” of 
poetry can overcome this identity crisis. Ginsberg’s influence from Blake clearly extends well 
beyond liking his poetic imagery.  Ginsberg wants to travel through time and space, but he does 
not want to leave his body behind.  The way to accomplish this for Ginsberg was to make poetry 
a vehicle for effective rhetorical overtures. 
 The major move Ginsberg makes to this end is that he sees poetry as a superior form of 
mass communication than the technologies of the time. His setting of the world in the realm of 
action requires a rhetoric that assumes unity not fragmentation. Ginsberg sees technologies as 
fragmenting the world, separating speech from human bodies.  Basing his ideas on the Sunflower 
Sutra experience, Ginsberg theorizes that Blake’s poetry allows his ideas to travel through time 
and encounter us, or perhaps as Ginsberg would argue, Blake’s consciousness travels through 
poetry to reach us under our similar ancient sky.  To conceive of poetry as a device for 
communication is perhaps not new, but it is certainly a break from the ways poetry was 
perceived by Ginsberg’s audience.  This means Ginsberg is more appropriately understood as a 
theorist of communication who forwarded poetry as mass medium. 
What is Ginsberg’s conception of this new poetry? How can it be characterized? It is 
clearly not the 1950s literary object, a poetry that depends upon a “middle style”: “a style that is 
adjectivally unadorned, restricted to a diction of familiar words, and straightforward in its 
syntax.”528
                                               
528 Edward Brunner, Cold War Poetry (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 
48. 
  Ginsberg broadens the understanding of poetry to that of a rhetoric which serves as 
the alternative to the fragmenting nature of mass media technology.  
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 The broad category of the poetic is seen by Ginsberg as a way of articulating and 
accounting for human motives, in the Burkean sense. Ginsberg believes poetic writing allows for 
a connection between people that is not possible through other forms of mediation. This is how it 
is able to facilitate identification/division.  When that happens, the rhetorical dimensions of the 
poetic act can be fully seen – one can reframe the universe, and therefore know the nature of 
governments, the world and God.  This act of reframing the universe is only possible through 
poetry, and only then, is a mere glimpse of an alternative ordering of things, places and people.  
In short, poetry is invaluable because it serves the rhetorical function of making and remaking 
the world.  It creates places for meaning to be made, re-made, and reconsidered. 
To take the analysis further, allow me to examine a bit from an interview where Ginsberg 
is asked about the influence of Walt Whitman on his work: 
AG: So Whitman, then, is defining or articulating democracy as based on adhesiveness, 
tender comradeship, and says it cannot succeed without it. 
Q: In a way, though, that’s just a nice, soft thing to believe. It’s never been like that, after 
all. 
A: Well, of course we’re in an especially difficult age of materialism in the sense that we 
are really surrounded by machines and electricity and wires and are sitting in cars in 
drive-ins and to some extent are isolated from direct contact we might have that comes 
form living in large families and farmhouses and country dances and adventures in the 
haybarn. But because of overpopulation and because of this highly centralized network of 
artificial communications it becomes increasingly necessary to have a breakthrough of 
more direct, satisfactory contact that is necessary to the organism.529
 
 
Ginsberg finds within Whitman a potential corrective to the overabundance of isolated, 
communicative experiences that Americans have – alone even when they are together at places 
such as the drive-in theater.  Ginsberg believes that the contemporary world is full of 
unsatisfactory contact that is not direct – that is, one person to another, without mechanical 
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intermediaries. Ginsberg could be seen as someone who is arguing that Gesellschaft is 
overcoming Gemeinshaft, to use the terms of the social theory originated by Ferdinand Tönnies. 
In the United States, this idea developed into “Modernization Theory,” which argued “the 
progressive movement of history involved the replacement of community and communal ways 
(those orientations labeled by Parsons ascriptive, affective, particularistic, and diffuse) by 
modern ways.”530 However, I believe that Ginsberg is not arguing that communal interaction has 
been replaced, but that it has been altered in a significant way. He believes that poetic discourse, 
his rhetorical theory as I am calling it, is the necessary breakthrough in order to make sure 
authentic contact remains in the world where people are surrounded and engulfed by mechanistic 
communication. In fact, this is a much more reasonable interpretation of Tönnies’s idea: 
“Tonnies formulated his Gemeinshaft-Gesellschaft distinction at a time when men and women 
were intensely conscious of being involved in two kinds of human interaction. His terms 
Gemeinshaft and Gesellshaft were not places; they were forms of human interaction.”531
 In addition to this, Ginsberg’s reference and obvious desire to be consubstantial with 
Walt Whitman further flesh out his view of human communication. Alessandro Portelli argues 
that Whitman’s central characteristic is his intense embodiment of the power of oral discourse. “ 
“‘You conceive too much of articulation,’ says Whitman, figuratively addressing language itself, 
Liquids are always continuous, never discrete or articulated, Whitman's prearticulated voice is 
the culmination of an American dream of a communal, egalitarian Eden free from divisions and 
 
Ginsberg sees the interaction between the two requiring a different way of communicating in 
order to provide elements that mechanical communication leaves out of the interaction. 
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articulation.”532 Whitman, seeing language as a liquid substance, naturally wants to wind up 
divided, distinct – perhaps in the separate containers of individuality. Whitman’s dream of 
language is for it to preserve its fluid form, and perhaps individuality could be immersed within 
it, instead of containers for it. The conclusion is one for Portelli that merges Whitman’s theory of 
language with his politics: “The formal implications of the dialogic openness of oral discourse 
frequently merge with its thematic and symbolic suggestions. Whitman's blurring of textual 
boundaries becomes a figure of the manifest destiny of a boundless, democratic, imperialistic 
America with movable borders in fluid and perennial expansion. The unfinished continuity of 
oral discourse suggests metaphors of the nation's weak and thus inexorable form.”533
 But Whitman’s theory of language and political view are unsatisfactory for Portelli as 
they have a tendency to ignore the material reality of social systems: “Whitman's resistance to 
articulation and his attack on ‘linguistics and contenders’ – against, that is, those whose task it is 
to articulate language and discriminate ideas – express his yearning for the deep organic unity 
that makes democracy meaningful; yet they also represent his inability to perceive democracy as 
a historically given form of organization of complex, diversified societies.”
 Related to 
Whitman’s historical moment, the limits of the United States, both geographically and 
politically, seemed without fixity to him. The influence for Ginsberg here is one where the 
personal limits of humanity, facing a new era after World War II, had that same weak form to 
them. Ginsberg saw consubstantiality giving way to individuality, as his quote suggests.  
534
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 Portelli sees 
Whitman as unable to see what actual democratic practice might look like. Whitman hovers in 
533 Portelli The Text and the Voice, 88. 
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the world of the ideal democratic sensibility without indicators that he understands it must be 
limited in order to be practiced. Ginsberg’s view is a bit different, seeing this sort of connection 
as essential to the human organism’s existence. Ginsberg has no problem conceptualizing the 
practice of democracy with its limits, but seeks a rhetorical practice that recognizes the need of 
such organically unifying understandings of language within a world where the material and 
technological limits are historical, clear, and unavoidable. 
Ginsberg is not naive; he does understand that personal communications between living 
human beings are not always possible.  The question from the interviewer is one that associates 
American ideal life with fiction.  Ginsberg doesn’t disagree directly, but calls attention to the fact 
that society has changed, that technologies of communication, dissemination and information 
have materially altered our interactions.  The fear is that these interactions excise healthier forms. 
There is nothing particularly wrong with the new technologies of communication except for the 
fact that they are replacing human to human communication.  What is lost is the attention to the 
interlocutors’ embodiment.  This, for Ginsberg, is not mere inconvenience or just a matter of 
quality.  Sustained periods without embodied communication will lead to breakdown and the 
destruction of the healthy human organism.  Ginsberg’s criticism of the “massification” of 
society can be characterized as a critique from the communicative standpoint.  That is, Ginsberg 
believes that the technologies of mass communication directly conflict with the technologies of 
communication available from and in the body.  This conflict leads to the suppression or 
withering of these embodied abilities. What is needed for the modern era is a technology of 
broadcasting that can avoid the problems of stripping human communication of it’s most healthy 
components – the spiritual and the embodied, familiar and common nature that is central to all 
human beings.   
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These three central terms: rhythm, spirituality and poetry, compose the three major ideas 
behind the theory of rhetoric that Allen Ginsberg is advancing.  Rhythm highlights the 
advantages of a human-produced speech, and how the mediation of the production of the human 
voice strips vital elements from the communion portion of the communication process.  
Spirituality is one of these key elements, the idea that you are interconnected and involved in the 
larger project of human existence, as well as the larger questions that have frustrated and inspired 
fellow human beings throughout time and special restrictions.  And finally there is the term 
poetry, which is the unrecognized mass media form that overcomes the deficiencies of 
processed, mechanized communication, allowing the human voice with its perfect imperfections 
to transcend space and time to connect deeply to audiences infinitely distant.  To summarize, 
Ginsberg has constructed a rhetorical theory that confronts and attempts to solve the limitations 
and fears surrounding the human rhetorical situation of the 1950s.  
I am not advocating here that Ginsberg’s rhetorical theory is perfect, nor do I advocate 
that it really does all of the things that he suggests.  What I want to call attention to is the 
complexity, depth and intellectual nature of what Allen Ginsberg was attempting to do with his 
poetics. I want to point toward a more theoretical understanding of Ginsberg as someone deeply 
engaged in questions of effective rhetoric and effective communication instead of someone 
interested in effective poetry.  For Ginsberg, these questions are the same, whereas they might 
not be the same for the contemporary literary critic.  There is an understanding of Ginsberg that 
is left out when we consider him as the producer of poems rather than the theorist of 
communication who produced poems as his rhetorical efficacy. 
There is one final perspective that must be considered to fully appreciate the Ginsberg 
flavor of the Beat’s rhetoric.  This would be his sexuality, which is not just inconvenient or out 
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of place in 1950s America, but deeply dangerous to signal to the public.  Ginsberg’s sexuality 
influenced his rhetorical understanding of communication as well as his poetic, and through 
some analysis I hope to expand the appreciation of this part of his life to his rhetorical theory. 
5.4 SEXUALITY IN GINSBERG’S WORK 
There has been a lot of scholarship that tries to place the importance of sexuality to Ginsberg’s 
work, or to the philosophical idea of the subject. Ginsberg’s sexuality is something he was very 
open about and discussed many times with interviewers.535
Despite the programmatic use of his homosexuality, sometimes disguised as bisexuality 
on the model of Walt Whitman, as both subject matter in itself and a spring-board to 
wider political questions, a number of critical essays on him manage somehow to run 
their course without reference to it. Others mention it only reluctantly, and by indirect 
means. But, of those that deal with it directly, most classify what they call his indiscretion 
as no more than an instrument with which to shock the bourgeoisie, perversely, and 
without good reason.
 Examining Ginsberg’s sexuality 
within the rhetorical environment of sexuality of the time gives a more complex and enriching 
picture of the role it plays in the rhetorical theory I am advancing. In many cases, Ginsberg’s 
sexuality is treated over simplistically if addressed at all in critical work: 
536
 
 
The homosexual scene of New York was well established when Ginsberg decided to move there 
from his native New Jersey to attend Columbia University. “Throughout Ginsberg’s oeuvre, New 
York serves as an indispensable nexus between his poetry and his sexuality, providing the literal 
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terrain which he mines for poetic imagery and for the terms with which he comes to understand 
his own sexual identity.”537
The influence of New York culture on Ginsberg must be understood through the complex 
communicative environment of homosexuals at the time. The metaphors used to understand gay 
culture at the time were very different from the current discursive choices: 
 This rich resource for rhetorical invention is central to understanding 
Ginsberg’s work, and therefore becomes a site of investigation for the rhetorical critic in order to 
provide insight into how texts were constructed and the potential rhetorical theory at work 
behind them. 
Before Stonewall (let alone before World War II), it is often said, gay people lived in a 
closet that kept them isolated, invisible, and vulnerable to anti-gay ideology. While it is 
hard to imagine the closet as anything other than a prison, we often blame people in the 
past for not having had the courage to break out of it (as if a powerful system were not at 
work to keep them in), or we condescendingly assume they had internalized the prevalent 
hatred of homosexuality and thought they deserved to be there. Even at our most 
charitable, we often imagine that people in the closet kept their gayness hidden not only 
from hostile straight people but from other gay people as well, and, possibly, even from 
themselves.538
 
 
The metaphor of the closet provides a set of judgments derived from its use. With the closet 
metaphor, an incomplete and very inaccurate picture of sexuality after World War II in New York 
emerges:  
Given the ubiquity of the term today and how central the metaphor of the closet is to the 
ways we think about gay history before the 1960s, it is bracing – and instructive – to note 
that it was never used by gay people themselves before then. Nowhere does it appear 
before the 1960s in the records of the gay movement or in the novels, diaries, or letters of 
gay men and lesbians. The fact that gay people in the past did not speak of our conceive 
of themselves as living in a closet does not preclude us from using the term 
                                               
537 Jeffrey Erik Jackanicz, “Three Gay New Yorks: the City as Heuristic in the Poetry of Allen 
Ginsberg, James Merrill, and Mark Doty” Ph.D. Diss., the University of Texas at Austin, 2000, 
21. 
538 George Chauncey Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male 
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 6. 
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retrospectively as an analytic category, but it does suggest that we need to use it more 
cautiously and precisely, and to pay attention to the very different terms people used to 
describe themselves and their social worlds.539
 
 
The terminology in use, far from describing a “closeted” and therefore secret, potentially self-
hating gay society was not the New York that Ginsberg encountered.  The vocabulary used by 
homosexuals themselves at that time provide an alternative to the closet metaphor which indicate 
a separate, distinct social world in parallel to regular society: “Gay people in the prewar years, 
then, did not speak of coming out of what we call the gay closet but rather of coming out into 
what they called ‘homosexual society’ or the ‘gay world’ a world neither so small, nor so 
isolated, nor, often, so hidden as ‘closet’ implies.”540
Many gay men, for instance, described negotiating their presence in an often hostile 
world as living a double life, or wearing a mask and taking it off. Each image has a 
valence different from closet, for each suggests not gay men’s isolation, but their ability – 
as well their need – to move between different personas and different lives, one straight, 
the other gay, to wear their hair up, as another common phrase put  it, or let their hair 
down. Many men kept their gay lives hidden from potentially hostile straight observers 
(by ‘putting their hair up’), in other words, but that did not mean they were hidden or 
isolated from each other – they offered, as they said, ‘dropped hairpins’ that only other 
gay men would notice.
 After World War II, the vocabulary begins 
to transition into a less distinct but still very real “gay world,” but not to a point where gay men 
can feel comfortable advertising their sexuality in public.  This “gay world” lives within instead 
of along side the “regular world,” and is full of many dangers to its members. A culture of highly 
coded rhetorical moves expands to where gay men could communicate with one another in ways 
that would make sure they would not be identified or threatened with job loss, ostracism, or 
violence from mainstream society: 
541
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Ginsberg’s encounters with the gay culture of New York City most likely introduced him to 
these highly coded moments of communication where the risks involved with being identified as 
gay came with a heavy price. The highly coded environment, as the quote indicates, made gay 
men feel that they were “masked” most of the time, and could only reveal their true selves by, 
ironically, dropping coded hints at other men. 
 This rhetorical practice was so successful because it communicated the appropriate 
meaning for multiple audiences. It kept gay men hidden from the threat of public violence yet 
still permitted them to live their sexuality. “Given the risks involved in asserting a visible 
presence in the streets, most gay people chose not to challenge the conventions of heterosexual 
society so directly. But they resisted and undermined them nonetheless by developing tactics that 
allowed them to identify and communicate with one another without alerting hostile outsiders to 
what they were doing.”542
Whereas fairies used codes that were intelligible to straights as well as to gays, such as 
flashy dress and an effeminate demeanor, other gay men (the “queers”) developed codes 
that were intelligible only to other men familiar with the subculture, which allowed them 
to recognize one another without drawing the attention of the uninitiated, whether they 
were on the street, in a theater, or at an predominantly straight cocktail party or bar. They 
were so effective that medical researchers at the turn of the century repeatedly expressed 
their astonishment at gay men's ability to identify each other, attributing it to something 
akin to a sixth sense.
  It was the ultimate rhetorical self defense strategy. The practice was 
so finely detailed that it appeared as if it were working by extra-sensory inducement: 
543
 
 
Such a highly developed rhetoric for a very specific audience would appear “invitational” to that 
audience, but an outside audience might interpret it as “mind reading.” Ginsberg’s presence in 
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such an environment could do nothing but indicate to him the power of coded messages, as well 
as the power of messages that all audiences interpret the same way. 
But even within this atmosphere that required detailed, coded messages, things were 
changing for gay culture in major cities. The “gay world” received a boost from the conditions 
that the war placed upon individuals. World War II brought a number of servicemen and women 
to major cities where they saw and interacted with gay culture for the first time, or placed them 
in situations where they could act on their sexuality. “By freeing men from the supervision of 
their families and small-town neighborhoods and placing them in a single-sex environment, 
military mobilization increased the chances that they would meet gay men and explore their 
homosexual interests. Many recruits saw the sort of gay life they could lead in large cities and 
chose to stay in those cities after the war. Some women who joined the military, as well as those 
on the homefront who shared housing and worked in defense industries with other women, had 
similar experiences. As a result, the war made it possible for gay bars and restaurants to 
proliferate and for many new gay social networks to form.”544
                                               
544 Chauncey, Gay New York, 10-11. 
 This climate of increasing venues 
for gay social networking most likely impacted Ginsberg as he explored the city with Jack 
Kerouac during his time at Columbia University. More importantly, such codings say less about 
the gay culture and much more about how regular culture selects its norms and standards:  “The 
process by which the normal world defined itself in opposition to the queer world was manifest 
in countless social interactions, for in its policing of the gay subculture the dominant culture 
sought above all to police its own boundaries. Given the centrality of gender nonconformity to 
the definition of the queer, the excoriation of queers served primarily to set the boundaries for 
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how normal men could dress, walk, talk, and relate to women and each other.”545 The exclusion 
of “gay culture” as abnormal restricted heterosexuals’ behavior as much as it restrained the 
discursive and performative practices of the homosexual community. It is this policing of the 
boundaries of normalcy that is the discourse which Ginsberg is responding to through at least his 
early work, such as “Howl.”  The restrictions on behavior are enforced through discursive norms, 
and Ginsberg can be seen as challenging these norms with his own implicit theory of appropriate 
discursive practice. This discursive policing is crucial as it often spills over into the material 
practices of enforcement as Woods points out: “The police maintain the sexual, as well as the 
political status quo, in their consistent and aggressive opposition to love. Law always interferes 
with the expression of love.”546
 Ginsberg’s sexuality has been used by a few scholars as a heuristic from which to 
understand his poetics. Most point out that without discussing his sexuality, analysis of Ginsberg 
fails to include one of the most central characteristics. As Woods argues, 
 This sentiment could serve as the representative anecdote for the 
relationship of the gay culture to the normal culture in New York at this time. This discursive 
policing and material policing controlled all expressions of affection no matter the sexuality. 
 It is necessary, then, to accept that Ginsberg’s programme includes his sexuality to the 
extent to which his sexuality has a bearing on his life, either literally, insofar as he writes 
down his thoughts as they occur to him and refrains from extensive correction and 
alteration (like Lawrence); or metaphorically, insofar as the concept of spontaneous 
poetry is more important in what it stands for, than in that each poem should be 
spontaneously composed. We must also accept that he highlights his sexuality by verbal 
and tonal means no more than he highlights, say, his politics or his family history.547
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The common tone of sexuality in Ginsberg’s work for Woods is one of normalcy. That is, 
Ginsberg discusses his sexuality in a very matter-of-fact tone in the same way political views or 
relationships with family are discussed. However, there is a bit more here than just proof that 
sexuality is central to Ginsberg. Articulating his sexuality in the same tone as familial relations 
or political views violates the highly coded nature of alternative sexuality in the period, and 
radically re-associates homosexuality and bisexuality to the level of normalcy of relatives or 
political views. This is a rhetorical move, and a radical one given the rigid discursive policing of 
sexuality at this time. 
Ginsberg’s sexuality should also be considered from the perspective of “gay camp,” 
which is a rhetorical response by artists to an environment that restricts expression: “Camp is an 
outgrowth of the particular historical and cultural environment in which gay artists and readers 
have had to function, and it has served as a means of giving gay people a larger space in which to 
move, loosened from the restraints of the dominant society.”548 How does “camp” rhetoric do 
this? One of the ways is that gay camp provides a space where violations of the norms of society 
are not only permissible, but expected, as a sort of comic expression. This is similar to Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque, which he argues is a luminal place where established 
hierarchies and official orders of value may be questioned: “Carnival celebrates temporary 
liberation from the prevailing truth of the established order; it marks the suspension of all 
hierarchical rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions.”549
                                               
548 David Bergman, “Strategic Camp: The Art of Gay Rhetoric” in Camp Grounds: Style and 
Homosexuality ed. David Bergman (Amherst: University of Massachusets Press, 1993), 92. 
 Such suspension in a venue of 
liberation allows for the questioning of such assumptions, something that gay camp provides:  
549Mikhail Bakhtin. Rabelais and His World. trans. Helene Iswolsky. (Bloomington:Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 109.  
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Camp and the carnivalesque occupy many of the same cultural positions. For example, 
Bakhtin argues that the carnivalesque has three basic forms: the ritual spectacle, comic 
verbal composition, and various forms of abuse such as curses and oaths. Camp takes 
such equivalent forms as the drag show, the queeny repartee, and the gay put-down. Like 
the carnivalesque, it merges the sublimely grand with the heartily ridiculous.550
 
  
These rhetorical strategies indicate that there is a similarity between camp rhetoric and the 
carnivalesque. The techniques of gay camp open a space where gay sexuality can be displayed, 
but perhaps only because it is performed in an environment recognized by the audience as 
completely ridiculous, and outside the bounds of so-called “normal” society. “The carnivalesque 
is always visible, an open provocation of the dominant culture; while camp frequently separates 
gay culture from straight culture.”551 It appears that Bergman is willing to admit that there are 
similarities between the carnivalesque and camp, but camp is not a complete moment of 
carnivalesque liminality. Perhaps the restrictions placed upon gay sexuality make it a special 
case that doesn’t quite fit Bakhtin’s assumptions. In any event, Ginsberg’s work should be 
scrutinized for elements of this camp rhetoric. Bergman identifies six elements that are present in 
camp rhetoric:  “(1) both the author and the reader wear disguises – the disguise of 
heterosexuality; (2) the masquerade enforces an intimacy even as it distances the participants in 
the masquerade; (3) it is maintained with a buoyant humor (lacking in Symonds), the “camp” 
laugh; (4) the entire affair is conducted in an elaborate style which while seemingly superficial, 
reveals to the initiated an unspoken subtext.”552
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 However, we cannot forget that Ginsberg’s Howl 
and Other Poems was put on trial for obscenity after being seized by the postal police. If it were 
550 Bergman, “Strategic Camp,” 101. 
551 Bergman, “Strategic Camp,” 100. 
552 Bergman, “Strategic Camp,” 99. 
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in the tradition of camp rhetoric, the carnivalesque scene of such rhetoric would have allowed it 
to exist as a moment of ridiculousness. In the analysis of “Howl,” I will look for elements of 
camp rhetoric. With these qualifications in mind, perhaps Ginsberg’s rhetorical mode is not 
campy, but an alternative to camp rhetoric – an addition to the rhetorical options available for the 
performance of non-normative sexualities.  
This is how William Patrick Jeffs sees Ginsberg’s poetics – an invitation to reject the 
pressures of mid-twentieth century conformity: “Ginsberg’s law-breaking and language-breaking 
seek to dismantle pressures that urge Americans to conform to certain behavioral norms that 
limit their social and political freedoms.”553 Ginsberg’s resistance to conformity did not just exist 
in the political sphere, but began as a critique of literary standards of the era. “Ginsberg 
associates the monolithic social norms of the Cold War with the narrow vision of the New Critics 
of the forties and fifties who believed in the literary text as a work unto itself apart from 
biographical and political concerns.”554 Jeffs argues that the way this happens is through the 
strategic use of obscene language to rupture the adhered-to standards of society. “The poet 
employs slang and obscene words to deflate society’s norms and to reshape its consciousness. 
The works of the Beats, especially Ginsberg’s poetry. . .fuse sexual honesty with a lack of 
shame, thereby opening up literature and society’s consciousness to explorations into new 
subject matters.”555
                                               
553 William Patrick Jeffs, Feminism, Manhood, and Homosexuality (New York: Peter Lang, 
2003), 72. 
 Jeffs is convinced that the source for these arguments comes from 
Ginsberg’s sexuality. “His homosexuality, certainly a source of guilt for him as an adolescent, 
becomes a source of strength as the poems in Howl and Mind Breaths attest. His sexual otherness 
554 Jeffs, Feminism, Manhood, and Homosexuality, 73. 
555 Jeffs, Feminism, Manhood, and Homosexuality, 75-6. 
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lies behind his pleas for new kinds of men; it also lies behind his calling into question the 
masculinity of men in positions of power.”556
 The common denominator of all of these aspects is a connection to the human body, and 
the perils and pleasures of being embodied. The attention Ginsberg paid to the embodied 
condition was well summed up by one commentator: 
 What was once a disadvantage becomes a source 
of inspiration; what once was perceived as an ill has become part of the cure through the 
“madness” of Ginsberg’s rhetoric. 
I think Allen could sing to those assembled teachers about his usually-not-discussed-in-
company body parts with such élan, and be accepted so freely, because everybody 
understood that on some level it wasn’t really his ass he was talking about anyway. It was 
an attitude toward the world and toward the body, a sweet-natured, laughing acceptance 
of earthliness that existed, for Ginsberg, as a means to get off the earth plane. As bodily 
as his work may be, it usually tends upward and outward, away from gravity, moving 
through the fact of flesh toward other arenas. Amazingly, his most famous poem invented 
a new cultural category – neither homo nor straight, quite, but the ‘angel-headed hipster,’ 
the beat whose transcendent sexuality lifts him out of the familiar categories, knocking 
the binary off its high horse, setting himself loose to sing.557
 
 
Doty notes some of the most important rhetorical elements of Ginsberg’s work, specifically the 
importance of attitude.  Doty argues this attitude allows for a transcendence of the sexuality 
binary plaguing America in the 1950s (and still today). More importantly, I think this can be 
understood as a rhetorical theory. The idea that the poem interrupts normal binaries and creates a 
new position to occupy from which to transcend the binary is offering a new rhetorical position. 
Here one can identify with the speaker of “Howl” and identify with that person. Doty pushes 
toward this view in further remarks that point out the limits of Howl’s revolutionary potential:  
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“It seems as if American’s willful denial of queer sexuality might simply have crumbled in the 
face of it, and that a generation of gay men might have taken it as a clarion call to freedom, but 
neither of those things happened. Of course, this may simply have been because it was a poem, a 
form that tends to be a far advance scout of culture rather than an actual agent of change.”558
Doty’s problem is not his analysis of poetry, Ginsberg or Howl, but more his 
understanding of “change.”  One view is that the poem, being a harbinger of change did not 
directly result in political action, so therefore it had little influence in the political moment.  If 
poetry is considered symbolic action, as Burke argues, then we have political action on the level 
of the rhetorical. As the speaker attempts to identify and divide in order to find a place for 
himself, he offers a new political position for the reader. This is the contribution to beat rhetoric 
that Ginsberg makes, and it focuses on the human body.  I argue that this was influenced 
primarily by Ginsberg’s struggles with his sexuality. Ginsberg realized that to provide the sort of 
revolutionary sentiment that Doty is discussing, one needs to start at the roots – 
identification/division.  Without a new way of speaking about the commonplaces of humanity, 
there would be no hope of reaching a common identity that could be shared as the start of a new 
way of speaking about the political and the sexual. 
 
Many scholars have weighed in on Ginsberg’s sexuality and its influence on his work. 
Gwen Brewer argues that Ginsberg’s “open proclamation” of his sexuality in poems and other 
writings was a “moving force in encouraging other gays and lesbians to come out of the closet, if 
sometimes only to indicate that not all gays and lesbians were like him.”559
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Before Stonewall (Binghamton NY: Haworth Press, 2002), 310. 
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The purpose of poetry is the Burkean understanding of rhetoric – to help human beings 
become consubstantial, to situate their own motives with those of others.  Understanding 
Ginsberg’s work this way broadens the appreciation of his work as an implicit rhetorical theory. 
Kerouac’s basic rhetorical principles which I explored in earlier chapters gave Ginsberg 
the perspective from which to address his position, gain recognition as a speaking subject by an 
audience, and to participate in public address as a homosexual.  Ginsberg, unlike Kerouac, 
needed to resolve his sense of place in a more direct manner than Kerouac.  As Foster put it, 
“Kerouac’s work was rarely political, at least explicitly so; it was left to Ginsberg to show how 
Kerouac’s expressionistic aesthetic could be used for political ends.”560
Ginsberg’s inability to reconcile his sexuality and society’s demands arguably landed him 
in psychiatric care.  The lack of a proper way of achieving order of the symbols that constitute 
society was more the cause than an inability to “follow the rules” or understand them.  Ginsberg 
required a new way of making, changing and ordering the universe, and his poetic practice 
became that necessary rhetoric. Ginsberg needed a way of identification with a society that only 
  Foster is using the term 
political in its overt sense, as Kerouac’s political importance can hardly be ignored.  Many of the 
overtly political aspects of the beat rhetoric are derived from Ginsberg’s work.  Ginsberg had a 
much more pressing and critical need to establish a place from which to be in society than 
Kerouac, who was performing heterosexuality, unquestionably at least for most who interacted 
with him. Allen Ginsberg was never comfortable in passing as a heterosexual.  For him, his 
homosexuality was something that had to be expressed, performed and lived, although in 
cautious ways.  He was no fool and was not ignorant of the dangers of his environment. 
                                               
560 Edward Halsey Foster, Understanding the Beats (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1992), 85. 
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offered division.  Without the necessary counterpart to that division – a manner of recognizable 
identification as a part of society – Ginsberg had no method or ability to speak, demand, argue or 
engage with larger societal forces.  He had to innovate an identification that both satisfied him 
and the larger demands of 1950s American society. 
5.5 BURKE AND GINSBERG: BUCKING THE SYSTEM THROUGH BURKING 
Allen Ginsberg’s poetry often overshadows his contributions to literary criticism.  Through his 
life, Ginsberg was asked to write reviews, introductions and commentary for many published 
books of poetry, novels, collections and albums. Aside from this, Ginsberg occasionally delved 
into literary criticism.  It is within these critical pieces that rhetorical criticism can reveal some of 
Ginsberg’s deeper concerns about rhetoric, literature and the human being. 
Ginsberg’s essay on William Blake, whose importance cannot be underestimated in 
Ginsberg’s poetic practice, has a section where he argues for the importance of Shakespeare.  
Ginsberg follows John Keats, who argues that Shakespeare is great because of “negative 
capability.”  Ginsberg goes on to explain in his own words what he thinks negative capability 
means: 
Which is to say, the possibility of seeing contending parties, seeing the communists and 
Capitalists scream at each other, or the Buddhists and non-Buddhists, or the Muslims and 
Christians, or the Jews and the Arabs, or the self and the not-self, or your mommy and 
daddy, or yourself and your wife, or your baby and yourself.  You can see them all 
screaming at each other, and you can see as a kind of comedic drama that you don’t get 
tangled and lost in it, you don’t enter into the daydream fantasy of being right and being 
one side or the other so completely that you go out and cop somebody’s head off. Instead 
you just sort of watch yourself, you watch them in and out of the game at the same time, 
both in and out of the game, watching and wondering at it.  That is to say, the ability to 
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have contrary ideas in your head at the same time without it freaking out, without ‘an 
irritable reaching out after the fact’ or conclusions.561
 
 
Why is Shakespeare or Blake important? It is not because they provide works that others could 
not hope to match in quality.  It is because these authors provide abilities to the readers.  These 
authors provide a method for individuals to step outside of the conflicts and see them both 
without either being overcome with the din of the noise or the force of the conflict.  They 
provide a way to enact what he calls “wonder” which requires a frame of “comedic drama” in 
order to avoid being overwhelmed with the conflict and “freaking out.”  In short, the authors 
provide “equipment” for coping with conflict on multiple levels – Ginsberg does not leave out 
any level of potential conflict in his articulation. 
Ginsberg continues his discussion of negative capability by explaining the benefits.  For 
Ginsberg, the result of negative capability is a better, more complex understanding of the roots of 
the conflict: 
Naturally, you reach out and want to know more, but you don’t get mad, crazed, say ‘I 
gotta know the answer, there is one answer and I, me, I have to have the one answer,” 
maybe the question has no answer, maybe there is not even a question, though there may 
be perturbation and conflict.  So, you could apply that, say, to the present Cold War 
situation where everyone wants to destroy the world in order to win victory over the 
Wrong (either side).562
 
 
Ginsberg applies the desire for knowledge to the idea of negative capability in the context of the 
Cold War.  Negative capability does not put one in the position of inability to act, on the 
contrary, it allows for a more thorough examination of the question. Ginsberg shows the danger 
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of misunderstanding quite well in the Cold War – the drive to be right over the desire to 
understand literally risks the destruction of the Earth. 
This “negative capability” is something that not only avoids ultimate destruction, but also 
creates, “a kind of exquisite awareness that intensifies,” providing a position where one can be 
“both in and out of the game, watching and wondering at it which is the best we can do 
actually.”563  Negative capability provides space for the politics of “wonder,” which is, “the best 
thing we can do . . . it’s so amazing.”  The result of the position of wonder is only expressible by 
Ginsberg poetically:   “If you take that attitude and open yourself up an allow yourself to admit 
everything, to hear everything, not to exclude, just be like the moon in the old Japanese haiku: 
‘The autumn moon/ shines kindly/ on the flower-thief,’ or like Whitman’s sun which shines on 
the common prostitute in his poem ‘To a Common Prostitute.’”564
This level of openness and acceptance is in line with Buke’s idea of the comic frame, 
which he describes in detail in his book Attitudes Toward History. Burke is concerned with what 
he calls “debunking,” which “can disclose material interests with great precision. Too great 
precision, in fact.”
 
565
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 The revelation of material interest as the goal of critique is too narrow for 
Burke as it risks a dangerous reduction: “For though the doctrine of Zweck im Recht is a veritable 
Occam’s razor for the simplification of human motives, teaching us the role that special material 
interests play in the ‘impartial’ manipulations of the law, showing us that law can be privately 
owned like any other property, it can be too thorough; in lowering human dignity so greatly, it 
564 Ginsberg, Deliberate Prose, 295. 
565 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
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lowers us all.”566
Burke suggests an alternative mode of criticism that will avoid this reductive calculus: “A 
comic frame of motives avoids these difficulties, showing us how an act can ‘dialectically’ 
contain both transcendental and material ingredients, both imagination and bureaucratic 
embodiment, both ‘service’ and ‘spoils.’”
 The reduction of human motives to pure material interests is the problem with 
the precision of debunking. However great the revelation that material interests extend even to 
the application of the law, this revelation risks a reductive view that all human action is 
materially motivated.  If this “lowering” of human dignity is allowed to occur, it limits the 
possible motives ascribable to human actions only to material desires, which is unsatisfactory for 
Burke. 
567 Burke sees a certain amount of ambivalence as 
necessary to a complete account of the motives at play in any situation. The complexity of 
human action combined with the inability to know all the factors at work in any given situation 
mean that there must be some degree of uncertainty in the criticism. “One might say of the comic 
frame: it also makes us sensitive to the point at which one of these ingredients becomes 
hypertrophied, with the corresponding atrophy of the other. A well-balanced ecology requires the 
symbiosis of the two.”568
Burke believes that the comic approach to understanding human relations is not only 
better than debunking, but provides for a balanced approach to other people, allowing 
relationships to form:  
 What Burke is arguing is that a comic frame, as opposed to the 
reductionist, materialist view of debunking, provides a healthier view of human motives for it 
makes one aware when the criticism becomes too one sided.  
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In the motives we assign to the actions of ourselves and our neighbors, there is implicit a 
program of socialization. In deciding why people do as they do, we get the cues that place 
us with relation to them. Hence, a vocabulary of motives is important for the forming of 
both private and public relationships. A comic frame of motives, as here conceived, 
would not only avoid the sentimental denial of materialistic factors in human acts. It 
would also avoid the cynical brutality that comes when such sensitivity is outraged, as it 
must be outraged by the acts of others or by the needs that practical exigencies place 
upon us.569
 
 
Each decision that we make about why someone does something is an attribution, according to 
Burke. These attributions are not only important to our understanding of the people that surround 
us, they also frame the possible relationships we can have with others. The entire political or 
social map, therefore, is written with these vocabularies of motives. Burke’s argument here 
clearly demonstrates why he feels the comic approach is best as it seeks a balance in attribution, 
allowing future relationships to be constrained but not determined through an over-simplistic 
attribution of motives from a past encounter with another.  This also benefits the individual since 
reductionism is minimized in any encounter, a positive result can be extracted from most 
encounters: “The comic frame, in making a man the student of himself, makes it possible for him 
to ‘transcend’ occasions when he has been tricked or cheated, since he can readily put such 
discouragements in his ‘assets’ column, under the head of ‘experience.’ Thus we ‘win’ by subtly 
changing the rules of the game – and by a mere trick of bookkeeping, like the accountants for big 
utility corporations, we make ‘assets’ out of ‘liabilities.’”570
                                               
569 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 170. 
 Such a change in perspective allows 
for a more reflective and constructive assessment of one’s own motives and desires, helping 
people discover a path for positive action rather than a defeatist view of unchangeable motion – 
the sense that people never change.   
570 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 171. 
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In the end result, the comic frame suggests a new democratic subject for Burke. “In sum, 
the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. its ultimate 
would not passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would transcend himself by noting his 
own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and the non-rational.”571
There is a good example of Ginsberg applying the comic framing to his own life as he 
recounts in an interview an injury he received based on his attitude toward others. He was 
responsible for caring for a number of dogs that he did not want to take care of, and he slipped 
and fell on the ice. He details his reaction to the incident: 
 
Burke thinks the comic frame provides reasons as well as a way of being rational or non-rational, 
instead of leaving those ideas in the field of motion. Burke believes attention to one’s own 
thinking and consciousness is a superior alternative to attributing human behavior to a passive 
system.  Burke’s comic frame is a critical instrument that people can use to restructure the world 
around them in terms of their own action, giving them some political power to alter the 
conditions of their existence via changing their attitudes toward and about others. 
I was carrying their water and food, but I was really irritated and angry – stomping out 
angrily, and I stomped right out on the ice and slipped and fell. As I was walking I was 
thinking – resentfully – ‘Why did they leave those dogs with me, rah, rah, rah. . .’ So I 
wasn’t watching where I was going. I wasn’t being mindful of the fact that I had slipped 
on the ice because of these slick tennis shoes I was wearing. I should have been slower 
and more deliberate, and enjoyed what I was doing; or, at least, been aware of what I was 
doing, and put some good boots on to go out there on the slippery ice. . . It was a direct 
object lesson that while the mind was clouded with resentment and anger, I could get 
hurt! I mean it was totally direct. There was no way out.572
 
 
Ginsberg chalks up an accident to his experience column by becoming an “objective observer of 
himself” freeing his attribution of the accident not to the selfish individuals who left him to care 
                                               
571 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 171. 
572 Ginsberg, Spontaneous Mind, 401. 
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for too many dogs, but to himself and his inability to concentrate on his surroundings due to his 
anger.  His “clouded mind” prohibits him from seeing the whole situation and understanding the 
need for balance and responsibility for his own attitude toward the situation.  
Furthermore, Ginsberg attributes the act of comic framing– making sure to pull benefit 
out of ambivalence and not immediately simplify the situation – as an inventional resource for 
his poetic-rhetoric:  
I have to really go back to the ground of the situation, get back to the fact and say what it 
is I’m resenting, and write that down as an image. ‘Dogs barking in the barn calling for 
their food in the icy hay,’ or something like that. Is that something to get angry about? 
Otherwise I might have said, ‘Having to go out and feed the dirty dogs of reality’ or 
something rather than, ‘the dogs lonesome in the barn barking in their icy hay.’ When 
you have to go back to the ‘icy hay’ you come up with poetry. I mean the ‘icy hay’ is 
much better than ‘dirty dogs.’573
 
  
Keeping mindful of the situation and not immediately reducing it to the terms available easily in 
the debunking attitude provides the better inventional resource for poetry. Ginsberg believes that 
the more ambivalent “icy hay” is better poetry than the reductionist-derived “dirty dogs,” for one 
conveys a very limited, personal attitude and the other allows for more interpretation of the 
scene. As Burke would point out, “It [the comic frame] considers human life as a project in 
‘composition,’ where the poet works with the materials of social relationships.”574
                                               
573 Ginsberg, Spontaneous Mind, 403. 
 Ginsberg, 
instead of blaming his friends for selfishly leaving him with the “dirty dogs” changes the attitude 
toward one of sympathy for the dogs, surrounded by “icy hay.” This is done through re-framing 
his injury as his own fault for allowing himself to purely paint his situation as unfair, and getting 
angry about it. His rhetorical frame of choice – to blame his reductionist view of the situation for 
his injury – allows him to criticize the incident poetically, allowing for a larger and more 
574 Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 173. 
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sympathetic interpretation involving the dogs.  Ginsberg’s framing also defines the rational and 
irrational viewpoint, positing his attitude of victimage and anger as irrational as it led to his 
senseless injury on the ice. The rational view is to “enjoy” even labor that might seem unfair or 
thoughtlessly assigned. 
There are other connections between Burke and Ginsberg on the line of comic framing 
that will be investigated.  In this section I will argue that Kenneth Burke’s comic correctives are 
the explicit goal of Ginsberg’s poetic practice of “inversion within inversion” as I argued above.  
Ginsberg’s contributions to American poetic practice are not his final purpose.  He seeks to offer 
a new way of framing, thinking, and speaking about the world. His alternative is a stark contrast 
to dominant ways of thinking and speaking of his time as his is rooted in the complexities and 
messiness of the human body.  In the next chapter we will see through my examination of 
“Howl” that Ginsberg’s association with Burke is very close, as the notion of framing as well as 
inversion and Burke’s sense of the socioanagogic will come into complementary play. 
Clearly this is what Ginsberg admires from the poets he praises in his criticism. He is 
attempting, I argue, to offer a new way of attaining this position through a new rhetoric which 
includes methods of framing, inventing, and understanding the world rooted primarily in the 
common material condition of being an embodied human being.  Now I will turn to “Howl” to 
see how this rhetoric plays out in its first invitational form. 
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6.0  “HOWL” AND BEAT RHETORIC 
 
In this chapter I offer a rhetorical criticism of the poem “Howl” by Allen Ginsberg in order to 
further explain his contributions to the beat rhetoric. I examine the poem looking for the key 
elements to Ginsberg’s contribution, circulating around the terms body, spirituality and poetry. 
These terms represent the critical vocabulary around which Ginsberg’s implicit rhetorical 
contributions can be understood.  
Allen Ginsberg, as I argued in the last chapter, sought relief from his discomfort with the 
dominant modes of rhetoric and communication of his own time by returning to the limits of the 
human body as a productive rhetorical topos.  This allowed Ginsberg to structure a rhetoric that 
placed the limits and advantages of being in a human body as the centerpiece of a theory of 
human communication.  As I argued in the previous chapter, Ginsberg saw the fragmented, 
mechanistic communicative norms of the 1950s as destructive and dangerous.  Seeing the limits 
of the human body as necessary recalcitrance, Ginsberg celebrates the limits of the human form 
as providing a better mode of consubstantiation for society. Using Kenneth Burke’s ideas of 
recalcitrance and comic framing, we can see Ginsberg as being interested in offering an 
alternative rhetoric for a healthier mode of communication between people.   In this chapter I 
will argue that “Howl” can be seen as both an argument for the alternative rhetorical mode 
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Ginsberg advocates as well as being a demonstrative act, composed along the principles of the 
rhetoric that he advances. 
First, I will examine some analysis that has been done on “Howl,” then I will review 
some of the important rhetorical insights of Kenneth Burke that can help make “Howl” 
understandable as a demonstration and argument for a different rhetoric.  Finally, I offer my own 
analysis of “Howl” and explain why I consider this great American poem a central part of an 
implicit rhetorical theory for the beats. 
6.1 PREVIOUS SCHOLARS ON “HOWL” 
Tony Trigilio argues that, “Ginsberg's language in Howl combines transcendent and immanent 
modes of representation, creating what he calls in his 1986 Howl annotations a "mystical" and 
"commonsensical" language for prophecy.”575
                                               
575 Tony Trigilio, “‘Sanity a Trick of Agreement’: Madness and Doubt in Ginsberg’s Prophetic 
Poetry” Poetry Criticism 47 (2003): 125-127, 125. 
 He is not alone among critics who seem to 
gravitate toward “Howl’s” language and communicative properties as the richest element of the 
poem for criticism. Trigilio concludes that, “The madness of the protagonists of Howl is a divine 
language of "mercy" and "affirmation" that represents eternal "gaps" in consciousness through an 
attention to border conditions: boundaries between West and East, representation and 
nonreferentiality, immanence and transcendence, psychiatry and antipsychiatry, and individual 
authority and communality. The lives of these "best minds" seem non-narratable in Howl 
because dominant juridico-medical discourses of the era rely on language incapable of exploring 
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gaps in the blurred boundaries inhabited by these protagonists.”576
Paul Portugues seeks the origins of Ginsberg’s prophetic and messianic style through his 
whole canon. He argues that “Howl” represents the contributions of the physical body to 
Ginsberg’s poetic style: 
 The failure of the 
commonplace languages of the time to account for the drives, desires and lives of the people 
Ginsberg writes about require a new language, something that Ginsberg attempts in Trigilio’s 
estimation.  
By 1955, when Ginsberg had reached the mature style of “Howl,” he had mastered the 
technique of using his physical surroundings as both a thematic and a structural 
foundation. He had also learned how to add to walking and pills various techniques of 
controlled breathing, each of which enabled him to prolong and plumb the prophetic 
illuminative seizure. He drew these techniques from an interesting configuration of 
sources: experiments in breathing that induced a mild euphoria of hyperventilation; the 
rhetorical cadences in the prophetic poetry of Jeremiah and Christopher Smart; and the 
saxophone riffs of Lester Young. All gave lift to his images, creating the ‘singability’ that 
he had said was essential to durable prophetic poetry.577
 
 
For Portugues, Ginsberg’s reliance on breath and natural speaking cadence were tools that helped 
Ginsberg realize his goal of creating poetry that gave the desired and effective meaning to his 
poetry that he wanted. All of these breathing experiments were attempted in order to give 
Ginsberg’s poetry the ability to communicate the prophetic message he wanted to get across to 
his readers and listeners. 
In addition to language, scholars also note the importance of the body to Ginsberg’s 
poetry. Examining Ginsberg’s poetic corpus, Bradley J. Stiles remarks, “In much the same spirit 
as Kerouac, Ginsberg replaces the natural landscape with the popular culture terrain; for 
                                               
576 Trigilio, “Sanity a Trick of Agreement,” 126. 
577 Paul Portugues, “Allen Ginsberg's Visions and the Growth of His Poetics of Prophecy” 
Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism, ed. Janet Witalec (Detroit: Gale, 2002): 157-173, 158. 
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Ginsberg, however, the spaces between the images are more important than the images 
themselves. Artists, he says, must place themselves within those gaps, creating the ‘poem of life 
butchered out of their own bodies.’”578 Although Stiles’ examination of Ginsberg is focused 
mostly on his later work, Stiles argues that Ginsberg’s attention to the human body as inventional 
resource for his poetry was germinating since the 1940s. “It is only beginning with ‘The 
Change,’ however, that Ginsberg’s poetry is characterized not only by its intense attention to the 
particular details of each moment and the internal reactions of the consciousness within the body 
he inhabits to the passing, moment-by-moment occurrences, worries, joys, and desires – qualities 
he had demonstrated since before Howl – but also by a new freedom from self-recrimination and 
guilt.”579 Stiles argues that Ginsberg’s change in perspective was one of attitude toward his own 
embodied state from one of recognition and struggle with the limits to one of acceptance of the 
limits and chronicling them without guilt. The shift for Ginsberg’s acceptance of his embodied 
state comes in the 1960s according to Stiles.  “Ultimately, he found that the only way to 
transcend the concerns of the body was to immerse his attention wholly in the body experience, 
to become completely involved in all matters of the body, from sex to politics to death, and allow 
his detached soul to watch the reactions of his ego-self to these experiences.”580
                                               
578 Bradley J. Stiles, Emerson’s Contemporaries and Kerouac’s Crowd (Madison NJ: Farleigh 
Dickenson Press, 2003), 104. 
 This period is 
much later than “Howl,” occurring after his journey to India and encounters with spiritual 
practitioners and thinkers. 
579 Stiles, Emerson’s Contemporaries and Kerouac’s Crowd, 104. 
 
580 Stiles, Emerson’s Contemporaries and Kerouac’s Crowd, 94. 
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Some scholarship on “Howl” points to it as potentially altering the idea of language as a 
whole. Preston Whaley, Jr. exemplifies this when he writes:  
‘Howl’ liberates sound-images from meanings.  Of course, just as nets swipe butterflies 
from their flight, interpretations snatch words from theirs.  Certainly, I am a butterfly 
catcher, if only to let the butterfly go after saying an important thing.  Both ‘Howl’ and A 
Love Supreme show that social, psychological, and artistic bondage result from 
‘imaginary walls.’ Art can imagine a loving freedom even as it calls cold realities to 
account.581
 
 
Whaley points out that “Howl’s” rhythms and scheme are based on the natural human breath, 
and that the patterns of the poem are similar to John Coltrane’s improvisational jazz masterpiece 
A Love Supreme.  Whaley self-identifies as a butterfly catcher who, through his analysis, strips 
words from meaning.  “Howl’s” meaning is meaninglessness.  It is “art for art’s sake,” in the 
same way a butterfly does not exist strictly for human pleasure.  Unfortunately what is lost 
through such assumptions is the perspective of the poetic act as a rhetorical one – the creation of 
a text for the purpose of teaching, pleasing or moving an audience.  Whaley argues that “Howl’s” 
meaning stems from its separation of meaning from words, and exists on a level of engagement 
somewhat beyond normal semantics. It identifies the walls of real limitation while offering a way 
to transcend those walls by separating meaning from words, and perhaps re-attaching it to the 
experience of the poem. 
Other scholars approach “Howl’s” meaning in a more static sense.  On Howl’s 50th 
Anniversary many commentators wrote essays to examine why it was such an important poem.  
According to one commentator: 
The announcer voice of the poem keeps folding all those lives in as preview of the 
spectacle the poem will produce, meanwhile it’s producing it now, and so much of the 
                                               
581 Preston Whaley, Jr., Blows Like a Horn: Beat Writing, Jazz, Style, and Markets in the 
Transformation of U.S. Culture (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 181. 
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excitement of ‘Howl’ is its capacity to produce those two effects at once. You’re rubbing 
your hands as you read – ooh, this is going to be really good – but the experience is 
already happening.582
 
 
In this interpretation, the experience of “Howl” is in the reading of “Howl” – one knows that the 
poem is good because reading it gives one an expectation of “goodness” just around the corner.  
This is done, apparently, by the expectations produced by the “announcer voice.” To produce 
this dual effect so well one would need to be a master rhetorician.  The voice creates the 
expectation for the reader while delivering the result. 
Other essays point to “Howl’s” importance as a commodity, a site to make meanings, of 
many varieties:   
‘Howl’ still helps young people realize their actual ambitions: not to become a poor poet 
living in a dump but maybe to become a physical therapist when you are expected to 
become a lawyer, or maybe to become a lawyer when everybody expects you to fail at 
everything. ‘Howl’ transforms the losers into winners by offering a process of permission 
handed down from Blake and Whitman.583
 
 
This understanding of “Howl” brings it in line with the classic American trope of “be who you 
are, no matter what they say.”  This reading of “Howl” gives the poem the sense of granting 
permission to the reader to act on ambitions that they might not feel are appropriate. This critic 
offers the closest reading to “Howl” as rhetorical as it can be used by the readers in order to 
justify their decisions of what to pursue in their lives. 
Furthermore, Foster discusses “Howl” strictly as a commodity: 
In 1986 Barry Miles published his annotated facsimile edition of ‘Howl,’ prepared with 
Ginsberg’s assistance.  Incorporating drafts, and offering footnotes and extensive 
appendices, Miles’s edition looks like a sourcebook for dissertations and scholarly essays 
                                               
582 Eileen Myles, “Repeating Allen,” in The Poem That Changed America: Howl Fifty Years 
Later, ed. Jason Shinder (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), 85. 
583 Bob Rosenthal, “A Witness,” in Shinder, 45. 
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– an odd packaging, to say the least, for a poem and a poet who were once poorly served 
by critics and the academy.584
 
 
Now Ginsberg’s poem, “poorly served” at one point can be served with culinary gusto, properly 
prepared and seasoned for the waiting consumers. One does not have to stretch too far here to 
call up associations between cooking and rhetoric, used as a pejorative interpretation of rhetoric, 
the art of tasty appearance. Moving “Howl” into the realm of the consumable, arid academic 
object of study is another vein of interpretation that is usually coupled with the predictable 
transgressive reading. 
Another move in interpreting “Howl” is to associate it with the tradition of literary 
modernism.  As Vivian Gornick put it in her assessment of the poem: “Like Leaves of Grass, it is 
an ingenious experiment with the American language that did what Ezra Pound said a great 
poem should do: make the language new.”585  Pound’s famous goal of poetry is a bit ambivalent, 
as “new” could mean a number of potential flavors of success (or failure). But Gornick continues 
her praise of “Howl” as new by indicating its traditional heritage: “‘Howl’ as I have been 
suggesting, is in many respects a poem that honors the principles of Modernity – le mot juste, the 
objective correlative, the use of complex semantic and rhetorical figures – even though the 
critics, put off by its ‘bad taste,’ didn’t see how fully Ginsberg was working within the 
tradition.”586
If “Howl” is traditional but at the same time offering the new, it could fit into what Burke 
called “casuistic stretching,” which is where, “one introduces new principles while theoretically 
 
                                               
584 Foster, Edward Halsey Understanding the Beats (Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 
1992), 100. 
585 Vivian Gornick, “Wild at Heart,” in Shinder, 9. 
586 Gornick “Wild at Heart,” 40. 
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remaining faithful to old principles.”587 Through this method, Burke argues that many complex 
ideas in language are robbed of their ambivalence because they are not seen as containing 
opposites. “Our language is somewhat haphazard. Sometimes we have the words for the 
opposites, without the ‘higher’ abstraction that would unite them. Sometimes we have the 
‘higher’ abstraction, and believe so thoroughly in its pristine unity that we don’t even seek for 
the antithesis subsumed in it.”588 Casuistic stretching causes this departure of language from 
ambivalent meaning to flattened, clear meaning. But Burke does not dismiss it as a purely 
negative thing: “We believe that dissociative trends can be arrested only by a return to 
integrative thought (the over-simplification of which is manifested in adherence to a ‘party 
line’).”589 “Howl” makes the language new by working fully within the poetic tradition.  It is 
very high praise for a sophist or a rhetorician as well as a poet.  The rhetorical nature of “Howl” 
is what gives it such a double-edged character – traditional and grounded as well as new and 
radical.  It is indeed one of the faculties of rhetoric, to “prove opposites.”590 As Michael Leff 
argues, “Rhetorical arguments generally deal with confused notions, with ideas and concepts that 
do not admit of a single, unequivocal meaning.”591
                                               
587 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1984), 229. 
 “Howl” seems well-suited to a rhetorical 
reading since it seems to be hovering between near opposites in the scholarship. A rhetorical 
criticism of “Howl” can provide a reading that elucidates the rhetorical dimensions of the poem 
and how it can be seen as a part of a larger rhetorical theory. 
588 Burke, Attitudes, 231. 
589 Burke, Attitudes, 232. 
590 Aristotle, On Rhetoric trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
35. 
591 Michael Leff, “The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from 
Cicero to Boethius” Rhetorica 1:1 (Spring 1983):23-44, 23. 
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“Howl” as an object of attention and meaning-creation is closest to the reading that I 
suggest, but strictly viewing “Howl” as a commodity that can “mean” for different audiences 
allows for perhaps too broad of a range of meanings.  A balance of attention to poet and reader is 
optimal, as well as a balance between poem as object and poem as rhetorical act.  Before we get 
into “Howl,” I should establish a reading of Ginsberg as the rhetorical theorist and practitioner, a 
man concerned with the relationship of the embodied human being, language, and the resulting 
political situation that extends from this often volatile mixture. 
In my reading, I offer another voice to the conversation: consideration of “Howl” as a 
blueprint for a rhetorical mode.  I see “Howl” as a poem that blurs the distinction between poetry 
and rhetoric.  It attempts to use the traditional poetic tropistic forms in order to indicate a 
problem with communication in general in the 1950s. This general problem in communication 
can be solved, Ginsberg argues, by adopting a poetic-rhetoric much the way Howl is constructed.  
In the end, Howl serves as a rhetorical template for proper human communication. It 
problematizes standard relationships within the culture, then offers a critique of them.   Before I 
can offer that read, I must take inventory of the tools for analysis offered by Kenneth Burke to 
understand poetry as human communication. 
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6.2 BURKE, POETRY AND THE SOCIOANAGOGIC CRITIC 
“By the ‘principle of courtship’ in rhetoric we mean the use of suasive devices for the 
transcending of social estrangement.”592
Burke’s quote above is an attempt to establish a rhetorical principle for identification 
where social structures require transcendence in order to provide for consubstantiality.  Burke is 
interested in modes of censorship that are more implicit and cultural than explicit and 
governmental.  As an example, Burke offers his criticism of Venus and Adonis by William 
Shakespeare, where he lines up the participants in the romantic or seductive drama of the poem 
with the social classes of the time.  His argument is that “sexual courtship is intrinsically fused 
with the motives of social hierarchy.”
  Kenneth Burke’s project to offer a full slate of modes 
of identification, communication and persuasion that could be understood as based on poetry.  
Burke begins his investigation into rhetoric with the story of Samson, rendered poetically by 
Milton.  He ends with investigation of “pure persuasion” where his examples and advice are 
drawn from many texts.  But what specific tools can Burke offer the critic interested in 
specifically engaging a poem to say something critical about it? 
593
Thus, when this poem is viewed ‘socioanagogically,’ it will be seen to disclose, in 
enigmatically roundabout form, a variant of revolutionary challenge. By proxy it 
  If this is true, then the poet can offer a mode of offering 
arguments that challenge the existing social order in ways not only permissible, but perhaps 
more socially effective than a mere statement of political belief:  
                                               
592 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), 208. 
 
593 Burke, Rhetoric, 217. 
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demeans the old order, saying remotely, in sexual imagery, what no courtly poet could 
have wanted to say, or even have thought of saying, in social or political terms.594
 
 
These elements are difficult to discern, but Burke warns the critic of an oversimplistic 
approach where the critic assumes that the poet deliberately places sexual imagery in a poem in 
order to achieve connection with overtly political expressions:  
We do not assume that the poem’s concealment of a social allegory in a sexual enigma 
was consciously contrived. True, scholars who favor the ‘fustian’ theory are tirelessly 
examining pure poetry for evidence of disguised allusions to prominent contemporary 
personages. But even where such allusions were deliberately inserted by poets and 
discerned by readers, such tactics would not argue deliberateness in the sort of expression 
we are here studying. These identifications can be implicit, and ‘unconscious.’595
 
 
What Burke is saying here is somewhat similar to the analysis of social inversion that I explained 
in the last chapter offered by Stallybrass and White, based on the theories of language proposed 
by Bakhtin.596
Burke’s critic seeks out the implicit identifications between the sexual, the hierarchical 
and the social through socioanagogic criticism. He offers some guidelines on how to engage in 
socioanagogic critique: 
  The similarity is the idea that social hierarchies are implicit within all aspects of 
human existence, not just the overtly political.  These hierarchies can be blurred and contrasted 
within language, which can offer a critique of the larger more obvious social order.  This occurs 
because of incongruity noticed in the inappropriate ordering of the “natural” order of things.  
To get at the sort of thing we are here considering, one must first reject all speculations in 
keeping with the typical empiricist question: ‘What do I see when I look at this object?’ 
A poetic observation involves no naked relation between an observed object and the 
observer’s eye. The topics that the poet uses are ‘charismatic.’ They glow. . . [T]he poet’s 
                                               
594 Burke, Rhetoric, 217. 
595 Burke, Rhetoric, 219. 
596 Peter Stallybrass and Eric White The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: 
Methuen, 1986). 
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symbols are enigmatic, they stand for a hidden realm, a mystery (though its ‘divinity,’ 
like that of the Roman Emperor or “Pontifex Maximus” of a secular realm, may be 
derived from a social hierarchy).597
 
 
The “glowing” that Burke attributes to the meanings that a socioanagogic criticism finds in a 
poem are linked with the word charismatic, presented in scare quotes.  What are we to make of 
this as the start of a method that supposedly will link hierarchies related to the human body with 
hierarchies in society as a whole?  The answer is surprisingly simple – the charismatic glow is 
the association with poetic discourse and mystery.  That is, that the creation of poetry involves a 
sort of mystification process already, and the connection between the social and the body are 
bound up with the poetic due to the poetic’s invitation that the symbols and mystery surrounding 
it involve status and importance. “Even the world of natural objects, as they figure in poetry, 
must have secret ‘identification’ with the judgments of status . . . By ‘socioanagogic’ 
interpretation we mean the search for such implicit identifications.”598
Burke further defines the socioanagogic as the search for social mystery, as opposed to 
the search for celestial mystery that medieval critics were looking for in Biblical allegory. 
Instead of interpreting the presence of God in daily life, Burke wants to seek out the presence of 
social hierarchies in mystical, or hidden formulations: 
  The critic seeks to 
unravel those identifications and point to the re-arrangement of hierarchy that the poem 
implicitly suggests due to its intertwining of more “natural” hierarchies. 
The new equivalent of ‘moral’ or ‘tropological’ criticism would probably be found in a 
concern with the poem as a ritual that does things for the writer and reader: re-forming, 
stabilizing, heartening, purifying, socializing, and the like. Any sense in which one order 
                                               
597 Burke, Rhetoric, 219. 
598 Burke, Rhetoric, 219. 
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is interpreted as the sign of another would probably be the modern equivalent of the 
‘allegorical.’599
 
 
Burke’s sense of what this criticism would look like and what it would accomplish sounds like it 
would reveal the relationships between the assumed “natural order” of the society and the 
“natural.” The terms remain in scare quotes as a sign that the natural is possibly never reached; 
that hierarchy can be critiqued, rearranged, and evaluated critically, and that the best criticism 
should leave a space behind for reconsideration of its insights. Having said that, the 
socioanagogic criticism that I will employ here will be to seek out moments where Ginsberg’s 
poem points at the social and socioanagogically suggests that it might be out of line with the 
natural – the embodied condition.  It will be these moments where the unhealthy condition of the 
body might serve as a way of rhetorically indicating the belief in an unhealthy society, further 
reinforced by the relations between the high and low within that culture, as per Stallybrass and 
White and their notion of contradiction always and already apparent within the high/low 
hierarchies in any social ordering. “The primary site of contradiction, the site of conflicting 
desires and mutually incompatible representation, is undoubtedly the ‘low,’ they write. “Again 
and again we find striking ambivalence to the representations of the lower strata (of the body, of 
literature, of society, of place) in which they are both reviled and desired.”600
                                               
599 Burke, Rhetoric, 220. 
 The use of the 
socioanagogic perspective in rhetorical criticism will reveal how Ginsberg points at these 
orderings and offers an alternative rhetorical mode of engagement between people, their society, 
and their culture. 
600 Stallybrass and White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, 4. 
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Kenneth Burke’s idea of the comic frame will also inform this analysis.  For Burke, the 
framing of an event as either tragic or comic has serious implications for the reaction to the 
event. The attitudes will have correspondence to the frame.  As Ott and Aoki note in their 
criticism of news reports surrounding the murder of Matthew Shepherd, “When social injustices 
such as the anti-gay beating of Matthew Shepard are framed in tragic terms, naming McKinney 
and Henderson as vicious, the public finds expiation externally in the punishment of those 
identified as responsible. Framed in comic terms, however, one can identify with the mistaken, 
become a student of her/himself, “‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles,” and learn from 
the experience.”601
How does the Beat rhetoric fit into Burke’s comic frame as well as the socioanagogic? 
By placing the natural social order in question by juxtaposing it with its opposite, the Beat rhetor 
has the opportunity to condemn society for poor judgment and stupidity, since they cannot 
possibly understand the insights of the Beat perspective.  But this is not what happens.  Instead, 
the Beat rhetor establishes the scene as comic – not necessarily humorous, but mistaken – and 
therefore any member of society can potentially see space for alternative ways of living along 
side their own correct (natural) ways.  
 Instead of a forgetting through blame and punishment, we instead have a self-
investigation, where one sees the events as human and correctable. 
As far as criticism goes, Burke sees the critical act as a balance between examining 
elements of the life of the poet for information as to how the poem works as symbolic action:  
The text, as a particular instance of symbolic action, should be closely studied for its 
implicit and explicit equations, plus their transformations. Its internal relations would be 
studied as though ‘anonymous.’ But the text should also be analyzed from the standpoint 
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of ‘symbolic action in general,’ ideally with the knowledge of the author as citizen and 
taxpayer, of his ailments, of his ‘property in’ the economy of his times, of all and any 
contextual bits of ‘factacity’ that might be shown to bear upon his text, considered as a 
symbolic act.602
 
 
Burke believes that the meaning of the text operates on its own terms, but also operates as 
symbolic action based on the ills and the beliefs of the author as well. Understanding the text is 
an act that reveals possible meanings by knowing something about the author helps the critic 
offer meanings by arranging the terms in ways that illustrate the symbolic action of the text.  
My analysis of “Howl” will hopefully reveal some of the elements of the Beat rhetoric at 
work.  Using Burke’s sense of the socioanagogic, the implicit identifications that will be revealed 
will link the social with the natural in ways that either critique or reinforce those hierarchies. 
“Howl” is a complicated work, and this analysis seeks to complicate that complication. 
6.3 COMPLICATING AN ALREADY COMPLICATED POEM: ANALYZING 
“HOWL” 
Gordon Ball seems to understand that the need for a complicated reading of “Howl” must begin 
with a complicated reading of Ginsberg as the poem’s architect. Ball argues that, “each of the 
long lines of Part I of ‘Howl’ is ideally a single long breath: Ginsberg’s locating a poem in 
human tongue and breath, as well as his linking it to music, has helped give us verse with a much 
greater emphasis on oral delivery and performance, mixing artistic media.”603
                                               
602 Kenneth Burke, “Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment” Critical 
Inquiry 5, 2 (Winter 1978): 401-416, 412. 
  Focusing on the 
603 Gordon Ball, “Wopbopgooglemop: ‘Howl’ and Its Influences,” in Shinder, 96. 
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“blur” that “Howl” is produced from is a move toward understanding “Howl” as a significant 
contribution to a rhetoric.  Ginsberg’s fusion of distinct discursive styles and boundaries could be 
considered a powerful argument about how to alter communication just below the surface of a 
poem that hopes to politically alter society. 
Ginsberg’s poetics are well described as a “mix,” and it is this unique fusion of 
embodiment and the poetic tradition that he adds to the Beat Rhetoric.  If Kerouac is the Beat of 
kairos, then Ginsberg is the Beat of embodiment.  By embodiment, we see how Ginsberg calls 
attention to the material limits of being an embodied human being while at the same time using 
those limits as a source of invention, style and delivery for his rhetoric.  Ginsberg’s rhetoric 
begins with the limits of the human body.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Ginsberg sees 
appropriate human communication as defined by the limits of being human. 
Ginsberg’s theory of poetic production is based directly on the human voice: 
So that’s what I understand of projective verse: the lines are scattered out on the page 
pretty much the way you would break them up in your own breaths if you were actually 
pronouncing them aloud.  They were written to be spoken.  As if they were actually 
spoken.  You could score the poem on the page to give an indication of what rhythm 
you’d be using, what phrases would be all in one breath, and what phrases would be in 
short breaths; what single words like ‘O’ might be all by themselves in single breaths 
taking all that weight and time.  The breath of the poet ideally is reproduced by the 
breathing of the reader.604
 
 
This might explain the repetitions and meanderings of “Howl” since Ginsberg is attending to a 
writing that attempts to replicate the nuances of oral discourse.  “One reason for the use of 
cumulative iteration and incremental repetition is orality is the unilinear direction of discourse. 
Once uttered, words cannot be called back or erased by only amended by additional words, in the 
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form of variation, specification, or repair. Oral discourse is a work in progress that includes its 
own drafts and revisions. Literature, in turn, adopts repetition and repair to stage a discourse 
steeped in the forms and timing of orality.”605
In “Howl” we can see a concern for the embodied condition from the very start.  The 
opening lines set the exigence for the poem: 
 This literary method to simulate a somewhat 
natural element of human speech, present in “Howl” further confirms the idea that “Howl” can 
be read for an implicit rhetorical theory that centers on the human body as its source and limit. 
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by 
madness, starving hysterical naked, 
dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn 
looking for an angry fix, . . .606
 
 
We are introduced to a rhetorical event in the most traditional sense of the phrase – someone is 
testifying to his or her experience.  What has been seen has all the earmarks of a tragedy.  Those 
who were at the top of the speaker’s generation are now destroyed, seeking out “angry” drugs in 
a state of hysteria.  Madness is cited as the cause of their destruction, and we are left thinking 
that perhaps addiction is the root of their condition at this point.  
Here we see Ginsberg drawing on the inversion strategies noticed by Stallybrass and 
White – he combines the bodily notions of high and low with geographic ones in an attempt to 
set high and low from two different social aspects together.  The best minds are naked in the 
street and starving; they are hysterical and dragging themselves through the streets for an “angry 
fix.” Stallybrass and White note: “the body cannot be thought separately from the social 
formation, symbolic topography and the constitution of the subject. The body is neither a purely 
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natural given nor is it merely a textual metaphor, it is a privileged operator for the transcoding of 
these other areas. Thinking the body is thinking social topography and vice versa.”607
The bodies of the “best minds” are lacking in serious ways, but at the same time what’s 
missing from the appropriate social positioning is recoded to advantage:  
 This is not 
a case of individual or group prosecution, but a rhetorical re-mapping of the valences of society. 
Stallybrass and White argue here that the body is the site for operatively defining and coding 
social values and their signs. In “Howl” we begin with a body that has the greatest mind, but 
crawls on the street at the wrong time of day in the wrong part of town looking for the wrong 
thing. The wrecked body with the greatest mind will serve in the poem as the operator of an 
attempt to comically and anagogically re-write these codings for the reader. 
  angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly 
connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night, 
who poverty and tatters and hollow-eyed and high sat 
up smoking in the supernatural darkness of 
cold-water flats floating across the tops of cities 
contemplating jazz,608
 
 
Here is a listing of hierarchical oppositions, each of which serves a socioanagogic function, 
questioning the relationship between the terms.  First we have “hipsters” who, in 1950s 
American society were definitely not anywhere near the top of the social order, “burning.”  The 
ambivalence allows for an association to something illegal, perhaps, but the implication is that 
they desire connection to the rest of the universe, even though we are given the sense that they 
have a deeper connection already, supernaturally floating near the rooftops and “contemplating” 
jazz.  
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Additionally, they live in poverty, their clothes are tattered, and they stay up all night.  
Although they are violating almost all of the highest order values of 1950s American society, 
they still “float” above the cities, somehow above it all. This could be a gesture toward the 
unrooted nature of these “best minds,” which would be another re-coding of societal value. They 
are above the tallest man-made geographical structures by being at the lowest rung of the social 
hierarchy.  This inversion of social status and geographical placement calls into question the 
value of such things as wealth, nice clothes and good apartments. One must give up these 
markers of high status to achieve a higher level of being – contemplation.  This has many 
connections to Ginsberg’s study of the aesthetic tradition – St. John of the Cross in particular, 
which is also a current of the time, discernible in the work of Thomas Merton.609 Ginsberg’s 
interest in St. John’s work was a part of what Barry Miles calls the religious vocabulary 
Ginsberg gained while at Columbia.610
This is also a nice comic picture, where in an amusing way the reader can imagine the 
tortured geniuses literally floating through the night air over the buildings, smoking and using 
their great minds to think about popular music instead of something perhaps more important, or 
literary. It can also be read as an absurd scene, whereas the combination of low, in the terms of 
social place – and high, quite literally floating, but more symbolically out of and above the 
important domain for the body to produce meaningful discourse, the reader might have to “go 
from a principle to a principle of principles (from the dialectical order to an ultimate order of 
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terms) – and such ‘incommensurability’ may be called a ‘leap’ from morality to religion.”611 
Such a leap requires an absurd scene in order for the move to be made. This means, for Burke, 
that there is a contradiction that requires violation of a moral precept from another vocabulary. 
“Often the attempt to obey one moral injunction may oblige us to violate another.”612
As the poem progresses, the things the “great minds” engage in become more and more 
associated with the extremities of the lower body, departing quickly from the normal social 
admiration that should be given to their higher body strata, the mind. The ambivalence such a 
pairing (or a contradiction) suggests is explained by Burke: “The forbidden (of either holy or 
obscene sorts) can become identified with the magic experiences of infancy, the tabus [sic] of the 
excremental, which are established along with the first steps in language, and fade into the 
prelinguistic stage of experience. Thus, ironically, the very ‘seat of highest dignity’ can become 
furtively one with the connotations of the human posterior, in a rhetorical identification between 
high and low, since both can represent the principle of the tabu.”
 I believe 
this to be the rhetorical motive of “Howl” as Ginsberg takes all of our presuppositions about the 
body and its appropriate places as a site of identity and discourse and inverts them. This 
inversion creates the need for such “leaps” by violating the socioanagogic connections between 
the secular and the sacred. 
613
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construction of appropriate place for appropriate bodies. As Stallybrass and White examine 
exhaustively, the creation of the bourgeoisie as a class relied heavily on establishing new 
meanings and ways to symbolically identify the “poor” – through smell, distinguishing the 
suburb from the city, and hygiene.  “The reformation of the senses produced, as a necessary 
corollary, new thresholds of shame, embarrassment and disgust. And in the ninetheenth century, 
those thresholds were articulated above all through specific contents – the slum, the swer, the 
nomad, the savage, the rat – which in turn remapped the body.”614
As the poem continues, the confrontation of these abstract moments become increasingly 
direct, as Ginsberg uses adjectives with nouns that don’t necessarily follow or are even assumed 
by readers to associate at any level: 
Although they specifically 
investigate the rise of the bourgeois class through symbolic re-coding, the same principles are 
applicable here. Shame, disgust and other reformations are directly confronted by “Howl” which, 
if these moments are to be admired, require some abstract “leaping” between hierarchical 
vocabularies. 
Peyote solidities of halls, backyard green tree cemetery 
dawns, wine drunkenness over the rooftops, 
storefront boroughs of teahead joyride neon 
blinking traffic light, sun and moon and tree 
vibrations in the roaring winter dusks of Brook 
lyn, ashcan rantings and kind king light of mind, 
who chained themselves to subways for the endless 
ride from Battery to holy Bronx on Benzedrine 
until the noise of wheels and children brought 
them down shuddering mouth-wracked and 
battered bleak of brain all drained of brilliance 
in the drear light of Zoo, 
who sank all night in submarine light of Bickford’s 
floated out and sat through the stale beer after- 
noon in desolate Fugazzi’s, listening to the crack 
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of doom on the hydrogen jukebox,615
 
 
The notion of a “peyote solidity” alone is a contradiction that blurs the status of the hallucination 
with reality.  If we are in a world where visions become solid, there’s little out of bounds.  In the 
last chapter I argued that the 20th century was a time where disembodiment was the nature of 
communication. “The question remains what sort of creatures we communicating beings have 
become. The power of ‘comunication’ lies in its ability to extend human interaction across the 
expanses of space an time; its pathos lies in its transcendence of mortal form. Communication 
suggests contact without touch.”616  Ginsberg seems to highlight this question as we follow the 
presence of the great minds through familiar, yet disconnected surroundings. Each location has a 
value judgment that radically shifts our relationship to the place or the object that would 
normally spark some sense of comfortable familiarity.  Using his notions of proper rhetoric, each 
line is a powerful exhaled vision – an utterance that points to a moment that blurs the assumed 
difference between reality and illusion.  Here we also see the Whitmanic long lines, which Glen 
Burns argues contain transformative properties of meaning: “As with Whitman, by the time we 
have traversed the stretch of one of these long lines, we have experienced a rapid set of 
transformation. And like Whitman again, the process of organizing these lines into poems is 
accumulative.”617
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the social hierarchy. Without its usual associations, the reader is forced to try to figure out how 
the two, usually opposite things are related. 
For example, the phrase “backyard green tree cemetery dawn” has the ambivalence of 
watching the “dawn” in a “cemetery” which is also a “backyard,” eroding associations of 
geography and appropriateness as well as hierarchies of beginning and ending.  “Holy Bronx” – 
a combination of terms that would never be heard together except for contradiction and 
opposition – serves as one of the destinations of the benny subway ride “to nowhere” that ends at 
a Zoo with the “best-mind” exhausted and passing out on the ground. In these examples, an 
absurd conflict is revealed by the poet’s seemingly random associations revealing the 
ambivalence between holy and foul in the secular hierarchy by forcing the reader to follow along 
in his “leaps” from one vocabulary to another. 
This section of the poem contains the famous “hydrogen jukebox” construction, which is 
clearly an example of Burkean “perspective by incongruity.” This device is suggested by Burke 
as one that “appeals by exemplifying relationships between objects which our customary rational 
vocabulary has ignored.”618 It is not only one of Ginsberg’s most well known constructions, but 
exemplifies the hierarchic confusion of “Howl.” Glen Burns calls the phrase “meaningless in 
itself,” only valuable because it “forces our attention on the gap between the two words when 
read in context.”619
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technology.  The association makes both the atomic weapon and the jukebox ambivalent, 
throwing their value into question – something that could not be done as well without this 
device.  The use of perspective by incongruity forces ideas of compatibility and connection 
where none are obvious. This can lead to absurd “leaping” between vocabularies if the tension 
between the two ideas is high. For Burke, the presence of poetry itself can be read as a 
perspective by incongruity: “Poetry, broadly defined, is a locus for perspective by incongruity, a 
place for incongruous metaphors can be pushed together to create new ways of viewing the 
world – a counter-gridlock, a hypertext (in contemporary metaphorics).”620
Other oppositions that are offered in the poem are less tame.  As the poem progresses the 
oppositions become more embodied, and also, at the same time more stark in their implications: 
 Poetry, through this 
analysis of Burke, is a place where metaphor, and perspective by incongruity in particular, can be 
deployed to create alternative orderings of the world. 
who let themselves be fucked in the ass by saintly 
motorcyclists, and screamed with joy, 
who blew and were blown by those human seraphim,  
the sailors, caresses of Atlantic and Caribbean  
love, 
who balled in the morning in the evenings in rose- 
gardens and the grass of public parks and 
cemeteries scattering their semen freely to 
whomever come who may,621
 
 
These inversions of the dominant or accepted natural order of things in society are more complex 
than they appear to be.  Instead of a mere celebration of sodomy, there are also other celebrations 
occurring – for example, the combination of the seraphim with the sailors as well as the sexual 
                                               
620 Deborah Hawhee, “Burke and Nietzsche” Quarterly Journal of Speech 85 (1999): 129-145, 
139. 
621 Ginsberg, Howl, 13. 
 320 
encounters creates a dizzying play of illicit associations that throw into controversy the accepted 
place of each participant and act.  The association of the angelic and the sexually profane raises 
questions about the profanity of the act and the sanctity of the act. The distribution of something 
as sacred as intercourse freely in the public park (a place usually associated with the profane, or 
at least the dirty masses) is not only questionable on a legal basis, but raises questions about the 
distinctions between public spaces and private spaces by placing the park and the human body 
together.  This association makes one question the relationship of the usually private body with 
the clearly public park. 
Overtly displaying the queer body in the midst of sexual activity and the throws of 
passion is a very raw image for the time. This imagery, far from shocking, is delivered in what 
Gregory Woods defines ironically as a uniform tone:  
That they are in the vernacular, makes no more of them than what they say: that members 
of his generation – and he does not specify percentages – found anal intercourse with 
motorcyclists pleasurable, fellated and were fellated by sailors, indulged in indiscriminate 
sexual activity in parks and Turkish baths, lost their lovers, and promiscuously formed 
sexual bonds with women. In the light of Kinsey's revelations of 1948, these (of 1956) 
are unexceptional. Given the terms on which the poem presents itself – terms of 
Whitman-like candor and inclusiveness, and of social disaffection – the sexual passage is 
in tonal, formal and ideological keeping with the others, neither more nor less emphatic 
than they. The manner of the whole poem dictates the manner of its parts. If its sexual 
content is hysterical – an arguably appropriate epithet – Its hysteria does not stand out in 
any way from that of the other pages.622
 
 
The controversial content for Woods is not sexual, but the tone and style in which the sexual is 
revealed. The poem has a hysterical tone, but there is no alteration of this tone when homosexual 
intercourse is discussed. The hysterical tone is uniform – which could be read as a perspective by 
incongruity writ large. The poem provides an even, hysterical tone for any of the transgressive 
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acts depicted. This “ambivalent hysteria” is the rhetorical mode in which “Howl” encourages 
reconsideration of the distinctions between forbidden moral and legal actions, making its style a 
perspective by incongruity which radicalizes, as Woods puts it, “unexceptional” revelations. The 
radical nature of “Howl” then might not be the content, but the rhetorical choices made with that 
content and how to deliver it to the audience. As Burns puts it, “It is a communal joy, a 
movement to the outside, a serial arrangement of lines disrupting the little stabilizations 
continually supplied by the formations of society.”623
First are the blurrings of societal organization accomplished through use of comic 
framing.  There is no condemnation or even names associated with the “incorrect” ordering of 
society – but at the same time the beat figures in the poem are not perfect, they commit a lot of 
questionable acts that they could be blamed for.  Instead, the beat rhetoric leaves all situations 
comically ambivalent, so that the reader wonders if they should judge or even if judgment is 
possible of the strange situations that they find in the poem.  
 Here Burns suggests that “Howl” provides 
something communal that is outside stable society. “Howl” manages to accomplish a sense of the 
communal but not societal in a couple of ways. 
Later in the poem we encounter moments that appear less comic, and more like the tragic 
frame.  In part 2, we encounter Moloch, the being responsible for all tragedy in the world: 
 What sphinx of cement and aluminum bashed open  
their skulls and ate up their brains and imagi 
nation? 
Moloch! Solitude! Filth! Ugliness! Ashcans and unob 
 tainable dollars! Children screaming under the 
 stairways! Boys sobbing in armies! Old men 
 weeping in the parks! 
Moloch! Moloch! Nightmare of Moloch! Moloch the 
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 loveless! Mental Moloch! Moloch the heavy 
 judger of men!624
  
 
Moloch sounds more like a concept or an attitude than a guilty person in this long list of charges 
and negative associations.  The Whitmanic use of the exclamation point is apparent, which 
speaks to the influence Whitman’s style had on Ginsberg. Some of the associations are said 
almost as if they were identifications – “Moloch!” followed by “Filth!” and then later “Children 
screaming under the stairways!” and other terrible scenes seems to indicate that Moloch is 
completely transitive with these situations.  Moloch is both the cause of and the situation itself.  
The question that opens this section asks about the “sphinx” made of construction materials that 
“ate up their brains and imagination,” referring to the “best minds” from the first part of the 
poem. This suggests that the industrial, modern constructed world is somewhat responsible for 
the destruction of the imagination that was investigated in the first part of the poem. Moloch is 
not only the evil to blame, but is also the blame in the world. Moloch is consubstantial with the 
motives of the modern construction of the world.  Moloch is also the evil produced by these 
motives.  
The evil of the world appears throughout this section of the poem in images of people 
expressing raw emotion without much complex communication. It appears that humans are 
rendered into a state of complete despair due to Moloch. Even the toughest, the soldiers, weep 
due to Moloch. Moloch is also “unattainable dollars” at the same time as “ashcans.” This 
indicates a consubstantial relationship between that which is most desired and sought after, and 
that which is garbage. Moloch exists as and within both concepts. 
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Ginsberg uses the beat rhetoric in this section in order to make consubstantial relations 
between material conditions and human situations that in the dominant rhetoric would be 
difficult to compare. The beat rhetoric, with its focus on the limits of the body – here are just 
flashes of scenes that are decontextualized, children screaming and men crying that everyone has 
a common experience with – and the opportune – the moments are just flashes, and they are 
arranged along side the expressions of “Moloch” in repeated form.  In this way, Ginsberg can 
allow the readers to make associations that might go beyond a direct “blame” relationship.  
Remember, Ginsberg wants to critique the entire mode of proper human communication in his 
moment, as well as critique the material arrangement of the society.  He accomplishes this by 
allowing the associations to develop with the audience as they read the list.  Ginsberg creates a 
desire for dissociation from Moloch and all that we might see Moloch as being consubstantial. 
More ambivalence creates more opportunities for necessary rhetorical leaping in vocabularies. 
Division with Moloch is achieved socioanagogically.  Ginsberg reverses the order of 
high/low within American culture in order to raise questions as to who is revered and why in his 
moment in American society: 
They broke their backs lifting Moloch to heaven! Pave 
ments, trees, radios, tons! lifting the city to  
Heaven which exists and is everywhere about 
us!625
 
 
After describing Moloch in such unpleasant terms, Ginsberg now shows how everyone has been 
slaving away for Moloch, destroying themselves to lift up the total of existence to the unhealthy 
ideal.  Socioanagogically, Ginsberg offers an ambivalent moment where the city is being lifted to 
Moloch and the city is Moloch.  He points at the vast amounts of energy and work needed to lift 
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the “tons” to the heavens, which is still happening (“lifting” as opposed to “lifted”). Self-
sacrifice is also an element of making Moloch and his city heavenly; it is backbreaking work. 
Hard work, a socially valuable idea in the contemporary vocabulary is somewhat lampooned 
here, making it look foolish and dangerous for people to work so hard to bring something so evil 
to such a great height.  
The problem of Moloch is a problem that seems so vast that no force could combat it. 
Moloch is given a litany of identities in this section of the poem, so much so that no part of 
society is clean or free from evil influence. The purpose of Moloch and his great evil is to 
represent a real political problem for Ginsberg. “The first line that came to Ginsberg was 
‘Moloch whose eyes are a thousand blind windows.’ This was the informing image out of which 
the rest of the poem was generated.”626 Without Moloch, “the behavior of the hipsters would 
seem arbitrary without a clearly defined social context.”627
Without our being completely aware of it, we have been presented a whole mapping of a 
certain group of people as they make their way through the city, pressing the excitement 
that it already possesses into a more cleansing ecstasy but also a more destructive one. 
The map is already quite large and a number of figures appear in it — figures of place, 
emotion, actions, visions, all of them concretely tied to the material density of their being. 
Each line is a little story, one more cross on the figure of the roof-top, one more angry fix 
in junk hunger, one more ashcan ranting at the skull of Moloch.
 This context, for Burns, is defined by 
Moloch – the reason that the characters in the poem behave the way they do. Burns explains the 
coherency of the actions in part1 through the lens of part 2 in a sort-of causal relationship:  
628
 
 
Moloch exists as the target of ecstatic, excited people as they become more and more destructive. 
At the same time though, Moloch is where these people exist and act. I do not agree that part 1 of 
the poem moves into a more destructive vein, instead I see the amplification of each part a 
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stronger push on the reader to “leap” symbolically above the rooftops like the “great minds” and 
the increasing amplification of the poem, culminating in the accusatory and exclamatory litany of 
charges against Moloch in part 2. The “destructive” nature of the poem comes from re-
associative possibilities in the many metaphors that through incongruity, force absurd choices in 
value upon the reader. 
In Part 3, we see another response or reaction to Moloch: mental illness.  The narrator of 
the poem begins by praising Carl Solomon, Ginsberg’s friend he met in a mental hospital. 
“Solomon’s friendship helped Allen survive one of the most difficult periods of his life and, in 
all probability, he was largely responsible for helping Ginsberg retain his sanity.”629 Solomon 
introduced Ginsberg to many French writers and conversed with him in the hospital about 
literature, thoughts, and the world. Most importantly, “Solomon taught Ginsberg much about 
unconventional behavior.” 630
Carl Solomon! I’m with you in Rockland 
 It is this unconventional behavior that might be the subject of the 
vocative praise for Solomon we find in the poem: 
where you’re madder than I am 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where you must feel very strange 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where you imitate the shade of my mother 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where you’ve murdered your twelve secretaries 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where you laugh at this invisible humor 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where we are great writers on the same dreadful 
typewriter.631
 
 
                                               
629 Michael Schumacher, Dharma Lion: A Critical Biography of Allen Ginsberg (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992), 117. 
630 Michael Schumacher, Dharma Lion, 116. 
631 Ginsberg, Howl, 24. 
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This section, like section one, provides a full torrent of increasingly amplified absurdities 
that force the reader into a space of ambivalence. Some moments of horror, such as when 
Solomon has murdered twelve secretaries, are immediately diffused by the speaker laughing at 
“invisible humor.” This moment of perspective by incongruity calls the whole section into 
question as humorous or serious, as for something to be funny it has to be perceived in some 
way. “Invisible humor,” much like “hydrogen jukebox” invites a leap into the gap between the 
words. This leap is not into nothingness, but into the implicit value association with each term. 
Like metaphor, each term implicates the meanings of the other one, and suggests new ways of 
perceiving each term separately through the combination. 
The stanza also suggests pathways to consubstantiality even within the restrictive 
environment of institution. Although the repetition seems at first glance to be the move toward 
identification, “Rockland” is always a signifier for the mental hospital. To be “with someone” in 
“Rockland” is to be “without” society. This ambivalence is further complicated with the notion 
that Solomon is “madder than I am” and “must feel very strange.” The complications in this 
section of the poem must be read in terms of Ginsberg’s own experience with “madness” in his 
life and work. 
The repetitive claim of “madness” and the supposed evaluation that Solomon is “madder 
than I am” yet “imitates the shade of my mother” clearly reference Ginsberg’s personal 
experiences. But instead of being purely autobiographical, these moments point out the 
contradictory difficulty and ease he finds in relating to Solomon. Easy because he reminds him 
of his mother, but hard because the reminder is linked to madness. These instances, occurring in 
the same person, are not easily split. They are so close together that to dismiss one is to remove 
the other. I’ve already mentioned in an earlier chapter Kenneth Burke’s notion that rhetoric is 
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characterized when one places identification and division so closely together that they are nearly 
impossible to distinguish. This is an exemplar of what Burke means, but how does its appearance 
in poetry differ from the appearance of identification/division in a political speech? 
Burke believes the difference to be between representation of material object and 
connection to symbolic value: “The ‘poetic’ image of a house is also an ‘idea’ of a house, insofar 
as it has purely dialectical significance, allowing for verbal manipulations that transcend the 
empirical or positive. You can’t point to the house that appears in a poem; even if the poet may 
have had a particular house in mind. For his word ‘house’ will also stand for relationships alien 
to the concept of house as such. The conceptual house is a dwelling of such-and-such structure, 
material, dimensions, etc. The poetic house is built of identifications.”632
I’m with you in Rockland 
 The distinction Burke 
offers can help the interpretation gain some critical distance from the biographical details of 
Ginsberg’s commitment in a mental hospital and ask what the “poetic madhouse” comes with as 
far as his rhetoric is concerned. What is offered here to the reader is a confused sense of why 
Carl Solomon is being praised. Is he praised for exceptional behavior in resisting the madhouse, 
or is he praiseworthy because of his madness that keeps him there? As the section moves on a 
broader sense of the identification/division is revealed: 
where there are twentyfive thousand mad comrades all together singing 
the final stanzas of the Internationale 
I’m with you in Rockland 
where we hug and kiss the United States under our bedsheets the United 
States that coughs all night and won’t let us sleep633
 
 
                                               
632 Burke, Rhetoric, 84-5. 
633 Ginsberg, Howl, 25. 
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The stanza pushes not only identifications between Solomon and supposedly Ginsberg, but 
divides clearly as well. The communists and communist sympathizers are there, but “mad” – 
perhaps excluded from both society and the communist party, but it also suggests that “we” as 
the “United States” are there as well, making out with Solomon and the narrator under the sheets. 
The trouble that started just for Ginsberg and Solomon, or the narrator and Solomon has now 
expanded to implicate the United States, including even its “dark side” of communist 
sympathizers. The blur is expanded through images of embodied activities, singing and kissing, 
but also through ideological terms like “Internationale” and “United States” – certainly “poetic 
houses” as they function in the poem, more associative than delineating. Many readers might 
identify with “United States” but not want to be present in the madman’s bed making out with 
him. The implication of praise for such contradictory activies necessitates some absurdist 
“leaping” from sexuality to ideology to mental health in order to figure out why Solomon is 
praiseworthy. 
Connecting madness to all of this requires a return to William Blake’s influence on 
Ginsberg. “Blake, for whom rock was a symbol of mental barrenness, would doubtless smile at 
the invisible humor of the name of New Jersey's state mental hospital.”634
While the litany-structure and the long accretive periods imply, by association with 
liturgy, that the poet is a sacred figure, we have no sense of him as a controlled being 
 Reading Ginsberg 
through Blake, or as a disciple of Blake as Ostriker suggests brings a different relief to the 
mapping of the poem. Ostriker argues that madness is a process in the poem, a process by which 
Ginsberg accepts the understanding of everything as it comes to him. Instead of struggling to fit 
it into absolute categorical classifications, he shatters the walls: 
                                               
634 Ostriker, “Blake, Ginsberg, Madness,” 121. 
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apart, capable of observing, interpreting, judging, explaining. Instead of shaping, he 
appears to let himself be shaped, spontaneously and irrationally, by his visions. In other 
words, Ginsberg “becomes what he beholds.” The madness of this reveals itself as a 
manic rush of language without logic, a dramatic violation of rules of prosody, 
punctuation, grammar, and syntax (e.g. “paint hotels,” “purgatoried their torsoes”), and a 
violent (or casual) yoking together of elements which our reasonable mental habits keep 
asunder: the sacred and the profane, the realistic and surrealistic, a sense of comedy and a 
sense of tragedy.635
 
 
This “yoking together” of what Ostriker lists as opposites is for her what madness represents in 
the poem. Madness then is an interpretive frame, a way of thinking that permits an alternative 
politics to rise out of the categories offered from the accepted, normative hierarchy. The 
mechanism of madness is what Burke would call “the characteristic invitation to rhetoric,” which 
is “putting identification and division ambiguously together so that you cannot know for certain 
just where one ends and the other begins.”636
  Instead of the frustrating and impossible task of direct communion, Ginsberg embraces 
consubstantiality as the best solution – using identification/division in its inherently 
contradictory relationship as a means of establishing deeper connections.  Ginsberg offers his 
experiences with Solomon in the poem as an example and also as a means of establishing 
consubstantiality with the reader in hopes of establishing within them the same rhetorical mode 
 Yoking together, or “identifying” things with each 
other that perhaps spark a sense of “division” as the stronger of the yin-yang pairing forces 
interpretive leaps by the reader which might not change their mind in relation to the value 
hierarchy they have, but at least it exposes to them the implicit, hidden values linked to words, 
phrases, or ideological terms. This is what Burke is calling for when he argues for a 
socioanagogic criticism – a method of figuring out the sacred within the secular orderings of 
vocabularies in a society. 
                                               
635 Ostriker, “Blake, Ginsberg, Madness,” 120. 
636 Burke, Rhetoric, 25. 
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of understanding that he uses in “Howl” to argue for an alternative relationship between people, 
things, and ideas. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I analyzed “Howl” as an example of the consubstantial, socioanagogic rhetorical 
strategy that Allen Ginsberg advocates.  His theory of rhetoric, as constructed from my criticism 
of “Howl,” uses the Burkean ideas of perspective by incongruity and socioanagogy to create 
absurd moments that force recognition of the dominant society’s value structures.  Ginsberg’s 
poem, through many devices, offers a vision of human communion that accepts and 
acknowledges the limits of an embodied human being, but turns those into productive limits.  
Kenneth Burke’s ideas of consubstantiality, identification and socioanagogic criticism were 
employed to make these connections stand out in the poem “Howl.” In the next chapter, I move 
to synthesize the contributions to the beat rhetoric offered by Ginsberg and Kerouac by studying 
the work of Diane Di Prima as an applied case of beat rhetoric. In Di Prima’s novel Memoirs of a 
Beatnik, examples of applied beat rhetorical principles from both of these theorists work together 
to craft persuasive expression. 
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7.0  DIANE DI PRIMA AND THE GROTESQUE BEAT RHETORIC 
I was a poet, I had a work to do. And that work included an old resolve that I had 
expressed to Dean Cobb at Swarthmore, and that she had given me back as a 
Latin proverb. I am human, therefore nothing is foreign to me. It came to me still 
as a resolve, a vow: There was nothing that I could possibly experience, as a 
human in a female body, that I would not experience. Nothing I would try to 
avoid. No part of human life I would turn my back on . To me this was obviously 
just part of the job, part of what one as a writer set out to do.637
 
 
This quote from Diane Di Prima’s autobiography indicates that she sees her role as a poet to not 
avoid experiences of any type. Di Prima’s vow sounds a lot like the kairotic rhetoric offered by 
Jack Kerouac I examined in a previous chapter. Her understanding that her point of examination 
comes in the limits of a “human in a female body” connect her to Allen Ginsberg’s 
understanding that the limitations of the human form are a topos of great potential. Because she 
is restricted as a human in a female body, no experience could possibly be foreign to her. This 
means that she can understand any human experience not in spite of, but because of these limits. 
With attention to opportunity, timing and “avoiding avoidance” she becomes poet. 
Looking back from 2001, Diane Di Prima saw her work in as a rejection of 1950s values: 
“In the striving, get-ahead thrust of America 1950, where nothing existed beyond the worlds of 
the senses, the clearest way to turn form materialism was to turn to the arts. To be an outcast, 
outrider was the calling. Not fame, or publication. Keeping one’s hands clean, not engaging. By 
                                               
637 Diane Di Prima, Recollections of My Life as a Woman: The New York Years (New York: 
Penguin, 2001), 161. 
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staying on the outside we felt they weren’t our wars, our murders, our mistakes.”638 This attitude, 
she eventually recognizes, is untenable as an alternative to the political regime she saw herself in 
opposition to: “Like my father continually washing his manicured hands, we struggled to keep 
clean. I didn’t then see the painful similarity.”639 The creation of poetry and art was a bit more 
complicated than an Archimedean lever that would remove practitioners from the complications 
of the system. It can be argued that the entire decade was one of mixed messages and unclear 
political options for women. “Appearance (in all its meanings) and façade run through many 
teenagers’ and young women’s stories; they struggled to conform, often through approximating 
acceptable beauty standards, dissimulating and curious at the same time. These themes surface 
repeatedly in memoirs and literature of the period. Girls’ discontent was articulated, as it was for 
others in the society, as a hidden longing for meaning, for something more real than the middle-
class lives set out for them.”640 In the spirit of Socrates’ condemnation of rhetoric as dealing with 
mere doxa, or appearance and not episteme, or truth, the era was one of ambivalent and opposite 
messages for women as to what they should want to be or could become in life.641 The 
contradictory invitations are an invitation to rhetoric, as Burke reminds us – “But put 
identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where 
one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric.”642
                                               
638 Di Prima, Recollections of My Life as a Woman, 101-2 
 It is an 
invitation that I investigate in this chapter, looking for contributions to the Beat rhetorical theory 
639 Di Prima, Recollections of My Life as a Woman, 102. 
640 Wini Breines, “Beats and Bad Girls” in Joanne Myeerowitz, Ed. Not June Cleaver: Women 
and Gender in Postwar America 1945-1960 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 391. 
641 For a detailed discussion on doxa, see Takes Poulakos, “Isocrates Use of Doxa,” Philosophy 
and Rhetoric 34,1 (2001): 61-78. 
642 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), 25. 
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that so far has only included the ideas of men. In this chapter I will examine Diane Di Prima’s 
book Memoirs of a Beatnik for elements of beat rhetoric. Although Di Prima’s work has much in 
common with the implicit rhetorical theories of Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg, I approach her 
work using Bakhtin’s theories of the grotesque and carnival in order to detail the particularities 
of her work from theirs. Although she is using the ideas of kairos and the body as topos, Di 
Prima’s fiction gives a position of subjectivity to women understood via Bakhtin’s theories of 
inversion, the grotesque, and the power of the carnivalesque. These elements are present to some 
extent in the works of Kerouac and Ginsberg, which will be noted as the criticism progresses. 
Suffice it to say for now that although the carnivalesque and grotesque are not the major parts of 
the rhetorical theory of Kerouac and Ginsberg, they are present, and Di Prima capitalizes upon 
them in her application and augmentation of beat rhetorical theory. This can be seen as her 
contribution to the beat rhetoric via her application of it in her writing. In this chapter I hope to 
present clearly what she offers and develops. To do that I will first set up the rhetorical situation 
of women in the fifties, focusing mainly on middle class, American white women and then 
explain how the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin work in the method of rhetorical criticism. Of course, 
Di Prima would probably argue that her work could apply to women of many different 
intersections, and I am not denying that possibility. I narrow my exposition of women in this 
manner in order to detail the radical possibilities of Di Prima’s rhetoric. 
 Finally I will perform a rhetorical criticism of Di Prima’s novel Memoirs of a Beatnik to 
show the rhetorical theories and ideas at play in her work. First I will engage the extant literature 
on Di Prima, specifically on Memoirs of a Beatnik to see what critical or scholarly attention has 
been paid to her and what insights have come from it. Di Prima’s status as a “beat” is well 
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established.643 As Tim Hunt argues, “We must now consider the whole range of Beat voices and 
Beat experience, not just the work and lives of the small set of men whose impolications of the 
cultural and social transformations that the 1940s incubated and that the 1950s and 1960s 
realized.”644 Hunt believes that examination and investigation of the work of those inspired by or 
parallel to the principle, male beats completes the picture of the beat literary project. “It is that 
Kerouac, Di Prima, and Frazer wrote in ways that subverted what the novel had been and toward 
new modes of creative discourse.”645
Anthony Libby’s investigation of Di Prima’s poetry and writing is a quest for how to 
place her work as a product of her politics and societal views, as many studies of literature can 
easily become. For Libby, Di Prima is worth study due to her role in society: “She is the rebel 
who was immersed in three major American cultural revolutions of the century.”
 
646
                                               
643 See Ann Charters, Ed., Beat Down to Your Soul: What Was the Beat Generation? (New York: 
Penguin, 2001), 116; Michael Schumacher, Dharma Lion: A Biography of Allen Ginsberg (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), 336 for details on Ginsberg and Di Prima’s presence in 
contemporary publications, 409 for their joint efforts on free expression; Diane Di Prima, 
“Knowing Allen Ginsberg,” Patterson Literary Review, 35, (2006): 13-19. 
 Libby 
believes that an investigation into the contradictions within her writing and poetry of different 
times will give us a clearer picture of Di Prima’s politics. Libby’s study is important to reveal the 
gaps in perspective on Di Prima’s work. “Di Prima has received comparatively little critical 
attention for several reasons: maybe gender is still an obstacle, as well as the admitted 
unevenness of her work as whole, to say nothing of her identification with the still not 
644 Tim Hunt, “Many Drummers, a Single Dance?” in Ronna C. Johnson and Nancy M. Grace, 
eds. Girls Who Wore Black: Women Writing the Beat Generation (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002), 259. 
645 Hunt, “Many Drummers, a Single Dance?” 259. 
646 Anthony Libby, “Diane Di Prima: ‘Nothing is Lost; It Shines in Our Eyes’” in Ronna C. 
Johnson and Nancy M. Grace, Eds. Girls Who Wore Black: Women Writing the Beat Generation 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 45. 
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academically respectable Beats. But perhaps there is also the perception that she is a difficult 
case.”647
Libby’s investigation reveals several important implications. First, through a rereading of 
many of her texts, Libby identifies Di Prima as someone who “values experience that breaks out 
of the usual categories, as she values a conception of self that breaks out of the usual groupings, 
groupings which form the basis of progressive politics now.”
  Libby’s argument is that Di Prima’s difficulty in being categorized as a writer and a 
poet mean that many do not attend to her works critically. Libby develops his claim by 
comparing her literary production with the political movements of the eras in which she is 
writing. 
648 Libby feels this is her strength, 
her ability to avoid all groupings and exist solely on the margins at all times. Libby argues this 
quality is “the source of her strength as a poet in her most productive years.”649
Libby’s study closely examines Di Prima through a thorough analysis of her style. This 
study is not interested in linking back her style in her prose to her intent as a radical or a 
revolutionary, or what her intent was behind her writing. For example, Libby argues that 
opposition is the trademark of Di Prima’s style: “This combination of opposites is not unusual in 
Di Prima’s poetry. In fact, it could be said to be the defining characteristic of her work, both in 
aesthetics and in more general habits of mind, from her earliest publications onward.”
 Libby 
investigates two texts, including, Memoirs of a Beatnik. His examination focuses on identifying 
how Di Prima through texts displaces conventions and offers a critique of patriarchy through 
images that blend memoir and pornography.  
650
                                               
647 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 49. 
 Libby 
648 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 48. 
649 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 49. 
650 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 52. 
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sees this style of combining opposites allows her to communicate  a sense of anger through her 
work, as “rage is cut with comedy, just as their treatments of love blend romance with squalor, 
appropriately voicing these mixtures in language and imagery that themselves mix radically 
different tones, figures, or levels of style.”651 The mixture of opposites, for Libby, allows the 
poems to become appropriate. This combining opposite, for Aristotle, was the purpose of 
rhetoric. “Here is a major reason why rhetoric, according to Aristotle, ‘proves opposites.’ When 
two men collaborate in an enterprise to which they contribute different kinds of services and 
from which they derive different amounts and kinds of profit, who is to say, once and for all, just 
where ‘cooperation’ ends and one partner’s ‘exploitation’ of the other begins?”652
Libby’ focus is to give a portrait of Di Prima through her texts. He concludes that she is 
nearly impossible to pin down into a definitive political reading. In his analysis of Memoirs of a 
Beatnik, he argues that the text is “divided by many oppositions: most conspicuously the genre 
opposition between convincingly recounted memoir and pornography.”
 Likewise, 
Libby is struck with the ambivalence of Di Prima’s rhetoric since the style blends the opposite 
voices in such a way that many different levels of the expression of anger, as well as other 
emotions, are apparent. 
653
                                               
651 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 52. 
 The pornographic 
scenes are rich in detail and description, which Libby argues are central to pornography as a 
genre. However disgusting the eroticism of pornography is politically to Libby, he still praises Di 
Prima’s use of it. The oppositional strategy of the entire book strikes Libby as an example of 
how Di Prima is progressive even when it appears she is serving conservative, patriarchal 
interests: “Even here, though, in serving one of the least respectable needs of the patriarchy, she 
652 Burke, Rhetoric, 25. 
653 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 54. 
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is also progressive in her own way, introducing unusual elements into the usually rigid genre of 
male-centered pornography, elements that threaten the neat gender hierarchies that form the 
basic pornographic conventions.”654 He is amazed and a bit bewildered at her abilities, and 
concludes that “she may be engaged in a rebellion deeper than that of her critics.”655  As we shall 
see, the style that Libby struggles to identify politically may garner its politics from its 
ambivalence. As Stallybrass and White note, discourses about the body are significant because 
they contain within them the stabilizing factors that provide order to society at large: “The 
‘carnivalesque’ mediates between a classical/classificatory body and its negations, its Others, 
what it excludes to create identity as such. In this process, discourses about the body have a 
privileged role, for transcodings between the different levels and sectors of social and psychic 
reality are affected through the intensifying grid of the body.”656
                                               
654 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 54. 
 Identification, as offered by 
society comes under threat by combinations involving the high and low related to the human 
body. My criticism of Memoirs of a Beatnik using Bakhtin’s theories will clarify how Di Prima 
does this, how her work is carnivalesque, and how comic and grotesque ambivalence can offer a 
space for the reorientation of political subjectivity. All of this is done via the beat rhetoric – 
using notions of kairos as a sense of timing and the limits of the body as commonplaces to 
advance the possibility of reorientation. The contribution Di Prima makes is to advance the 
grotesque, using the limits of the human body in sexual situations as a commonplace for her 
readers. The kairotic can be perceived as an interruption in a temporality seen as set and 
fatalistic, and the body can be seen as unclean and inappropriate, but still a place from which 
655 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 66. 
656 Peter Stallybrass and Aaron White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (London: 
Methuen, 1986), 26. 
 338 
meaning can be constructed. But in order to understand what is being transgressed, some 
orientation to the scene of women’s subjectivity in the fifties is required.  
7.1 WOMEN IN THE FIFTIES 
The best characterization of women’s position in the fifties is one of ambivalence. Women were 
expected to fulfill contradictory roles and had limited economic and material power. “For 
women, the postwar era represented a dramatic retreat from the trends of previous decades. From 
the twenties through World War II, women had been steadily expanding their sphere by going to 
college and going to work in growing numbers. The war years brought huge numbers of women 
into the work force doing jobs that had been previously open only to men. It was a turbulent time 
when everyone’s life seemed to change practically overnight.”657 This broadening of opportunity 
under the banner of necessity was seen as temporary. After the war, these changes were not so 
easily rolled back. New, persuasive roles were imagined for women that sometimes pitted them 
against themselves. “‘Insecurity’ and ‘self-doubt’ were our buzzwords. We worried about not 
being clean enough, or womanly enough, about not finding husbands, about not being good 
enough mothers. We were afraid of ‘getting a reputation,’ of ‘being a cocktease,’ and we were 
terrified of getting pregnant. We made our life decisions on the basis of safety and security.”658
                                               
657 Brett Harvey, The Fifties: A Women’s Oral History (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), xiv. 
 
At the same time, women were experiencing a broadening of opportunity and increase in 
potential roles in society. “A few middle-class women began to think about the nature of their 
own educations – the source of their strengths, the reasons they accomplished less, if in fact they 
658 Harvey, The Fifties, xv. 
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did, and the way accomplishment an achievement had been constantly defined by men. On the 
surface the 1950s seemed to suggest a decade of glorification of motherhood, but in fact 
mothering was so denigrated that women who gave their serious energies to it for any period of 
time were considered unfit to do anything else.”659  Perhaps the experience during the war could 
be reconfigured by having women relegated to more menial jobs, but the spirit of individual 
accomplishment was always just under the surface. “Perhaps the greatest shift in attitude that 
grew out of the war was the way women began to see themselves. Many married workers 
realized that they must be quite capable to hold down two jobs at once. Being paid for what they 
were doing – even if the pay was less than men were taking home, in a society dedicated to the 
cash nexus – could only enhance self-esteem. Self-assurance built up on the job managed often 
to overcome nagging doubts about whether their children would suffer. The paychecks women 
took home not only gave them an immediate sense of security but also helped sustain a sense of 
independence in a legal establishment that in some places still saw women archaically as their 
husband’s property.”660 Dan Horowitz complicates the situation by arguing that many different 
motivations were present in the 1950s which required different rhetorical responses. His case 
study is that of Betty Friedan’s toning down of her left-wing labor union past in favor of a 
conversion narrative in order to avoid accusations of communist sympathy and more effectively 
mobilize middle-class women to the cause of feminism.661
                                               
659 Eugenia Kaledin, Mothers and More: American Women in the 1950s (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1984),48 
 The position of women after the war 
was characterized by such ambivalence. Activities such as holding down a regular job provided 
both liberation and concern, an apt invitation for the construction of rhetorical positions women 
660 Kaledin, Mothers and More, 68. 
661 Daniel Horowitz, “Rethinking Betty Friedan and the Feminine Mystique: Labor Union 
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could (or should) inhabit. Many of these rhetorical responses hovered around the areas key to the 
beat rhetoric, as I will show with some examples.   
First, frustration over appearances and the appropriate role for women expressed itself in 
many ways during the fifties. “Disaffected teenage girls longed for something significant in their 
lives. ‘Authentic,’ ‘genuine,’ and ‘real’ were word used repeatedly. The 1950s did not provide 
them with a sense of being real. They felt that being sheltered, virginal, and female (the first two 
adjectives equivalent to the third for middle-class white girls) precluded the experience of 
meaningfulness. The sense that the culture was rife with hypocrisy, everyone keeping up 
appearances in one form or another, generated a yearning for genuine feeling.”662
A good case study for this ambivalence is the rhetoric of mothering. It seems very clear 
that in the 1950s women were expected to be mothers. “In fact, motherhood couldn’t really be 
described as a ‘choice’ in the fifties. For one thing, the ideology that equated womanhood and 
motherhood was powerful and ubiquitous.”
 Di Prima’s 
eighteen-year-old sense of the role of the poet is her construction of agency within this general 
feeling of social artificiality. She does offer a hint though that the quest for real experience is 
nearly the same activity, as the metaphor to her father cleaning his well-kept hands shows.  
663
                                               
662 Breines, “Beats and Bad Girls,” 390. 
 Describing motherhood as a “drift,” many women 
found themselves as mothers without much critical thought to the role. But, much like many 
other positions for women in the fifties, motherhood is marked with ambivalence. “Motherhood 
can be experienced as a powerful and creative act and in the fifties, powerful and creative acts 
were hard for women to come by. The project of rearing children was touted as the ultimate 
challenge to women’s skill, resourcefulness, organization, and even scientific talents. It was also 
663 Harvey, The Fifties, 89. 
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her exclusive domain, the one area in over which she could exercise complete control. Adding to 
the complexity was the fear of the “devouring other,” inspired by readings of Freud and applied 
by critics such as Leslie Fiedler to indicate the destructive potential of mother-son relationships 
that became too close.664 Compared to what awaited her in the job market, motherhood presented 
itself as an alluring career with pleasant working condition, opportunities for creativity, and good 
job security.”665 The ambivalence arrives at the point where women are seen as the expert and 
sole individual responsible for the child’s well being. This often came with the contradictory 
viewpoint that the mother is to blame for any problems the child might have: “Although 
seemingly contradictory, the two theories, of maternal deprivation and overprotection, had one 
thing in common: the notion that mothers had accumulated an almost unlimited power. 
Paradoxically, this idea gained currency at a time when women had virtually no real economic 
power, despite the advertising industry’s attempts to set them up as purchasing decision-makers 
in the home.”666
                                               
664 See David Ketterer, “In [Mutant] Dreams Awake,” in Steven G. Kellman and Irving Malin, 
eds. Leslie Fiedler and American Culture (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1999). 
 This limitation of power through an apparent specialization and unique 
“empowerment” of women extended from sewing to cooking to the cleaning of the home. 
Ultimately, the 1950s found women in the position of “home economist,” the target of 
advertising and decision making, but only within the limited sphere of the grocery list or the 
kitchen needs. “The advertisers attempted to attract whoever did the deciding. Although their 
ultimate decision to advertise most products to the woman consumer undoubtedly bolstered the 
development of the consumer role, creating that role and establishing a new function for the 
household in the world of mass production and mass distribution was, for them, a means to their 
665 Harvey, The Fifties, 92. 
666 Harvey, The Fifties, 107. 
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clients’ financial ends. The home economists, on the other hand, consciously created and defined 
a place in the new economic order of the private home and for the married women who stayed in 
it.”667 The combination of restriction and ultimate authority, plus the mixed messages of decision 
maker and obedience placed the fifties woman in the situation best described by Kathleen Hall 
Jamison as the “double bind.”668  Helen Gurley Brown’s Sex and the Single Girl (1962) offered a 
radical rhetoric far away from motherhood, suggesting how and why a “girl” should remain 
single and work to please all men by being “the Girl.”669
 As society was shifting its opinion on the true role of women, the struggle created 
confusion as well as frustration.  The struggle for the truth about this situation is one rhetoricians 
would characterize as doxastic. From the perspective of rhetoric, doxa is the only social “truth” 
that can be had: “Doxa is manifested through prudence because society in general does not 
engage in cooperative critical inquiry. Instead society possesses the ‘truth’-this is its doxa-and 
prudence allows for ethical and agent-oriented critique of the manner in which the ‘truth’ is 
transmitted and transmuted. Here ‘truth’ is created by rhetors that interact with and re-constitute 
their selves and society; the possession of ‘truth’ is then time-bound and societally contingent. 
 Liberation for women from the confines 
of marriage and homemaker was cast as perpetual servitude to “men” as a category. Such 
seemingly libratory discourses that offer an escape from the ambivalence of motherhood offer 
nothing more than another role in the service of men, yet with hints of potential power. In the 
end, the broad valence of discourses suggest a situation that could be inviting for many rhetorical 
responses. 
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This "truth" changes over time through a collective reinterpretation that is a result of both a 
contingent prudential praxis and the collision of cultural fragments.”670
7.2 FEMINIST APPROACHES TO RHETORICAL THEORY 
 In other words, truth 
understood via doxa is always being determined and re-determined by rhetors in all avenues of 
society. For women in the situation of the double bind, one way out was to express themselves 
creatively. Diane Di Prima saw poetry as a way of expressing her human subjectivity, or of 
presenting a human subject in a female body to which no experience of this world could be alien. 
This position she establishes through her rhetorical production. This alternative mode of 
expressing the position of the subject – not from official positions of authority – means that Di 
Prima is engaging in rhetorical production that the field of rhetoric would consider feminist.  In 
the next section I will outline some of the ways rhetorical theorists have approached feminist 
theory and rhetorical theory in order to provide approaches and tools for critics who wish to 
understand the complexity of such texts. 
Current work in communication theory and feminist theory identifies women working in areas 
directly outside of the field proper and draws upon their works for the formulation of theory.671
                                               
670 Jim A. Kyupers, “Doxa and Critical Rhetoric: Accounting for the Rhetorical Agent through 
Prudence” Communication Quarterly, 44,4 (Fall 1996):452-462, 459. 
 
These efforts problematize traditional theory making assumptions, placing the starting point of 
theory within other texts and philosophies. This work also expands the traditional realm of 
671 Karen A. Foss, Sonja K. Foss, and Cindy L. Griffin Feminist Rhetorical Theories (Thousand 
Oaks ,CA: Sage Publications, 1999); Krista Ratcliffe, Anglo-American Feminist Challenges to 
the Rhetorical Traditions: Virginia Woolf, Mary Daly, Adrienne Rich (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1996).  
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rhetoric from persuasion and single-actor speech events to virtually any text, film or treatise. The 
implications of this move do not stop at just canon expansion – rather, the development of 
feminist rhetorical theory expands the boundaries of inclusion as to who can speak and who can 
serve as the audience for such speech.672
The place for feminist criticism of texts that are not of a theoretical or philosophical 
genre has been addressed.  Several scholars have examined texts and unpack multiple 
dimensions in texts for feminist theory as well as rhetoric, and the intersection of the two 
fields.
 Expanding the possibilities of theory only serves to 
expand the possibilities of what we are able to understand about rhetoric and its function in the 
world. It is within this theoretical context that I approach Diane Di Prima’s work Memoirs of a 
Beatnik as rhetoric. 
673
Helene Cixous’s Laugh of the Medusa is considered by Barbara Biesecker as a rhetorical 
theory. Biesecker approaches Cixous’s work as able to answer two striking aspects in modern 
conceptions of women and rhetoric. Biesecker identifies Cixous’s essay as a work that provides 
women strategies which to use to intervene in the traditional province of male rhetoric. She 
 The ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin can be used to identify those moves occurring in Di 
Prima’s work. Through Bakhtin, a new reading of Di Prima occurs, highlighting the feminist 
rhetoric of the text. This criticism places her novel as both contribution and application of beat 
rhetorical theory.  
                                               
672 Barbara Biesecker, “Towards a Transactional View of Rhetorical and Feminist 
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states, “I think it is necessary for feminists to notice that the recovery and analysis of ‘great 
orations’ by women is operated by a double gesture, a gesture that simultaneously writes ‘sexual 
difference’ into and out of history.”674
Rhetorically, the problem for women is this: How do women effectively intervene in the 
space of the symbolic, given that the conventional modes of the  enterprise as such – 
what Aristotle has called ‘the available means of persuasion’ – have historically effected 
their silence and thus have circumvented their force? Put another way, how and where are 
women to begin speaking and writing since the only language available to them 
constitutes ‘woman’ as that which must be excluded as the other in order to conserve the 
identity of the same?
 The alternative to this approach relies too much on 
scholars who exist outside the discipline, so for Biesecker, the “implications for rhetorical theory 
and directly to the issues she raises about the gaps in current feminist rhetorical scholarship:  
675
 
  
Biesecker is interested in how a feminist intervention in rhetoric can occur within a language that 
automatically marks them as passive outsiders to it. By intersecting the study of rhetoric and 
feminism in her analysis of Cixous’s’ text, Biesecker hopes that feminists will “be able to read 
their own manifestos differently.”676
Feminist rhetorical criticism has attempted in multiple ways to answer the question 
posited by Biesecker. Critics have focused on a number of various texts, with important 
implications for the scope as well as the direction of feminist rhetorical criticism.  Catherine 
Palczewski offers a rhetorical analysis of writings of Gloria Anzaldùa’s letters, arguing for their 
rhetoricity. Palczweski argues that Anzaldùa’s letter form of writing, “offers a counterweight to 
 Biesecker hopes that this new dimension to rhetoric will 
enable women to accomplish more political and social change.  
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the discipline’s focus on the finished speech as the primary object of study.”677 Palczewski sees a 
de-centering of rhetoric’s traditional concern with the speech as the only genre as a way to bring 
in feminist texts as objects of rhetorical criticism. “Stylistically the letter is a distinctive use of 
the form because of the way it positions audience. Hence, the letter deserves a place in the 
history of public address.”678
Susan Zaeske offers rhetorical theory through an analysis of the Book of Esther as a 
strategy for feminist rhetors. Her analysis focuses on a text that does not explicitly claim to be 
rhetoric or feminist: “It is my hope that engaging Esther in this way will contribute to efforts 
move beyond a unitary, male-dominated history of rhetorical theory through the recovery and 
recognition of a work that does not announce itself as rhetorical theory, but has operated as 
such.”
 Palczewski believes that criticism can question and open the 
usually tight borders of rhetoric to new texts. These moves in criticism are essential to further 
development of feminist rhetorical scholarship. 
679 Zaeske’s theory prescribes a rhetorical strategy by tracing a history of the uses of 
rhetoric by various feminist speakers and their effective employment of rhetoric. Exploring the 
utilization of rhetoric historically and devising a theory from this text allows a different 
perspective on the function and scope of rhetoric: “Its goals are not success in the assembly or 
courtroom, but survival and resistance in a foreign land. Its ethical ideals are not valid decision 
making or justice, but balancing personal integrity with the welfare of community.”680
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 In this 
way, Zaeske’s rhetorical analysis blurs ideological distinctions between the personal and the 
678 Palczewski, “Bodies, Borders, and Letters,” 10. 
679 Susan Zaeske, “Unveiling Esther as a Pragmatic Radical Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, 
33, 3 (2000):193-220, 194.  
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public. She also expands the canon of rhetoric beyond the Aristotelian conception of epidictic, 
forensic and deliberative categorization.  
Lisa Flores studies Chicana rhetoric to reveal how rhetorically Chicana feminist authors 
create the idea of a homeland through their texts. “As object the Chicana feminist is 
disempowered. Knowledge about her has been created by others, and she is forced into roles that 
do not fit.”681 This problem for Flores is the source of the focus of Chicana rhetoric. Flores 
examines poetry and other rhetorical artifacts from Chicana rhetors and reveals how the writers 
create the idea of a homeland in order to form a subjectivity of their own. In her conclusion, 
Flores delineates a key portion of feminist rhetorical scholarship; “Further exploration of the 
process of creating one’s own definitions should be a part of feminist scholarship.  .  .  As we 
become aware of the different ways in which women use the resources available to them to 
construct their identity, we can continue to build feminist theory that opens spaces and provides 
voice for women.”682
Although all considering different texts from different theoretical perspectives, each critic 
provides a scope and purpose for rhetorical criticism in feminism. This short examination of a 
few works of feminist rhetorical critics serves to highlight the variety of ways in which the idea 
of feminism has been approached through rhetorical criticism. Each of these critics offers an 
investigation into the possibilities of a rhetorical “place” for women. In each situation, the way a 
rhetorical place is crafted differs based on cultural and social factors. None of the previous critics 
 Studying the application of rhetoric to create identity for those who are not 
allowed the opportunity by the dominant ideology will point out those spaces where subjectivity 
is possible.  
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or theorists have turned toward Bakhtin to garner critical insights into how feminist thinkers craft 
their rhetoric because the rhetoric was an elucidation of realizations. In Di Prima’s case, her 
rhetorical turn elucidates a place for the occurrence of realizations and the crafting of alternative 
subjectivity. In this analysis, Di Prima’s text uses what I am calling the beat rhetoric to craft that 
place. In order to fully elucidate the place she offers, I now turn to an explanation of how 
Bakhtin’s ideas can be useful in rhetorical criticism to reveal these insights. 
7.3 NOTIONS OF CARNIVAL AND THE GROTESQUE  
Mikhail Bakhtin’s study of the work of Rabelais attempts to find the significance and meaning of 
Rabelais’s novels which, up until Bakhtin’s treatment, were not very seriously considered.683
It [Carnival] is a festival offered not by some exterior source but by the people to 
themselves. Therefore the people do not feel as if they were receiving something that 
they must accept respectfully and gratefully. They are given nothing, but they are left 
alone. This festivity demands no sanctimonious acknowledgement or astonishment such 
as official occasions usually expect. There are no brilliant processions inviting the people 
to pray and admire. Instead a signal is given to each and every one to play the fool and 
madman as he pleases.
 
Bakhtin finds Rabelais’s images of feasts, carnivals in the streets and the mixing of food and 
bodily forms to be not just for entertainment or shock value, but a very deliberate move to 
uncrown and strip the official tradition of the popular carnival, turning the official order upside 
down for a limited amount of time. Bakhtin states:  
684
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The carnival is something created outside of the official system by the people themselves: “In the 
world of carnival, awareness of the people’s immortality is combined with the realization that 
established authority and truth are relative.”685
Inside carnival, two important images constitute its effectiveness: The banquet and 
images of feasting. Bakhtin discusses the role of these banquets as a sort of triumph over the 
everyday world. Eating symbolized humanity’s conquering of the external, processing it and 
making it a part of the internal: “Here man tastes the world, introduces it into his body, makes it 
part of himself. Man’s awakening consciousness, could not but concentrate on this moment, 
could not help borrowing from it a number of substantial images determining its interrelation 
with the world.”
 The carnival is a way of questioning the often un-
questioned authority and power of the ideologies and institutions that operate around people 
daily.  
686
This element of victory and triumph is inherent in all banquet images. No meal can be 
sad. Sadness and food are incompatible (while death and food are perfectly compatible). 
The banquet always celebrates a victory and this is a part of its very nature. Further, the 
triumphal banquet is always universal. It is the triumph of life over death. In this respect 
it is equivalent to conception and birth.  The victorious body receives the defeated world 
and is renewed.
 Bakhtin believes that the role of the feast is more than just celebration of a 
communal kill – it is the figurative triumph of life over death, and an occasion for triumph:  
687
 
  
This focus on life over the notion of death, which is compatible with food imagery alone, 
has important rhetorical implications. Bakhtin argues that the imagery of the banquet carries with 
it particular feelings and contexts. In a text, a choice to utilize the imagery of a banquet over 
imagery of food is suggestive of a move toward a carnival. This carnival would exist for the 
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reader in his or her mind – a temporary unsettling of the ideology of authority. The author’s 
traditionally perceived role as guide or master of the text leading the reader would be replaced by 
a more participatory engagement in the text – the reader is not the definitive subject of an 
authorial discourse handed down from above. Using banquet imagery also provides the author a 
space to equalize social relations and further universalize the carnival critique of authority or 
ideology: “The scene is strictly limited by time, the time of the banquet, but during that period 
there are no footlights, no separation of participants and spectators.  Everybody participates. 
While the usual world order is suspended, the new utopian order which has come to replace it is 
sovereign and embraces all.”688
Although limited in scope, the banquet imagery is an important part of the carnival scene. 
It provides a position for everyone to take up agency in a critique of ideology and authority as 
they are enacted in individual lives. Carnival provides this through a lack of hierarchy and 
official sanction, as the banquet table would seem to represent.  
  
Bakhtin’s theory of the grotesque image is important to carnival due to the foregrounding 
of the base. The clean and holy are moved to the background in favor of a celebration of the 
lower body, the genitals and bodily functions. Organs and pieces of the body are described in 
detail in grotesque imagery. “Exaggeration, hyperbolism and excessiveness are generally 
considered fundamental attributes of the grotesque style.”689
What is the purpose of the carnival? Clearly it is officially invoked, so it cannot be called 
into existence by an individual with a specific purpose in mind. Carnival exists when base 
elements and the lower regions of the body are highlighted, or when festive eating or 
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consumption of food and drink in a party-like atmosphere are established. The establishment of 
this is symbolic, as Bakhtin points out in his analysis of Rabelais. The images of carnival call 
into question hierarchy and create spaces which allow “a special type of communication 
impossible in everyday life” to occur.690
It is, first of all, a festive laughter. Therefore it is not an individual reaction to some 
comic event. Carnival laughter is a laughter of all the people. Second, it is universal in 
scope; it is directed at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants. . . Third, 
this laughter is ambivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time, mocking, deriding. 
It asserts and denies, it buries and revives.  Such is the laughter of carnival.
 These spaces that are created by texts only exist for a 
limited time – the course of the reading of the novel. So what purpose do they serve? For 
Bakhtin, the only purpose is to laugh at official institutions and societal truth, or ideology:  
691
 
 
Through this type of laughter, everything is game for mockery. Through laughing at the official, 
unofficial and everyone in the world while simultaneously laughing at oneself, “A new form of 
communication always creates new forms of speech or a new meaning given to the old 
forms.”692
It could be argued, that Bakhtin’s notions of the carnival, the role of the banquet and the 
grotesque are particular to Rabelais, and the transition from the medieval world to the 
Renaissance. What application do they have to modern texts? Bakhtin invokes this question 
when he asks, “Perhaps all these images are nothing but a dead and crippled tradition? Nothing 
but an empty form, a dead weight, which prevents the author from seeing and representing the 
 Carnival is the place where new communication, or at least new meanings, can 
emerge for Bakhtin. He thinks that the use of such images provides a place for refiguring of 
meanings since the laughter of the carnival moment is ambivalent. 
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true reality of modern times?”693
This long development had its own scoria, its own dead deposits in manners, beliefs, 
prejudices. But in its basic line this system grew and was enriched; it acquired a new 
meaning, absorbed the new hopes and thoughts of the people. It was transformed in the 
crucible of the people’s new experience. The language of images developed new and 
more refined nuances.  Thanks to this process, popular-festive images became a powerful 
means of grasping reality; they served as a basis for an authentic and deep realism. 
Popular imagery did not reflect the naturalistic, fleeting, meaningless, and scattered 
aspect of reality but the very process of becoming, its meaning and direction. Hence the 
universality and sober optimism of this system.
 He answers his own question by indicating that these images 
speak to humanity on a base level, maintaining currency over time because it addresses the key 
conceptions that humanity uses to organize its relationship to the world and itself:  
694
 
 
For Bakhtin, the notions of the grotesque, carnival and the feast, when they appear in literature, 
are always markers of an inversion of norms. For Bakhtin, all three serve as an invitation to the 
reader, a way for Rabelais to join with the reader in an ambivalent space that may offer re-
conceptualization of society’s hierarchy.  Now I will critique Memoirs of a Beatnik using these 
conceptions from Bakhtin in order to highlight the feminist rhetorical contributions that can be 
garnered from her work. 
7.4 CARNIVALISTIC ELEMENTS OF MEMOIRS AND BEAT RHETORIC 
Diane Di Prima’s semi-autobiographical book Memoirs of a Beatnik is primarily more fiction 
than fact, even though titled a memoir. For Kerouac, as shown earlier, this was often the 
opposite. Di Prima seeks to unsettle the easy boundaries formed around types of texts. Chapters 
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that discuss her acquaintances, female lovers, and experiences in New York City are interlaid 
with chapters that discuss in vibrant detail various sexual encounters. I argue that the 
ambivalence generated by carnivalistic images in this text allow for a positioning of a feminist 
subjectivity.  The rhetoric used by Di Prima is similar to the rhetorical ideas of Ginsberg and 
Kerouac, but importantly using their ideas to create a position from where a woman’s voice 
could be heard as persuasive. 
 Anthony Libby’s criticism of the book, which I detailed a bit earlier in this chapter, 
offers a very specific framing for understanding Memoirs. Libby’s analysis of this book offers 
three implications. First, he comments on the large amount of homosexual activity depicted in 
the book. For Libby, these lesbian scenes are outside of typical depictions of the act because they 
are created by a woman about women and avoid the problems of male created scenes in 
pornography, as Mulvey identified in her work on the masculine gaze.695 Secondly, the 
pornographic writings are interlaid with images and language Libby calls “surreal” which are 
“threatening to the suspension of intellect required by pornography.”696 Libby argues this use of 
language interrupts the usual processing of pornography by the reader, disrupting “the erotic 
theater of the mind.”697
One scene that Libby points to for proof is one that I also find particularly revealing:  
“Against my cheek Petra shuddered and came like a great, alien mammal, and my  hand in 
Matilda’s cunt ached as it was alternately squeezed by her thighs and  ground by the frantic, 
 Finally, he argues that her word choice allows her to avoid creating sex 
scenes for mere male pleasure, allowing freedom from the male dominated interpretation of the 
text. 
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circular movements of her pussy. . .”698 (Di Prima, 1988, p. 62).  For Libby, this image is surreal 
and disrupts it from being a purely pornographic image. From a Bakhtinian perspective, the 
image is ambivalent at best, and highlights sexual encounter using metaphors that de-center the 
sexuality of the image as it is constructed. Describing one of the participants in this orgy as a 
“great, alien mammal” when she experiences orgasm is an indicator of grotesque style through 
hyperbole and excessiveness. According to Bakhtin, “exaggeration becomes caricature” in 
examples of grotesque imagery. The purpose is to provide a “contradictory and double-faced 
fullness of life.”699  Along with description and highlighting of the sexual organs and pleasure in 
the scene, characterization of the resulting pleasure in the sex act as “alien” presents the other 
view of the situation. In this scene, the pain and pleasure described in grotesque images unsettles 
the typical images of pornography. Libby links these images back to Di Prima’s anger 
intertwined in the sexual act.700
 Grotesque focuses on the lower body in the beginning of Memoirs of a Beatnik 
contribute to the start of the book by raising the question as to whether this moment is a 
beginning or an end. Contemporaneous sources such as Evergreen Review suggest that the 
 I argue that these images provide a way for the text to constitute 
the world through contradiction. The grotesque always highlights the intertwined nature of birth 
and death in the world. Libby interprets Di Prima’s work with great insight, but the omission of 
the grotesque applied to the body in the sex act leaves out the possible ambivalence that such 
images can create. 
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textual environment of the late sixties was one where “politics, sex, and art went together.”701
The muscles of my thighs felt sore, and I passed my hand over them to feel the 
grainyness of the dried come that was stuck to them here and there. Then I slid my hand 
between my legs and felt softly of the lips of my vagina. The skin was raw as I slipped 
my fingers inside, exploring gently. He certainly was a big one, I thought. A big one for 
the first one, that was good. . . .Now, I thought with a little grin of cynical pleasure, I 
certainly won’t have any more trouble using Tampax.
 
Evergreen Review, noted for publishing some of the earlier beat writings had transitioned to a 
more explicit rhetoric linking effective political expression with explicit imagery.  In Di Prima’s 
book this seems to be the case. Her narrator describes waking up in a strange apartment, and 
begins to detail the loss of her virginity. As she describes the apartment, she begins to focus on 
her own body:  
702
 
  
Here we find the grotesque imagery used to emphasize contradiction. First, her 
description of her own body, soreness, the dried fluid still left on her, all absent of discussion of 
her emotions or rationality. The characterization of her lover as nothing more than the size of his 
penis is further a grotesque image through characterization. Essentializing her lover to his 
generative organ is a clear reversal of the usual hierarchy of top down. The privileging of the 
brain and head in opposition to the genitals is reversed, providing privilege to body parts 
associated with excretion and reproduction. As Stallybrass and White note:  
Grotesque realism uses the material body – flesh characterized by corpulent excess – to 
represent cosmic, social, topographical, and linguistic elements of the world. Thus 
already in Bakhtin there is the germinal notion of transcodings and displacements 
effected between the high/low image of the physical body and other social domains. 
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Grotesque realism images the human body as multiple, bulging over-or under-sized, 
protuberant and incomplete.703
These elements are present when we read about how large he is, how open she is now and how 
“grainy” and “sore” her thighs are the morning after. The over indulgence and the 
incompleteness of the body mark a completeness and a whole to the narrator, who is happy that 
now she can use Tampax easily.  The focus on the lower body instead of the mental state of the 
woman who has lost her virginity reverse the expected order of the narrative, where such 
physical elements of the sexual act would be secondary to the emotional or rational state of the 
narrator. 
 
Through all of these images, there arises some tension and contradiction. The 
contradiction occurs between expectation of form and what the text delineates. First, in the 
beginning of a book, readers already know that they are at the start, the opening of something. Di 
Prima’s choice to highlight grotesquely the loss of virginity (especially through avoiding any of 
the act, just the physical effects) describes the end of what is traditionally held as innocence.  
In titling the work Memoirs, Di Prima is also evoking a similar contradiction in 
expectation. She uses the genre expectation of a “memoir” in an unexpected way. Genres are 
more than just categories, often helping people make sense of their world as containers of 
expected response. “In other words, as individuals’ rhetorical responses to recurrent situations 
become typified as genres, the genres in turn help structure the way these individuals 
conceptualize and experience these situations, predicting their notions of what constitutes 
appropriate and possible responses and actions.”704
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cultural patterns, and as tools for exploring the achievements of particular speakers and writers; 
for the student, genres serve as keys to understanding how to participate in the actions of a 
community.”705
Life writings cannot be used as straightforward documentation of historical facts. The 
possibility is too strong that their authors did not accurately remember their life history 
when writing, or even deliberately “remembered” the past incorrectly in order to describe 
themselves, their families, or other loved ones more favorably. Even if the writers were 
intent on describing the past entirely correctly, this could only be managed to a limited 
degree; an exhaustive and complete reconstruction of one’s life is impossible to achieve. 
When writing, authors know for instance the consequences of decisions and actions taken 
in the past, and cannot disregard these results. The social code governing a society also 
influences what authors mention, how they mention it, and what they leave out.
 In either view, the function of genre is not metaphysical, but negotiated – genre 
helps readers understand and interact with social expectation, and authors can play with what a 
genre suggests as the appropriate, then twist it for rhetorical effect. The genre is as important for 
readers as the story in this view. The genre helps the reader understand what sort of experience 
they will be encountering in the book. As far as the genre expectations of memoir go, Helke 
Dreier argues for little difference in the forms of memoir and autobiography, lining up the 
similarities: 
706
 
 
The raw, detailed facts listed in this “memoir” violate the expected norms of genre, as well as the 
violation of the social code in discussing such an act in vulgar terms. In Di Prima’s book these 
expectations are shattered almost immediately with seemingly pornographic images.  
This violation of the content of the expected genre is a concept Bakhtin describes as the 
chronotope. Morson and Emerson argue the chronotope can be effectively upset by placing 
events or actions in a genre that are unexpected or out of place:  
                                               
705 Carolyn R. Miller, “Genre as Social Action,” in Aviva Freedman and Peter Medway, eds., 
Genre and the New Rhetoric (London: Taylor & Francis, 1994), 39.  
706 Helke Dreier. “Memoirs as Dynastic Means of Legitimization: Dutchess Sophie of 
Hannover.” Biography: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly. 27, 3 (Summer 2004): 495-516, 496. 
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So important are chronotopes that we all intuitively recognize what Bakhtin has in mind. 
We know, for instance, that actions that would be highly implausible, if not impossible, 
in a nineteenth-century realist novel may be fully expected in a chivalric romance or 
other adventure tale; and we tend to shape our expectations to given works based on a 
sense of what is plausible in a work of that kind.707
 
  
When Di Prima infuses her Memoirs with violence or pornographic depictions of sex, or 
casual conversation about bodily fluids and raw feelings after sex, she upsets expectations for the 
memoir. The chronotope for her own pornographic imagery faced with text we expect to read in 
a memoir can “implicitly dispute (or agree with) each other. That is, the relation of chronotopes 
to each other may be dialogic.”708 In the United States specifically, there is a long tradition of 
highly sexualized memoir, including Henry Miller, who Ken Shapiro argues, “writes hundreds of 
pages describing in the minutest and clearest detail his exploits in bed.”709 Additionally, in My 
Secret Life, explicit pornographic scenes fill the story as if they were its only motive. As one 
scholar notes, “Pornography never generalizes, but rather, repeats instances, moments, and 
scrupulously rendered concrete detail. The author of My Secret Life wants always to move 
through these particular rooms, to record these very singular moments; he doesn’t desire 
transcendence but always immanence.”710
                                               
707 Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson. Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics. (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 371. 
 The presence of explicitly sexual imagery also tinged 
reception of Emma Goldman’s autobiography Living My Life (1931) prompting readers to 
evaluate the strength of her political vision not on the efficacy of her rhetorical performance, but 
her sexual habits. “The autobiography removed her from such direct contact with her audience 
and, contrary to her own expressed wishes, allowed readers to decouple and reconstruct the 
708 Morson and Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 369. 
709 Ken Shapiro, “Introduction,” in Henry Miller, Tropic of Cancer (New York: Grove 
Weidenfeld, 1961), xvi 
710 Deborah Lutz, “The Secret Rooms of My Secret Life,” English Studies in Canada, 31,1 
(March 2005):118-127, 125. 
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relationship between the life she had intensely lived and her political convictions.”711
This contradiction is further developed with the use of the grotesque focus on the lower 
body. For Bakhtin, these are the areas of death and destruction – through digestion and 
defecation, as well as the areas of reproduction and childbirth. These areas, for Bakhtin, can 
never be separated and only further create an ambivalent space where the ideology of the society 
can be questioned:  
 The 
presence of highly charged sexual imagery clearly pushes readers toward a particular range of 
responses to the genre, none of which are quite the effect we see in Memoirs. The presence of 
explicit pornographic images is not enough to rhetorically spark what is going on in Di Prima’s 
work. One way to critically assess this difference is the use of Bakhtin. The chronotope of 
memoir along with the expectations of pornographic genre are combined in a way that does not 
meet the expectations of either, but rather offers an alternative rendering that hopes for a 
transcendent moment. Memoirs of a Beatnik combines these two chronotopes to evoke a 
dialogism that upsets dominant ideology about the role of memoir, and memoir written by a 
woman. The result is disturbing, but within the rhetoric of the carnival, as I will discuss later, this 
disturbance is where subjectivity can arise due to ambivalence.  
Negation and destruction (death of the old) are included as an essential phase, inseparable 
from affirmation, from the birth of something new and better. The very material bodily 
lower stratum of the grotesque image (food, wine, the genital force, the organs of the 
body) bears a deeply positive character. This principle is victorious, for the final result is 
always abundance, increase.712
 
  
On the other side of this contradiction, beginning with an ending, there is still a beginning 
of something taking place. The narrator’s focus on her genitals highlights the ending of 
                                               
711 Oz Frankel, “Whatever Happened to ‘Red Emma’? Emma Goldman, from Alien Rebel to 
American Icon,” The Journal of American History, 83, 3 (Dec 1996): 903-942, 908. 
712 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, 62. 
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innocence and a change.  Laura Kipniss (1996) investigates pornography and its implications in 
her book Bound and Gagged. Kipniss argues that pornography serves as a rebellion against 
ideological norms of control that are traditionally centered on the body. For Kipnis, pornography 
is a way to confront difference and open up spaces in ideological constructions:  
Pornography forces social differences in our faces: Not only class differences, not only 
differences between male and female sexuality, but the range of differences between 
women. Calling one version of sexuality ‘nature’ and assigning it to all women is false in 
many ways, not least of which involves turning an historically specific class and 
educational position – coincidentally, that of the feminist antiporn intellectual – into a 
universal that tramples over the existence of very real divisions between women.713
 
  
What Libby terms as spaces of freedom from male ideas of dominance and control can also be 
read as moments where the social hierarchy is highlighted in all its inequity. As Kelly McDowell 
argues, “Lesbian pornography works from within the dominant power structure of mainstream 
pornography to undo its own established norms. It appropriates the apparatuses which have been 
used to dominate women and resignifies them in accordance with a female subjectivity. This 
demonstrates the unfixity of power and the possibility for its re-appropriation.”714
                                               
713 Laura Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America. 
(New York: Grove Press, 1996), 150.  
 McDowell’s 
claim is based on not just the images of pornography, but the production of lesbian pornography 
by women with the intent being consumption of the images by other women. This is quite a 
distance from the analysis of pornography offered by Andrea Dworkin where, “strains of male 
power are intrinsic to both the substance and production of pornography; and the ways and 
714 Kelly McDowell, “The Politics of Lesbian Pornography: Towards a Chaotic Proliferation of 
Female Sexual Imagery,” Xchanges 1, 1 (September 2001) 
http://infohost.nmt.edu/~xchanges/xchanges/1.1/mcdowell.html  
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means of pornography are the ways and means of male power.”715  Pornographic images are 
more ambivalent than Dworkin’s assessment when the production element is considered. In this 
case, Di Prima’s production of lesbian pornographic images is not intended for the sole 
consumption of lesbians, but a mixed audience, which would allow the male controlling gaze 
that Dworkin writes about access to the images. However, I argue this does not have a 
transformative effect on the rhetorical potential of the scenes. The effect’s change, if any, is 
argued by Jill Dolan as one where the power relations are thrown into question by virtue of the 
participation of lesbians in the scene: “In the lesbian performance context, playing with fantasies 
of sexual and gender roles offers the potential for changing gender-coded structures of power. 
Power is not inherently male; a woman who assumes a dominant role is only malelike if the 
culture considers power as a solely male attribute.”716
Symbolically deploying the improper body as a mode of social sedition also follows 
logically from the fact that the body is the very thing those forms of power under attack --
- government, religion, bourgeois manners and mores – devote themselves to keeping ‘in 
its place.’ Control over the body has long been considered essential to producing an 
 Di Prima taps into all of these complex 
readings and potentials at once with her explicit lesbian encounters in the book. The opening 
scene of Memoirs, with the suggested “transcoding” that Stallybrass and White see in Bakhtin, 
can become a moment where pornography highlights the “taking” of a woman. But the scene is 
also ambivalent because of the highlighting of the lower-bodily strata, making the construction 
of hierarchy in a normative manner difficult at best. The pornographic element in Memoirs can 
serve as a political space through this ambivalence. These spaces also serve as places to rebel 
against the deployment of ideological controls: 
                                               
715 Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1979), 24. 
716 Jill Dolan, The Feminist Spectator as Critic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
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orderly work force, a docile populace a passive law-abiding citizenry. Just consider how 
many actual laws are on the books regulating how bodies may be seen and what parts 
may not, what you may do with your body in public and in private, and it begins to make 
more sense that the out-of-control, unmannerly body is precisely what threatens the 
orderly operation of the status quo.717
 
 
Kipnis taps into some of the ideas of Bakhtin about the nature of the body and its role in 
arranging social hierarchy which is so well explained by Stallybrass and White. Focus on the 
lower strata call the hierarchy into question, creating a space of ambivalence where, according to 
Kipniss, inequities can be revealed, but according to Bakhtin, social ambivalence rises. The 
images in Di Prima’s book create a space of such ambivalence, since they offer up front images 
of lower body strata in grotesque form. This highlighting of the lower strata does not just come 
in pornographic images, although I would argue those are the most powerful moments in the text 
where ambivalent spaces for consideration of subjectivity are created. 
Another aspect of highlighting the lower strata is when the narrator discovers her 
pregnancy. This, coming near the end of the book, has the important implication of finalizing the 
book. However, traditionally a memoir is supposed to be a discussion of events in the past. Here, 
Di Prima utilizes the grotesque and focus on her body to problematize this traditional conception:  
And when the full moon shone on the fire-escape again, I didn’t get my period as I should 
have. And as the moon waned, my breasts grew and became sore, and I knew I was 
pregnant. And I began to put my books in boxes, and pack up the odds and ends of my 
life, for a whole new adventure was starting, and I had no idea where it would land me.718
 
  
Once again, focus on menstruation and the discussion of the body’s changes. This is the last 
paragraph of Memoirs, and through her discussion of potential birth near the end, we expect to 
hear about the end of her “wild days” as a beatnik. However, the mention of “adventure” and 
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uncertainty that comes with it suggests the future is wilder than the memoirs we have just read. 
The fact that the narrator “had no idea” what was coming is pretty shocking considering the 
pages of orgy and sexual encounter that we just encountered as a recurrent theme of the book.  
These moments, especially this one, highlight the connection between Kerouac and 
Ginsberg that Di Prima has, at least rhetorically. Here we have the limits of the body – changes 
coming due to pregnancy – seen as the beginning of a great adventure instead of the end of one. 
The pornographic scenes can be read as Ginsbergian rhetorical moments as well. The limits and 
disgust of the grotesque body are cherished experiences that the narrator shares in extreme detail 
out of joy.  Kerouac’s rhetoric of kairos is present here as well, as the chronos of the moon’s 
phases as well as the body’s changes for coming pregnancy are contrasted with the decision to 
“move out” because of the opportunity pregnancy presents for adventure. Of course, Di Prima’s 
rhetoric utilizes these beat rhetoric theories, but for the purpose of creating a position to speak 
from persuasively, a feminist subjectivity. However, what Di Prima creates is a bit unusual if not 
very controversial from her use of the grotesque. 
The prime example of this in the novel is when the narrator is raped by the father of her 
friend.  The narrator goes home with her lover from college, and meets her lover’s family, which 
she finds nearly opposite of her own. She describes the father, Serge, as “like most vigorous 
healthy men, at least half his problem was simply that civilized life could not contain, or in any 
way use, his energies.”719
                                               
719 Di Prima, Memoirs, 66. 
  The family travels to the beach and has a picnic where everyone 
drinks and eats in a celebratory mood. The narrator dozes off alone while reflecting on her love 
for her friend:  “I was awakened by the weight of another body on my own and a tongue in my 
ear. I pulled my head free and turned enough to see that Serge, complete with shorts and 
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sunglasses, was lying on top of me.”720
Serge somehow managed to free his rigid cock from his shorts, for I could feel it poling 
between my legs, looking for a way in. Suddenly his mouth was on my bare backside, I 
could feel that absurd moustache against by skin. And my fear and horror seemed 
ridiculous. This was Serge, poor silly Serge, who never got to screw his wife, and if he 
wanted to throw a fuck into me, why I might as well let him. It wasn’t going to hurt me. 
Not a whole lot. Anyway, it didn’t seem that I had much choice. I stopped struggling. 
Serge immediately sensed my acquiescence. His hands released their vice-like grip on my 
shoulders, and slid under my sweater, under my blouse and took hold of my breasts.
   She attempts to escape, but he catches her and she 
states, “I struggled silently to  free myself, all the time thinking unbelievingly that this was rape, 
that I was about to be raped:”  
721
 
  
What to make of this scene? Is it simply a giving in to the dominant male in this instance 
as a weak female? For Libby, this passage is another example of contradiction, in her world 
where “nothing sexual is unambiguous; nothing sexual is wholly destructive, and even 
destruction is never wholly negative.”722
What Libby misses here is the possible rhetorical uncrowning of the patriarchy through a 
grotesque and symbolic acquiescence. For Bakhtin, even the most serious oaths and statements 
of violence are used for the uncrowning or unmasking of official truth. Bakhtin gives the 
example of the Roman carnival, where a little boy blows out his father’s candle in a processional 
and cries, “Death to you, Papa!”
  He interprets the above description of Serge as Di 
Prima’s dismissal of her attacker with “bored affection.”  
723
                                               
720 Di Prima, Memoirs, 67. 
 These cries were echoed by all at the carnival. The taking of 
the most serious crime and transforming it into ‘gay matter’ helps to de-legitimize the control 
that power or ideology has over individuals, giving them subjectivity and agency. The rhetorical 
721 Di Prima, Memoirs, 68. 
722 Libby, “Diane Di Prima,” 48. 
723 Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, 138. 
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work here opens a space for the reader where typical and expected roles can be questioned and 
recast. Within the larger scope of beat rhetoric, the application here of the topoi of the limits of 
the body as well as time work together to bring ambivalence to the forefront and provide 
opportunity to the reader to see the expected roles of woman and man as questionable and 
changeable.  
Looking at the scene again, Di Prima’s description of Serge as “poor” and “silly” at the 
moment the narrator realizes that rape is inevitable are the equivalent of the extinguishing of the 
candle. To take Bakhtin’s example a bit further, candlelight vigils are generally considered to be 
the most solemn and holy of rituals in which one can participate. Given that example, the 
seriousness of the rape scene is “extinguished” through the pity the narrator gives to her attacker. 
The narrator seems convinced to define herself out of the rape by re-describing the situation. 
Furthermore, the narrator discusses whether she should “allow” her attacker to continue. 
However, the discussion of her rapist as silly and harmless gives her room to discuss whether or 
not she should do him a favor. This totally flips the standard conception of a rape scene on its 
head, making the entire situation uncomfortably ambivalent. Is it a rape if the “victim” becomes 
someone who “does a favor” for the “attacker?” 
Additionally, her characterization of Serge has the effect of disempowering him by 
discussing him in caricature, a quality of grotesque literature. His silly nature, his “absurd” 
moustache seems to kill the fear of the narrator, and she becomes in control of the situation. The 
unsettling of the dominance of the patriarch though caricature and grotesque imagery to 
transform the horror of the act into “gay matter” is the sort of rhetorical disarming that allows the 
narrator to occupy a position above Serge in a situation that seemed hopelessly one-sided. Serge 
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is something to be laughed at rather than feared. Very much like the son blowing out the candle, 
the typical illumination of events is darkened.  
The role of laughter allows the narrator to unmask her attacker for what he truly is – 
unusable by society, as her earlier description indicates. Permitting him to have sex could be read 
as a critique against society’s prescribed roles for men and women. Providing a carnivalesque 
space to investigate traditional male and female roles in society allows for laughter at what 
normally would be considered an inevitable situation. Di Prima states, “The real horror, the 
nightmare in which most of us are spending our adult lives, is the deep-rooted insidious belief in 
the one-to-one world. The world of ‘this is my old man.’”724
The major question is whether or not the scene takes place in a carnivalesque atmosphere. 
Remember, for Bakhtin, writing as he is about Rabelais, the carnivalesque takes place 
symbolically, through imagery and rhetoric that invoke the “gay matter” of carnival.  The rape 
scene occurs after a picnic which has all the characteristics of a carnivalesque feast: “There was 
enough to eat, and nearly everyone was intent on stuffing themselves. Conversation was jovial, 
Martha’s wit crackling like that wood she had gathered.”
  This scene’s ambivalence, typical 
of the deployment of grotesque imagery, can now open a space for the questioning of the normal 
hierarchy. Perhaps the scene is one that places the guilt of rape on society which forces men like 
Serge to behave this way – the narrator describes him as made useless by society.  Of course, that 
this sex is unwanted, or a threat at all is merely an illusion, and her use of grotesque imagery 
allows for questions and critique of traditional conceptions of rape, sexuality and the roles 
society imposes on men and women through those assumptions.  
725
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tone must be victorious, as eating is a mode of life triumphing over death. Di Prima could give 
into her attacker, but in the spirit of carnival, grotesque characterization allows her to laugh at 
powerful problematic of victim and attacker, of who is in control of a precarious situation. At 
first the victim, Di Prima is able to rhetorically position Serge as the subject of a powerful and 
problematic society, thereby shifting the power over the situation to her through carnivalesque 
laughter at her attacker’s physical features, abilities and personality.  
I argued earlier that the deployment of the grotesque imagery and the hints at a 
carnivalesque situation in Memoirs of a Beatnik allow for the repositioning (or positioning) of a 
feminist subjectivity. Now I will turn to a few examples of how that subjectivity is occupied 
during the story by the narrator. The ambivalent spaces created by the use of the grotesque 
rhetoric, such as the scenes above, allow for the questioning of what is normally unquestioned. 
The feminist subjectivity appears in the novel as a rather traditional public address-styled 
argument aimed at the reader. 
The first example is an invective against birth control.  The narrator argues against the 
birth control pill by claiming, “it makes you fat, the pill does. . . gives you sore breasts, slight 
morning sickness, condemns you, who have avoided pregnancy, to live in a perpetual state of 
early pregnancy: woozy, nauseous and likely to burst into tears.”726
What then? What does that leave us? Leaves us ye olde-fashioned diaphragm, and we all 
know what a drag that is, and ye almost-as-olde creams and foams, which purportedly 
can be used without a diaphragm, and are good for exactly twenty minutes to a half hour 
after insertion, which means you have to work pretty fast, with one eye on the clock. 
They also drip and run and are unspeakably gooey, and add to the natural joyous gooey-
ness of lust a certain chemical texture and taste, which could, I suppose, with 
determination, become an acquired taste but is at least slightly unpleasant to the 
 She describes the use of 
some alternatives to the use of the pill:  
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uninitiated. And up you get, if he gets his up again, and you insert into all the gooey mess 
inside you some more foam. Medieval, I’d say.727
 
 
Di Prima’s use of the grotesque slides into a comic and distasteful description of so-called 
modern contraceptive techniques. Use of adjectives such as “gooey,” “foam,” as well as using 
terms such as “uninitiated” brings birth control out of the sterile, scientific terms of approval 
with which they are usually associated. The characterization of these representatives of medical 
science in such grotesque terms reduces them to the equivalent of medieval medicine but this 
section should be read in context with the very next part, which is the alternative:  
Or it leaves us having babies. Having babies has certain advantages, not be gainsaid. One 
is that you don’t have to do anything about it – when you want to fuck, you just fuck. 
Nothing gooey, nothing tension-making. If you get knocked up, the discomfort of early 
pregnancy tends to last only two or three months – whereas with the pill it lasts forever. 
Pregnancy always makes me want to fuck more, too, and I enjoy it more. And in those 
last months, the delights of ingenuity are added, and many new joys discovered. As for 
childbirth, having a baby is a matter of laying down and having it. After the first one, 
nothing could be easier if you forget the rules: forget doctors, hospitals, enemas, shaving 
of pubic hair, forget stoicism and ‘painless childbirth’ – simply holler and push the 
damned thing out.728
 
  
Referring to the act of childbirth as “hollering” and the baby as a “dammed thing”, as well as the 
joys of “fucking” while pregnant,  serve as grotesque characterizations of an act normally 
discussed in clinical or highly romanticized terms. Grotesque images, as stated above, tend to 
provide ambivalence, where nothing is proven final or complete. This is not a polemic against 
birth control; it is the creation of space for alternatives to the dominant discourse of society. 
Grotesque images allow for the separation from official sanctioned discourse into a realm where 
everything is the target of laughter, which allows for the inversion of things that would not 
normally be questioned. In this case, we have a powerful demonstration of the grotesque as a 
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place where feminist subjectivity can arise. The narrator is able to invert the position of medical 
science in two ways. First, she equates birth control methods of her time with primitive medieval 
techniques. Secondly, she places unassisted natural childbirth as easier as and simpler than 
medically supervised birth. Being pregnant is not a medical condition, but a natural one in this 
rhetorical turn. 
Di Prima is able to answer Biesecker’s question again by seeming to counterpoint the 
dominant rhetorics of birth control as a woman’s choice and medical science. By upsetting the 
dominant discourse, claiming it’s really no big deal to have babies, she posits a world where 
women can reject privilege offered by the state, the subject is urged to avoid the hospital in favor 
of her own devices. Pregnancy, usually considered a fragile state, is a state where sex becomes 
much more pleasurable and creative. And the discomfort of pregnancy is short term rather than 
the long term suffering brought about by birth control pills.  
Additionally, the description of birthing as something that occurs at home, in typical 
surroundings, and in terms that are very guttural and animalistic upsets the typical stories on 
childbirth that are shared in the dominant discourse. These narratives, while not completely 
medically supported, are a part of the cultural machinery of judgment that we use to determine 
what makes a good mother: 
According to our cultural mythos, “good” mothers deliver vaginally without pain 
medication, after advance planning and appropriate prenatal education. Second-best 
mothers submit regretfully but docilely to whatever medical interventions the doctors 
recommend to correct and control their unruly bodies. “Bad” mothers make other, 
“selfish” choices, such as giving birth at home, seeking out an epidural or a cesarean 
section, or attempting a vaginal birth after a previous c-section. Alternatively, “bad” 
mothers may just fail to demonstrate sufficient control over their births. They may labor 
“unproductively” and thereby “fail to progress” or otherwise fail to proceed in a timely 
fashion toward an uncomplicated birth. In some hospitals, women that end up receiving 
cesarean sections resulting in healthy babies are routinely given unsolicited literature on 
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grieving to help them through their feelings of failure and loss at not having successfully 
achieved a normative birth.729
 
 
The normative birth standards of the time of Di Prima’s writing were not the same as described 
above in our cultural moment. The point is that what is good or bad about birth and pregnancy 
are determined culturally as well as medically. Di Prima reflects on her own mother’s reaction at 
the time when she told her mother that for her first child she was going to deliver naturally: 
 
When I had asked my mother about ‘natural childbirth’ she was horrified. No, she said, of 
course she didn’t remember any of our births. She had been unconscious. She was quite 
self-righteous about it. Why, she wanted to know, would anybody want to experience all 
that? “They put me to sleep, and when I woke up, you were there.” To here, as to many 
women of her generation, pain-free birthing was one of the marvels of modern medicine. 
When I told her that I wanted to be awake, to see and feel my baby come out of me, she 
looked at me as if I was quite demented and not a little perverse.730
 
 
It is this normative, unquestioned hierarchy that the grotesque can cast into ambivalent by 
making it a target of laughter. The laughter creates a space where the order of the normal can be 
reconsidered, if only for a short time. However, this powerful rhetorical move allows for at least 
the recognition of the construction of the hierarchy, and at best, it provides a space from which 
one can construct alternative orderings. 
Comparing this section to others in the book, this section functions in the same way as 
earlier pornographic sections, unsettling the ideological construction of women (who are 
supposed to enjoy this natural and blessed event of having a child) and provides a new 
subjectivity. The woman is more dominant of the situation and in control of nature, deciding on 
where and when to give birth, and evaluating pregnancy based on the joy it provides for the raw 
sex act.  
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But on closer evaluation, both alternatives are rather comic. There is a grotesque element 
present in considering a baby as the casual result of sex. The grotesque is also present when 
childbirth is described as “hollering” and “pushing the dammed thing out.” This placing of the 
lower extremities above the mind is classic grotesque inversion in the Bakhtinian sense. It is not 
a serious advocacy in a traditional sense, but inversion. The inversion exposes a situation where 
the woman is in complete control of sex and childbirth.  The whole section on birth control can 
be read carnivalistically, placing normal hierarchy and ideology on its head to explore 
alternatives and laugh at all the results. However, the potential for subjectivity remains. Here the 
woman is in charge, an active determiner of when sex occurs (for her pleasure), pregnancy (a 
hidden joy for sexual pleasure) and when childbirth occurs (as an unexpected result of seeking 
out sex partners). 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
In examining Memoirs of a Beatnik, I have attempted to extrapolate Di Prima’s answer to 
Barbara Biesecker’s burning question – How do women place themselves rhetorically in a space 
designed by and suited for men? I have argued that through the use of the carnival, grotesque 
imagery and other forms, Di Prima creates a space where the normal hierarchy is interrupted 
temporarily between the reader and the world in order to laugh at ideology and dominant 
discourses, opening them up for interrogation. Through Bakhtinian theory, Di Prima’s semi-
autobiographical text takes on a different dimension and a clearer picture of the appeal of her 
writing comes forth. Perhaps the scope is even unknown to Di Prima, drawing on the ancient 
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rituals of carnival which, according to Bakhtin, have evolved through literature over the 
centuries to continue to enable us to construct spaces where we can gain some agency.  
Memoirs of a Beatnik demonstrates how the grotesque and carnivalesque, as rhetoric, can 
serve to make the beat rhetorical contributions a place to develop a political position. Di Prima’s 
unsettling of ideology through use of the grotesque and carnival provide an invitational space for 
the reader to experience and join in laughter that questions the hold particular systems of thought 
have over individuals.  
Di Prima’s constant use of the grotesque, her carnival treatment of subjects such as rape 
and virginity, and her political commentary on birth control and other women’s’ issues, go hand 
in hand. Injecting of carnivalistic scenes with images of the grotesque provide a way around 
dominant ideological constructions of female subjectivity. As she demonstrates through 
pornographic images as well as grotesque images of the body after sex, Di Prima’s construction 
of subjectivity is made effective in a text where the reader sees page after page of norms 
interrupted. Di Prima’s space is one where she can finally answer the question posited by 
Biesecker on ground that is not set out by dominant discourse. Since everything is up for 
carnivalesque laughter, the subjectivity is as well, and this provides a unique space for feminist 
subjectivity. The grotesque, combined with ideas of kairos and the body as a topos, create the 
ambivalence necessary from which to construct a place from which to speak. 
In this chapter, I argued that Diane Di Prima’s contribution to the beat rhetoric of kairos 
and body as topos was that of the grotesque and carnivalesque. In this addition, a space for 
feminist subjectivity can be created through the ambivalence brought out through grotesque 
imagery. In the final chapter, I will follow the beat rhetoric’s development in another direction 
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by analyzing Amiri Baraka’s controversial September 11th, 2001 poem in order to evaluate how 
the beat rhetoric functions today.  
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8.0  CONCLUSION: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BEAT RHETORIC 
 
In this work, I have argued that the Beats – notably Allen Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac – should 
be considered as implicit rhetorical theorists in addition to their status as poets and writers of 
literature. Through my analysis of the two most famous works by these writers – On the Road 
and “Howl” – I have shown that both works could be considered contributions to a rhetorical 
theory that I call beat rhetoric.  To establish this I have drawn on several ideas from rhetorical 
criticism and theory, most prominently the ideas of Kenneth Burke, who argued that rhetoric was 
not only persuasion, but a process of identification and division for the purpose of 
consubstantiality - a “coming together” of people in a special type of cooperation when people 
recognize similar motives between one another. In addition to Burke, I argued that Kerouac’s 
principal contribution to the beat rhetoric was a sense of kairos, or “appropriate timing,” which 
he tried to demonstrate in the style and composition of On the Road. Allen Ginsberg’s primary 
contribution was to recognize and develop a poetic that celebrates the limitations of the human 
body. It is through these limits that we can find new ways to reach out to others for identification 
and division of motives. Both offer not only a literary product, but a strong suggestion as to how 
such texts should be made. The purpose of both texts that I analyzed is to reach out for 
consubstantiality with others. 
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Of course Kerouac and Ginsberg are not the only Beats.  I also discussed Diane Di Prima 
in order to assess her application of this implicit rhetoric. Although Di Prima is using the beat 
rhetoric as I constructed from Kerouac and Ginsberg, she also contributes to it with her sense of 
the grotesque. Her engagement of beat rhetoric shows how its application can be used for many 
purposes.  In her case, she used it to suggest a place for a new feminist subjectivity, using the 
genre of memoir in order to craft the necessary ambivalence of rhetorical situation in order to 
deploy Bakhtinian senses of transgression. There are also examples of perspective by incongruity 
as well as representative anecdotes, specifically in Kerouac and Ginsberg, which for Burke are 
devices par excellence for the struggle of identification and division. 
I chose these figures for several reasons.  First, Ginsberg and Kerouac are arguably the 
most well-known and most central characters to the Beat Generation literary movement.  One 
cannot do an analysis of any part of Beat culture without including them.  Secondly, their works 
are canonical to the Beat Generation movement, and still continue to enjoy popularity as 
exemplars of Beat writing.  They are also critically significant, having received attention from 
critics, scholars, and others who wish to comment broadly on the Beat Generation, or comment 
on what the proper meaning of “beat” is. Di Prima is one of the few women beat writers, and her 
work is significant because of that fact, as well as the fact that she uses the rhetoric a bit after the 
establishment of what I am calling the key texts of beat rhetorical theory.  
However, this focus on Ginsberg and Kerouac effaces other contributors to the beat 
movement. As a broad social movement, the Beat Generation had many participants, many of 
whom wrote within the Beat rhetoric as I outlined it here, and many of whom were published.731
                                               
731 See Ann Charters, ed.  Beat Down to Your Soul. (New York: Penguin, 2001).  
  
There are also numerous writers who were inspired by the beat movement who in turn, 
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contributed to the movement’s extension into other movements in the future.  The attention I 
give to Ginsberg and Kerouac is the beginning of the sort of attention that should be given to the 
many figures in the Beat Generation to see what contributions they have for the larger Beat 
rhetorical theory that I have sketched here. 
In this conclusion I would like to gesture in that direction by offering some cursory 
analysis of the effectiveness of the Beat rhetoric in the modern era.  I will analyze Amiri 
Baraka’s poem “Somebody Blew Up America,” a poem that was written, performed and 
published within a month of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. I 
argue that Baraka’s poem can be read as a manifestation of the Beat rhetorical theory, and an 
attempt to, as the best Beat rhetoric does, argue for how to see political events in general as well 
as how to see and understand the events of September 11th.  The Baraka poem is significant 
because it led to a state-wide controversy in New Jersey, where Baraka held the post of poet 
laureate – a post that the state legislature would eventually eliminate due to Baraka’s poem.  
The New Jersey Poet Laureate controversy, as I term it, is not just controversial, but 
germane to my rhetorical study.  First, as a public controversy, there is an ample amount of 
discourse from media, the public, and from the politicians that naturally arises.  Most of the 
discourse surrounding the controversy is definitional – that is, it attempts to argue that Baraka 
violated the norms of proper poetry, so therefore cannot be considered a poet, thereby failed to 
uphold the post of poet laureate.  Secondly, the arguments in the public discourse about Baraka’s 
poem tend toward equating his “sick” poetry as a natural extension of a “sick” mind and/or body 
that produced it. This development might indicate an opposite audience reaction in the light of 
my arguments that the beat rhetoric uses notions of consubstantiality and kairos, as well as comic 
framing.  As I will show in this conclusion, elements of the beat rhetoric are present in Baraka’s 
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poem, and the reaction to them show just how transgressive these elements are. What I find in 
my analysis of the controversy is a moment of discursive policing - an attempt to explain away, 
remove, or eliminate the transgressions of the normative heirarchy found in Baraka’s poem.  
Finally, there is a larger discussion of the purpose of poetry in the political sphere that is 
played out in the media of the crisis.  This discourse I believe can be examined to see how 
successful the beat rhetoric is in the modern era. The results are fairly unsuprising, as the 
dominant hierarchy struggles to find any way to “discount” rhetorical strategy that unseats the 
normative paradigm. 
8.1 AMIRI BARAKA AND BEAT RHETORIC 
Amiri Baraka, known as LeRoi Jones for the first part of his career, was influenced directly by 
the beat poets in his early work. “Jones’s early artistic influences show that he was located not 
only outside a black artistic/poetic community but also outside of a black poetic tradition. For the 
most part, Jones was not part of a black literary tradition. Rather, his early poetry reflected his 
bohemian sentiments.”732
                                               
732 Jerry Gafio Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual (New York: 
New York University Press, 2001), 48. 
 Instead of writing about race issues, Jones’s first poetry focuses on his 
own reflections about his day to day life. His first published work, a letter to the editor, was in 
defense of Jack Kerouac and the Beat Generation after they had been attacked by Norman 
Podhoretz in the pages of Commentary magazine. In Jones’s reply, Jerry Watts finds much in 
what Jones did not say, attempting to avoid admitting his unfamiliarity with Harlem being from 
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the middle class himself. What is revealing from Watts’s analysis is the reasoning why Jones 
moved to Greenwich Village, which was to get writing instruction:   
What Jones evidently could not admit was that he had come to Greenwich Village to gain 
access to a community that could and would help him master his craft as a writer. Instead 
of defending his intellectual and personal freedom, he hid his artistic motivations behind 
the deceptive claim that his flight ot the Village was an escape from the black 
bourgeoisie. If Jones had revealed his reasons for moving to the Village, Podhoretz and 
others might have regarded them as a confession of estrangement from the black 
community. And such an interpretation would not have been completely wrong. Living in 
Greenwich Village was Jones’s way of distancing himself from a life governed by 
bourgeois mores.733
 
 
Watts argues that if Jones admitted to a desire to learn to write for class reasons it would destroy 
his credibility. His answer to Podhoretz about the value of the Beat Generation would have lost 
all of its steam if Jones were not immediately connected to writing or producing art for the 
betterment of the black community. The fact that Jones realized this and crafted a rhetorically 
savvy response to Podhoretz indicates that Jones was very much attuned to and aware of the 
position attributed to him due to his race. Although Baraka primarily saw categories in terms of 
economic class, he realized not everyone sees these divisions this way. His attitude about his 
position as African-American was therefore fluid, at least at first - “As a bohemian, Jones viewed 
himself as a member of a deviant subculture outside the tolerated boundaries of the dominant 
white society. For Jones, ‘white America’ was an ethos, not simply a place where whites were 
found in large numbers.”734
                                               
733 Watts, 36. 
 As an ethos, perhaps most well defined in this case as a “dwelling,” 
Jones felt that he could divide from that ethos by associating with others who also wanted to be 
outside of the dominant culture. 
734 Watts, 37. 
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This situation is far too complicated to cover in full detail here, but some highlights of the 
difficult position Baraka found himself help to illuminate the importance of the beat rhetoric in 
his work. In the beat environment of Greenwich Village, Baraka found his social status inverted 
from mainstream American society. “Blacks were considered by the Beats as heroic precisely 
because they were seen as the true antithesis to decadent bourgeois society. This romanticization  
of the black lumpen ignored the possibility that their tenuous socioeconomic situation might not 
have been a conscious rejection of bourgeois society but vice versa.”735 Praised and admired for 
being marginalized, blacks in the beat generation had the unenviable position of being admired 
for being oppressed and excluded from opportunities. This led to the awkward situation of being 
expected to, in Burkean terms, “identify with the division” offered by the dominant society. 
Additionally, Baraka’s negotiation of these different social positions influenced his view of 
social structure, perhaps moving him toward a more fluid interpretation of human relations. As 
Walton Muyamba argues, following the work of Tejumola Olaniyan, culture and identity are 
expressed in a fluid, contingent manner that Baraka picks up on and includes in his poetry. 
“Since the culture has no essential basis, neither do the identities that develop from engagements 
with it. Just as the culture is rootless and ever in flux, so too is the process of identification. In 
Jones/Baraka’s case the best way to articulate these cultural and personal revolutions, how to 
imply these changes, is by turning jazz improvisation into a literary and cultural philosophy, into 
a way of stating poetically the ‘transgressive and transitional truth’ of black identity.”736
                                               
735 Watts, 39. 
 
Muyamba believes that for Baraka, the nature of culture, society, and the self is a negotiation 
736 Walton Muyumba, “Improvising over the Changes: Improvisation as Intellectual and 
Aesthetic Practice in the Transitional Poems of LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka” College Literature 
34, 1 (Winter 2007): 23-51, 25. 
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based upon the lack of a totalizing, hegemonic cultural story. “For Jones/Baraka the openness of 
culture (and its traditions) remains possible only when the structural incompleteness of the 
cultural fabric, its as yet unwoven threads are exploited through renewal ad infinitum. This 
cultural openness creates the space for the antagonistic but cooperative transactions between the 
self and the culture.”737
Of course, Baraka changed his name from LeRoi Jones in order to identify (using one of 
the most powerful symbols available to someone, that of name) with his changing interests and 
connections to black nationalism and pan-African movements. In more recent years, Baraka 
identifies as a Marxist thinker, and believes that “the goal of the revolutionary poet is to write 
poems that educate and intensify the class consciousness of the working class. To do this, the 
revolutionary poet must develop a writing style that is accessible to the masses. Such a poet is 
the creator of a popular mass art.”
 Therefore, the articulation of identification and cultural belief is as 
crucial as that belief — without the articulation, the belief fades into obscurity. A place must be 
maintained for the articulation of the self, and this space provides a place for identification and 
division, if we put it in Burkean terms. For Baraka’s work, it suggests the need for rhetorical 
posturing, as the need to always be “proving opposites” in order to find moments of 
consubstantiality with others are primary to determining both identity and culture. 
738
                                               
737 Muyumba, 31. 
 In examining Baraka’s work on jazz criticism, Lee B. 
Brown observes that the many changes in Baraka’s jazz criticism over the years can be explained 
by understanding Baraka as attuned to situational fluidity. “It is arguable, from Baraka’s point of 
view, that — while hewing to basic convictions — he sees his discourse as responsive to a 
738 Watts, 456. 
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shifting picture.”739 Brown’s view is one that highlights the importance of rhetorical adaptation 
of ideas given the circumstances. Even with so many political interests and changes through the 
years of Baraka’s focus, interests, and style, Watts is forced to conclude that the early beat 
sensibility is the dominant influence in Baraka’s work: “Baraka appears to have returned to the 
approach to society that he took during his Beat bohemian days. It may be crazy to believe that 
Baraka has returned to his bohemian roots, but I don’t think he ever left.”740
Jones held a close relationship with Allen Ginsberg for most of his life and identified 
with the beats because “they are outside the mainstream of American vulgarity.”
 The orientation 
toward society that Baraka kept through his work could contain the same theoretical assumptions 
and rhetorical topoi that both Kerouac and Ginsberg used. 
741 The 
association of the mainstream with the vulgar, and the beats as the ones that he wants to identify 
with suggest that in Baraka’s work there may be elements of the beat rhetoric present. For 
example, Watts argues that Baraka is a radical intellectual, “precisely because he still has a 
normative vision of society that is neither hegemonic nor realizable in the existing political-
economic parameters of the social order.”742 Compare this observation to those of Osteriker and 
her argument that both Blake and Ginsberg should be read as prophetic since they use their 
rhetoric as a way of moving others toward envisioning and realizing that world.743
                                               
739 Lee B. Brown, “Marsalis and Baraka: An Essay in Comparative Cultural Discourse” Popular 
Music 23, 3 (October 2004): 241-255, 252. 
 Should 
Baraka be read as a prophetic poet? I won’t seek to answer such a broad question here, but what I 
740 Watts, 479. 
741 Charlie Reilly, ed. Conversations with Amiri Baraka (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1994), 110. 
742 Watts, 469. 
743 Ostriker, Alicia. “Blake, Ginsberg, Madness, and the Prophet as Shaman” in Robert J. 
Bertholf and Annette S. Levitt, Eds. William Blake and the Moderns (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1982). 
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will engage is the idea that perhaps similar rhetorical moves exist between two poets who were 
close friends and who both wanted an alternative world and campaigned for it through their 
work. I offer my rhetorical criticism of “Somebody Blew Up America” in order to point to this 
beat influence, as well as identify moments of beat rhetoric at play in the work. 
8.2 THE SEPTEMBER 11TH POEM 
Amiri Baraka watched the attack on the World Trade Center from the third floor of his Newark, 
New Jersey home on September 11th, 2001.  By October 1st, Baraka completed his poem about 
the event, “Somebody Blew Up America.744”  The 226-line poem was well described in the New 
York Observer: “The press accounts of ‘Somebody Blew Up America’ have focused on the 
nuttiness of a few of its 226 lines and thereby overlooked the fact that the poem is hilarious and 
scabrous.  A rant about an unnamed group called ‘Who’ – basically the conspiracy of white men 
who deliver suffering to everyone else – it is full of song and surprise.”745
By the time of the publication of the New York Observer article, Baraka’s poem was at 
the center of a controversy in the State of New Jersey.  The New Jersey Anti-Defamation League 
(ADL) attacked the poem one week after Baraka read it at the Geraldine R. Dodge Poetry 
Festival in Waterloo.  The ADL argued explicitly that Baraka’s words were the root of the entire 
system of violence that made September 11th style attacks possible:  “What 9/11 served to 
 This account of 
Baraka’s poem is unusual for the news media of the time.   
                                               
744 Philip Weiss, "If Poet Amiri Baraka Becomes Ex-Laureate, Is It Bad for Writers?," New York 
Observer, October 21 2002. 
745 Weiss, 2002. 
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underscore is that words of bigotry lead to acts of bigotry which in turn lead to the kind of 
murder that occurred on 9/11.”746 This statement by the ADL was written in a letter to then 
Governor Jim McGreevey asking for Baraka’s removal from the position of poet laureate.  The 
controversy filled the news for almost three years – even appearing in articles reporting on 
Baraka’s activities after he was no longer poet laureate of New Jersey.747  How could one poem 
cause such controversy?  Normally, a poet cannot command two years worth of media attention 
in mainstream newspapers over an entire book of poetry.  This is the question asked by Piotr 
Gwiazda in his examination of Baraka’s poem: “My purpose is to ask why the same kind of 
political position we are accustomed to seeing in the pages of mainstream and left-leaning  
publications such as the Nation, the New Republic or the New York Review of Books becomes the 
target of condemnation when it is presented in the form of a disturbing, difficult poem composed 
by an African American poet who has an antagonistic relationship with ‘the American way of 
life.’”748
Apart from the failure of many of its critics to read "Somebody Blew Up America" in its 
entirety, another troubling aspect of the controversy over the poem is the fact that almost 
none of the commentators  who spoke about the poem  publicly took it for what it really 
is-a poem. And what does it mean to call "Somebody Blew Up America" a poem? For 
one thing, it means to pay attention not only to what it says but also to how it says what it 
says. It means to be alert to the discursive and formal elements that produce its unique 
configuration and to recognize how these elements project, identify, or at least call forth a 
 Gwiazda, like me, is interested in questions of appropriate discourse, and how and why 
a text labeled poetry that makes political claims is vilified, while those same claims can be made 
in a political journal and receive little to no public outcry. Part of the reason, he argues, is that 
the form is largely ignored in this controversy, which allows for the offensive reading: 
                                               
746 Weiss, 2002. 
747 Tony Ortega, "Poetry Slam:  Now We Know Why a Librarian Was Tight-Lipped About Her 
Celebrity Guest Speaker," Kansas City Pitch, April 22 2004. 
748 Piotr Giwazda, “The Aesthetics of Politics/The Politics of Aesthetics: Amiri Baraka’s 
‘Somebody Blew Up America.’” Contemporary Literature 45, 3 (Autumn 2004): 460-485,468. 
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particular kind of audience. The following remarks are intended as just the first step 
toward a discussion of Baraka's piece as a constructed utterance whose rhetorical 
strategies exist not only for the articulation of the poet's political agenda but also for a 
calculated aesthetic effect.749
 
 
Giwazda points out the importance of recognizing the utterance as a “poem,” but somewhat 
naively complains that it is the fault of the audience of critics to not see the text for “what it 
really is.” Such statements seem to be at odds with the wink toward constitutive rhetoric, which 
recognizes “the discursive background of social life” and that people are always “interpolated” 
into particular audiences, not roaming ontological subjects.750
Baraka instigated large changes in state law, national controversy, and generated a large 
number of newspaper articles that speculated on the poem’s meaning, Baraka’s politics, and the 
relation between his past poems and his modern political sensibilities.  Part of the reason for this, 
I will argue, is due to the   I will examine newspaper stories from September of 2002 through 
April of 2004, all of which report on the poem, Baraka’s defense of it, or the actions of the ADL 
and the State of New Jersey to force Baraka to retract the poem, apologize for it, or resign from 
the position of poet laureate. Gwaizda points out accurately that the primary complaint about the 
poem -- that it is anti-Semitic — ignores a framing that questions “rhetorical privilege,” that is, 
to speak from a position of totalizing objectivity, and lists a litany of violent acts in order to raise 
 Mentioning that Baraka’s 
utterance was to “call forth a particular kind of audience” suggests an understanding of the 
interpolated nature of subjects and audiences. However, the idea of the poem as a constructed 
moment meant for articulating both audience and meaning is one that opens the poem to 
rhetorical criticism. 
                                               
749 Giwazda, 471. 
750 Maurice Charland “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 73, 2 (May 1987): 133-150, 147. 
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questions about a common denominator.751
The way I will proceed will be through an analysis of the rhetorical framing and language 
use of the media surrounding this poem, and how the media implicitly offered a reading of 
Baraka’s poem through their choices in language.  I argue this analysis of language could be a 
good barometer of the success of the Beat rhetoric project as I have outlined it above.  
Additionally, if the reader of the newspaper never picks up the poem, the reader might have this 
story as the only account of the poem available.  The media offers a reductionist read of Baraka’s 
poem, often extending this read to account for Baraka’s political beliefs, as well as limiting the 
power and scope of poetry as a media itself.  In these ways we can easily see that the media still 
views the poetic and the political as distinctly separate categories of discourse.  In the Beat 
rhetoric, upon which I argue Baraka bases this poem, the distinction of political and poetic is 
intentionally blurred in order to speak differently about being in the world, or to permit a place 
for those who are different to speak.  In this case I argue that the media’s intense demarcation of 
the “proper” role of poetic discourse indicates that there is a clear threat to the discursive order 
from poetry like Baraka’s and it must be quickly policed or silenced to make sure this discourse 
is fully discounted as inappropriate.  
 The question I address in the conclusion is to 
examine the response in the media to the poem and from that attempt an assessment of what 
elements of beat rhetoric are present in the poem. 
In the case of “Somebody Blew Up America,” no overarching critical theory seems to 
fully explain what transpired in the battle over the meaning of this poem.  I will proceed with an 
analysis of the poem’s textual elements, then move to how the poem was “read” by the media, 
and in turn, suggested a unilateral reading to the public.  Although the public had access to the 
                                               
751 Gwaizda, 471-2. 
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poem through the internet – for which some newspapers published the URL – I will argue that 
the repetition of four lines from the poem again and again in the mass media narrowed 
possibilities, over time, of reading this poem as anything but offensive, and anti-Semitic.  The 
possibilities of alternative readings of Baraka’s poem were few, and when suggested, they 
dismissed the poem as meaningless, silly or trite, and not as a potential site of alternative 
rhetorical considerations. It will be my claim that Baraka’s poem, like the models of beat rhetoric 
examined in earlier chapters, offers an alternative rhetorical model to the one of the dominant 
society. Using elements of the body, kairos and the comic frame, Baraka attempts, like Di Prima, 
to articulate another position from which to communicate about events. For Di Prima, the issue 
was the subjectivity of women. For Baraka, writing as he is from his perspective of international 
Marxism, it might be capitalism as the key factor he wants to highlight in his poem. 
Through my analysis I want to make it clear that I am not accusing the media of 
explicitly attacking Baraka or deliberately representing his poetry or views for the purposes of a 
political attack.  Alternatively, I would like to suggest that the media, fully well-intentioned to 
report the stories to the readers, used phrasings and words that carried with them particular 
assumptions about the relationship of poetry to the poet, the location of meaning, and the power 
of the poem to influence thought and belief.  Critically analyzing the way the media represented 
this controversy is a unique opportunity to gain insight into common assumptions within daily 
natural language that frame the limits of poetry.  Examining this discourse will point out how 
and where particular uses of quotes of the poem, descriptions and other attributions of meaning 
offer a singular reading of the poem to the reader.  From this, the media also frame a place for 
poetry that is decidedly outside of the political, limiting the potential of almost any poem to be 
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read as political discourse.  First I offer my own critical reading of Baraka’s poem, “Somebody 
Blew Up America.” 
8.3 “SOMEBODY” AS ALTERNATIVE RHETORIC 
At the start of this work, I made some overtures toward the examination of the discourses known 
as “poetry” and “rhetoric.” I argued that the relationship between these discourses has always 
been close and intertwined. The shared relationship between these two different ways of 
speaking, thinking and perceiving the world is exactly what the Beats were after.  In the previous 
chapters I argued that both Kerouac and Ginsberg offer implicit alternative rhetorics through 
their major works. Both of these writers were seeking alternatives to the rhetorics offered by 
mainstream society. Both contribute elements to the beat rhetoric, notably a focus on the body as 
a commonplace, and the kairotic.  Amiri Baraka takes this tradition of the Beat rhetoric and 
applies it to the events of September 11th, 2001 as an exigence to produce a poem that not only 
addresses the tragedy, but evaluates the tragedy of September 11th comparatively against the 
perspective of a nation that perpetuated tragedy through most of its history toward people of 
color. 
With this shared relationship in mind, examining Baraka’s “Somebody Blew Up 
America” reveals a host of various sites of meaning generated by the blur of the traditional 
provinces of rhetoric and poetry.  Starting at the beginning of the poem we find the speaker 
addressing the reader in a very straightforward and traditional manner: 
(All thinking people 
   oppose terrorism 
   both domestic 
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   & international… 
   But one should not 
    be used 
   To cover the other) 
  
They say its some terrorist, some 
         barbaric 
                          A Rab, in 
   Afghanistan 
It wasn't our American terrorists 
It wasn't the Klan or the Skin heads 
Or the them that blows up nigger 
Churches, or reincarnates us on Death Row 
It wasn't Trent Lott 
Or David Duke or Giuliani 
Or Schundler, Helms retiring 
 
It wasn't 
the gonorrhea in costume 
the white sheet diseases 
That have murdered black people 
Terrorized reason and sanity 
Most of  humanity, as they pleases752
 
 
The opening parenthetical statement seems almost like a dedication or epigraph for the poem as a 
whole.  It could also be read as announcing the intent of the poem – it speaks in a general sense 
of what is not to be done, i.e. cover up one form of terrorism with another, and hints at the 
specifics of 9/11 and the responses to it in the weeks following the attack – how all thinking 
people oppose terrorism, but large acts of terror can be used to cover up the daily terrorist 
environment the government could perpetrate against its own citizens.  The parenthesis, as 
“artifice” in Bernstein’s terminology, resist a reading of the statement as a direct utterance from 
the speaker of the poem.753
                                               
752 Amiri Baraka, Somebody Blew up America [HTML] (October 2001 2001 [cited December 7 
2005]); available from http://www.amiribaraka.com/blew.html. 
  Instead, the phrase resists an easy reading, liminally floating 
753 Charles Bernstein, A Poetics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 10. 
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between being seen as an assumption to keep in mind while reading, or as a foundational belief 
of the author – a purpose for writing the poem. 
The next stanza begins attempting to account for 9/11 through the common “they say” 
figure of speech that denotes some authority, the media as a whole, or common discussions 
overheard in public places – and sometimes all three at once.  This trope’s use here indicates to 
the reader that popular media and public opinion are behind the view that an “A Rab” committed 
the act of terror, as opposed to the long list of “nots” which include most Republican and 
conservative high-profile American political figures. The speech here is stylized into a mocking 
of white vernacular American discourse. The parenthetical opening of the poem warns us that 
one form of terrorism should not cover another, but after this exhaustive list of those who might 
be considered the “usual suspects” of violence, we start to wonder about their culpability in 
“blowing up America.” The beginning stanzas have a palpable sense of distance - that some 
unnamed “A Rab” in Afghanistan blew up America instead of the long list of violent, offensive 
and hateful people who are in our own backyard. Baraka is already moving toward an 
identification of America as something beyond homogenous, unified, and wholesome. 
Into the third stanza, the “not” is expanded from hate groups and politicians who are 
conservative to the idea of racism and racist violence on a general level.  The continuous 
discussion in terms of the negation – the “not” serves a purpose here that is also along the lines 
of artifice, but in the vein of artifice that assists absorption through difficulty.  Along with 
breaking up the word “A Rab,” the continuous conversation in the terms of the negative allow 
for a reading of dissatisfaction with the accounts for terrorism provided in the status quo.  
Through its content as well as the form, the poem points toward dissatisfaction as the meaning of 
these accounts – the large and overwhelming lists of American terrorists and acts of terror are a 
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stark contrast to the generic “A Rab” who is only described as being from Afghanistan.  There is 
also a bit of surprise in the rhetoric of the speaker, expressing a sense of dismay that the “white 
sheet diseases” didn’t perpetrate this crime, since they are comfortable and familiar with 
slaughter.  The transition between racist crime and the 9/11 attacks is non-existent for the 
speaker.  Immediate association between the two events is assumed, creating another site of 
artifice that works toward absorbing the meaning of dissatisfaction with the 9/11 accounts. 
Looking further into the poem, we find the next section moves us into the main body of 
the work: 
They say (who say? Who do the saying 
Who is them paying 
Who tell the lies 
Who in disguise 
Who had the slaves 
Who got the bux out the Bucks 
 
Who got fat from plantations 
Who genocided Indians 
Tried to waste the  Black nation 
 
Who live on Wall Street 
   The first plantation 
Who cut your nuts off 
Who rape your ma 
Who lynched your pa754
 
 
In this portion, the trope of “they say” is again repeated, but immediately interrupted with an 
open parenthesis.  “Who say? who do the sayin?” directly asks to know the source of the “they” 
who were allowed to proclaim who, and by association, who was not, responsible for the terror 
attacks.  At this point, the authority of the common account for 9/11 is rejected, and the poem 
attempts to find out who is doing the speaking.  Almost instantly, the question diverges to the 
                                               
754 Baraka, “Somebody Blew Up America.” 
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issue of who is allowed to speak, and then to the account of slavery, racism and genocide in 
American history.  The structure of this section is, in argumentative terms, an enthymeme, 
described by Aristotle as, “a type of deduction” but more informal – the enthymeme relies on the 
“commonplaces” or common sense, the familiar, of the audience.  Aristotle defines the 
commonplace as “notions possessed by everybody” in the audience.755
 In this way, enthymemes are powerful arguments as they call on the audience to actively 
participate rather than passively receive the address.  Comparatively, there is much in common 
here with Bernstein’s notion of the relation of artifice and absorption when they work together in 
a poem – the construction allows the reader deeper absorption of meaning through interrupting 
the “easy” assimilation of the text. 
 The audience here is 
complicated. Baraka’s use of phrases like “who lynched your pa” seem to indicate a black 
audeince. At the same time the perpetrators also “genocided Indians” and live “on Wall 
Street/the first plantation.” Baraka is not merely constructing a black speaker for a black 
audience, but is attempting to constitute a line of connection between all these atrocities. The 
focus on bodily violence - rape and castration - also seeks to unify the audience as people. 
Baraka though does highlight black violence with references to “plantations” and “lynching.” 
The entire stanza seeks to make the line between terrorists and victims unclear, and helps 
unsettle the easy binary between the terms. The stanza looks like a common enthymeme, but 
works in a very complicated  manner - blurring the nature and understanding of terrorist violence 
while clearly listing the most horrific injustices imaginable. 
                                               
755 Aristotle, "On Rhetoric," in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
Princeton/Bollingen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2154-5. 
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Baraka does not directly indict anyone for the attacks on 9/11 but much more effectively 
has the audience, or reader, jump to particular points in common knowledge by carefully using 
words that hint toward the conclusion.  The skillful construction of these enthymemes has the 
reader jumping to one group or the next to attempt to assess blame for these atrocities.  Some, 
like the lines “Who cut your nuts off?/ Who rape your ma?” seem like open ended questions, but 
the term “lynch” and it’s racist connotations cannot be missed by the reader.  However, the tense 
of the second line, using the term “rape” along side the past tense “lynched” once again allows 
for dissatisfaction in that meaning as the rape is, apparently, presently occurring or ongoing. 
This is the style of the remainder of the poem, with the exception of the final two stanzas.  
Almost every line begins with the interrogation of “WHO” and lists atrocities extending from 
hate crimes, racism, the Holocaust, imperialism, class exploitation, poverty, colonialism and the 
excesses of global capitalism.  Although it is not clear who the “who” is, the structure of the 
poem leads the reader to jump to particular conclusions as certain points only to disrupt those 
assumptions with the next stanza: 
who try to put DuBois in Jail 
Who frame Rap Jamil al Amin, Who frame the Rosenbergs, Garvey, 
         The Scottsboro Boys,      The Hollywood Ten 
  
Who set the Reichstag Fire? 
Who knew the World Trade Center was gonna get bombed 
Who told 4000 Israeli workers at the Twin Towers 
   To stay home that day 
Why did Sharon stay away                    ? 
                                          / 
Who,Who, Who/756
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This section of the poem includes the four lines of the poem that would be repeated continuously 
in every story dealing with the controversy of Baraka’s poem and his defense.  In this section, I 
add only the four lines above it and the line immediately following as evidence of the inability to 
close the question “Who blew up America?”  The question the poem poses suggests in a simple 
read that the answer is forthcoming, but the artifice and absorption of the poem, along with the 
skillful use of what Aristotle would call the “commonplace” or shared meanings through 
enthymeme.  This section would be cited as the evidence of Baraka’s anti-Semitism in the poem, 
and would eventually not only lead to calls for his dismissal, but the elimination of his job in 
entirety.  Directly above the lines about Sharon and the Israeli World Trade Center employees, 
Baraka lists a variety of political trials, framings, and set ups for the reader to conclude are all for 
the benefit of the same group.  The group must be extremely diverse to both benefit from the 
framing of Marcus Garvey and his subsequent prison time, and the indictment of the Hollywood 
Ten, under investigation by the House Un-American Activities Committee in the 1950s.  This 
diversity of accusation to an invisible, temporally fluid, and timeless enemy is completely 
contradicted in the next line, where Israel is suggested to have foreknowledge of the attack.  
Once again, the reader, through the contradiction they provide themselves through their own 
enthymemes, arrives at dissatisfaction. 
Elements of the beat rhetoric are present in the poem, most notably the sense of kairos 
that I analyzed in Kerouac’s work. The kairotic as deployed in Baraka’s poem is a bit different 
qualitatitively, but the basic sense is the same - to privledge connections that interrupt linear, 
chronological time. Here is one example from the middle section of the poem: 
Who/  Who /  Who/ 
Who stole Puerto Rico  
Who stole the Indies, the Philipines, Manhattan  
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   Australia & The Hebrides  
Who forced opium on the Chinese 
Who own them buildings  
Who got the money  
Who think you funny  
Who locked you up  
Who own the papers 
Who owned the slave ship  
Who run the army 
Who  the  fake president  
Who  the ruler  
Who  the banker  
   
                 Who/ Who/ Who/757
Instead of a linear, logical progression of history, Baraka offers a fragmented view placing “slave 
ships” within one line of “who the fake president” — an obvious jab at President George W. 
Bush and the controversy surrounding his election in 2000. Baraka’s rhetoric of kairos here 
points at connections between the owners of buildings, slave ships, and papers that might not be 
apparent if one approached them in the terms of narrative, chronological history. “Who stole 
Manhattan” and “forced opium on the Chinese” would never be connected to terrorism, or even 
associated as the same act normally. But Baraka’s kairotic re-arrangement of the elements 
suggests a much larger terrorist conspiracy than was imaginable at the start of the poem. 
 
 As it reaches its conclusion, the poem becomes even more overwhelming. The final stanza of 
the poem offers no answer to this never ending litany of questions, only the frustrated result of 
such compounded, copious accusations: 
                                               
757 Baraka, “Somebody Blew Up America.” 
 395 
Who is the ruler of Hell?  
Who is the most powerful  
  
Who you know ever  
Seen God? 
But everybody seen  
The Devil  
  
Like an Owl exploding  
In your life in your brain in your self  
Like an Owl who know the devil  
All night, all day if you listen, Like an Owl  
Exploding in fire. We hear the questions rise  
In terrible flame like the whistle of a crazy dog 
Like the acid vomit of the fire of Hell  
Who and Who and WHO (+) who who ^  
    Whoooo and Whooooooooooooooooooooo!758
The conclusion of the poem keeps the entire proposition open, again providing no answers, only 
the sound of the question “who” like “the whistle of a crazy dog” or an “owl exploding in 
fire.”
 
759
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  The poem’s conclusion appears to be that the questions will continue to be asked about 
9/11, but additionally they perhaps indicate the “insanity” that result from such investigations.  
The dog’s crazy whistle indicates insanity directly, while the flaming owl indicates a self-
destructiveness or destructiveness that is all-consuming from asking these questions.  This could 
possibly point as well to the intensity of the questions, and the desire to know the truth about 
these events. Most importantly, the conclusion of the poem indicates that these questions will 
always be asked, and are always around us. Like the “whistle of a crazy dog” the questions howl 
in neighborhoods across America. Once the oversimplification of the definition of “terrorist” is 
759 Baraka, “Somebody Blew Up America.” 
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investigated, the questions become all-consuming, as the owl “exploding in fire.” In the end we 
might understand the questions as important, but unanswerable, because not one person, group or 
country is responsible for these atrocities. The poem exposes the insane quest to assess blame to 
one individual or group and suggests, as the parenthetical introduction warns, that such 
accusation allows for atrocity. 
But for the mass media, these questions were either irrelevant or uninteresting, and four 
lines about Israeli workers taking September 11th off, as well as the line about five Israelis 
filming the attacks became the sum total meaning of not only this poem, but of Baraka’s 
inexcusable anti-Semitism, and would lead to the elimination of his job. Investigation of media 
accounts of the poem might provide some clues as to why. 
8.4 CONTAINING AND CONSTRAINING “SOMEBODY” 
Baraka’s poem was initially read on September 19th of 2002 at the Geraldine R. Dodge Poetry 
Festival in Stanhope, New Jersey.  Eight days later, Governor James E. McGreevey announced 
publicly that he was requesting Baraka’s resignation as New Jersey poet laureate.  Spokesman 
Kevin Davitt stated, “The language used in Mr. Baraka’s recent poem could be interpreted as 
stating that Israelis were forewarned of the September 11th terrorist attacks.  Mr. Baraka should 
clarify the intent of his language, apologize for any potential misinterpretation of his language, 
and resign.”760
                                               
760 Peter Saharko, "Governor Calls for State's Poet Laureate to Resign," Associated Press Wire, 
September 27, 2002. 
  The article quoted from Baraka’s poem the offending lines:  “’Who knew the 
World Trade Center was gonna get bombed,’ read a line from the poem, which was cited by the 
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Jewish Standard weekly newspaper.  ‘Who told 4000 Israeli workers at the Twin Towers to stay 
home that day? Why did Sharon stay away?’”761  This quote is followed by the line: “Some 
Jewish groups have characterized the poem as anti-Semitic.”762 In response to this reading of 
these few lines, Harris and Neilsen observe, “The fact that the anaphoric structure of the poem 
with its interrogating litany of Who’s begins by raising the question of the status of the utterance, 
by throwing into question the political and rhetorical ground on which the saying takes place, 
would seemingly make more difficult some of the charges that have been levelled against the 
poem, but that would require an actual reading of the poem.”763
This first article somewhat sets the tone for media coverage of the Baraka controversy 
through several major assumptions:  First, that he is, in some respect, directly represented by the 
utterances in the poem; second, that he is responsible for the way those utterances are 
interpreted; third, these four lines from the poem are indicative of the content of the entire poem. 
The media leave the Governor’s office claim that Baraka should “correct” the 
“misinterpretation” of his language and apologize for it unchallenged in the initial months of the 
controversy.  By September 27th, the controversy was characterized as initiated by “Some Jewish 
groups.”
  
764  By October 7th, only a few days later, the poem was described in the media as 
“widely criticized.”765
                                               
761 Saharko. 
  No citation to other articles is given, nor is there any explanation as to 
what widely criticized means.  Only the ADL and the Governor’s office are cited as sources of 
762 Saharko. 
763 William J. Harris and Aldon Lynn Nielsen, “Somebody Blew off Baraka” African American 
Review 37, 2/3: 183-187, 184. 
764 Saharko. 
765 Thomas J Lueck, "Mcgreevey Seeks Power to Dismiss State Poet," New York Times, October 
7, 2002. 
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controversy, asking Baraka to resign and, in absence of that, generating the legal authority to 
remove him from the position of poet laureate. 
On September 29th, 2002, The New York Times declared, “Political turmoil has found 
the last virgin turf in New Jersey public life: the poet laureate.”766  Although missing a large 
portion of literary history by claiming that the position of state endorsed poet remained to this 
point void of political concerns, the article attempts to account for the controversial poem by 
presenting Baraka himself as controversial and political, not poetry.  “Poets are usually ignored, 
not censored,” the article claims after describing how the Governor of New Jersey has no power 
to fire, remove or replace the poet laureate.767
The article then sets about the task of normalizing the controversial within Baraka’s 
politics.  “The artist formerly known as LeRoi Jones has had so many phases – Greenwich 
Village beatnik, Harlem black nationalist, bloodied warrior of the 1967 Newark riots, Marxist, 
critic of Newark mayors – that he seemed unfazed by the rocky start of his laureate phase.”
 
768
                                               
766 Matthew Purdy, "Our Towns; New Jersey's Unrepentant Poet of Outrage and Indignation," 
New York Times, September 29, 2002. 
  
Baraka, in this light, is a creature whose nature is radical change.  Reasons for the changes are 
absent, as are any explanation as to what a “laureate phase” would be, since it is markedly 
different than the other clearly radical incarnations of Baraka.  His nature is to be radical and 
controversial, as this event “unfazed” him – the implication being that since poetry is crossing 
the world of politics, it should be a big deal.  Also, it should not be missed that calling Baraka 
“the artist formerly known as” is a not so subtle reference to Prince – conflating Baraka’s name 
change with the name changes of a pop music artist who’s work is dead center in the realm of 
767 Purdy, “Our Towns.” 
768 Purdy, “Our Towns.” 
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big business entertainment.  Making the association between Baraka and Prince also associates 
their work – poetry becomes like pop music. 
Near the end of the article, poetry is stripped of political content save Baraka’s “unusual” 
occupation:  “This standoff between governor and poet is surprising in a state with a poetic 
tradition that includes Walt Whitman, William Carlos Williams, Allen Ginsberg, and a Turnpike 
rest stop named for Joyce Kilmer.  But Mr. Baraka said, superfluously, that he dislikes poetry ‘as 
decoration.’  He likes strong stuff that rattles people. ‘If they resent what I’m saying, I can resent 
their resentment,’ he said, ‘but I’m not going to censor them.’”769
                                               
769 Purdy, “Our Towns.” 
  An almost unbelievable 
paragraph creates a distinction between Whitman, Ginsberg and Kilmer as “decorative” poetics 
that would never be politically controversial as Baraka is.  These are the folks that highway rest 
stops honor; they don’t get into fights with the governor’s office.  This construction of Baraka as 
the site of controversy, not poetry, allowed the media to construct the writer as completely 
responsible for his or her creations.  If the creation goes wrong, then it is not a question of 
reading but of production.  Therefore, the artist has done something wrong and must account for 
the issue.  This is reinforced by the media’s construction of poetry as something in league with 
society, normal, and innocuous.  What is so fascinating is how easily the media frames the 
controversy with Baraka on the outside of “normal” poetry, and rarely, if ever, does the media 
even consider that Baraka’s work might be conservative – in the sense that poetry has always 
attempted to offer new and controversial perspectives, and has always been a site of contested 
meaning. But within the frame provided by the media, the entire experience of the poem on the 
whole cannot be encountered. As Dietram A. Scheufele observes, media framing is offered by 
journalists to quickly make sense of a story based upon accepted schemas and frames of 
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reference provided by the audience.770
The ease of this move is also assisted by the refusal of the media to quote any other lines 
from “Somebody Blew Up America” except for those quoted above.  The lines are provided 
without any context except a short paragraph following them indicating that the Anti-Defamation 
League finds the poem anti-Semitic. There are a couple of exceptions in the media to this 
formula, one occurring in The Boston Globe on October 13th where an additional section of the 
poem appears.  After quoting the familiar lines, the article offers:  “That wasn’t the poem’s only 
reference to Jews.  An earlier stitch asks, ‘Who know why Five Israelis was filming the 
explosion/And cracking they sides at the notion.’”
 This complicated arrangement of meaning is what Baraka 
tries to highlight as the subject of his poem, but it becomes reduced to the one claim against it. 
771
The writer goes on to answer Baraka’s claim that the poem is anti-Semitic because it only 
references Israel and Israelis:  “See, if he’d said 4,000 Jews were tipped off, that would have 
been an anti-Semitic canard.  But why should he be labeled a Jew-hater for claiming that 4,000 
Israelis were in on the plot? Nobody was fooled by this sophistry.”
 Either reference is one that does not fully 
engage the litany of crimes mentioned in the text. 
772
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  In this case, more of the 
poem is quoted for the purpose of developing the argument that Baraka is an anti-Semite.  In the 
rest of the column, the author quotes other Baraka poems for the purpose of offering 
preponderance of evidence. Separated from the artifice of the poem, the lines’ meaning is only 
offered in one dimension.  The poems effort to suspend the readers in a dizzying array of 
associated accusations and questions related to terrorism is suspended with the focus on these 
771 Jeff Jacoby, “New Jersey's Bigot Laureate,” The Boston Globe, October 13 2002. 
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lines.  Additionally, associating Baraka with “sophistry” – or the manipulation of the truth 
through words – further reinforces this view of Baraka as a trickster with words, and not to be 
trusted.  He is attempting to deceive through clever word use. 
Another example of other lines of the poem being cited occurs via Associated Press wire 
covering Baraka’s comments at the dedication of the Newark Public Library as a literary 
landmark on October 2nd, 2002.  Formulaically, the reporter cites the offending lines, then goes 
for a twist: 
Baraka noted the poem also questions atrocities committed against many groups, 
including Jews.  One stanza read: 
‘Who put the Jews in ovens,/ 
and who helped them do it/ 
Who said ‘America First’/ 
And ok’d the yellow stars/ 
WHO WHO’773
 
 
This seemingly defensive move on the part of the media is immediately countered by the next 
line of the article, which offers an implicit interpretation of this “new” section of the poem:  
“Shai Goldstein, New Jersey regional director of the ADL, who supported McGreevey’s call for 
Baraka to resign, said the Newark poet has ‘added insult to injury.’  ‘One of our big concerns is 
that the ‘big lie’ has now been repeated by a representative of the state of New Jersey,’ Goldstein 
said Wednesday.”774
                                               
773 Jeffrey Gold, "Poet Laureate: 'Won't Resign, Won't Apologize'," Associated Press, October 2 
2002. 
  Although left vague, could it be said that Goldstein reads this section of the 
poem as questioning the existence of the Holocaust?  Under this interpretation, Baraka’s defense 
becomes more ammunition for framing him as anti-Semitic. 
774 Gold 
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Additionally, limits on the role of poetry were placed on the office that Baraka held.  In 
this way, the Governor was able to avoid criticizing the poem itself, and reduced the controversy 
to the realm of what an official representative can and cannot do.  “McGreevey said elected 
officials must have some say in choosing poet laureates and means for holding them accountable. 
‘It’s not the governor’s poet laureate,’ McGreevey said, ‘It’s the state’s poet laureate.”775  This 
attribution of ownership to the state would further the understanding that nothing controversial is 
to be said by a poet endorsed by the state government.  McGreevey is also potentially removing 
himself from any direct association with the poem for his own political safety.  The Governor 
continues in the same article to then outline the specific relationship of poetry and government:  
“Clearly there needs to be a bright line between poetic license and governmental discourse . . . 
Yet, Baraka’s poem sets forth falsehoods as fact.”776
Another rhetoric deployed in the controversy was that of “expertise.”  The media went to 
other poets or poet laureates to get “expert opinion” on Baraka’s poem.  One of the most expert 
was the poet who served as poet laureate prior to Baraka – Gerald Stern.  Claiming he made a 
mistake and that he was sorry that he nominated Baraka, Stern claims “[Baraka] is such a liar to 
say he is not anti-Semitic.  There is such ignorance and lying in his whole posture.”
  McGreevey posits this demarcation and we 
are supposed to place Baraka on the side of governmental discourse due to his position as 
laureate.   
777
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October 6 2002. 
  No 
qualifications or explanation are given from Stern as to why this is the case.  The article rests on 
Stern’s credibility as another poet to warrant his claims. 
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The Buffalo News goes a step farther in credibility by asking various faculty members of 
the University of Buffalo writing program their informed opinion of the controversy.  
Interestingly enough, the question is limited to the future of free expression and artistic license.  
Robert Creely attempts to defend Baraka by attacking the lines singled out by the media as 
representative of Baraka’s views, not just the poem:  “The sentiment those lines express is 
reprehensible, but the poem is not simply those lines.  His opinions about American history are 
much more complex than the isolation of those lines,’ said Creeley. ‘If one respects the poet 
laureate, one has to understand that he or she has opinions that may not concur with the general 
feelings of the public, Creeley said.”778  Creely concedes that the lines are indefensible in order to 
gain ground on the issue of free expression.  He also points out that Baraka is, like most people, a 
complex human being and his political opinions cannot be boiled down to a few lines from a 
poem.  Neither strategy gains much traction as Creeley’s statement is immediately juxtaposed 
with New Jersey ADL head Goldstein, who said, “This is an honorary position that he [Baraka] 
dishonored with his words of bigotry,” and New Jersey State Senator Garry Furnari, who offered 
this observation:  “When you create a position whose purpose is to promote and enhance poetry, 
and that person doesn’t live up to that standard, he should be removed.  By saying he was poet 
laureate and reading a poem whose only purpose, it seems to me, was to be divisive and promote 
hatred – I am hard-pressed to see how that promotes poetry.”779
By this time the New Jersey Senate voted to remove the position of poet laureate.  
McGreevey could not fire Baraka, nor could anyone in the government remove him.
 
780
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governor and the state decided that the best course of action to ensure that state money did not 
get into the hands of someone so clearly anti-Semitic would be to remove the post of poet 
laureate in its entirety.  
The media’s take on this move was through many articles that mocked or even 
questioned the necessity of poet laureates at all.  “While the controversy has sparked a nasty 
kerfuffle in the Garden State, across the river, in Manhattan, many people were more shocked to 
learn that New Jersey had a poet laureate.”781
Irving Feldman, a poet and professor of English at UB [The University of Buffalo], 
doesn’t believe there should even be state poet laureates. “In general, I am skeptical about 
the institution of poet laureate.  They tend to be functionaries and to institutionalize 
poetry.  Somehow it seems contrary to the American egalitarian spirit,” Feldman said.  “I 
would suggest all the other posts be abolished as well, and the poet laureate demoted to 
what he [sic] was before – consultant in poetry to the Library of Congress.”
 In another article, a professor of English argues that 
it is almost silly for a state to have a poet laureate: 
782
 
 
The article ends at this point, resting on the idea that poet laureate is a position that we would be 
better off without.  The implication we are left with is that the poet laureate as a mix of the 
political and the poetic is simply untenable.  Mixing the political with the poetic is doomed – it 
ruins poetry.  No mention is made by Feldman of the potential of poetry ruining politics.  
Political change through poetry is not even a question worth considering.  It is a potential threat 
to poetry as an art that, at its best, should remain separate and apart from the political.  It is also, 
quite unbelievably, constructed as counter to egalitarianism. Perhaps what is meant is that having 
laureates might chill some people from thinking they can write poetry without being one of the 
anointed.  Still, the connotation is that to have laureates is counter to whatever composes 
egalitarian American spirit. 
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The New York Observer, the paper with which I began this essay, offers the most 
accommodating read of the controversy of any of the articles discussed here.  The Observer 
quotes one of the committee members who nominated Baraka for the position at length: 
The poem hits a nerve because of the reality underlying the poem,” says Jim Habba 
[coordinator of the Dodge Poetry Festival].  “I think the claim about the Israelis leaving 
the building is wholly untrue.  But this is a poem.  And that is a powerful image.  What is 
it saying?  What is it doing?  It’s doing a lot of things – some of them hurtful, some of 
them maybe revelatory.  Yes, it’s crude, but we have never had an adequate conversation 
about American policy toward the Middle Eastern Conflict and we’re about to go to war 
with Iraq.783
 
 
Habba, who is identified as a poet who served on the committee to nominate Baraka, offers a 
very interesting and fluid read of the meaning of Baraka’s poem.  It is the read closest to the one 
I offer.  Habba links this fluidity of meaning to the need to have adequate public discussion about 
Middle East relations with the United States on the eve of war.  Even though the poem offers 
untrue statements as a part of it, Habba pushes the reader to look to the holistic “reality” of the 
poem to find its value.   
Even though gracious, the article ends up affirming poetry as doing the same thing as 
something like public deliberation – it brings up issues for conversation that need to be debated.  
The framing of poetry through this quote by Habba puts poetry in a positive light, but only as 
something that is like public deliberation.  Framed within the larger context of the media 
treatment, the reader must wonder why poetry should be doing this since it’s artistic and should 
be pretty – and we already have public deliberation and debate to work out what we should do as 
policy.  The positive read becomes another way to constrain the role of the poetic; we are miles 
away from Bernstein’s epistemic poetry at this point. 
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On July 2, 2003, McGreevey signed into law the bill that would eliminate the position of 
poet laureate for New Jersey.784
The ranks of the unemployed increased by at least one Wednesday.  New Jersey finally 
fired Amiri Baraka as its poet laureate.  It’s about time. 
  It is interesting to note that even in this article the four lines 
from the poem are again quoted, and referred to as “called Anti-Semitic” by “leaders.”  After this 
article, The Record follows up with a news article entitled “Baraka:  Lazy, Cruel and Now out of 
a Job.”  The elimination of his job now allows the media to frame Baraka as one of the “outside” 
or problems with America – laziness and unemployment as terms come with them a baggage that 
there must be something wrong with the person who is jobless.  The American work-ethic insists 
that having a job is not only positive, but also a necessary condition of being “normal.”  Aside 
from the headline, the paper works Baraka’s position into that of anyone who has received 
justice – they deserved it, because they did wrong.  This article is worth quoting at some length: 
Baraka is the Jayson Blair of poets.  In a pinch, he fabricates. 
Of course, he sees himself far differently.  Baraka, an African-American who once went 
by the name of LeRoi Jones, prefers to cast himself as another creative voice silence by a 
racist conspiracy of Jews and others insulted by his writing.  It was this conspiracy that 
forced Governor McGreevey to sign a law Wednesday abolishing the poetry laureate’s 
job – or so Baraka wants us to believe. 
Nice try, Amiri.  Now back to reality. 
Baraka’s problem is much more mundane, hardly as exotic as a conspiracy.  Plain and 
simple, he lost his job because he played fast and loose with the truth.  He has no one to 
blame but himself. 785
 
 
Aside from the totally bizarre association of Baraka with New York Times’ libelous reporter 
Jayson Blair, these paragraphs are a perfect exemplar of the discourse of the mass media 
eliminating any possible complexity to this poem.  Just like a child caught lying by a teacher, 
Baraka deserves to be punished since he did not maintain fidelity to the truth in his poetry.  
                                               
784 Paul H. Johnson, "Mcgreevey Signs Bill Eliminating Poet Laureate," The Record, July 3 
2003. 
785 Michael Kelly, "Baraka: Lazy, Cruel, and Now out of a Job," The Record, July 3 2003. 
 407 
Associating Baraka’s defense with conspiracy theory helps paint him as potentially crazy, while 
the trope “He has no one to blame but himself” draws on the commonplace of American work-
ethic, a rhetoric of hard, individual work which has been a thread of national discourse since 
colonial days.786
The saturation of stories disciplining, restricting readings, or celebrating Baraka’s 
“firing” foreclosed any of the potential in the more positive readings to allow the poem a more 
open read.  In the end, New Jersey is without a poet laureate, and interest in the poem has 
disappeared from the headlines.  The most recent article about this controversy, in April of 2004, 
makes fun of the controversy identifying Baraka as someone with a history of “tweaking” the 
“Chosen Race” as well as defending (in one line) Baraka’s right, “to spew bad poetry is 
sacrosanct.”
  Contrasting Baraka’s defense with reality places him as someone who has poor 
perspective, and is obviously failing to see something very obvious and apparent.  At the end of 
the article, Baraka is cast as a victim since he “believes his own lie.”  Such strategies not only 
limit the public view of Baraka, but they also limit the power and potential of poetry as a 
discourse.  Here, clearly poetry is limited to having the same function as journalistic writing – it 
must deal in facts, it must be well investigated and it cannot lie, or else you will be the equivalent 
of Jayson Blair.  Poetry as journalism, as the purveyor of facts from events in the world, 
eliminates any read of poetry as I offer above – that the meaning could potentially come from 
what the poem might push you toward in all of its complexity. 
787
                                               
786 See Herbert A. Applebaum, The American Work Ethic and the Changing Work Force: A 
Historical Perspective (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 
 The column then goes on to investigate who would dare spend public money to 
bring someone guaranteed to offend the community to the public library to speak.  The author 
787 Ortega, "Poetry Slam:  Now We Know Why a Librarian Was Tight-Lipped About Her 
Celebrity Guest Speaker." 
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interviews the editor of a local literary journal, who offers that Baraka’s poem is “incoherent” 
and “a shame” because, “[i]t leaves him [Baraka] open to whatever reaction people are going to 
have.”788  Additionally, the four lines from the poem are again quoted, and cites from one of 
Baraka’s earlier poems as a “classic nugget from the 1960s,” quotes a line from it and ends the 
article with “Whee! That’s some good counterculture mind-ganja, hepcat.”789
Even in this final article on the controversy, the same strategies are apparent for reading 
poetry.  Poetry is again a reflection of the politics of the author in a direct relationship.  Also, 
meaning is clear of the poem from four lines.  Also, the strategy of condemning Baraka as a bad 
poet due to his inability to get the facts right is used at the same time as the strategy of reducing 
poetry to irrelevant or silly – or in this case, only something that old stoned hippies would enjoy.   
 
Overall, without a conspiracy, the media provided a homogenous and simplified account 
for “Somebody Blew Up America.”  The reader does not have to attend to the text of the poem in 
any way to understand the poem’s subject.  The media provides the four lines that are key, as 
well as analysis about the poem’s meaning from experts.  They paint Baraka’s politics as 
extreme and unacceptable.  They also relegate poetry and the poet laureate position, through the 
use of experts, as something inconsequential and trivial.  Overall, the media’s reporting on this 
controversy could not have turned out better if it had been organized from above as a conspiracy.   
The political content of poetry is again constrained, and Baraka, as responsible author, is 
disciplined and trivialized by the media. 
                                               
788 Ortega. 
789 Ortega. 
 409 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
 
On Amiri Baraka’s latest essay, posted on his website, he signs his name “NJ & Newark 
Schools’ Poet Laureate (the Legislature Lied!)”790
I have tried to show through this controversy, and hopefully through this entire work how 
the beats’ work can and should be seen as a rhetorical one. The elements of beat rhetoric in 
Baraka’s poem focus mostly on kairos, but also point out the limited nature of human beings to 
know. The policing of Baraka’s discourse into the extremely limited mode of “harmless poetry” 
indicates the presence of a perceived threat from society.  The beat rhetoric is one that questions, 
limits and forwards uncertainty as a mode of proper communication.  That is, the political, the 
personal, and the aesthetic are in flux in the Beat rhetoric. Using the limited, recalcitrant human 
body as a topos, and the non-linear associations of kairos, or the opportune and timely to make 
logical connections, as well as comic framing and perspective by incongruity serve to establish a 
  Baraka can continue to claim he is poet 
laureate of New Jersey, but for those reading the newspaper accounts of this controversy, that 
may not be easily done.  Seen as “resolved” by those who choose the stories and the headlines by 
the State’s elimination of the position, “Somebody Blew Up America” as a controversy is over 
and done with.  The media’s discourse served to eliminate the complexity of poetry as a site of 
contested meaning, reducing it either to a fact-based discourse, or the ramblings of someone who 
has reprehensible political views.  In the end, the discourse over this controversy serves to 
discipline and limit the power of poetry’s rhetoric through a journalistic rhetoric that limits, 
simplifies and reduces sites of meaning to the easily explainable.   
                                               
790 Amiri Baraka, Does Newark Want to Go Back to July 1967? (September 16, 2005 2004 [cited 
December 5, 2005]); available from http://www.amiribaraka.com/newark.html. 
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small outpost of alternative communicative practices.  Traditional positions of authority, as we 
saw in my analysis of “Howl” as well as On the Road, are generally upended, in a Stallybrass 
and White sense, for the purpose of providing space for what they saw as a more “authentic” 
form of consubstantiality between people. But in Baraka’s case, we see a stark example of how 
easily this type of revolutionary rhetoric can be interrupted by the more ‘centripetal’ forces that 
provide the official discourses of the society. 
  Foreclosure of potential meaning by the way journalists account for controversies over 
creative political texts such as Baraka’s limit political potential for artists and rhetors interested 
in social change.  “Somebody Blew Up America” as an explosive text was defused, contained, 
and disciplined by the rhetoric of the media.  The question as to “why” provides some hopeful 
perspective about the potential of the Beat rhetoric project.  For if it were not so threatening or 
should it contain no revolutionary elements, the drive to discipline and explain this discourse 
would not exist.  Amiri Baraka’s poem, invoking the Beat rhetorical principles of embodiment, 
as well as upending traditional positions of authorized speech, as well as invoking the kairotic 
over the chronic in presenting history, represented a threat to the stability of the discourses 
known as political rhetoric and poetry. The blurring of these distinctions is exactly what 
Baraka’s poem accomplishes, which has the undesirable (from the perspective of the status quo) 
effect of distributing the ability to critique the political to a creative discourse like poetry. This 
blurs the origin of the concept of ethos, and allows almost anyone to make credible claims as to 
the nature and scope of the politics of the society.   
The Beat rhetoric sought to re-arrange communicative and human relationships into 
something that the creators of it thought was more sustainable.  Baraka’s poem attempts to do 
this same thing around a site of national tragedy. In one sense we should celebrate that this sort 
 411 
of discourse can still elicit the power that its creators hoped it would have. In another, we should 
fear the disciplinary power of the authorized discourses.  The example of “Somebody Blew Up 
America” is one that indicates rhetoricians and rhetorical critics should pay more attention to 
poetic events in the public as they represent sites where normative discursive rules are enforced, 
re-enforced, and disciplined. 
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